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iThesis Abstract
Since the publication of Halliday (1988) a number of studies on the linguistic 
encoding of pain have appeared. These include Lascaratou (2003; 2007) on 
Greek, Hori (2006) on Japanese, Overlach (2008) on German. Using 
Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG), this thesis adds another language to 
the existing body of work on how physical pain gets encoded cross-
linguistically. The empirical work undertaken comprises the analysis of an 
original corpus of interviews with seven Italian speakers living with one of 
three chronic conditions: Systemic Lupus Erythematosus (SLE), Rheumatoid 
Arthritis (RA), and Spinal Disc Herniation (SDH). 
This thesis shows the multiple ways in which the lexicogrammar of Italian 
encodes bodily pain as THING, (nominally), HAPPENING (through verbs), 
and as QUALITY of something (adjectivally). The analysis shows that 
speakers in the corpus favour the first type of encoding and suggests why this 
might be the case.
From pain itself, the scope of the analysis broadens to include the lived 
experience of physical pain related to chronic illness by looking at the 
informants’ use of evaluative language. This is analysed by means of 
Appraisal Theory (Martin and Rose, 2003; Martin, 2005; Martin and White, 
2005), which identifies three attitudes encoded through the system of 
appraisal. These are: affect (the speaker’s feelings and emotive responses, 
appreciation (the evaluation of things and events), and judgement 
(evaluations of people’s behaviour). The analysis shows the most frequently 
encoded attitude is affect, with a tendency to favour indirect over direct 
encodings. It is suggested that this is because of a desire to avoid coming 
across as over emotional and therefore unreliable, a sentiment rooted in the 
informants’ experiences of having their symptoms and conditions doubted in 
the past, even in medical encounters.
A broad narrative analysis approach is then used to explore the types of 
identities that are constructed and presented by the informants. The notion of 
agency is used to critique the commonly-held view of chronic illness and pain 
as completely disempowering. The analysis shows that – within the same 
individual – feelings of powerlessness coexist, in a fluid state, with notions of 
heightened agency. My informants work towards preserving a pre-illness 
identity where contradictions and paradoxes are harmonised through 
language.
ii
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1Introduction
1 Origins of the present work
1985 saw the publication, by the American literary scholar Elaine Scarry, of 
‘The Body in Pain: the Making and Unmaking of the World’. The work has 
been very influential and has generated considerable debate. 
Essentially, it is a meditation on the vulnerability of the human body. Central to 
this vulnerability is the nature of bodily pain, its place among human 
experiences, its characteristics, and its effects on the individual experiencing it 
and, arguably, on society at large. 
Scarry argues that the power of bodily pain lies in the difficulty of encoding it 
linguistically. The difficult relationship between pain and language has a 
number of consequences, both personal (i.e. relevant to the individual) and 
political (i.e. relevant to society).
Although it certainly was not the first scholarly work to deal with the topic of 
pain and its relationship to language1, it can be confidently stated that it was 
instrumental in bringing the topic once again to the fore, as attested by the 
plethora of articles, monographs, and conferences discussing bodily pain that 
have since followed. Among this scholarly output, it is rare not to find 
references to Scarry’s work. Some critique it; others support it. All 
acknowledge the importance and topicality of the issues it raises. 
                                                            
1 See chapter one for other works dealing with the topic of pain, both preceding and following Scarry.
2This thesis can be situated among the works inspired by the publication of 
The Body in Pain and is without a doubt intellectually indebted to it. 
Specifically, it has its genesis in reflections prompted by one of the central 
themes of the book, regarding the already-mentioned relationship between 
bodily pain and human language. 
For the American scholar, at the heart of this relationship lies —
fundamentally — an impossibility. Her view is that bodily pain is antagonistic 
to language. Not only does the former resist the latter; it has the power to 
effectively annihilate it. Scarry’s position on the language-pain relationship is 
that language is rather ill-suited to capture the complexities of pain:
Physical pain does not simply resist language but actively destroys it, bringing 
about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sound 
and cries a human being makes before language is learned (p. 4).
My initial assumption, after reading Scarry’s position on the matter (of which, 
as mentioned, the quotation above is perhaps the strongest statement), was 
that although bodily pain did present particular challenges for language, it did 
not lie beyond its grasp. 
On this matter, I found myself in agreement with Natoli (2000). In his book on 
the experience of pain in western culture2, after discussing the manifold 
difficulties that sufferers encounter before they can give their experiences 
even some rudimentary linguistic form, he states: eppure del dolor si parla 
‘and yet one does talk about pain’.
                                                            
2 I shall discuss Natoli’s position in more detail in chapter one.
3In truth, as the discussion in chapter one will show, there is a certain 
ambiguity (not always picked up by her critics) in Scarry’s reasoning. A careful 
reading of her text (1985: pp. 3-23) reveals that – at least implicitly – she 
acknowledges the ability of language to re-emerge from the abyss where, in 
her view, pain has banished it. In many cases sufferers manage, somehow, to 
voice their pain, breaking the silence and going beyond the groans and grunts 
or, in the most severe cases, the screams that at times appear to be the only 
audible encodings of such experience: 
Physical pain has no voice; but when it at last finds a voice, it begins to tell a 
story (Scarry, 1985: 3; my emphasis).
Language then begins doing (again) what it is supposed to do: it construes 
and shapes experience; it objectifies and orders it; it expresses the self, builds 
rapports and sustains interactions. It partly overcomes pain by allowing the 
individual to affirm his or her existence and reify their experience. 
Telling of one’s pain and of the overall experience of illness helps the sufferer 
to regain coherence (Frank, 2002) and the act of finding the words orders 
what pain has rendered disordered. Language may not be a cure but it 
constitutes the first ‘tidying up’ exercise (Heshusius, 2009) from which healing 
(at least a partial one) may finally emerge.
Whether or not, once they have found a voice, sufferers also find a listening 
ear is quite another matter. As I will show, a recurrent theme in the interviews 
that I collected for this research is the frustration that sufferers often endure as 
a consequence of not being really listened to, let alone understood, 
especially, and sadly, in their encounters with the medical profession.
42 M.A.K Halliday’s study of the linguistic encoding of pain: relation to the 
present research
Not long after the publication of Scarry’s book, Halliday’s (1988) wrote a brief, 
yet seminal paper on the linguistic encoding of the experience of bodily pain3. 
In it, he analysed the linguistic encoding of physical pain thorough the 
lexicogrammar of English using a small corpus of doctor-patient exchanges 
(English was the language of the analysed encounters). Halliday’s paper is 
clearly situated within the theoretical framework of Systemic Functional 
Grammar (henceforth: SFG), which he developed. In spite of the significance 
of the study, one of its limitations (which I shall discuss in more details in 
chapters one and three) is the small size of the corpus he utilised and the fact 
that the conclusions he draws only relate to English. 
3 The ALOMAR Plus corpus
This thesis came into existence partly in response to Halliday’s invitation to 
further test his analytical paradigm with larger corpora and on languages other 
than English. 
In order to do this, I collected an original corpus of interviews with a group of 
native Italian speakers (six women and one man), each affected by one of 
three chronic conditions: Systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE), Rheumatoid 
arthritis (RA), and Spinal disc herniation (SDH). The ages of the participants 
when the interviews were collected ranged from the early thirties to the late 
                                                            
3 It has not been possible to establish whether Halliday had any knowledge of Scarry’s book, 
5sixties. Building an original corpus of interviews in Italian has allowed me to 
explore how the experience of bodily pain is encoded in a language other than 
English using Halliday’s theoretical framework (SFG). A more detailed 
discussion of Halliday’s paper is found in chapter one. 
Throughout this thesis, the corpus will be referred to as the “ALOMAR Plus 
corpus”. The name indicates that six out of the seven participants interviewed 
belonged to a support and advocacy group for people with rheumatic (or 
autoimmune) diseases called ALOMAR, whereas one of them — the only 
male interviewed — was not a member of the group, since his condition 
(SDH) is not an autoimmune disease. More about the composition of the 
corpus will be said in chapter two, where individual biographical sketches for 
each participant are to be found. More information about each of the 
aforementioned conditions is also to be found in chapter three.
4 Specific research questions
This thesis aims to answer the following research questions:
1. How does the lexicogrammar of Italian encode the experience of bodily 
pain?
2. What kind of evaluative language do the participants whose interviews 
are collected in the ALOMAR Plus corpus use to present their 
experience of being chronically ill and in pain?
3. What kinds of ‘selves’ and/or identities (in this thesis, I use the terms 
more or less interchangeably) do the participants create and present 
6through the language they use to describe their experiences of chronic 
illness and bodily pain?
5 Organisation of the thesis
Chapter 1 contains a literature review; its purpose is to outline the general 
intellectual background against which this research has been conducted and 
to situate it among existing literature on the topics of language, pain and 
chronic illness. The chapter is divided into two sections. Section one 
discusses contributions from various disciplines on the subjects of pain and 
language, often in relation to each other. The works discussed in this section 
have been included because they provide a useful background to the 
discussion on language and pain. In section two of the chapter, I shall present 
works which are more directly relevant to the arguments made in this thesis;
in most of them language is a central focus and this thesis is partly a response 
to them, partly a further development of arguments made in those works, and 
partly an attempt to fill perceived gaps in the debate.
Chapter 2 presents and justifies the methodology and theoretical orientations 
adopted in this thesis.
Chapter 3, which is the first analytical chapter, addresses question 1. In it, my 
findings are compared with those of Halliday (1988) and discussed. In 
addition, Halliday’s paper is discussed in more detail. This chapter also 
presents relevant aspect of SFG, the theoretical tool adopted by Halliday and 
7extended to the analysis of the ALOMAR Plus corpus presented in chapter 
three.
Question 2 is discussed in chapter 4, where Appraisal Theory (Martin and 
White, 2005) is presented and used to analyse the ways in which the 
experiences of bodily pain and chronic illness are evaluated by my informants. 
Furthermore, the chapter also addresses what other elements are evaluated 
in the interviews of the ALOMAR Plus corpus and in what way. The encoding 
of the participants feelings (affect) in relation to their experiences of chronic 
illness and attendant bodily pain is also addressed.
Adopting a broad narrative analytical approach, and building on the findings of 
the previous chapters, chapter 5 addresses question 3 and looks at the 
identities that the speakers in the corpus construct and present.
Chapter 6 brings together the various strands of the discussion found in the 
preceding chapters and discuss them. It identifies the original contributions of 
the present research and suggests some practical applications (and
implications) of the findings. This final chapter gives, based on the preceding 
analysis, an answer to the two questions: can one talk about pain? If so, how?
86 A note on the use of language in this thesis
A work on the experience of pain and illness (or any other topic, for that 
matter) that claims to be grounded in linguistics cannot ignore the fact that 
words mean in more than one way. 
From early work on denotation and connotation to more recent studies in 
fields such as sociology (Bourdieu, 1992) linguistics (Irigaray, 2002), Critical 
Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1995) and performativity (Butler, 1999)4, 
research has shown that language is never neutral. Terminologies and 
taxonomies carry a number of overt and covert meanings; they offer (often 
impose) interpretative keys which can be biased in a number of ways.
In the case of this thesis, the problem became apparent shortly after the 
writing up process had begun. How, for example, ought the individuals who 
took part in the research, giving their consent to being interviewed, be referred 
to? In sociolinguistic studies, such individuals are variously referred to as 
‘subjects’, ‘informants’, ‘participants’ or simply ‘speakers’. These commonly-
used labels offer advantages, such as the possibility of protecting people’s 
identities. With their anodyne, supposedly neutral sound/tone, they also 
contribute to claims of objectivity, scientific precision and detachment, 
something that the social-sciences appear to envy of the so-called ‘hard-
sciences’, such as biology, chemistry, and physics. As Halliday points out (in 
Webster, ed. 2003: 199), ‘those who study language have often been 
                                                            
4 Obviously, this is not meant to be a full list of works on language as a tool for ‘creating’ 
reality, rather than merely ‘reproducing’ it. It should also be noted that not all the 
mentioned scholars agree with each other’s views. 
9concerned with the status of linguistics as a science [...] us[ing] other, earlier 
developed sciences as a model.’
Such supposed detachment, however, comes at a cost: depersonalisation. 
One thing that became obvious during the research for this thesis was the 
intensely personal nature of the experiences collected. Pain may be invisible 
and intangible, but it is always experienced by an embodied individual: a 
woman or a man with a unique biological and psychological make-up, a 
unique history. Pain and illness are always embodied and, crucially, personal 
(Heshusius, 2009).
Other terms employed in the literature, especially discourse studies on 
medical language, or works from the medical humanities, include sufferer, and 
the obvious patient. They too are unsatisfactory. The former, sufferer, 
provides an interpretative key: the person as ‘victim’; the latter medicalises the 
individual, attributing a role that may be far from the truth, and this is true 
whether one concentrates on the etymological sense of the word or on the 
current meaning of ‘someone in the care of a medical institution or 
professional.’ Like the terms mentioned earlier, these too depersonalise the 
individual; in addition, they can be patronising and can perpetuate stereotypes 
often seen as demeaning and disempowering. 
The fact that words applied to certain groups of people or employed by certain 
communities of practice are at least problematic has been noted by linguists 
but the point has been made particularly forcefully by authors involved in 
social work (Thompson, 2001) and in disability advocacy (Morris, 1991). As 
Thompson (ibid p. 31) writes, ‘what is needed is not a simple list of proscribed 
10
words but, rather, an awareness of, and sensitivity to, the oppressive and 
discriminatory power of language.’ 
Therefore, in light of the above, choosing how to refer to the women and the 
one man who accepted to take part in my research has been challenging. I 
have opted for a mixed approach: in many cases, in what follows, I shall be 
referring to the individuals whose language is the topic of the present work by 
their first names (albeit changed, to protect anonymity). I shall also be using 
terms such as patient, informant, subject, speaker, and sufferer as more or 
less synonymous. This represents, in my view, a less than satisfactory choice 
and I am aware of the problems it entails.
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Chapter 1: Cultural background to this thesis and literature review
Introduction
As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the aims of this thesis is to fill a 
gap in the existing studies on the linguistic encoding of the experience of 
bodily pain. This absence, as noted, has been particularly visible in the field of 
linguistics. 
Although the situation began to change with Halliday (1988), as late as 2007 
Lascaratou (2007: 9) was still able to point out, correctly, how peculiar it was 
that, despite the central role of language in human pain behaviour, ‘pain has 
not been the object of comprehensive study within and across languages.’ 
Since then, more attention has been devoted to this area and more scholars 
have been working on these topics, albeit from different perspectives. More 
linguists are responding to Halliday’s invitation to investigate the language of 
pain with larger corpora and cross-linguistically. 
The debate initiated by Scarry (1985) on the pain-language nexus has 
resulted in increased interest from a number of academic quarters. Such 
works are not immediately relevant for this thesis, its scope, structure, and 
theoretical orientation. Nonetheless, it is felt that, to varying degrees, they 
deserve mentioning. Beginning with The Body in Pain, this large body of work 
forms the cultural and intellectual background upon which the present 
research rests and with which, in a way, it has entered into a dialogue. A 
selection of this ‘background literature’ will occupy section 1 of this chapter. 
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The works included have been chosen to illustrate the variety of scholarly 
approaches they represent. Furthermore, many of the topics they address, 
such as the life-altering nature of illness and pain, illustrate and shed light 
upon points made by my own informants and that I address in chapters 3-5. 
Attention to these points will be made where necessary, in section 1 of this 
chapter.
A further reason for presenting and discussing a selection of this vast body of 
literature is to highlight that no research originates in a vacuum. As well as 
being the latest instalment in a dialogue within a particular discipline — be it 
sociolinguistics, DA, or any other — it responds and is intellectually indebted 
to a much wider discussion.
Section 2 will be devoted to presenting and assessing studies that deal with 
the topic and that are immediately relevant for the present research, with 
reasons given for their selection. The same section will also introduce and 
justify the choice of analytical frameworks to be employed as analytical tools 
in the present research.
Unlike for bodily pain, the role of language in medicine has been the focus of 
considerable attention. The medical encounter, for example, has proven a 
fertile area of investigation for discourse analysis (DA) and critical discourse 
analysis (CDA). The so-called ‘narrative turn’ (Riessman, 2008) in the social 
sciences has been fruitfully applied to the investigation of various aspects of 
the illness-experience and the relatively recent burgeoning of what are now 
collectively known as (auto)pathographies. Studies in this area can be 
considered to be part a developing field of research: ‘health communication’. 
13
Harvey and Adolphs (20015) provide a broad definition of what health 
communication studies include. The present study would sit comfortably within 
this field:
Health communication, by definition, refers to all aspects and modes of 
communication that take place within medical contexts or broadly relate to the 
subject of health and illness. Accordingly health communication is an all-
embracing term that takes into account a huge and diverse range of 
communicative activities touching on health and healthcare, ranging from 
personal accounts of health and illness and encounters with medical 
professional, through to health policy documentation and side effects 
information presented on drug packaging.
Because pain is mainly experienced and investigated as part of the wider 
experience of illness (and the present study is no exception), a number of 
such studies will also be presented and discussed in section 2 of this chapter, 
especially for their relevance to the latter portion of the thesis.
1.1 The cultural background: the broader tradition of reflections on pain and 
language in non-linguistic literature
a) Philosophical reflections on pain and its experience
‘[T]he useless, unjust, incomprehensible, inept abomination that is physical 
pain.’ These are the words of the French writer Huysmans (1959: 2). The 
                                                            
5 I have been kindly allowed to see the typescript in pre-publication form; I am therefore unable to 
provide an exact page reference.
14
same sentence, however, might have been spoken or written by nearly 
anyone who has ever had to personally endure physical pain, or watch 
someone they love endure it. Since time immemorial, human beings have 
been reflecting on the nature of pain, as well as on wondering about the 
reasons for its very existence. Often, like Huysman, they have concluded that 
it has no reasons and ultimately remains a puzzle.
It is perhaps because of its enigmatic nature that pain, in its various 
permutations, has been the object of much philosophical interest over the 
centuries. A full discussion of what philosophy has had to say about it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, there is one aspect of the pain 
experience that philosophers have investigated and which is immediately 
relevant to the present study: the communicability of pain. 
As pointed out in the previous section, the impetus for the present research 
arose out of being confronted with precisely one such claim, namely, Scarry’s 
(1985) argument about pain’s essential unsharability, which — she argues —
is ensured through pain’s ‘resistance to language’ (p. 4).
Scarry partly bases this assertion on a view derived from our everyday life, 
namely, the difficulty encountered by anyone experiencing pain of accurately 
describing it. This situation is directly relevant for health communication. In 
both patients and medical professionals, it is often the source of considerable 
frustration. For the patient, not being able to accurately encode the precise 
nature of a noxious stimulus (its intensity, the type(s) of sensation(s) it 
engenders, its exact location, and so on) is, from a pragmatics point of view, 
face threatening. 
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As many of the participants who were interviewed for this thesis testify (see 
chapters four and five), this difficulty often results in being considered a less 
than reliable witness of one’s own experience. In the worst cases, patients 
can, in a more or less veiled manner, be accused of exaggerating symptoms, 
even of inventing them. On the other hand, patients’ difficulty in articulating 
their own pain may mean that medical professionals are unable to quickly 
formulate a diagnosis and prescribe the appropriate treatment.
This difficulty in communicating pain is often the source of frustration outside, 
as well as inside, the consultation room. This is again attested by some of the 
Alomar Plus informants and again can be face threatening. 
In the broad sense given by Harvey and Adolphs (2011), health 
communication can include all those encounters with non-medical 
professionals — such as spouses, other family members, and friends —
where health (and pain) matters are discussed. Friends and relatives are 
obviously not expected to provide a diagnosis, yet their support can be crucial 
for the well-being of someone suffering because of their health. Solidarity is 
established linguistically and it is therefore extremely frustrating when an 
individual is not able to encode and communicate his or her experience.
Natoli (2002) offers a comprehensive overview of the meanings given to the 
experience of physical pain in western culture. His work reflects, among other 
things, on the challenges that pain inflicts upon language and the relationship 
between the former and the latter. 
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In common with other scholars (Good, 1994; Scarry, 1985; Morris, 1991, inter 
alia), Natoli argues that the experience of pain has a transformative power: 
when it does not destroy it, it alters and heightens perception. For the Italian 
philosopher, pain is not only a personal experience, but also a ‘cosmic event’ 
which potentially concerns everyone. It is precisely in this intertwining of the 
personal with the universal that, for Natoli, resides the possibility of the 
transformation of the experience of pain into language. Pain, Natoli goes on to 
say, belongs exclusively to the one who is suffering; and yet, witnessing any 
suffering abruptly brings onto the scene the possibility of your own suffering: 
Hence the plot, the feeling that everyone is concerned […]. The experienced 
pain becomes universal in the image of the possible pain’ (p. 11) 
This dialectic tension brings about the ‘rebirth of language’. In spite of the 
difficulties, the one in pain ‘breaks the wall of silence that separates him from 
the rest, looks for words, and perhaps even finds them’ (p. 10). Whether 
spoken or unspoken, the experience of pain positions the one in pain within 
what I would term a ‘community of sufferers’. Perhaps paradoxically, pain both 
isolates and brings together. 
Natoli’s argument that the ‘cosmic nature of pain’ is a force that leads to 
language-generation is certainly interesting and, in my view, it can be used to 
counterbalance Scarry’s (1985) argument that pain is ‘language-destroying’, 
as discussed in the introduction. Pain does, however, impose particular 
constraints on the manner in which it is communicated.
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It is this very same possibility of seeing one’s own possible suffering in 
somebody else’s pain (whether linguistically encoded or left unspoken) that 
can account for the difficulty of transforming one’s pain into language. The 
one in pain is acutely aware of the fear, even horror, that his or her suffering 
can engender. Often, for people who suffer from an illness (chronic or acute) 
there is an absence of what Ramanathan (2010; 2011) calls ‘languaging’, the 
transformation of the experience into language, which results in invisibility. It 
is precisely this ‘languaging’ (in its various aspects) that, broadly speaking, 
this thesis is concerned with.
The perceived lack of language about pain, meaning not only the absence or 
paucity of lexical items (i.e. pain-descriptors) but also the scarcity of literary 
works on pain as opposed, for example, to romantic love, may be accounted 
for pragmatically. 
From a politeness-theory point of view (Brown and Levinson, 1987), those in 
pain who do not or cannot communicate their pain might be seen as 
addressing their interlocutors’ negative face, the desire not to be imposed 
upon. In addition, sufferers might have convinced themselves of the futility 
(from a therapeutic point of view, but not exclusively) of communicating their 
suffering to somebody who does not share in the experience. 
It is common for human beings to refuse to even contemplate the idea of 
pain. There is, in other words, a ‘cultural aversion’ to pain; the mention of it, 
even as a mere object of study, is often enough to cause unease and 
discomfort. Pain, whether experienced or even simply studied can separate 
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and isolate. It is therefore unsurprising that, unlike romantic love, bodily pain 
is hard to find in literature (at least in the West). It is not that those in pain do 
not have the words to tell about their experiences; rather, they often do not 
see the point in talking about it. This may be for a number of reasons, loss of 
hope in a solution being only one of them. 
It is true, however, that, as Bending (2000: 82) states, ‘[i]t has become a 
commonplace that pain defies language [...] that it is unique as a sensation 
and that [it] cannot be described or shared.’ With reference to Woolf’s (1926) 
often quoted passage on the failure of literature to offer ‘the merest schoolgirl’ 
words to ‘describe a pain in [her] head to a doctor’ (vol. iv, p. 318), Bending 
(ibid p. 84) opines, with reason, that it is usually misquoted (for example by 
Scarry, 1985). When the passage is read in context, it becomes clear that 
what Woolf actually means is that, considering the ubiquity of both pain and 
illness, it is surprising that “they have not become the subjects of literature, 
superseding love, battle, and jealousy as ‘the prime subjects of literature’” (p. 
84). Thus it is the aforementioned human fear of pain, its aversive nature, 
rather than a supposed inability of being encoded by linguistic means that 
explains such paucity. Bending sheds light on Woolf’s position by pointing out 
that, for the English author, the main barriers to writing (and, I would add,
talking) about pain involve elements such as ‘taste, decorum, and fear’ (p. 84). 
Especially in a culture like ours, with its relentless emphasis on youth, 
efficiency, and the body beautiful, talk of pain is considered, often by those in 
pain themselves, to be out of place. And for the healthy, hearing about pain is 
unpleasant because, as Natoli (2002) points out, hearing about someone 
else’s pain reminds us of the possibility of our own possible suffering. It seems 
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therefore unsurprising that in literature, just like in everyday speech, pain 
should be the eminent absentee. 
Pain is centripetal. It looks – and forces the sufferer – to look inwards. Love, 
joy, and physical pleasure (jouissance), are potentially just as hard to 
linguistically encode. However, they are ‘centrifugal’: they project outwardly, 
like a liquid from a container which is full to the brim. Herein resides the main 
difference between the experience of physical pain and that of other 
sensations. As Natoli (ibid pp. 9-10) argues: ‘Love, which is demonstrative, 
cannot be told, but it generates signs and words. Pain — on the other hand —
in all the signs it gives off reproduces itself as the ultimate enigma.’
A crucial point in Bending’s argument, and one that I and other linguists (see 
below) share entirely and that I hope this thesis will contribute to support, is 
that the flaw in the argument of those who argue for the fundamental 
uncommunicability of the experience of pain is a failure to realise that ‘pain 
can enter into language and be accommodated by its structures – whether 
descriptive or metaphorical – in the face of a paucity of directly expressive 
words for painful sensations’ (Bending, 2000: 82). Pain is complex and so is 
the language that speakers employ to talk about it, as chapters 3-5 of this 
thesis will demonstrate. The number of directly descriptive words to refer to 
one’s pain are probably few, and this explains why the person in pain:
[F]aced with the absence of appropriate language, is compelled to move 
outwards from the direct description of pain itself into a metaphorical and 
explanatory realm in which pain is fitted into another and distinct framework of 
reference (Bending, 2002: 85).
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Figurative language (similes and metaphors) is not, as Scarry (1985) appears 
to suggest, proof of the inability of language to encode the experience of pain, 
and thus of the latter’s ineffability. On the contrary, as the data in the present 
study will help to demonstrate, figurative language is testimony to the 
resourcefulness of human linguistic systems. 
In addition, as both section 2 of this chapter and chapter three will show (both 
following Halliday, 1988), the complexities of an experiential domain such as 
that of bodily pain are dealt with not only at the level of the lexicon but also, 
crucially, at the level of the grammar, through the system of ‘transitivity’.
b) The view from history
A point that I shall make repeatedly throughout this thesis is that pain is both 
socially and historically situated. As such, it takes on meaning(s) from its 
socio-historical surroundings. 
As Melzack and Wall (1996) show, the very perception of painful phenomena 
is to a large extent influenced by the cultural meanings assigned to them; in 
this respect, for example, religion is a particularly powerful interpretative tool.
A number of researchers have looked at pain from a historical perspective. 
Like philosophers, historians appear to have given the issue of pain more 
thought than have, until recently, linguists. Their findings, although not 
primarily preoccupied with the linguistic encoding of the experience of physical 
pain, have a bearing on any meaningful study of any aspect of the pain 
experience. It is beyond the scope of this review, and of this thesis, to provide 
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a full account of historical research on pain. However, the insights of historical 
research presented here have influenced, to varying degrees, the thinking 
behind this thesis and have helped to focus the questions asked.
Rey (1993) draws on different sources to present the universally shared 
experience of physical pain, from antiquity to the present. The French scholar 
stresses the importance of cultural and social factors in the experience of 
pain. She makes the important observation that the meanings attributed to 
pain influence the way it is perceived and lived. This point, as mentioned, has 
been made by other authors (e.g. Melzack and Wall, op cit), working from 
different perspectives. 
Like others after her (see below), Rey argues that the often-made distinction 
between physical and psychological pain is often blurred, and perhaps 
ultimately meaningless. She then notes that often a distinction is made 
between pain, which is understood to be physical, and suffering, which is seen 
as moral. However, she points out that there is a further distinction that can 
superimposed on the first:
[T]he word suffering seems more to refer to the subject while pain seems 
more to apply to the objectification of this suffering, which legal parlance 
translates perfectly when it evaluates the “pretium doloris” [the price of pain]. 
When a doctor questions a patient, he is more likely to ask, “Where does it 
hurt?” or “Are you suffering?” or even “What seems to be the trouble?” rather 
than to ask him directly what type of pain he feels; however, he transcribes in 
his patient’s file “abdominal pain” or “lower back pain” (1993: 3).
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This simple observation highlights the conceptual and terminological 
confusion surrounding the experience of pain. Rey also stresses that when 
pain is ‘intense and persistent or simply chronic [as is the case for the 
speakers in the ALOMAR Plus corpus] it always involves the entire being. [… 
The person’s] entire personality becomes doleful and his intellect becomes 
dulled’ (p. 3; my emphasis). This complexity of the pain experience is bound 
to find linguistic realisation; for example through the grammar, a point which, 
as noted, has been made by Halliday (1988; Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004).
Rey’s study is broad in scope and deals with the scientific theories of pain as 
well as the various remedies for pain in history. Interestingly for the present 
study, however, it also addresses – to an extent – the relationship between 
pain and language. Obviously, the possibility of analysing transcripts of 
encounters such as medical consultations is only a recent development. By 
necessity, Rey relies on literary works, such as the Homeric texts (the Iliad 
and the Odyssey), the works of the tragedians, like Sophocles (Philoctetes 
[also discussed by Scarry, 1985] and Trachiniœ). And although not a literary 
work, Rey comments on the linguistic encoding of pain in one of the most 
important medical works (or, to be precise, collection of works) in the entire 
western tradition: the Corpus Hippocraticum. 
The aforementioned works offer relevant insights on the lexical encoding of 
pain, its perception and psychological aspects. For example, in Sophocles 
‘[p]ain is perceived almost as an independent being which takes possession of 
the subject, invades it and takes over’ (Rey, 1993: 15). 
These construals of pain persist through time: pain as the Other, the “it” that 
invades and takes over has been observed in modern medical encounters 
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(see Cassel, below; I shall discuss the encoding of pain as an ‘entity’ that 
displays agency in chapter three). From a cognitive point of view, the 
diachronic and cross-cultural persistence of this way of linguistically reifying 
pain is a striking phenomenon, pointing, it appears, to a cognitive universal. 
As the present research will show, this is an understanding of pain that 
persists to this day. 
c) Anthropological perspectives
The understanding of the experience of pain, and its construal through 
language, has provided anthropologists with fertile ground for research. 
Jackson (2000: 144) states that ‘pain is a concept, not a thing’. As such, it is 
culturally interpreted and historically situated. Culture and history both have 
personal and wider, societal dimensions. It is therefore unsurprising that pain 
(as well as, more generally, illness) should be interesting as objects of 
research for anthropologists of various theoretical persuasions and working 
within different sub-fields. Obviously, medical anthropologists figure 
prominently in research on pain, illness, and their relationship with language. 
Morris (1991), not an anthropologist but, like Scarry, a literary scholar, argues 
that pain, in a way, is a cultural artefact. ‘[T]he experience of pain is decisively 
shaped or modified by individual human minds and by specific human 
cultures’ (p. 1). Pain, he argues, is situated and constructed historically, 
culturally and psychosocially. 
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With references to (among other things) art, history, and literature, he 
convincingly argues for a multidisciplinary approach to the study of pain and 
one which makes use of different perspectives. If, as Morris puts it, ‘pain is 
always personal and always cultural’ (p. 25), then it is imperative that we 
approach its manifestations, such as the linguistic ones, from a variety of 
points of view. Any study of pain and its language is, perforce, a study in 
subjectivity if, as Morris opines: 
[t]he pain we feel […] always belongs to a particular place and time and 
person. It may be trivial or negligible (if we choose to interpret it so) but is 
never simply an impersonal code of neural impulses, like changeless, 
computer-generated messages sent over an internal telephone (p. 29).
Like Jackson, Morris (ibid pp. 9-12) argues against the sharp dichotomy 
physical pain – mental pain. He refers to it as ‘a myth’ (p. 9) which ‘like all 
myths – no doubt depends on the serviceable truth it brings into a murky 
world’ (p. 9). Indeed, one of Morris’s stated aims is ‘to begin to collapse the 
artificial division we create in accepting a belief that human pain is split by a 
chasm into uncommunicating categories called physical and mental’ (p. 9). 
Language is instrumental in perpetuating this myth but also crucial in 
‘dismantling’ it. 
As I shall argue in chapter four, attention to the language of evaluation can 
begin to show the mental and emotional dimensions of chronic pain. Morris’s 
argument against a sharp distinction, based in a Cartesian world-view, 
between mental and bodily pain is — as stated — shared by other scholars. 
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The present research too is intended to problematize such a view. However, 
as Davies (2010) cautions, it is important to acknowledge that although the 
commonalities and interfaces between so-called mental and bodily pain may 
be numerous, the fact that speakers so consistently differentiate between the 
two indicates that there are ways in which these two modes of suffering are 
essentially distinct.
Del Vecchio Good, Brodwin, Good, and Kleinman (1992) combined their 
efforts and points of view to produce a collection of papers on pain and illness 
from the perspective of anthropology (medical and ‘general’). Their work is 
particularly important in highlighting the connections between pain, its 
understanding and interpretation, and culture. They note that pain is present 
across time and in every culture. As such, it is the focus of attention in various 
traditions of medical literature: Islam, India, China, and the West. Del Vecchio 
et al. (ibid) point out that the relationship between pain and culture is essential 
because the latter provides the one in pain different ‘categories, idioms, and 
modes of experience’ (p. 1) to experience, interpret, and – crucially for the 
present study – speak of the former. This is apparent, for example, in some of 
the metaphors that speakers in the ALOMAR Plus corpus employ, that will be 
addressed in chapter four.
For example, among the Sakhalin Ainu of Japan, one often hears complaints 
about ‘bear headaches’ that ‘sound’ like the heavy steps of a bear; or of ‘deer 
headaches’ that sound and feel like the considerably lighter steps of a deer, 
whilst a ‘woodpecker headache’ feels like a woodpecker pounding into a 
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trunk. Latinos in North America make a distinction between a dolor de cabeza 
(headache) and dolor de cerebro (brainache), presumably a deeper, more 
intense experience. Such cultural differences can at times be striking. Del 
Vecchio et al. (ibid) point out that Nigerians complain about a range of 
different types of pain using language that in North America “would be 
considered potential indicator […] of psychoses [such as]: ‘it seems as if 
pepper were put into my head,’ ‘things like ants keep on creeping in various 
parts of my brain,’ or ‘by merely touching parts of my brain it hurts’” (p. 2).
Del Vecchio et al. (ibid) explain that the interest of chronic pain for 
anthropologists is tripartite. First, the anthropological study of chronic pain 
‘exposes basic contradictions of medical ideology’ (p. 7). For example, 
ostensibly the medical profession has the reduction of suffering as one of its 
stated aims. However, anthropological research of the experience of pain 
highlights how a lack of understanding of the psychological and cultural 
aspects of the true significance of pain for a patient results in a number of 
negative outcomes: over or underprescription of drugs, and the inability of the 
patient to fully participate in the economic life of the community are just some 
of them.
Secondly, chronic pain translates into a number of social problems, like its 
socio-political effects. Patients often complain that medical professionals, 
even pain specialists, often appear to be insensitive to their suffering and 
needs. They concentrate on the biomedical side of pain at the expense of 
what might be termed the social and cultural model of it. Understandably, it is 
often the case that medical professionals only pay attention to a patient’s 
linguistic output in order to ascertain the intensity of pain and its source. This 
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is not wrong. However, the totality of the language used by a patient to 
describe her experience is revealing of the true effects of pain on the 
individual and those around him or her. Furthermore, attention to and an 
understanding of the cultural models used by patients and available to them 
could potentially help the practitioner to assist the patient in the fight against 
pain with means that complement drug therapy. 
Thirdly, the study of chronic pain allows anthropologists to explore issues of 
embodied experience. Such study has both theoretical resonance and 
practical relevance for the study of pain, especially of the chronic type.
Anthropologists concerned with the anthropology of everyday experience and 
the embodiment of cultural categories of distress are drawn to pain in order to 
understand how the bodily experience itself is influenced by meanings, 
relationships, and institutions (Del Vecchio et al.1992: 7).
The work of these authors has added very valuable insights to the study of the 
experience of pain. For the linguist looking at language and pain, one of their 
observations is particularly relevant:
[H]uman conditions such as pain are not adequately appreciated if the 
analysis begins and ends with the exploration of linguistic terms and cultural 
taxonomies (ibid p. 7). 
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In other words, pain and its manifestation, linguistic and otherwise, do not 
occur in a vacuum.
More recently, Jackson (1994, 2000, 2003, 2005) has written extensively 
about the experience of pain, in particular chronic pain, and the challenges of 
encoding and communicating it. Writing as an anthropologist, she is 
particularly interested in the relationship between culture and the experience 
of pain, especially in how it is communicated and ‘translated’ both inter and 
intra-culturally. 
Like other researchers (see above), Jackson comments on the difficulty of 
communicating pain. Interestingly (and crucially), she also highlights the fact 
that part of the difficulty of communicating pain is caused by the ways in which 
such communication is received (or not received, by being ignored or 
underestimated, for example). Like all communication, pain-communication is 
(at least) a two-way process; it must be encoded but also decoded correctly. 
‘[A] sufferer grappling with enormous amounts of pain will find that the more 
she communicates her pain, the greater the risk of its being seen as 
illegitimate’ Jackson, 2003: 174). That sufferers often encounter disbelief 
regarding their experiences, and frequently see their pain ‘delegitimised’ in 
both medical and non-medical encounters, became apparent while collecting 
the interviews on which this thesis is based. 
Across cultures, one of the most important interpretative constructs that 
humans have at their disposal to come to terms with various aspects of their 
29
lived experiences is religion. As the present studies reveals, language that 
draws on specific religious traditions is often employed to communicate the 
emotional aspects of, among other things, the experience of pain.
Glucklich (2001), partly historical investigation and partly anthropological 
enquiry, is a study of the religious meanings attributed to physical pain. One of 
the common assumptions, when talking about physical pain, is that it is 
always evaluated negatively, especially by the person experiencing it. One 
might mention the complex phenomenon of masochism; however, this is 
considered, by the general public and by psychiatry (Hales and Yudofsky,
2003) as pathological, and often related to the sphere of sexuality. By 
exploring various religious narratives, Glucklich shows how the experience of 
pain can, and indeed is, evaluated positively in some situations. Pain, he 
argues, ‘can make self-transcending realities accessible and vivid’ (p. 207). 
Unsettling as this may be, it alerts us to the fact that it is not sufficient to look 
at the lexicon of pain. According to context, one can, and indeed does, 
encounter entirely contrasting discourses of pain, where by discourse I mean 
‘stretches of language as short as a conversational exchange or as long as 
the literature of an academic discipline [or a religious community]’ (Barton, 
2001: 169). 
It would be interesting, in such cases, to see – for example – what metaphors 
are employed, what lexical choices are made. It would also be useful to 
systematically investigate (as I will do in chapter four of the present thesis, for 
the ALOMAR Plus corpus) how people and communities where pain has the 
kind of functions discussed by Glucklich use the resource of appraisal. As I 
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will discuss, although in the ALOMAR Plus corpus speakers conform to the 
expectation that pain will receive negative evaluations, even more so do the 
various therapies they are prescribed. And in some instances, the disease 
itself is evaluated positively, at least after its onset, for the possibility it allows 
the person to fashion a different, preferred self.
Cohen (2010) looks at depictions and descriptions of pain in the late Middle 
Ages. The body of texts she looks at is wide-ranging; it comprises martyrdom 
narratives, descriptions of torture, and of surgery. Like the works mentioned 
above, her research too looks at the ways pain was understood, through 
cultural references, by a historically situated society – the mediaeval - and the 
mediaeval mind. Like the other scholars mentioned here, Cohen 
contextualises pain. She points out that, if one looks carefully enough, even in 
temporally remote cultures one can find numerous example of language of 
and about pain. Importantly, Cohen observes that the language of and about 
pain (its discourses, lexicons, metaphors) are – to a large extent – culturally 
shaped, if not culturally imposed. The meanings attributed to physical pain are 
bound to be reflected in the language used to speak it (in the sense of giving 
voice to it) and the language to speak (or write, of course) of it. 
For example, in the mediaeval period, self-inflicted pain as a form of penitence 
and to purify oneself from sin was not uncommon. As Cohen observes, ‘[i]t 
was deeply tied to the most basic narrative of Christianity: the Crucifixion’ (p. 
28). Although pain thus obtained would still provoke an aversive reaction (i.e. 
it could still be clearly identified as an unpleasant, noxious stimulus), its 
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interpretation, deriving from its redemptive function, could be, overall, 
evaluated positively. 
The same is true of illness and the pain it causes. Cohen points out that 
‘[p]ractically all late medieval religious texts dealing with pain counted it as a 
blessing, not a danger. […] [O]ne could build one’s hopes, fears, and 
understanding of life upon the irregular and abnormal that often become a 
regular part of life – illness and pain’ (p. 32). St. Augustine, one of the most 
influential mediaeval thinkers, said about bodily pain that it is useful (‘utilis 
dolor est’) ‘because it indicates life. It is better to have a painful wound than an 
insensitive gangrene, for the latter indicated the death of the affected organ’ 
(p 32). As far as illness was concerned, it could indeed signify a punishment 
from God, but more often than not it was considered to be a sign of his favour.
Cohen (ibid pp. 147-167) makes the obvious but important observation that 
pain, which is not transmissible (through contagion, for example) and not 
visible (although pain-behaviour can be) relies on language to be noticed and 
observed. ‘A stable vocabulary of pain was the principal requirement for any 
sort of functional discussion on pain’ (p. 150). To describe pain, physicians 
borrowed lexical items from other sensory fields, for example smell and taste. 
To describe the quality of pain, descriptors could be described as piercing, a 
knife, or throbbing. ‘Such semantic transitions had become so common that 
one had no need ever to think about the original usage of the terms’ (p. 147). 
Indeed these terms are still in use today. Cohen also makes interesting 
observations about the relative stability of the vocabulary of pain (which, in her 
usage, also includes figurative language: metaphor and simile). She argues 
that ‘the conservatism of pain vocabulary lies in its functions’ (p. 150). Patient 
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and physician had to be fairly confident that the lexicon and figures of speech 
they used would be easily, accurately, and quickly understood. Within 
‘communities of practice’, meanings had to remain stable to allow 
understanding and facilitate diagnosis and treatment. Cohen opines that 
‘[w]hen it came to the description of symptoms, it made little sense for 
physicians to pioneer a new vocabulary or be creative with the literary forms 
of language’ (p. 150). The paucity of the lexicon of pain, the recurrence of the 
same metaphors – as commented upon by, among others, Scarry (1985) –
might therefore be a function of the imperative to guarantee prompt 
understanding. It might be, in other words, a point of strength, rather than a 
weakness.
To return to the general discussion, obviously our mindset and that of the 
speakers in the ALOMAR Plus corpus is far removed from that of the late 
mediaeval man or woman. However, it is interesting to note, as I do especially 
in chapter four, that even for the 21st century speakers of this corpus, the 
language used to talk about the overall experience of chronic illness and its 
attending pain (e.g. illness and pain as a limitation vs. illness and pain as an 
opportunity) is influenced, even shaped, by the interpretative frameworks they 
choose to adopt.
In recent times, studies of the linguistic expression of pain within specific 
linguistic communities have begun to appear. Koffman, Morgan, and 
Higginson (2008) interviewed Black Caribbean and White British patients 
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suffering from cancer-related pain. The research shows similarities but also 
interesting, culture-related differences. Pain is central in the experience of 
both ethnic groups and both groups characterise it as unpleasant, a 
challenge, and an enemy. However, more Black Caribbeans than white British 
consider their pain as either a test of their faith or a punishment from God. 
This, the researchers claim, reflects Black Caribbeans’ strong faith. Neither 
group refuses analgesic treatment; however, in findings that echo Glucklich 
(2001), for the West Indian patients, pain provides redemptive qualities and 
offers the means of getting closer to God. Interestingly, ‘instead of being 
perceived as maladaptive or negative, justified punishments were perceived 
by Black Caribbean patients as being a positive and an active response to 
their illness that strengthened character’ (p. 356).
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1.2 The language of Health Communication: Literature review of studies of 
direct relevance for this thesis
As previously stated, this thesis can be considered as a contribution to the 
study of health communication, as defined by Harvey and Adolphs (2011). In 
particular, it offers a contribution to one aspect of health communication, 
namely, communication about bodily pain within the experience of chronic 
illness. 
The purpose of this section (2) is to present and critically evaluate the existing 
literature on those aspects of health communication that are the most relevant 
for the present research. Doing so will clarify how this research sits within this 
expanding field of enquiry and will point out what original contribution it 
makes. 
Unlike the majority of works the works mentioned and discussed in section 1 
of this chapter, the ones addressed here all specifically, and primarily, 
concern themselves with linguistic aspects of health communication (as 
opposed to historical, philosophical, and so on). However, it will be noticed 
that they originate not only from different sub-fields of linguistic enquiry but 
also from other disciplines, such as medicine. The reason for their inclusion, 
however, is simple: they have the linguistic datum at their centre, albeit 
different aspects of it.
1.2.1 The medical tradition
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For understandable reasons, the medical profession has always been aware 
of the intimate relationship between language and the experiences of illness 
and pain; of the limitations of the former and the peculiar challenges of the 
latter. 
For example, countless doctor-patient encounters contain the question: “What 
does your pain feel like?” or variations thereof. All such encounters are bound 
to alert both patient and practitioner to the difficulty of appropriately encoding 
this most common and yet most unique of human experiences. It is therefore 
unsurprising that some of the earliest studies on the dyad pain-language 
should have originated from within the medical field, and with very practical 
aims.
Melzack and Wall (1982; 1988; 1996) - the former a psychologist, the latter a 
physiologist – have paid considerable attention to ‘the puzzle of pain’ and to 
its complex relationship with language. In what is now considered a classic 
work, they comment on the difficulty of ‘expressing [the] pain experience6’ (p. 
36). In common with lay views of language (i.e. from non-linguists), that 
mainly identify language with lexical items, they concentrate on single words 
that express, or fail to express, as the case may be, what patients might be 
feeling when they say they are in pain.
                                                            
6 All quotations from Melzack and Wall are from Melzack and Wall, 1996.
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The reason for [the] difficulty in expressing pain experience […] is not because 
the words do not exist. There is an abundance of appropriate words, but they 
are not words which we use often. There is another reason: the words may 
seem absurd. We may use descriptors such as splitting, shooting, gnawing, 
wrenching or stinging, but there are no ‘outside’, objective references for these 
words (Melzack and Wall, ibid. p. 37).
It is clear from this quotation that Melzack and Wall are aware of the specific 
cognitive and philosophical problems that the encoding of the experience of 
physical pain entails. Like Scarry (1985) they identify the absence of an 
external referent for pain as one the main obstacles to its linguistic encoding.
Physical pain happens, quite literally, ‘under the skin’. Even when it produces 
‘pain behaviour’, it remains invisible and, as Scarry (1985) points out, its very 
existence can, and very often is, doubted.
This view is not without merit; pain does indeed reside within the body. In 
those instances where no damage to bodily tissue is visible to the onlooker 
and where no visible pain-causing agent can be discerned, to accurately 
communicate one’s pain can indeed prove challenging. However, as pointed 
out by Bending (2000), amongst human experience bodily pain is not unique 
in lacking a visible external referent. So is sexual jouissance; and so is love, in 
its broadest sense, when the object of affection is, or has been, visible to no 
other than the lover. To this can be added, as previously mentioned, that as 
Bending (2000) has pointed out, rather than the lack of a visible, external 
referent, what makes pain-communication problematic is the difficulty ought to 
be discerned in existing cultural norms dictating what subject matters are 
more or less ‘legitimate’ and acceptable as topics of communication. Across 
37
many cultures, there is a certain resistance to talking about one’s pain. This in 
turns adds to the difficulty people have in verbalising the experience. 
Language acquisition is not only about mastering grammar, it is also about 
learning how to talk about specific topics. Crucially, it is also about learning 
about what can be talked about. However, in fairness to Melzack and Wall 
(1996) it must be said that, although they do not state it in such terms, they 
recognise that, in trying to communicate pain, what the sufferer is often faced 
with is what, echoing Hymes (2000), might be termed a deficit in 
‘communicative competence’ when it comes to pain.
Melzack and Wall’s research is relevant because many of their observations 
are derived from direct experience with patients and by careful analysis of 
pain-related talk. Careful attention to this material was instrumental in the 
development of the famous, and now widely-used, McGill Pain Questionnaire. 
The questionnaire, now available in many languages, contains a list of ‘pain 
descriptors’. These are lexical items that are read to patients; the patients are 
then asked to ‘choose only those words which describe [their] feelings and 
sensations at the moment’ (Melzack and Wall, 1996: 39). The pain descriptors 
used were selected according to the frequency with which they appeared in 
previously collected interviews with a number of patients. They include: 
flickering, throbbing, beating, pricking, tiring, pressing; hot, scalding, burning; 
tingling, itchy; dull, sore, sickening, suffocating, nagging (for the full list, see 
Melzack and Wall, ibid p. 63)
It would be beyond the scope of this thesis to dwell on the details of the McGill 
Questionnaire. However, it is relevant for the present research (and of interest 
to linguists) to point out that, quite aside from its validity as an 
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evaluative/diagnostic tool, the questionnaire highlights the importance of 
language in encoding the experience of pain; and it also highlights the 
subjective nature of the pain experience. In fact, all the above pain-descriptors 
are subjective evaluations (e.g. situated in the patient’s own and unique 
experience) of the pain sensation. In view of Halliday’s study of the ‘grammar 
of pain’ (which will be discussed below), it is interesting to note the 
aforementioned pain-descriptors are adjectives. These refer to one particular 
lexicogrammatical encoding of it (as identified by Halliday): that of pain as a 
quality of something.
In discussing Melzack and Wall, I have referred to the subjectivity of the 
experience of pain. The strongest acknowledgement of the importance of the 
individual, with her own biography and psychological makeup, in the 
experience of pain is offered by McCaffery (1972: 8), a professor of paediatric 
nursing, who famously stated: “[P]ain is whatever the experiencing person 
says it is, existing whenever he says it does.’ Discussing the importance of the 
patient’s experience for the interpretation of the painful stimulus, she adds: 
The body in which [the] sensation of pain occurs cannot be viewed as a 
machine, but rather as the patient’s personal, private possession, invested 
with the patient’s particular emotions. […] with the conceptualization of pain as 
an affect, verification of the pain by others is meaningless. Pain can be 
verified only by the person experiencing it (ibid. p. 7; my emphasis).
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These insights have caused controversy, and to an extent they still do. For 
example, Spence (2010) – a general practitioner – caused a stir when, in an 
article in the British Journal of Medicine (BMJ), he doubted figures estimating 
that the percentage of chronic pain sufferers in the UK is as high as 20%. For 
him, ‘[the] evidence is based on the unscientific [i.e. untrustworthy] definition 
that ‘pain is whatever the patient says it is’, an assertion so simplistic that it 
cannot be true’ (p. 1144; my emphasis). The patient’s voice is therefore, once 
again, doubted and her voice effectively silenced, an experience lived by most 
of my informants and reported by researchers such as Honkasalo (2000).
However, quite apart from its diagnostic and therapeutic value, insights such 
as MacCaffery’s have inspired much of the thinking behind the present 
research. Attention to the patient’s linguistic output is therefore paramount; 
more than other, technologically advanced diagnostic and imaging tools, 
language can reveal not only where pain occurs but also what it is for the 
person experiencing it and what it means for her or him.
Returning to Melzack and Wall, for the linguist, the importance of their work on 
the linguistic encoding of the experience of physical pain also lies in their 
methodology. As mentioned, these researchers compiled the list of pain 
descriptors by noting their frequency in preparatory work done with other 
sufferers. This implicitly acknowledges the role of repetition and of previously-
occurred talk in learning to speak of one’s pain. Speakers are not entirely 
‘creative’ when trying to verbalise their experience. Words and expressions 
used to talk about pain are often ‘recycled’ from previously occurred 
exchanges and chosen from the culturally and socially available lexicons of 
‘pain talk’. Every utterance about pain thus becomes a ‘text’. As mentioned, 
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one of the difficulties in talking about one’s pain might lie precisely in the 
physical, psychological, and cultural constraints that inhibit the production of 
‘pain texts’, thus greatly reducing the possibilities of dialogic and intertextual
work.
Other interesting and insightful studies into pain and some of its linguistic 
dimensions are those of Fabrega and Tyma (1976a, 1976b). In their work, the 
two researchers address the cultural, cognitive, and linguistic aspects of pain. 
They identify three classes of terms used by sufferers in pain utterances: 
primary pain terms, secondary pain terms, and tertiary pain terms. Primary 
pain terms (in English) consist of a limited set of words: pain, ache, hurt, sore. 
These function as a base for the perceptual description of the experience of 
pain. Secondary pain terms, on the other hand, are lexemes that denote 
physical changes of state or damage and are used as ‘qualifying pain 
metaphors’ in pain description: they refer to what the experience feels like 
burning, throbbing, splitting. Tertiary pain terms are terms of qualification that 
sufferers employ to signal degrees of intensity, the duration of a painful 
sensation, and location: ‘I have a burning pain in my stomach.’
Fabrega and Tyma’s early study is valuable for its attention to the linguistic 
element. What they refer to as ‘primary terms’ are — interestingly — nouns 
(but note that, in English, sore can also be an adjective and hurt a verb); 
‘secondary’ and ‘tertiary’ terms, on the other hand, are adjectives. Although 
Halliday’s work will be presented and discussed later, it is important to note 
that — without embedding their insights into a grammatical theory (as Halliday 
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does) — they acknowledge that the complex, different perceptual 
characteristics of the pain experience are accommodated by different 
categories of words in the language. The ‘limited sets of words’ they identify 
as ‘primary terms’ encapsulate, for the most part, the ‘quantity’ dimension of 
the pain experience, i.e. its intensity. Secondary and tertiary terms, on the 
other hand, capture pain’s ‘quality’, i.e. its type. Fabrega and Tyma recognise 
that although, especially in the case of ‘primary’ terms, the number of words is 
limited, language resourcefully manages to deal with the complexity of the 
experience by combining words and drawing on other semantic fields. Thus, 
language responds creatively to the problem of having to encode a complex, 
highly subjective sensory experience such as pain by ‘combining’ various 
lexicogrammatical resources. 
Studies like the one by Fabrega and Tyma’s are extremely important first of all 
because they drew attention to the issue of pain, within health communication, 
well before they were recognised as legitimate fields of enquiry. For the 
present research, they are particularly relevant for the attention devoted to the 
linguistic element. However, one element, or point of view, that is still lacking 
in their research, and that later works — including this thesis — address is the 
widening of the focus over and beyond single lexical items to include context 
and co-text.
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1.2.2 Health communication and the language of medicine
As stated, the studies mentioned above do not originate from within the field 
of linguistic studies but from medicine and psychology. 
Until relatively recently, and as a result of the ‘linguistic turn’ in the social 
sciences, linguists paid more attention to what might be grouped under the 
already-mentioned general heading of ‘health communication’, without 
specifically addressing pain which — as I will show below — began to become 
of specific interest to linguists only later. 
The literature on the topic shows a wide difference of interests, 
methodologies, and theoretical orientations. As Ainsworth-Vaughn (2001) 
points out, the majority of studies on medical encounters (which she terms 
‘praxis literature’) are atheoretical about language. In the praxis literature, 
language is ‘assumed to be the transparent vehicle of meaning’ (p. 453); 
utterances are assigned a single functional meaning, such as information-
giving, information-requesting, affective display, direction. The other type of 
studies identified by Ainsworth-Vaughn (ibid) are referred to as ‘discourse 
literature’ and consist of analyses of talk that stem from contemporary theories 
about situated discourse: conversation analysis, sociolinguistics, ethnography 
of speaking, interactional sociolinguistics. In both the praxis literature and the 
discourse literature, ‘research has had an explicit or implicit orientation toward 
the balance of power between patient and physician (Ainsworth-Vaughn, ibid 
p. 453). 
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Although such research is not immediately relevant for this thesis, it does 
address important questions that cannot be ignored in any study on the 
experience of pain and illness that does not concentrate exclusively on pain 
descriptors. This is because, as already stated, pain communication is health 
communication. 
One such question is the aforementioned issue of the power relation between 
patient and physician and, more generally, of personal agency. An early 
consequence of becoming ill and experiencing pain is, for most people, loss of 
(or reduced) autonomy. The patient, as the interviews collected for this study 
show, makes the transition from a state where she has freedom to act to one 
where such possibility is seriously curtailed, both for physical and 
psychosocial reasons. From actor she becomes acted upon. 
Focussing on questions in the doctor-patient encounter, some researchers 
(Frankel, 1979) concluded that the lower number of questions initiated by 
patients demonstrated a power imbalance in the doctor patient-consultation. 
However, as part of the present research will show, the situation might be 
more complex and, in evaluating concepts such as ‘power’ and ‘agency’ a 
wider context than the medical consultation ought to be taken into account. In 
the ALOMAR Plus corpus, for example, informants are seen clearly 
questioning, and even openly defying doctors’ clinical judgments and 
instructions. As Ainsworth-Vaughn points out (p. 463), the generalisation of 
findings such those by Frankel has probably contributed to the stereotype of 
the patient as powerless.
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Since the 1980s, a topic related to but wider than doctor-patient 
communication is the area of language and medicine. It comprises doctor-
patient communication but extends to medical language, health 
communication among the public, and everyday discourse about health and 
illness. Of particular interest for the present research are those studies that 
look at the lexicon of medicine as well as at metaphors in medicine and 
discourse about illness, disease, and health.
Jason and Murray (1985) investigate the uses of euphemism in medical 
language. Euphemisms in medicine may have evolved to allow medical 
teaching with the patient present, in order not to upset her or him. Jason and 
Murray report that euphemisms are still used in many cultures whilst others 
(North American, for example) have abandoned them for the sake of clarity, 
honesty, and also to avoid possible litigation. There is also the possibility that 
the official, scientific name of a disease offers ‘dignity’ to it; it is the name that 
is repeated by the diagnosed in countless encounters that confirms and 
vindicates her status as ‘officially ill’. As the interviews in the ALOMAR Plus 
corpus show, the moment when the person is given an official diagnosis, with 
an official, scientific name for it, is a time of momentous importance which 
often takes on quasi mythical status. Even if the diagnosis is serious and 
potentially life-threatening, the act of naming ratifies the person’s status as ‘ill’, 
it explains and justifies behaviour and complaints that may have been hitherto 
unexplainable and disbelieved, even by clinicians.
However, medical language has been shown (McCullough, 1989; Mintz, 1992) 
to often ‘erase’ the patient, to highlight diseases, body parts, whilst 
obfuscating the patient’s experience. Fleischman (2001) makes a comment 
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which is particularly relevant for this research, especially in view of its 
theoretical orientation (see introduction). She observes that this type of 
medical discourse: 
tends to cast the sufferer in the role of passive substrate, or medium, on which 
the more interesting player in the game, the disease, operates. (p. 476).
Translating this into functional linguistics terms, we might say that the sufferer 
is assigned the “dative/experiencer” role and the disease the ”agent” role; or, 
in terms of “grounding” relationships, that the disease is foregrounded and the 
sufferer backgrounded (p. 476).
1.2.3 Metaphor in health communication
With regards to metaphors in medical language, Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) 
seminal work on the pervasive nature of metaphorical language has clearly 
been influential. Medical discourse is fertile ground for metaphorical language 
and even more so discourse about pain, as even a cursory look at the 
linguistic data gathered in the ALOMAR Plus corpus will show. 
Talking about one’s own illness and suffering is challenging from an emotional 
and a conceptual point of view. Metaphorical language therefore becomes a 
very useful tool for the patient (but the same could also be stated of a patient’s 
loved ones) to grasp the enormity of his or her situation. The use of 
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metaphorical language, as the data in the following chapters clearly 
demonstrates, benefits all participants in health communication. The 
aforementioned cognitive and emotional benefits are in fact also important for 
the patient’s interlocutors. It should be pointed out that the use of the term 
‘metaphor’ made here includes not only regular, ‘lexical’ metaphor (Steen, 
2009), but also simile which, as Steen (ibid p. 37) states, is: 
typically characterized by direct language use, which sets up an opposition 
between two conceptual domains within the referential situation model which 
needs to be resolved in terms of the rhetorical purposes of the sender in the 
context model.
To include both types of metaphors, the term ‘figurative language’ will often be 
used in the present research.
Sontag (1978; 1988) and Scarry (1985) have been critical of the use of 
metaphors in talking about illness (Sontag) and pain. Gwyn (2001), on the 
other hand, has convincingly argued for their usefulness. Although this 
research does not have as its main concern, the use of figurative 
(metaphorical) language in pain and illness discourse it will, I believe, 
contribute to supporting Gwyn’s view.
Figurative language is not, as Scarry (op cit) appears to argue, proof of the 
inability of language to encode the experience of pain and of the latter’s 
ineffability. Metaphorical language, on the contrary, is testimony to the 
resourcefulness of language. As stated earlier, this type of language allows 
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the one in pain to make sense of pain by making it less alien; figurative 
language provides, to a degree, understanding.
Sontag (1978, 1988) is right in arguing that illness (and, it can be added, pain 
are not metaphors. She is also right when she claims that the metaphors used 
to talk about illness (and pain often is part and parcel of the illness 
experience) are often unhelpful, even ‘lurid’ (1978: 7). One need only think 
about current metaphors around cancer, where people affected by the 
disease are often spoken of as ‘fighters’ who can/will beat it. Here, the 
dangerous, although unstated, implication is that those who succumb to the 
disease were perhaps not brave enough or did not put up a good enough 
fight.
If this is the case, then one ought to think about how to substitute new 
metaphors for old ones, rather than doing away with them altogether. But in 
talking of illness and pain, metaphors are part of the solution, not of the 
problem. Their usefulness is demonstrated by their ubiquity. Gwyn (2001) 
cleverly critiques Sontag’s position by quoting the following passage which, 
ironically, is the opening passage of her book:
Illness is the night-side of life, a more onerous citizenship. Everyone who is 
born has dual citizenship, in the kingdom of the well and in the kingdom of the 
sick [and in pain]. Although we all prefer to use only the good passport, sooner 
or later each of us is obliged, at least for a spell, to identify ourselves as 
citizens of that other place (1978: 7).
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It is precisely taking up residency, albeit temporarily, in this ‘other kingdom’ 
which forms the basis of that fear, referred to above, that makes speaking and 
hearing about pain so difficult. 
Radley (1993) has looked at the role of metaphor in adjusting to chronic 
illness. This is particularly relevant for the present study, since all the 
informants have chronic conditions. Radley states that there exists an ‘implied 
stigma’ in illness which requires that sufferers employ a number of ‘tactics’ to 
either disguise or minimise the impact of their illnesses. Thus sufferers are 
able to be accepted as ‘fully capable participants in social life’ (1993: 109). 
To fall short of such acceptance, either through the nature of the disease 
manifestations […] or through being judged as failing to bear one’s illness 
properly, is to risk being deemed ‘less of a person’. The chronically ill are 
subject to cultural expectations that, in their evaluation of the personal and 
social status of the afflicted, can be said to be the expression of a public 
morality. (ibid)
Crucially for the present study, bodily pain which in most cases (for the 
individuals whose interviews are discussed in this thesis) is not accompanied
— at least in the initial stages of the illness — by any visible manifestations, 
contributes more to placing the patient against the ‘public morality’ which 
Radley refers to. This is because pain disables but does so invisibly. 
In talking about the use of metaphor in health communication, it should also 
be noted that as Nerlich and Koteyko (2009) have shown, contrary to what is 
often assumed, it is not only patients and the media that resort to figurative 
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language when discussing pathology. Scientific and medical discourses too 
often resort to it by, for example, talking of ‘disease as invasion, the immune 
system as a defence system against foreign invaders, bacteria as good or 
bad, friendly or unfriendly and so on’ (p. 157). In particular, Nerlich and 
Koteyko (ibid) point out the high frequency of war metaphors in medical and 
scientific papers about MRSA infection in UK hospitals (the so-called 
‘superbug’). Such finding has relevance for this research where, in the 
language used by the ALOMAR Plus informants war and — more generally —
violence metaphors abound. Nerlich and Koteyo highlight that in the 
‘representations’ of MRS, the dramatis personae are multiple and their roles 
can dramatically change during the ‘drama’; the same actors can be both 
forces for good and negative ones. This is particularly relevant for the present 
study. As the data and the analysis presented in the following chapters will 
show, ‘actors’ normally thought of as benevolent in health communication can 
be — and indeed are — often cast in negative roles. And as the two 
researchers point out (ibid p. 166), the type of metaphorical representation of 
scenarios and actors which is used, and — as I will argue in chapter four —
the evaluations of such scenarios and actors, has implications for behaviour 
and actions, such as the abandonment of a particular prescribed 
pharmacological regimen.
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1.2.4 The ‘illness narrative’ genre: pathography and autopathography
No overview of the literature on (and of) health communication can be 
complete without reference to the study of illness narratives, and the two 
related genres of ‘pathography’ and ‘autopathography’. 
These two labels refer to experiences of illness told in the first 
(autopathography) or third (pathography) person. Such works are authored by 
a range of individuals with wholly different backgrounds: medics, journalists, 
teachers, housewives, to name only a few. Brody (2003: 28) is of the opinion 
that ‘we can best understand what it means to be sick by attending carefully to 
the stories people tell about sickness.’ They can vary greatly in length and 
quality and are published in a variety of forms, in printed and — increasingly
— electronic form. These vary in length from brief accounts to book-length 
memoirs written (or ghost-written) by individuals, some famous some 
unknown, with a particular condition that can be chronic — like arthritis — or 
acute, like cancer. Often, they are ‘survivor stories’ and can be seen as a sub-
type of the ‘confessional’ literature. Over the past thirty years or so, these 
writings have been increasing in number and popularity, especially in the 
English-speaking world. As stated, they are of interest not only to the general 
public but also to researchers keen to shed light on the illness experience as 
lived and understood by the patient.
Each pathography highlights a different aspect of illness from the perspective 
of the particular author in question. As a genre that, as noted, has been 
gaining in popularity, the pathography or illness memoir could be studied in its 
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own right; its linguistic practices and topoi share common features and aims 
(Hunsaker Hawkins, 1998; Brody, 2003). Many of these can be found in the 
data collected for this thesis, as chapters four and five will show. Thematically, 
they present the author’s life as a narrative interrupted by the onset of illness; 
there is clearly a ‘before’ and an ‘after’ which requires a number of 
adjustments. Often the author presents a new self which has emerged a result 
of being ill. What forms this new self takes and the overarching aims of the 
narrative varies, often according to the type of illness experiences (chronic vs. 
transitory; mild vs. life-threatening). Such texts may have different, often co-
existing aims: affirmations of life and personal strength, exemplary testimony, 
tribute. 
1.2.5 The narrativisation of the illness experience
Within the social sciences, the attention to the structuring of the illness 
experience through narrative forms and attention to the biographical element 
in the experience mark an important shift7. Mirroring, as argued by Riessman 
(2008), what is probably a concern of Western society with the primacy of the 
individual, increasingly many studies have been concerned with the shaping 
of a sense of self through narratives of illness. As Mishler (2006) points out, 
                                                            
7 Although the present research focuses on lay narratives (i.e. narratives told from the patient’s 
perspective), a study of health and illness narrative from the point of views of science and medicine, 
two name just two, would be equally legitimate and fruitful. Indeed, such points of view cannot be 
ignored in any broad study of health communication as previously defined. 
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researchers within the healthcare field have been particularly interested in the 
potential of illness, especially chronic, to shape patients’ identities. This shift 
signals the change from a state of affairs where the experience of the 
individual (the biographical datum) makes the transition from unhelpful 
verbiage — often dismissed or overtly ignored especially by medical 
professionals — to an essential element for a fuller understanding of the 
patient’s experience and, more generally, of health communication. This holds 
true whether the analysed narratives are produced by sufferers themselves or 
whether they are collected by researchers through mainly qualitative 
interviews (as is the case in this thesis).
Over the past thirty years a number of important works have appeared that 
apply the methods of narrative study to the experience of illness. They include 
(but are not limited to) the following: Kleinman’ seminal work (1989); Frank’s 
equally perceptive books on being ill and in pain, stemming from his own 
experience of illness (1997; 2002; 2005); Mattingly, (2001); Hurwitz, 
Greenhalgh, and Skultans (2004); Charon (2008); and Radley (2009).
As Radley (1993: 1) points out, the narrative approach to understanding 
sickness and health ‘stresses the biographical and cultural contexts’. 
[It] emphasizes the need to understand illness in terms of the patient’s own 
interpretation of its onset, the course of its progress and the potential of the 
treatment of the condition.
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The need to pay attention to social, cultural, and institutional contexts to better 
understand the experience if illness — and as an antidote to methods that rely 
solely on the biomedical model — has also been investigated by Mishler 
(1981), whose work also looks at the role of narrative in the shaping of 
personal identity (1999).
The increasing body of literature on the illness experience highlights the 
interconnectedness of societal (culture) and personal (biography) values in 
understanding both health and illness. In these accounts, the linguistic 
element is obviously crucial. Health and illness (and pain) are construed, 
conceptualised, and presented though processes of narrativisation that assign 
different roles to the various elements and characters in a patient’s story (the 
actors). 
A number of researchers have looked at the social and biographical data in 
narratives of illness to highlight different themes. Pollock (1993) has looked at 
ideas on ‘attitudes of mind’ in relation to health and illness. He has shown that 
popular conceptions of these two states involve moral judgements and often 
determine what patients and those around them consider ‘appropriate’ 
responses to the biographical disruption brought on by illness, as well as to 
the preservation of health. His findings show that it is often the case that 
people believe they have a degree of influence over their health but are more 
‘reluctant to accept responsibility for illness’ (p. 67). As chapters four, and 
especially five, of this thesis will show, the informants in this research clearly 
show awareness of societal judgements about ‘appropriate’ behaviour in 
responding to illness and maintaining health. Various linguistic ‘strategies’, 
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such as the frequent use of epistemic evidentials to stress the veracity of 
statements about their pain highlight this.
Williams (1993) collected and analysed in-depth, qualitative interviews with a 
chronic condition. His work — like this thesis — investigates the experience or 
rheumatoid arthritis (RA) sufferers and is particularly interesting for its attempt 
to show how an individual experience can reflect various societal forces at 
work in the context of which the individual sufferer is part. Although his stated 
aim to dissect ‘the characteristic ways in which society is represented through 
individuals’ discussions of the impact of chronic illness and disablement upon 
them’ (p. 93) leads him to some debatable, politically-situates conclusions, his 
study is relevant for the ways it shows how the interplay between the 
social/political and the personal finds its ways in narratives of illness.
In terms of thematic analysis, Williams (ibid pp. 95-96) highlights the following 
in his informant’s narrative: trust in her doctors and relinquishment of control 
over her body for the purposes of treatment in order to achieve 
‘independence’. This shows an ‘abandonment of responsibility over [the] body 
as a receptacle of disease’ which — however — does not result in a ‘passive
stance’ towards the disease’s disabling consequences and does not mean 
‘giving up on her life as a whole’. As the analysis in chapters four and five will 
show, my informants show varying degrees of ‘relinquishment’ (to use 
Williams’ term) of control over their bodies. All display degree of ‘resistance’ 
which might be a function of a different culture (Italian vs British) and of a 
different consciousness regarding the body which has been emerging in 
recent years. In common with Williams’ informant, the individuals I interviewed 
have clearly not ‘given up’ on life as a whole, as shown by several instances 
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of personal agency and positive evaluations vis-à-vis various aspects of their 
lives. The social value given to self-control and independence is reflected in 
subjective stances where the chronically-ill, faced with the limited 
effectiveness of treatments or their heavy side-effects, takes responsibility and 
makes judicious use of drugs or — as one of the informants for the present 
study related — stops taking them altogether.
Another theme identified by Williams is the desire not to become an 
encumbrance (Okada, 2011). This desire, common in experiences of chronic 
illness, is often the source of internal conflict for the sufferer and of a degree 
of ambivalence towards carers. Linguistically, the creation of this ‘active’, still-
independent persona is achieved through frequent use of active forms and 
construction that display the individual as maximally agentive. However, 
Williams makes the important observation (p. 103) that for most people 
affected and — to a degree, disabled — by chronic illness ‘life […] is not the 
heroic overcoming of dramatic obstacle, but the daily struggle with the 
mundane activities through which identity is expressed and confirmed.’ As the 
respondents in the ALOMAR Plus corpus show, such activities are ‘simple’, 
quotidian things like washing up, shopping for food, carrying a carrier bag, 
chopping vegetables, and so on. This is an important theme which 
differentiates the ‘heroic’ narratives which often appear in the 
(auto)pathographies of celebrities, especially sportspeople, from the 
narratives of ‘ordinary’ individuals.
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1.2.5 The experience of self in healthcare settings
More recently, the issue of how the self is experienced in healthcare settings 
has been explored by Rapport and Wainwright (2006). They rightly point out 
that when talking of our personal experiences, and especially of health related 
issues, we can hardly do so without talking about self. The two researchers 
observe that although medical technology can and does provide a plethora of 
information about the workings of the body and its component parts, they tell 
nothing about the way a person feels ‘in his or her self’ (ibid p. 1). This is an 
obvious, but for this reason not less important, insight which — as the 
interviews collected for this thesis show — is often overlooked by those who 
come into contact with the chronically-ill. Rapport and Wainwright rightly point 
out that it is principally through language that this important information is 
accessed. Quoting Brunner (2002), the two scholars affirm that the self is the 
‘common coin of our speech: no conversation goes on long without its being 
unapologetically used’ (ibid p. 1). Indeed traces of the self are abundant in 
narratives of illness. They can be uncovered in a number of ways; the use of 
Appraisal Theory in chapter four of this thesis is precisely an attempt to 
highlight this individuality, the informants’ first-person stance through their use 
of evaluation. Crucially, Rapport and Wainwright note that patients and 
clinicians tend to have, and often do have ‘different frames of reference for the 
experience of illness or disease’ (ibid p. 1). This makes it possible for different 
‘stories’ to emerge which — as the data in the present thesis shows — can be 
conflicting. This is a point also made by Kinsella (2006), in her study on the 
ways in which the self is constructed, through narrative, in three perspectives: 
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unitary, dialogical, and fragmented. These selves are linguistically 
constructed, which results in language wielding considerable power. 
Importantly for the present study, Kinsella (ibid) states that the way the self is 
constructed through discursive and narrative practices, whilst appearing to be 
a theoretical, somewhat ‘abstract’ matter has important, practical 
consequences, especially in healthcare settings.
1.2.6 Language and the experience of bodily pain
As noted, the majority of the studies mentioned thus far deals mostly with the 
linguistic structuring of the experience of illness. Although — for many of the 
conditions addressed by the aforementioned studies — bodily pain is an 
important element, it is not the central focus. This is not the case for two 
recent studies: Hellström Muhli (2010) and Vickers, Zychowicz, and Morones 
(2010).
Hellström Muhli uses a discourse and communication based approach in the 
context of care for the elderly to reflect on the experience of pain. The study, 
conducted in a Swedish institutional setting, makes use of recorded 
interactions between elderly patients and their professional carers. It focuses 
on how the elderly patients initiate narrative moves aimed at talking about 
their experiences of bodily pain. 
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At the same time, the study looks at how the healthcare professionals orient 
towards such accounts. It is, in this sense, ‘dialogical’. Pain-talk encounters 
are seen as an activity type and analysed to highlight ‘activity-specific 
coherence and incoherence’ (p. 57). Unlike the present research — which is 
more definitely grounded in SFG — Hellström Muhli’s analysis utilises 
concepts of ‘frame’ and ‘face-work’ derived from Goffman (1974), as well as 
those of ‘identity’ (Zimmerman, 1988) and ‘accountability’ (Briggs, 1986).
The Swedish researcher suggests (p. 55) that the experience of pain —
especially chronic — can be characterised as a social, as well as pathological 
experience. She also suggests that the cultural, as well as physical, 
constraints of ageing make the experience of pain in old age unique. On this 
point a degree of caution is necessary. It is true that, as Hellström Muhli writes 
(ibid p. 55), ‘the roles older people occupy and the stereotypes they 
encounter, may strongly influence the experience and expression of pain’ (ibid 
p. 55). This can be seen, for example, in the commonly-held (and heard) 
assumption that pain is inherent in the ageing process and therefore ‘normal’ 
and may result in underreporting of pain-related issues and underprescribing 
(or — in some cases — overprescribing of analgesics). Yet, one must be 
aware of the dangers of a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby the 
expectation of similarities in elderly patients’ discourse on pain contributes to 
a homogenizing view of a group (the ‘elderly’) which instead is far from 
homogeneous and that such analysis should contribute to dispel, rather than 
confirm. Indeed, throughout her paper, Hellström Muhli appears to use the 
‘elderly’ label unproblematically. 
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This limitation notwithstanding, the study is interesting and of value because it 
addresses the two-way nature of pain and — more generally — health 
communication: not only how it is communicated but also, importantly, how it 
is received. The importance of this factor is an issue that this thesis addresses 
in chapters four and five, by focussing on my informants’ reports on how their 
communication about pain is received by lay individuals and medical 
professionals. 
However, unlike Hellström Muhli’s study, this thesis focuses more on the 
linguistic encoding of the pain experience though the lexicogrammar without 
resorting to the concept of communicative activity type (CAT). This is in part a 
result of the data for the present project having been collected through 
qualitative interviews rather than consisting of recorded interviews in health 
care settings, as well as — obviously — different research agendas. Hellström 
Muhli concludes (p. 61) that her informants make physical pain ‘an issue 
about identity construction, social and relational suffering, and accountability.’ 
In addition, she states (ibid) that ‘[p]ain-talk seems to be constitutive of 
ambiguities’ and that ‘a common feature [of pain-talk] is that identity is central 
in the accounts of pain.’ Although, as noted, the present work differs from 
Hellström Muhli’s for theoretical orientation and research questions and 
priorities, her findings about the ambiguity of pain-talk and the centrality of 
identity to it are common features which emerge from the analysis in the 
following chapters. 
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The study by Vickers et al. (2010) stems out of an ethnographic investigation 
conducted among Mexican female immigrants to the US. It concentrates on 
naturally-occurring narratives about experiences of the Mexican and American 
health systems as experienced by one of the informants. In this particular 
study, bodily pain is rather peripheral and is only one of the elements that 
engender narratives on the woman’s encounter with two different, but equally 
disappointing — in their apparent inability or unwillingness to treat the cause 
of the woman’s pain (i.e. a damaged knee) — healthcare systems. Vickers et 
al. use their analysis to argue, rather unsurprisingly, that individual 
experiences shape an individual’s ideology of healthcare which, in the case 
they present, is negative. Narrative, in these researchers’ view, is indexical of 
the larger cultural context that gave rise to it. Like most of the informants in 
the present study, Vickers et al’s informant was prompted to seek medical 
advice following an injury that caused her to experience pain. However, pain 
per se is not the topic of this paper but rather the experience of healthcare. 
For the present research, the study’s main interest lies in the fact that it 
addresses the complex issue of the patients’ agency in making choices about 
their own healthcare. This issue will be addressed in chapter five of the 
present research.
1.2.7 Studies focussing on the lexicogrammatical encoding of pain
Of direct interest for this thesis (especially chapter three) are a number of 
studies by linguists. 
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Peters (2004) provides an analysis of the lexicon used to talk of the concept of 
pain in English, from a historical perspective. He offers an overview of the 
semantic changes involved in what could be broadly termed ‘the vocabulary of 
pain’. His discussion is very interesting as a documentation of the ‘genealogy’ 
of pain-descriptors in one particular language. However, more important is 
Peters’ acknowledgement of the relevance of the cultural context as a shaping 
force for pain-vocabulary. Language, thought, and culture exert mutual 
influence on each other. When it comes to pain, some concepts and 
construals come, so to speak, ‘ready-made’ and are adopted by speakers. 
However, culture, in its broadest sense, is also influenced and shaped by 
language, and so are speakers’ cognitive processes (Deutscher, 2011; Malt 
and Wolff, 2010).
Starting from the point of view of cognitive semantics, Peters stresses the 
importance of metaphor and, crucially, metonymy in processes of semantic 
categorisation and change and utilises them to study the diachronic evolution 
of pain vocabulary in English. Although his analysis relates to English, some 
of his observations hold cross-linguistically. For example, he notes that the 
conceptualization of pain is threefold (p. 198): 
1 The sensation of pain is a result or a corollary of certain processes. 
The relationship between these processes and pain is predominantly a 
causal one (my emphasis). 
2 Pain is identified with a hostile agent, who causes the sensation. The 
causal relationship is still present; the process brought into being or the 
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action performed by the agent (see chapter five, below) is not made 
explicit.
3 The experience of pain is related to the ‘container’ metaphor.
Point two, in particular, can be clearly verified in the ALOMAR Plus corpus, 
where pain frequently is indeed identified, in many cases, with a hostile agent. 
As will be seen, pain is often identified with a weapon, an angry volitional 
entity, a burden and an oppressor; pain is also an agent that diminishes a 
person’s abilities.
With regards to point three, the Italian speakers of the ALOMAR Plus corpus 
conceptualise pain as an entity that, although itself without precise 
boundaries, is a quantity that resides within the body which contains it. Pain is 
somehow also like a liquid: it can flood; it comes in waves; it surges and fills 
body and self (again, conceptualised as containers). And, finally, pain is a 
possession: it can be had, held, and given (in the sense of inflicted upon 
somebody); however, unlike ordinary possessions it cannot be disposed of at 
will.
One of the interesting observations that Peters makes is that, in present-day 
English, ‘there is a tendency to disguise and play down pain’ (p. 216). This 
can be seen in the rise of euphemisms like discomfort, distress, and 
inconvenience. This may be the result of cultural conditioning: one only admits 
to being in pain with reluctance, especially in a cultural context where even 
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the natural processes that are inherent in ageing, and that eventually result in 
death, are increasingly seen as undesirable, even illegitimate. 
In the ALOMAR Plus corpus, Italian equivalents of such euphemisms are not 
found, although the tendency to minimise one’s pain is clearly discernible but 
it is achieved more discursively than lexically. Given the limited size of the 
corpus, however, it is not possible to make claims as to the general trend in 
Italian.
Peters concludes his analysis by stressing the importance of taking into 
consideration the cultural contexts in which pain is spoken of. It is certainly
true that different cultures, and different contexts within the same culture, 
allow the expression of pain to different degrees. Within particular age-groups, 
older individuals for example, talk about various physical problems, such as 
illness and pain, seems to be viewed as more legitimate. This type of talk is 
known as ‘trouble-telling’ (Coupland, Coupland, and Giles, 1991) and has 
been shown to serve a number of functions (Coupland et al. ibid and Poulios, 
2008)
As noted in the introduction, it was Halliday (1988) who provided the first 
systematic account from the point of view of linguistics of the construal of pain 
by language. As I shall explain in more detail in chapter three — which 
contains a more detailed overview and discussion of his study — he provided 
a paradigm of English pain expression from the point of view of transitivity, as 
understood by SFG. After Scarry’s work (1985), it was Halliday’s paper that 
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provided much of the motivation behind the present research and a 
considerable portion if the theoretical orientation it adopts. 
Halliday’s work is important for several reasons, the first of which is that, as 
observed, it constitutes the first attempt to systematically study the linguistic 
encoding of pain from a lexicogrammatical point of view, thus including the 
grammar and the lexicon. 
The language he analyses consists of an authentic - albeit, as noted limited –
corpus of doctor-patient interactions. In his paper, Halliday shows how the 
‘cognitive’ and meaning-making potential of language is utilised to construe 
the experientially complex experience which is pain. For Halliday (and, 
generally, for SFG) the grammar of a language is its ‘semantic powerhouse’ 
and a ‘theory of experience’. It follows that, by paying attention to the way(s) 
in which language construes experience can shed light on both the way 
individuals and, potentially, cultures construe a particular domain of 
experience. This observation opens up the path (and invites) cross-linguistic 
studies, of which this thesis is part. 
Directly inspired by Halliday is Hori (2006). Hori explores pain expressions in 
Japanese. Using a corpus of doctor-patient interactions, she analyses the 
encoding of pain in Japanese; like Halliday, she employs the notion of 
transitivity to shed light on how pain is encoded in the speech of her 
informants. She concludes that they conceptualise pain as residing ‘in the 
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body of the speaker […] invisible [to other people]’ (p. 222) and, ultimately, 
inaccessible to them. Hory’s study is particularly important in that it shows the 
applicability of Halliday’s paradigm to a language such as Japanese which, 
typologically, is far removed from English.
Without referring to Halliday, Pugh (2005) discusses the language of pain in 
India, within the Hindi and Urdu traditions. In particular, she addresses 
metaphoric language and observes that ‘[e]veryday speech, popular 
mythology, village love songs, modern novels, and classical poetry in North 
India are replete with metaphors of pain’ (p. 115). Her observation that Hindi 
and Urdu metaphors of pain draw heavily on ‘familiar images from the realms 
of home, field, workshop, and weaponry, to describe pain’s sensory qualities’ 
(p. 115) sheds light on two already-noted facts. First, the importance of culture 
in understanding and encoding pain. Pain, as also Melzack and Wall (1996) 
imply, is experienced by the body and understood by the brain, which 
interprets it culturally. Pugh makes the important point that, for Indians, ‘pain 
reflects the integrated mind-body system of Indian culture’ (p. 118). The 
sharp, familiar western distinction between physical and psychological pain is, 
Pugh maintains, absent in Indian thought. Physical pain has psychological 
elements and psychological pain is embodied too.
Secondly, in noting the importance of metaphorical language in the encoding 
of the experience of pain in India, Pugh indirectly supports Gwyn’s (2001) 
argument against Sontag’s (1977, 1988) rather dismissive treatment of 
metaphorical language in speech about illness and pain. The use of 
metaphorical language is a testament to the resourcefulness of language in 
tackling complex issues and phenomena, rather testimony to its limitations. As 
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Lakoff and Johnson (1981) and Kövecses (2002, 2003, 2006) argue, 
metaphorical language is an important cognitive, as well as communicative, 
tool that facilitates and enhances both the understanding and the 
communication of the experience of complex phenomena such as pain. 
Overlach’s (2008) study is an investigation of ‘the language of pain and of 
pain-talk’ in German. Using a corpus of doctor-patient interactions involving 
chronic pain sufferers, the author takes a discourse analytical, grammatical, 
and semantic approach to highlight various aspects of the language of pain. 
Like Lascaratou (below) and Hori, Overlach takes inspiration from and 
expands on Halliday (1998), thus adding an important cross-linguistic 
dimension. In his work, Overlach includes etymological observations on pain 
lexis in German. This is particularly interesting because it opens up the 
possibility of studying the language of pain diachronically, as well as 
synchronically.
Similarly to Italian, modern German has two basic terms to refer to ‘pain’: 
Schmerz and Weh (dolore and male in Italian), which are an example of ‘the 
primary terms’ (Fabrega and Tyma, 1976) displayed by a language to refer to 
pain. The etymology of Schmerz is unclear, but may derive from an Indo-
European root meaning ‘to bite’. Its current meaning evolved through usages 
that mainly referred to (painful) damage of the skin to refer to bodily pain in 
general. Weh was originally an exclamation of lament which was found, from 
quite an early stage, in most dialects of German. The term has 
correspondences in many Indo-European languages: O.E. wa, Lat. Væ, Gr. 
oa, It. Spa. Port. guai. It survives in the English woe, where it is attested in the 
language as a noun from the interjection from the late 12c. In German, the 
67
great diffusion of the interjection weh! has its origins in biblical translations 
from Greek and, ultimately, Hebrew. In its nominalised and often adverbial 
use, the term made the semantic transition from a more general sense of 
‘being unwell’ to the more restricted one of bodily pain, in expressions such as 
wehtun ‘to hurt’.
Broad in scope and depth of analysis are Lascaratou and Hatzidaki (2002), 
Lascaratou and Marmaridou (2005), culminating in Lascaratou (2007). The 
latter, a book-length study, is ‘the outcome of a long-term, large-scale, data-
based investigation of the linguistic manifestation of physical pain in Modern 
Greek’ (p. 1). The study looks at the ‘linguistic patterning (lexico-
phraseological choices, grammatical structures, and linguistic metaphors) of 
pain. The study is both qualitative and quantitative. Aside from its application 
of Halliday’s paradigm to yet another language, its importance resides in the 
size of the corpus, comprising 131 interactions ‘between pain-suffering 
patients and health care professionals’ (p. 1). 
With regards to the way in which Greek speakers ordinarily construe pain,
Lascaratou maintains that they mainly do so by construing it as a process, 
through verbs: I hurt, I’m hurting (here), it hurts, my arm’s hurting, that’s 
hurting me. As will be seen, chapter three of this thesis reaches a different 
conclusion with regards to an admittedly smaller corpus of Italian ‘pain-talk’. 
Lascaratou interestingly argues that ‘it is the degree of involvement of the 
sufferer’s self in the painful experience which greatly determines the character 
of its lexico-grammatical construal’ (ibid p. 184). Agreeing with Wierzbicka 
(1992), the Greek scholar claims that by framing emotions as verbs, speakers 
reflect their conceptualisation of such emotions as ‘inner activities’. 
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Obviously, one cannot make overarching claims about the way a speaker, let 
alone a whole ‘culture’, conceptualises an experience or a phenomenon. 
However, I am of the opinion that as Halliday (1998) articulates, and both 
Lascaratou and the present research show, attention to linguistic data can 
reveal a great deal about how sufferers view and position themselves vis-à-vis 
their conditions and pain. Part of the importance of Lascaratou’s work lies in 
the fact that it synthesises different perspectives: Halliday’s Functional 
Grammar, semantics and elements of cognitive grammar. In addition, it pays 
attention to insights gained from philosophy, literary and cultural studies. More 
references and detailed discussions of points of Lascaratou’s work will appear 
in chapter three. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology adopted in the thesis
This chapter will be concerned with methodological issues for the present 
research. To begin with, the nature and composition of the corpus — on which 
the subsequent analysis is based — will be addressed. The chapter will 
illustrate how the informants were selected and on what basis. It will also 
address the ethical considerations involved in the research. A biographical 
section will present personal information about the participants — including 
information about their medical condition — with a justification for the inclusion 
of such information and some field notes. The chapter will also address 
transcription conventions and further information on the overall theoretical 
framework of the present research.
2.1 The corpus
At an early stage of the planning for the research, the decision was made that 
the data would consist of spoken (rather than written) speech. A written 
corpus on the experience of living with pain and illness would have been 
easier to assemble, since — as noted — the genre that has become known as 
‘pathography’ has been gaining increasing popularity since the 1980s and is 
now well established. According to Hunsaker-Hawkins (1999: 3), ‘[a]s a genre, 
pathography is remarkable in that it seems to have emerged ex nihilo.’ 
Hunsaker-Hawkins (ibid p. 3) notes that ‘book-length personal accounts of 
illness are uncommon before 1950 and rarely found before 1900.’ Several 
volumes are now in print and easily available, at least in English
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From the beginning, however, the idea was to make use of spoken language 
for a number of reasons. First, spoken and written language differ in a number 
of ways, which have received attention from a number of scholars over the 
years (Tannen, ed., 1982, inter alia). As Chafe (1982: 45) points out, 
‘[s]peakers and writers have different relations to their respective audiences.’ 
Both modes are interesting and worthy of study but here the intention was to 
focus on language which had undergone minimum pre-planning and was 
shaped at least in part by direct interaction with an interlocutor. 
Secondly, the present research aims to be situated within the existing tradition 
of health communication studies that make use of spoken data. As noted, the 
research that, after Scarry’s work (1985), provided the inspiration for the 
present study, namely Halliday’s (1998), makes use of spoken data. Part of 
the aim in conducting this research was to further test and explore 
communication around illness and bodily pain by utilising a Halliday’s 
analytical framework, with similar data but from a wider corpus (as the size of 
the corpus in Halliday’s pain study is rather limited) in a language other than 
English.
The initial ambition was to collect a corpus of naturally-occurring talk. 
However, the definition of what exactly constitutes ‘naturally-occurring’ speech 
is not without problems. One interpretation is to think of naturally-occurring 
speech as any linguistic output that would have occurred without the 
researcher’s intervention, for example by covert recording. What is meant 
here by ‘covert’ includes both recordings made without the informants being 
aware of it, i.e. surreptitiously, as well as recordings whose real purpose (but 
not their being conducted) is kept from the informants. Collecting data in this 
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fashion would have presented both practical and ethical problems8. This 
method was therefore discarded in favour of overtly recorded speech, through 
semi-structured interviews. (Bowern (2008: 122) refers to semi-structured 
interviews as ‘naturalistic’ data.) The aims of the research were clearly and 
openly stated to each interviewee, notwithstanding the possible 
consequences of what has come to be known as the ‘Observer’s Paradox’. 
The effects of the ‘paradox’, however, may have been overstated — at least in 
this researcher’s view. While it is true that there are cases where making an 
informant aware of the true purpose of an observation, or that an observation 
is taking place at all, may affect the type of talk produced (the use of particular 
phonological or lexical features, for example), it is far from obvious that 
making the presence of the observer and the purpose of the investigation 
known will have a detrimental effect. As Cameron (1992: 132) points out:
[C]overt recording simply produces a different kind of data, interesting for that 
reason but not intrinsically superior to utterances produced in researcher-
informant dialogue.
Returning to the topic of naturally-occurring language, as Cameron (2001) 
explains, arguments as to what exactly constitutes ‘natural’ language or not do 
indeed raise ‘complicated issues’ (p. 20). It is certainly true that the type of 
communicative event (e.g. interview, rather than phone conversation) shapes, 
the kind of talk produced. Yet, as Cameron (ibid) argues, the manner in which 
                                                            
8 On both ethical and technical problems related to surreptitious recording, see Cameron (2001), 
Coates (1996), and Johnstone (2000).
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talk is elicited, observed, and recorded becomes part of the situational 
context. As long as this factor is clearly acknowledged and kept in mind, there 
is no reason why this type of linguistic data should be any less ‘natural’ than 
so-called spontaneous or ‘naturally-occurring’ talk. 
2.2 The ALOMAR Plus corpus
Having opted for spoken language, and given the aforementioned 
considerations, I decided that the appropriate way to proceed was to identify a 
group of speakers who had personal experience of living with chronic pain of 
various origins and who would be willing to take part in the present study. 
Initially, the idea was to contact pain-clinics with the aim of recruiting 
informants from amongst their patients. One possibility was to ask for 
permission to record doctor-patient interactions (as in Halliday (1988) and 
Lascaratou, 2008, inter alia). However, the idea was discarded because of the 
difficulties in accessing and obtaining consent from the relevant regulatory 
authorities in Italy. 
The second option was to identify and contact support groups for people 
suffering from chronic, painful conditions. This avenue proved more 
productive, as an initial internet search yielded several results, one of which 
was ALOMAR. ALOMAR is the acronym for Associazione Lombarda Malati 
Reumatici, (the Lombardy Association for People with Rheumatic Diseases). 
Founded in 1986, it is a voluntary entity run by and for people affected by 
rheumatic diseases. Its stated aims are9:
                                                            
9 Adapted from: ALOMAR website, ‘Associazione’. (Translation by the author.)
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 To fill the institutional void by offering help and moral support; 
 To assist patients by engaging in active volunteering in hospital 
wards; 
 To organise information exchanges between patients and medical 
professionals; 
 To organise and deliver courses to help affected people to better 
cope with their conditions. 
Wider ‘societal’ aims include:
 Advocacy on behalf of sufferers;
 Raising awareness about rheumatic diseases amongst the wider 
public.
Initial contact was made with one of the volunteers and, subsequently, with 
Annamaria10, a woman with Systemic Lupus Erythematosus (henceforth: 
SLE) and at the time president of the association (see below for lengthier 
biographical information on this and the other informants, as well as notes on 
medical conditions). 
Annamaria and I established contact via email and telephone; during these 
exchanges, I explained the aims of the research and asked if she would be 
                                                            
10 The names of all the informants have been changed to preserve anonymity.
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willing to be interviewed. She agreed and informed me that she would ask 
other members of the group if they too would be willing to take part. 
From the outset, one of the most pressing ethical concerns was not to mislead 
or cause further, unnecessary stress to people who, presumably, had already 
been enduring a number of difficulties. Therefore, I immediately disclosed that 
I was not a medical student and that the purpose of the research was 
humanistic, rather than scientific (in the common sense of the term). I also 
explained that it was to form the basis of my PhD thesis and its aims were in 
no way therapeutic. I did express the hope, however, that it might help in 
promoting a better appreciation of the implications of being affected by, and 
living with, a chronic, painful condition.
I first met Annamaria in person in January 2004 at the Milanese HQ of the 
association. The office is located within the main orthopaedic hospital in Milan. 
After enquiring further about the research project, she agreed to be 
interviewed. Having asked for permission to do so, I placed a tape recorder on 
the table between us. We talked undisturbed (except for one phone call) for 
about forty-five minutes, with nobody else present. The same procedure was 
followed with the other informants, whom I met on my second visit to the 
association a month later. The only two informants to be interviewed in other 
locations were Veronica, whom I met and interviewed on the hospital ward, 
and Fabio, who is not an ALOMAR member and whom I met and interviewed 
at his domicile (see below for further information).
All informants were clearly told about the possible uses of the data (for my 
thesis, journal articles and academic presentations) and of their right to 
withdraw consent, without providing any reasons, at any time between the 
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interviews and the publication of the first results. They were also informed that 
their names and any information that might identify them would be altered to 
retain anonymity. All participants were given the possibility of asking questions 
about the project, the reasons behind my interest, and my background. This 
was also done with the aim of fostering trust and building rapport.
The second round of interviews took place on a day when the 
members/volunteers11 were holding one of their regular meetings; 
consequently, I was not alone with any of the interviewees and our 
conversations could be overheard. The fact that the volunteers had other 
business to attend to on that day meant that none of these interviews lasted 
as long as the first one, with Annamaria. Each of the interviews in the second 
group lasted between 15 to 30 minutes. The fact that the location afforded 
privacy only to a limited degree might have influenced the content of the 
interviews.
The corpus for the present research also contains an interview with a male 
individual who, not suffering from an autoimmune disease, was not a member 
of ALOMAR. During my sojourn in Italy to collect the aforementioned 
interviews, an acquaintance to whom I had mentioned the topic of my 
research informed me that he knew a man who had been a chronic-pain 
sufferer for a number of years. He asked if I would be interested in talking to 
him; on hearing my positive reply he put us in touch.
I met Fabio at his flat in Milan on 1 September 2004, where he lived alone. I 
informed him of the aims of the research and of the ethical safeguards; he 
                                                            
11 All the ALOMAR members interviewed for the present research were also — at the time —
volunteers for the association, with different degrees of involvement.
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consented to being interviewed. The interview lasted around thirty-five 
minutes and, because of the comfortable setting, was friendly and relaxed.
Unlike ALOMAR members, Fabio does not have an autoimmune disease. He 
suffers from chronic back pain due to spinal problems (see section below for 
more detailed information). After some consideration, I decided to include his 
interview because, in view of his different pathology and gender, it might 
contribute to giving a broader view of the verbal representation of the 
experience of chronic pain by speakers of Italian. Ideally, the corpus would 
have contained an equal number of female and male informants, so as to 
allow some generalisations on gender-based differences in the encoding of 
the experience of chronic pain. The fact that this is not the case may be 
considered as a limitation of the present work. Throughout the present 
research the label ‘ALOMAR Plus corpus’ refers to all the interviews, including 
Fabio’s. 
Before approaching ALOMAR and being introduced to Fabio, I conducted a 
pilot interview with Antonio, a thirty-six year old male living in Milano. Antonio 
had been brought to my attention by a friend who believed he might be 
interested in taking part in the research. Although Antonio accepted to be 
interviewed and was informed of the aims of the research, during our meeting 
it emerged that — contrary to the information I had been given — he was not 
living with any painful, chronic condition. His main experience of pain was due 
to a minor accident years earlier. Although the interview was recorded and 
transcribed, it was not included in this thesis mainly because, unlike the other 
informants’, Antonio’s experience did relate to a distant, acute condition rather 
than a chronic one. 
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2.3 Biographical sketches of informants and field notes
As noted, I visited the ALOMAR offices twice in 2004. The medium-sized 
office consisted of a single room, sparsely furnished (a desk, a small table, 
some chairs and a couple of bookcases) within the perimeter of a large 
orthopaedic hospital in Milan with a specialised rheumatic unit. On my first 
visit, I was alone in the office with Annamaria (ALOMAR’s president), whom I 
interviewed. On my second visit, on 24th February 2004, as well as 
Annamaria, four other women were present. Their reason for being there was 
to hold a periodic meeting to prepare the association’s monthly newsletter. All 
agreed to be interviewed individually. 
Following are brief biographical sketches of all the informants. All the 
information was obtained during the interviews, following specific questions or 
volunteered by the informants themselves. This information is given to better 
contextualise the experience of each participant in the study. Although 
biographical information is less relevant for the first of the analytical chapters 
(chapter three), it is more important for a fuller appreciation of the issues 
arising in chapters four and five. Included, is also some contextual information 
that might assist in giving readers a better understanding of the topics 
discussed, as well as the informants’ perceived disposition towards the 
interview and the topics discussed. Information about age is precise only 
when the informant has openly mentioned it. In the other instances, it is 
estimated based on contextual and co-textual cues.
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2.3.1 Annamaria
Annamaria, ALOMAR’s president, is in her 50s and has SLE. She is married 
with children. She began experiencing symptoms in her twenties; at the time 
she was working full-time as a weaver in a textile factory. SLE has caused her 
a number of complications and forced her to leave paid employment. In 
receipt of incapacity benefits, she is now able to dedicate all of her energies to 
her family and to volunteering for the association, which she values 
enormously. 
Annamaria presents as very resilient and full of energy. She does not want to 
succumb to the disease, although she is fully aware of its seriousness and 
has obviously suffered significantly because of it. Having been my first point of 
contact, she is eager to help and proves very helpful throughout the time I 
spend at ALOMAR and later, when I contact her by phone to clarify some 
points.
2.3.2 Gina
Gina is in her early fifties, married with children. She has RA. Typically, her 
hands are deformed by the disease. 
During the interview, she looks tired and seems shy and reserved. Initially, 
she is not very talkative; she smiles but seems to be doing so to mask a 
degree of embarrassment. As the interview proceeds, she opens up more; 
she looks especially happy when she talks about her work as a volunteer, 
particularly with other patients. She is an active member of her local church. 
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She particularly enjoys sharing her experiences with members of the 
association and spreading knowledge about rheumatic diseases among the 
wider public. 
2.3.3 Veronica
Veronica is fifty-eight and has been living with RA since she was a teenager. 
She is married with children. When she began experiencing symptoms, she 
was a professional athlete (a runner). 
I met Veronica in the hospital ward of the same hospital where ALOMAR is 
based, recovering from her eighteenth operation to correct RA-related skeletal 
problems. 
She tells me that she is not in severe pain during the interview but cannot turn 
her head to look at me, otherwise her neck would hurt. Notwithstanding the 
circumstances, Veronica appears serene, even cheerful, and definitely 
displays a positive attitude throughout the interview. She shows no signs of 
bitterness.
In the bed next to her, there is a woman who has had surgery very recently. 
She is in obvious pain and while talking to Veronica I cannot help noticing her. 
I feel rather awkward in the presence of someone in pain, especially because 
this is an unanticipated situation.
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2.3.4 Sandra 
Sandra is the youngest of the ALOMAR informants. She has SLE and was 
diagnosed when she was still a schoolgirl. 
At the time of the interview, she is married and has no children. She is 
somewhat shy and states that she feels slightly apprehensive, since she has 
never been interviewed before. I reassure her. As the interview progresses, 
she opens up and shows a lot of interest for the research. She states that she 
is especially curious about possible differences in the expression of pain 
between Italy and the UK. 
Sandra has suffered significantly, mainly because of the pharmacological 
therapies. Due to her condition, she had to leave full-time employment and 
now works part-time for the same company.
2.3.5 Marta
Marta is sixty-five and has RA. She is married and without children (she 
miscarried when she was young). 
She presents across as well-adjusted but has obviously suffered because of 
her condition. To her, it is very important to fight the stigma that still attaches 
to RA. Throughout the interview she appears happy but it takes her some time 
to open up and mention her feelings.
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2.3.6 Anna
In her 60s, Anna suffers from RA. She is married and has children. Of all the 
interviewees, she comes across as the most distressed. Pain is a particularly 
severe problem for her, and has been throughout her illness. 
She admits to having experienced very low moments and depression. She 
finds comfort in her family but often finds it difficult to describe her pain and 
her suffering, especially to doctors. She is glad to belong to the association 
and finds solace in it.
2.3.7 Fabio
At the time of the interview, Fabio is in forty-one. He is single with no children. 
He has been suffering from SDH (see below for information about the 
condition) for a number of years. 
Pharmacological treatments were ineffective; therefore he has had to undergo 
surgery. Physically very active, he went skiing not long after the operation; this 
meant that he did not heal properly and so the pain has returned. 
Fabio tries to maintain a positive outlook and not to let the condition interfere 
with his life. Unfortunately, this is not always possible. A qualified nurse, he is 
very accurate in the descriptions of his symptoms. The interview took place in 
his flat.
A summary of the biographical information and place and length of the 
interviews is provided in Figure 2.1 below:
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Pseudonym Gender Age 12Condition Place of 
interview
Duration of 
Interview
Annamaria Female 50s SLE ALOMAR HQ, 
Milano
49mins.
Gina Female 50s RA ALOMAR HQ, 
Milano
26mins.
Sandra Female Late 
20s
SLE ALOMAR HQ, 
Milano
32mins.
Marta Female 65 RA ALOMAR HQ, 
Milano
28mins.
Anna Female 60s RA ALOMAR HQ, 
Milano
25mins.
Veronica Female 58 RA Orthopaedic 
Surgical Ward, 
Milano
35mins.
Fabio Male 41 SDE Own flat, Milano 43mins.
Figure 2.1. ALOMAR Plus corpus.
2.4 Notes on the medical conditions mentioned in this thesis
This section is only intended to provide the reader with some general 
information on the medical conditions that afflict the people interviewed for this 
research. 
2.4.1 Autoimmune diseases
All the women whose interviews are collected in the ALOMAR Plus corpus 
suffer from one of two autoimmune diseases. Such diseases are 
                                                            
12 See section below for a brief description of these conditions.
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characterised by ‘altered function of the immune system of the body, resulting 
in the production of antibodies against the body’s own cells’ (Mosby, 2009: 
171-172). Consequently, the immune system produces autoantibodies which 
attack healthy cells, causing localised and systemic reactions. ‘These 
reactions can affect almost any cell or tissue and cause a variety of diseases. 
Most autoimmune diseases occur in women’ (ibid p. 172).
2.4.2 Systemic Lupus Erythematosus (SLE)
SLE is a ‘chronic inflammatory disease affecting many systems of the body’ 
(ibid p. 1805). Its pathophysiological characteristics include ‘severe vasculitis 
[a condition in which involves inflammation of the blood vessels], renal 
involvement, and lesions of the skin and nervous system’ (ibid p. 1805). 
SLE is more prevalent in women. People with SLE can experience fatigue 
(especially in the initial stages), weakness, weight-loss, photosensitivity, fever, 
skin lesions on the neck and alopecia. ‘Depending on the organs involved, the 
patient also may have glomerulonephritis [a disease of the kidney 
characterised by inflammation of the small blood vessels known as glomeruli], 
pleurisy [an inflammation of the linings around the lungs], pericarditis [an 
inflammation of the pericardium, the sac which surrounds the heart], peritonitis 
[an inflammation of the peritoneum, the serous membrane that lines part of 
the abdominal cavity and viscera], neuritis [an inflammation of a nerve or part 
of the nervous system], or anemia [a condition in which your blood has 
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a lower than normal number of red blood cells]. Renal failure and severe 
neurologic abnormalities are among the most serious manifestations of the 
disease’ (ibid p. 1805). In some cases, SLE can be fatal.
2.4.3 Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA)
RA is a ‘chronic, inflammatory, destructive, and sometimes deforming disease 
that has an autoimmune component’ (ibid p. 1624). Its characteristics are a 
‘symmetric inflammation of synovial membranes [the soft tissue found 
between the articular capsule (joint capsule) and the joint cavity of synovial 
joints] and increased synovial exudates, leading to thickening of the 
membranes and swelling of the joints’ (ibid p. 1624). 
Usually, RA appears between the ages of 36 and 50, mostly in women. ‘The 
course of the disease is variable but is most frequently marked by alternating 
periods of remission and exacerbation’ (ibid p. 1624). The disease can have 
different degrees of severity (I to IV), characterised by joint stiffness and 
deformity, muscle atrophy, soft tissue lesions, subcutaneous swelling, and 
definite bone and cartilage destruction. RA ‘is not always progressive, 
deforming, or debilitating; most patients may continue in their jobs’ (ibid p. 
1624).
85
2.4.4 Spinal disc herniation (Prolapsus Disci Intervertebralis)
In common parlance, this condition is often (erroneously) referred to as 
‘slipped disc’. It is a condition affecting the spine. In it, a tear in the outer ring 
of an intervertebral disc lets the soft portion at the centre bulge out. The tear 
in the disc may cause the release of chemical material that can result in 
severe pain, even in the absence of root nerve compression. 
Often SDH is not diagnosed immediately, since patients can present with 
symptoms in the legs, knees, feet, as well as back. Other symptoms can 
include numbness, tingling, paralysis, muscular weakness, paraesthesia, a 
sensation of tingling, burning, pricking, or numbness of a person's skin; 
reflexes can be affected too. When the condition does not heal itself, 
treatment consists of anti-inflammatory drugs and, as last option, surgery. 
Symptoms can reoccur. 
2.5 Transcription and translation of the data and data-analysis
The methods used to transcribe spoken language can prove a thorny issue. 
Ochs (1999) has famously pointed out how apparently inconsequential 
choices in how to transcribe talk can have important consequences, for 
example by unwittingly providing an interpretative key. Several authors 
(Schiffrin, op cit; Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, Poland, 2001, inter alia) address 
transcription conventions and discuss some of the inherent problems in 
transcribing spoken discourse.
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One of the first decisions to be made in any transcription is the level of detail 
to include. All transcription is conceptualisation and favours (even points to) 
certain interpretations over others. Even in ordinary written language, for 
example, punctuation guides, as well as aids, understanding. Typeface too, it 
can be argued, is not neutral. 
In a transcript, what analysts include or exclude can be indicative of their 
focus and research interests (Whetherell, Taylor and Yates, 2001). Discourse 
analysts, conversational analysts, critical discourse analysts, dialectologists, 
and interactional sociolinguists – to name just a few – all use different 
conventions and levels of detail dictated by their research aims and theoretical 
orientations. Different methods highlight different interests and draw on 
different academic traditions. Conversation Analysis – for example – with its 
attention to the smallest details of spoken interaction has provided a template 
for the transcription of spoken language and the same can be said of 
Discourse Analysis. As Cameron points out (2001: 43): 
There is no ‘standard’ way to transcribe talk. Analysts may use a variety of 
conventions for just about every aspect of transcription, including how they lay 
out talk on the page, how to present prosodic, paralinguistic and nonverbal 
features, and whether to use nonstandard spelling [...]. Since talk is varied, 
and is collected [...] for various purposes, it is no bad thing that there are 
choices about transcription [...].
Mishler (1986: 50) rightly points out that in transcribing interviews for analysis 
at least a minimum level of detail is necessary. However, how fine-grained this 
detail is obviously ‘depends on the aims of the particular study and remains a 
matter of judgement.’ The implications of different transcription methods, and 
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the ‘risks’ posed by favouring one method over another, are also pointed out 
by Riessman (2008). Riessman (ibid) also warns against the dangers of 
‘reifying’ transcripts, although she underlies the importance of careful 
transcriptions. I have opted for a transcription method that does not attempt to 
reproduce in detail the flow of the spoken language. My questions and my 
informants’ contributions are reproduced in paragraphs, in a way which is 
similar to the way interviews are reproduced in journalistic pieces. I use 
common punctuation but keep it to a minimum, in an effort to convey the 
sense of how the linguistic output was produced. This way of transcribing talk 
is common in sociological and (auto)biography studies, including in those on 
illness experiences (Radley, 1993; Ramanathan, 2010; McPherron 
Ramanathan, 2011). In works that discuss finer morphosyntactic issues, 
researchers often provide the original accompanied by a ‘grammatical’ gloss 
and a translation into the language of the target readership. For the present 
work, the decision was made to utilise only an English gloss. Extralinguistic
clues , such as gesturing, and paralinguistic ones (such as stress, pauses, 
intonation) have been included only when they were deemed relevant to the 
point under discussion. The only conventions used in the transcriptions that 
appear in the following chapters that depart from common punctuation are the 
following:
[ ] contain relevant contextual information;
< > contain non verbal/paralinguistic utterances;
… indicates hesitation, often with lengthening of preceding syllable;
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One of the first choices to be made in transcribing the data for the present 
project was the issue of language. All interviews were conducted in Italian. 
Clearly, when they were first transcribed Italian was used. Yet, a decision had 
to be made as to the language in which they should appear in the final version 
of the thesis. The primary concern was obviously intelligibility for the reader. 
The two available options were to reproduce the text in Italian accompanied 
by an English gloss (a broad translation) or to provide only an English 
translation. Both choices have advantages and disadvantages. Providing the 
original Italian, together with an English translation, allows the reader to better 
appreciate the full quality of the linguistic output, especially for readers with 
some knowledge of the source language. Furthermore, it can be more difficult 
to discuss discursive and lexicogrammatical points in the source text by 
providing only a translation. Other researchers, however, have done so. 
Tannen (1989, 2007) for example, - in her discourse analytical work - makes 
use of Greek conversational data by presenting it only in English, occasionally 
accompanied by a transliteration of the original. Riessman (2008: 42) rightly 
points out that ‘[c]onstructing a transcript from a translated interview involves 
difficult interpretative decisions.’ This is true also when the interviews were 
translated, as they are here, by the researcher who conducted the interviews 
in the first instance and who is a native speaker of the source language. 
Although it can be argued that in this case the risks of misinterpretation are 
somewhat lower, they are not entirely absent. 
An appendix containing the full transcripts, in raw data form, of all the 
interviews is to be found at the end of the thesis. The appendix includes both 
the Italian and English versions.
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2.6 The interview format
The linguistic data presented in this work was gathered through semi-
structured interviews. What is meant here by ‘semi-structured’ is that although 
some topics were on the agenda (e.g. beginning of the illness, type of 
symptoms, impact on daily life, among other things), there was no set of 
predefined questions to be submitted to the interviewees. Morse (2001: 324-
325) refers to interviews such as this as ‘unstructured’. ‘The unstructured 
interview is a research strategy that permits the persons being interviewed to 
tell their stories at their own pace, in their own ways, and within their own time 
frames.’
The overall design of the research and, consequently, of the interviews can be 
rightly considered to be of a qualitative, rather than quantitative, nature. As 
Warren (2001: 85) notes, “[q]ualitative interviewing is a guided conversation 
[...] in which the researcher carefully listens ‘so as to hear the meaning’ of 
what is being conveyed’ (emphasis in the original). 
Yet, unlike casual conversation, the interview format does introduce elements 
of power-imbalance (Gubrium and Holstein, 2001), as the interviewer might 
come to be perceived as in a position of authority in view, for example, of his 
status as researcher. Unlike ordinary conversational partners, interviewer and 
interviewee bring different expectations to the communicative event: the right 
to the conversational floor, for instance, is unequally distributed, or there is an 
assumption that it will be so. 
From a topic point of view, even in a semi-structured interview the selection of 
items to be discussed is often skewed in favour of the interviewer’s interests; 
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the topics themselves are in large part a consequence of the questions asked 
and the stated aims of the interview13. As Warren (op cit p 3) says:
At first glance, the interview seems simple and self-evident [but this is not the 
case]. Questions elicit answers in more or less anticipatable format until the 
interviewer’s agenda is completed and the interview ends. [...]. [The 
respondent] is usually well aware of the routine and waits until questions are 
posed before answering. [...] Respondents are relatively passive in their roles, 
which are delimited by the interviewer’s coordinating activity and the available 
repository of answers. [...] This is the familiar asymmetrical relationship that 
we recognize as interviewing.
Notwithstanding these limitations, it was hoped that the resulting talk would be 
as ‘natural’ (in the sense of unconstrained) as possible. Precisely this attempt 
to obtain ‘unconstrained’ talk, as well as ‘situational’ circumstances, may 
account for the differences in the amount of language devoted to specific 
topics, such as pain, by different speakers in the corpus. Another factor in the 
amount of attention devoted to specific items may have been the topic’s 
prominence in the speaker’s mind at the time of the interview, as well as the 
quality of the rapport that developed between interviewer and interviewee. 
Such differences may also help to explain the different overall length in 
interview time among informants.
                                                            
13 For an outline of the interview as a genre, see Platt, (op cit pp. 33-54).
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2.7 The challenges of interviewing the ill
No interaction (verbal or otherwise) is without challenges. Interviewing the ill, 
however, poses unique problems. Although primarily referring to those 
afflicted by acute conditions, Morse’s observations (op cit p. 318) on 
interviewing the ill are worth quoting in full:
The [...] ill are frequently silenced by their disease or injury and muted by their 
treatments, and can be in shock or severe pain. The rapidity of the physical 
and/or mental changes they experience places them in an unfamiliar and often 
frightening environment – frightening because of the intensity of pain [...] and 
the threat to life and self-integrity.
However, as the same author (ibid p. 320-321) points out, in the case of the 
chronically ill an interview may be less problematic. Yet, this is by no means 
without challenges. 
For example, as noted, in the case of the present research, one of the 
informants — Veronica — was in a hospital bed recovering from surgery when 
the interview took place. Her discomfort was obvious. Another informant —
Anna — was still clearly distressed by her experience of pain, although at the 
time of the interview she reported feeling relatively fine and pain-free.
One should also remember that the onset of chronic illness can be a long, 
overdrawn process. Time gives the chronically ill the opportunity to develop a 
degree of familiarity with their conditions and, in some cases, a modicum of 
detachment. This is apparent in most of the interviews collected here. 
Often, the chronically ill have ‘rehearsed’ the interview in numerous 
encounters with medical professionals, family-members and friends. This 
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accounts for the depth of detail and ‘structure’ which is often found in 
narratives of chronic illness. 
Telling one’s illness may even be seen as therapeutic and may contribute to 
reconstituting one’s sense of self (Morse, op cit; Myers, 2010; Frank 1995). 
This does not mean, however, that a chronically-ill individual may not be 
experiencing, at or around the time of the interview, a relapse or may be 
undergoing painful treatment. As stated, this is precisely what happened when 
I interviewed Veronica (see below). Unexpectedly, I was led to her hospital 
bed where she was recovering from surgery performed on her the previous 
day. In the bed next to her was another woman, also recovering from surgery. 
This unforeseen situation certainly influenced both the content and length of 
the interview, as well as my psychological response. 
2.8 Theoretical and methodological orientation of the present research
As mentioned in the introduction, the overall aim of this thesis is to investigate 
the linguistic encoding of the experience of chronic illness and—in particular—
of its attendant bodily pain. It stems from a longstanding interest in spoken 
language and interaction and its outlook owes much to sociolinguistics, 
discourse and narrative analysis, and to functional approaches to language 
studies, particularly Systemic Functional Grammar. For this reason, the 
analytical approach taken may be described as ‘eclectic’, drawing on different 
traditions and methodologies. 
Chapters four and especially five, for example, are clearly more indebted to 
narrative approaches to language, although not in the stricter, sociolinguistic 
Labovian sense but rather in the broader tradition familiar to the social 
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sciences which today — as Kohler Riessman (2008: 14) points out — ‘is a 
veritable garden of cross-disciplinary hybrids.’ In her edited introduction to 
qualitative methodologies in health and social care research, Rapport (2004: 
5-6) includes in the list of narrative-based methodologies in health research 
discourse analysis, personal narrative, and socio-linguistic analysis. The latter 
is not the same as sociolinguistics, but it shares similarities with it in its 
emphasis on the social and the linguistic elements of narrated experience.
This research is ‘exploratory’ in the sense that although it was begun with —
and animated by — some overarching questions (e.g. “how do speakers 
encode the experience of bodily pain and chronic illness through the 
lexicogrammar of Italian?”), it does not set out — from the outset — to ‘test’, 
‘prove’ or ‘disprove’ any particular assumptions; it is data-driven. This, 
obviously, does not mean that there were no assumptions at all when the 
project started. For example, as noted one of the expectations was that —
overall — my informants would evaluate their diseases and concomitant 
bodily pain mainly negatively. Perhaps the main sense in which this work is 
‘exploratory’ is in that it does not set out to proceed on a definite course and is 
open to new discoveries, some of which – on further analysis – might certainly 
be interpreted differently. However, paraphrasing Tannen (2007: 6-7), it can 
be said that to claim that a work is not monolithic is not ‘to exempt individual 
works (or individuals’ work) having and having to make clear theoretical, 
methodological, and, when appropriate, empirical frameworks.’
As noted, the view of language in which this thesis is grounded is a functional 
one. More specifically, I share many of the assumptions put forward by 
Halliday and his followers, in what is known as SFG. It is not possible to fully 
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synthesise SFG’s theoretical assumptions here. Suffice to say that, according 
to SFG, human language is a complex tool that developed to allow 
communication and human interaction. One of Halliday’s most insightful 
intuitions is that language operates simultaneously on more than one level. 
Specifically, he identifies three ‘metafunctions’ of language: the ideational, the 
relational, and the textual. The textual metafunction deals with how the 
message (text) is organised, how it is presented; the ideational metafunction 
with how language, through grammar and the lexicon (the lexicogrammar) 
construes experience. Grammar, therefore, is ‘a theory of experience’ 
(Halliday, 1988). Finally, the relational metafunction identifies the task of 
building and maintaining relations and, through it, language continually 
operates to position speaker (or writer) and hearer (or reader) vis-à-vis each 
other. With these functions in mind (consciously or subconsciously), each 
locutor continually makes choices (in SFG, systems entail the possibility of 
making choices, hence the “systemic” in SFG) whenever she or he uses 
language. Various researchers have made use of insights derived from SFG 
to pursue their particular interests within their different approaches to the 
study of language. In the present work, especially chapters three and four, this
orientation will appear clearly. 
The ‘social’ nature of this research lies in the fact that it is preoccupied with 
language in a specific social context and — like traditional sociolinguistic work
— relates language form to extralinguistic factors. As noted, the research is 
also indebted to discourse studies in that its object is wide in scope; not only 
the individual lexeme or phoneme but ‘language beyond the sentence’. Or 
‘simply language – as it occurs’ (Tannen, 2007; emphasis in the original).
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In chapter four, which—as noted earlier—deals with evaluation in the 
language of the ALOMAR Plus informants, the analytical framework will shift 
from general SFG grammatical theory to the particular framework known as 
Appraisal Theory (AT). For reasons of relevance, chapters three and four will 
include more detailed discussions of the theoretical frameworks (SFG and AT 
respectively) as well as of the relevant literature within which each section is 
situated.
This research is also indebted (and should be see as a contribution) to the 
field known as Medical Humanities. Again, it is not possible here to go into 
detail as to what specifically researchers in this field are interested in14. 
Suffice to say that this burgeoning discipline aims to be the interface between 
biomedicine and the insights into the human experience as traditionally 
understood by the humanities. Several scholars (e.g Kleinmann op cit), many 
of whom are qualified doctors, have contributed immensely to our 
understanding of what it means to be ill and in pain, and to the role of 
language in this experience. The heterogeneity of approaches and insights 
used for this thesis is perhaps less suited to providing certainties but it 
nonetheless offers the possibility of gaining new insights when employed. 
A research on the experience of pain and illness that claims to be grounded in 
linguistics cannot ignore the fact that words mean in more than one way. From 
early work on denotation and connotation to more recent studies in fields such 
as sociology (Bourdieu, 1992) linguistics (Irigaray, 2002), Critical Discourse 
                                                            
14 For more details see, among others, Evans and Finlay, 2001 and Evans et al. eds. 2008.
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Analysis (Fairclough, 1995) and performativity (Butler, 1999)15, research has 
shown that, to use Irigaray’s (op cit) phrase, language is never neutral. Any 
terminology carries a number of overt and covert meanings; it offers, often 
imposes, interpretative keys which can be biased in a number of ways. In the 
case of this thesis, the problem became apparent shortly after the writing up 
process had begun. How, for example, ought the individuals who took part in 
the research, giving their consent to being interviewed, be referred to? 
In sociolinguistic and sociological studies, such individuals are variously 
referred to as ‘subjects’, ‘informants’, ‘participants’ or, in sociolinguistics, 
simply ‘speakers’. These commonly-used labels offer advantages, such as the 
possibility of protecting people’s identities. With their anodyne, supposedly 
neutral sound/tone, they also contribute to claims of objectivity, scientific 
precision and detachment, something that the social-sciences appear to envy 
the so-called ‘hard-sciences’, such as biology, chemistry, and physics16. Such 
supposed detachment, however, comes at a cost: depersonalisation. One 
thing that became obvious during this research was the intensely personal 
nature of the experiences collected. Pain may be invisible and intangible, but 
it is always experienced by someone: a woman or a man with a unique 
biological and psychological make-up, a unique history. Pain is always 
embodied and, crucially, personal (see Heshusius, 2009). Other terms 
                                                            
15 Obviously, this is not meant to be a full list of works on language as a tool for ‘creating’ reality, 
rather than merely ‘reproducing’ it. It should also be noted all of the scholars cited agree with each 
other’s views. For example, on Butler’s and Fairclough’s criticism of Bourdieu’s approach to language, 
see Myles (2010).
16 As Halliday (in Webster, ed. 2003: 199) points out, ‘those who study language have often been 
concerned with the status of linguistics as a science [...] us[ing] other, earlier developed sciences as a 
model.’
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employed in the literature, especially discourse studies on medical language, 
or works from the medical humanities, include sufferer, and the obvious 
patient. They too are unsatisfactory. The former, ‘sufferer’, provides an 
interpretative key: the person as ‘victim’; the latter medicalises the individual 
and assigns a role that may be far from the truth and this is true whether one 
concentrates on the etymological sense of the word or on the current meaning 
of ‘someone in the care of a medical institution or professional.’ Like the terms 
mentioned earlier, these too depersonalise the individual. In addition, they can 
be seen and perceived as patronising and can perpetuate stereotypes often 
seen as demeaning and disempowering. The fact that words applied to certain 
groups of people or employed by certain communities of practice is at least 
problematic has been noted by linguists but the point has been made 
particularly forcefully by authors involved in social work (Thompson, 2001) 
and in advocacy (Morris, 1991). As Thompson writes (op cit p. 31) ‘what is 
needed is not a simple list of proscribed words but, rather, an awareness of, 
and sensitivity to, the oppressive and discriminatory power of language.’ 
Therefore, in light of the above, choosing how to refer to the women and the 
one man who accepted to take part in the research has been challenging. I 
have opted for a mixed approach: in many cases, in what follows, I shall be 
referring to the individuals whose language is the topic of the present work by 
their first names (albeit modified, to protect anonymity). I shall also be using 
terms such as patient, informant, subject, speaker, and sufferer as more or 
less synonymous. This represents, in my view, a less than satisfactory choice 
and I am aware of the problems it entails.
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2.9 Some brief remarks on authorial stance in this thesis
Academic writing, like the research it follows from, is socially and historically 
situated; it has an I (the author or authors), a you (the readership), and an it, 
or a them, the topic and subjects of investigation. Yet, it is often the case that 
the practice of academic writing seems to imply that these three entities do 
not interact or influence each other, or do so only minimally. 
This is reflected in authorial practices, often enforced prescriptively, such as 
the avoidance of first-person pronouns (I, me, my, mine), and the use of 
agentless constructions (e.g. the research was conducted ...). Impersonality is 
often taken to represent a sine-qua-non for the achievement of the necessary 
detachment and academic rigour, as if the latter necessarily implied the 
former, and if the former automatically excluded the latter. With customary 
acumen, philosopher, psychoanalyst, and linguist Irigaray (2002: 1-2) is 
particularly forceful in her critique of the language of scientific and academic 
research. Referring to her own experience as an academic researcher and 
writer, she says: 
I felt irritated and amused by the language of science [...] the reality of 
scientific requirements, those norms or criteria of a so-called rigorous process. 
I stand before them as if I had to answer to them, to submit to being judged. A 
kind of tribunal of discourse [...]. This idealism, and its ideological 
consequences, require the ascendancy, or the authority, of a sentence or 
formula of the type: one says that x is equal to, greater than, or less than y. 
That is nothing more than an encoding of the world from which subjectivity is 
removed, and which is subordinated, under cover of the universal, to one 
single subject, or to several subjects. No feelings apparently ... A language 
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divested of all pathos, absolutely neutral and detached [...]. [S]cience does not 
say ‘I,’ or ‘you,’ or ‘we.’ (my emphasis)
As I embarked on this research-project, I operated with many of the same 
assumptions17. However, the more I interacted with the people whose stories 
this research aims to present and analyse, the more I read and thought about 
their words, the clearer it became that impersonality, let alone detachment, 
were neither truly possible nor, in my view, desirable. Cameron et al. (op cit p. 
5) reflect on the myth of impersonality with lucid words that deserve quoting in 
full:
[T]he subjectivity of the observer should not be seen as a regrettable 
disturbance but as one element [...]. Similarly, research subjects themselves 
are active and reflexive beings who have insights into their situations and 
experiences. They cannot be observed as if they were asteroids, inanimate 
lumps of matter: they have to be interacted with (my emphasis).
Therefore, I made the stylistic and intellectual choice of not shunning the 
personal in what follows, hence the presence of first-personal pronouns 
alongside generic ones; agentive as well agentless constructions. The hope is 
that this will be seen as a sign of intellectual openness and ownership, rather 
than of an inflated ego; of involvement coexisting with rigour. In the words of 
Ivanič (1998) who has written on issues of identity in academic writing:
                                                            
17 “The foundation for academia is what could be termed ‘proper science’ [...]. As students, 
researchers and professionals, we are the products of a long process of socialization into academic 
life, often heavily reliant on the value of science and objectivity above all else” (Dickson-Swift et al., 
2008: 82). Bourdieu (1988) refers to the professional socialisation of academics as the ‘habitus’. This 
habitus relies heavily on a set of linguistic practices, including (but not limited to) the ones mentioned 
here.
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Who am I as I write this book? I am not a neutral, objective scribe conveying 
the objective results of my research impersonally in my writing. I am bringing 
to it a variety of commitments based on my interests, values and beliefs which 
are built on my own history (p. 1).
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Chapter 3: The lexicogrammatical construal of pain in the Alomar
Plus corpus: a Systemic Functional Grammar perspective
The aim of this present chapter is to investigate the ways in which my 
informants construe — thorough the lexicogrammar of Italian — the 
experience of bodily pain. It should be pointed out that, in Systemic Functional 
Grammar (see below), the term lexicogrammar refers to the level of wording; it 
comprises both syntax and vocabulary. For Systemic Functional Grammar 
(SFG), ‘grammar and vocabulary are not two separate components of a 
language – they are just two ends of a single continuum’ (Halliday and 
Matthiesen, 2004: 7).
More specifically, the aim of this chapter is to offer an inventory of the 
lexicogrammatical resources through which pain is encoded and 
communicated by my informants through the lexicogrammar of Italian. At the 
same time, my intention is to comment on such tools and to offer insights on 
how they contribute to giving embodiment, in a linguistic sense, to this most 
unique of human experiences. Fundamental underlying questions of this 
chapter on the construal of pain in the corpus will be: 
What type of element is pain? Is it process, participant, or circumstance? Is it 
a quality of something? If participant, or quality, is it construed 
circumstantially? Does it involve the relationship between one process of 
configuration and another? And, in terms of any of these elements, is it simple 
or complex? And is it consistently construed in one way, or does it vary among 
different modes of construal? In other words, where does pain fit into the 
configuration of everyday experience?
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The chapter also aims to extend Halliday’s (1988) findings regarding the 
lexicogrammatical construal of bodily pain in English by applying the same 
analytical tools to a larger corpus of transcribed spoken data and to a 
language other than English. As previously noted, the investigation of the 
linguistic encoding of pain in languages other than English through SFG has 
been undertaken for Greek by Lascaratou and Hatzidaki (2000), Lascaratou 
(2003; 2007), for Japanese by Hori (2006), and for German by Overlach 
(2008). Where appropriate, elements of such works will be referred to and 
commented upon here. 
As pointed out in the introduction, this thesis as a whole and this section in 
particular can be understood as a further expansion of the investigation of this 
particular domain of experience using Halliday’s paradigm. As Lascaratou 
(2007) rightly points out, this domain of experience (bodily pain) is still 
underexplored by linguists.
The use of SFG for the analysis of health communication is not new (as the 
above references indicate); and not limited to speech about the experience of 
bodily pain. This analytical paradigm has been used, for example, to 
investigate the speech of individuals with mental health issues. In his work, 
Fine (2006) adopted SFG to instruct mental health professionals in the 
identification of ‘deviant’ speech, which might be indexical of a number of 
disorders, such as schizophrenia, psychosis, and mood disorders such as 
depression. In the introduction to his study, Fine points out that speakers 
affected by psychiatric disorders may show them only through the language 
they use. He therefore argues that ‘a functional [i.e. relating to how, through 
language, they mean] study of [their] language is not the study of a side 
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phenomenon or an epiphenomenon’ (p. 5). Instead, it is a central tool in 
‘seeing’ what might amount to an anomaly or a serious condition. Although the 
topic of this thesis present research is not psychiatric disorders but the 
experience of pain, there is similarity. As I shall argue later, for people who 
experience bodily pain — whose cause often takes a long time to be 
diagnosed and in some cases is never satisfactorily diagnosed — language is 
often the first, and at times the only, indicator of distress. However, as Fine 
(ibid p 7) points out, it is not only pathological conditions that language is 
indexical of. It ‘is also sensitive to disruptions in other areas of functioning —
such as shyness — and is indexical of them too.
3.1 A brief overview of SFG
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is appropriate to provide a brief overview 
of some aspects of the theoretical framework which, for the most part, informs 
it: Systemic Functional Grammar18. Particular attention will be paid to the 
notion of transitivity, as understood by SFG, and its relevance to our 
comprehension of the construal of real-life events through the grammar.
3.1.1 Grammar as theory of human experience
As previously noted, according to Halliday (1998: 2) the grammar of a natural 
language is a ‘theory of human experience, and it is a powerful theory in that it 
                                                            
18 It should be noted that although the theoretical framework known as Systemic Functional Grammar 
has its origins in the work of M.A.K Halliday, it is now practised widely and numerous researchers 
(many of whom are quoted here) have been making important contributions to the paradigm.
104
covers every aspect of that experience both real and imaginary.’ Through 
language, experience is filtered and construed and a certain ‘order’ is 
assigned to it. 
Referring specifically to the clause, Halliday and Matthiesen, (2004: 170), 
argue that it ‘is also a mode of reflection, of imposing order on the endless 
variation and flow of events.’ Indeed, in SFG, the clause is understood as a 
basic grammatical unit. As will be seen in more detail later, in a clause, 
participants, processes, and attendant circumstances are organised together. 
Within the clause, the central feature is the presence of a finite verb, which 
expresses the main process. For, SFG ‘processes’, or ‘going ons’, are what 
speakers consider reality to mainly consist of, rather than merely entities. 
Thus the clause (and — at a wider level — the grammar) is a ‘theory’ in the 
sense that through it we describe, order, and make sense of what surrounds 
us. Halliday and Matthiesen (ibid p. 24) argue that ‘we use language to make 
sense of our experience.’ Within the lexicogrammar, grammar – as Butt, Lukin 
and Matthiesen observe (2004: 270), the grammar has a remarkable power, 
because it lies and functions below the speaker’s conscious awareness; which 
leads them to talk of grammar as ‘covert operation.’ 
Therefore, it could be said that this chapter aims to ‘uncover’ such operation; 
to make explicit what the grammar does; how it construes a particular domain 
of experience – and through which linguistic means. It is, in other words, an 
exercise in ‘metagrammar’ or – to use Halliday’s term (2002: 373) –
‘grammatics’, in order to ‘reflect consciously’ on how the grammar of a specific 
natural language (Italian, in this case) helps us to grasp a certain area of our 
lived experience. As pointed out earlier, by scrutinising the grammar the hope 
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is also to shed light on how a particular group of speakers understand pain, 
both as an ‘entity’ and as an experience. 
Presumably, bodily pain has been part of the human experience from the 
earliest times. This, together with its complexity in terms of the sensory 
experiences it consists of, is bound to be reflected in the lexicogrammar of 
natural languages. Bearing in mind the cautionary words on the limitations of 
working with a relatively small corpus (see chapter 2 on methodology and 
corpus design), it is tempting to say that an analysis of the grammar of pain 
can help us understand how not only individuals, but also particular cultures 
understand it. 
Various researchers (e.g. Melzack, 1973; Cohen 2010; Rey 1995, inter alia) 
have noted that the experience of pain is very much a cultural product. Its 
role, value, and more generally the understanding of it vary across time and 
cultures. Paraphrasing Lascaratou (2003), at some point it might well be worth 
investigating not only what pain is for language, but also what language is 
(and does) to pain; how language, in other words, shapes the reality it tries to 
capture.
3.1.2 How language construes experience: the SFG perspective
Language construes human experience in multiple ways. At the most basic 
level, and arguably the most noticeable one, it categorises it by naming 
entities in the real and mental worlds. These are – broadly speaking - the 
entities (concrete and abstract; visible and invisible; real or imaginary) that we 
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perceive or believe to exist (Halliday and Matthiesen, 2004). However, Wolff 
and Malt (2010: 3) rightly point out that ‘although language may be crucial to 
human cognition, the basic units of cognition are clearly not words.’ They note 
that ‘people can have thoughts that are difficult to express’ and highlight the 
fact that logical — as well as other types — arguments indicate that ‘there 
must be a medium of thought that is independent of language.’ Nonetheless, 
language is still a potent tool for the formulation of thought (in its broadest 
sense) and for organising it. It is not only ‘things’, like house, river, or pain that 
are classified by language but also ‘happenings’, like walk, cut, and hurt. This, 
of course, is what lies at the base of the distinction between categories such 
as nouns and verbs, which has been familiar to grammarians since ancient 
times (Robins, 1997). 
Grammar simplifies reality, by making it more manageable and, arguably, less 
threatening. Some aspects of it are picked up and focussed upon at the 
expense of others. Yet, the grammar of a natural language also allows for 
complexity. It recognises that ‘human experience is too complex, and has too 
many parameters to be construed from any angle alone’ (Halliday, 2002: 374). 
Alternative views, at times conflicting ones, coexist in the grammar. This leads 
Halliday (ibid p. 374) to note that concurrence and complementarity are the 
salient characteristics of the ‘grammar of daily life.’ 
As I shall show in more detail in the following sections, a relevant example of 
this fact is that in the grammars of languages like (among others) Italian, 
English, and Greek, pain is construed at times as a thing, at times as an 
event, and at times as a quality, and realised respectively as a noun, a verb, 
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and an adjectivally. Furthermore, and more importantly, Halliday and 
Matthiessen (2004: 29) point out that: 
These elements are configured into complex grammatical patterns […]; the 
figures can be built up into sequences related by time, cause and the like -
there is no facet of human experience which cannot be transformed into 
meaning. In other words, language provides a theory of human experience, 
and certain of the resources of the lexicogrammar of every language are 
dedicated to that function (emphasis in the original).
Crucially, it is not only what happens ‘out there’, in the physical world, that 
language can construe and provide representations of. As previously 
mentioned, language is just as good at construing what happens ‘in here’, 
inside the speaker’s mind and – more relevantly for what we are dealing with -
within his or her body, below the skin surface. As pointed out by Fine (2006), 
effectively, what remains invisible to the eye is often apprehended by 
language.
3.1.3 Ways to mean 
The ‘representational’ function of language is known in SFG as the 
‘ideational’, one of the three19 ‘metafunctions’ of language. It is one of the 
three kinds of meanings that language encodes. The two other functions are 
the interpersonal and the textual. 
                                                            
19 Thompson (2004: 30) recognizes that other theoreticians have suggested other functions, such as 
‘expressive’.
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The interpersonal function relates to language as an exchange. Through it, 
the interaction and negotiation of meaning between speakers is constructed 
and negotiated. In essence, interpersonal meaning expresses how the 
speaker relates to the ideational meaning of an utterance, for instance by 
considering it a question, a request, or a demand. Through it, we try to 
influence and change other people’s behaviour, we express our opinions 
about what goes on in the world and attempt to influence and modify those of 
other people. More generally, language is a favourite tool for establishing and 
maintaining relationships with our fellow human beings.
Textual meaning relates to the organisation of the message. Fine (2006: 26) 
observes that ‘textual meaning is the meaning created when fitting an 
utterance into its context.’ It emerges in the choices a speaker makes in how 
to convey ideational and interpersonal meaning.
In SFG, these three categories are used, in the words of Thompson (2000: 
30):
[A]s the basis for exploring how meanings are created and understood, 
because they allow the matching of particular types of functions with particular 
types of wording to an extent that other categories do not
These are, of course, broad functions and this is why they are referred to as 
metafunctions (Thompson, 2004). Furthermore, according to Halliday and 
Matthiesen (2004: 30-31) the term metafunction in adopted in SFG to highlight 
the fact that what is being talked about is not merely the ‘purpose or way of 
using language’; using the term metafunction ‘suggest that function [is] an 
integral component within the overall theory.’ Coffin, Donohue, and North 
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(2009) observe that an approach to language such as SFG — which is 
communicative in nature — is particularly interested in linguistic forms in 
relation to which purposes they are used for.
3.1.4 The ideational metafunction and the construal of pain
As Thompson (2004: 86-87) points out, language, at its simplest level, 
‘reflects our view that the world consists of ‘goings-on’; these involve things, 
which in turn may have attributes and ‘go against background details of place, 
time, manner, etc.’. Such understanding is encapsulated, as stated above, by 
the ideational metafunction of language. As mentioned, in the grammar, this 
understanding is reflected in the fact that clauses – the fundamental units of 
meaning – consist of at least one main verb and of one or more participants 
(these ‘things’ can be material, but do not have to be), usually ‘realised’ (or 
‘actualised’) by nouns and noun-groups. ‘Things’ may also have attributes, 
normally realised by adjectives. In addition, the background details of time, 
place manner, and so on, are normally realised by adverbials, or adverbial 
groups. However, as Fine (2006: 40-41) points out, the elements that are 
combined in the grammar ‘are not things, events or circumstances directly, but 
rather the linguistic expression of them.’ Things are expressed in terms of 
linguistic categories labelled ‘participants’. Based on the meanings they 
encode, some of the most important types of participants are: Actor20, Goal, 
Senser, and Phenomenon, of which more will be said later.
                                                            
20 In SFG, it is customary for participants to be capitalised. This convention will be adopted throughout 
the present work.
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The construal of the experience of bodily pain through the ideational 
metafunction will be the main topic of this present chapter. Thus, what I shall 
be dealing with here are the ways in which my informants construe both their 
pain and the experience of having and being in pain through the grammar, in 
particular that of the clause. 
If, as McCaffery (1972) puts it, ‘pain is whatever the experiencing person says 
it is, existing whenever he says it does’, then the relevance of a close scrutiny 
of the grammar of pain in the clause becomes obvious. It is tempting to go so 
far as to say that linguistic analysis is probably one of the most accurate tools 
for finding out what pain truly is for an individual.
3.1.5 Transitivity
Within the ideational metafunction, the system that embodies the nature of 
reality as consisting of ‘goings-on’ is that of transitivity. 
Transitivity, in SFG, has a broader sense than the one it has in traditional 
grammar. Although in the SFG understanding of transitivity the focus is 
maintained on the main verbal group in the clause, ‘it refers to a system for 
describing the whole clause, rather than just the verb and its object’ 
(Thompson, op. cit, pp. 88-9). It is the type of process expressed by the main 
verbal group, in fact, that determines to a large extent how the participants are 
labelled. According to Halliday and Matthiesen (2004: 170), the transitivity 
system: 
[C]onstrues the world of experience into a manageable set of PROCESS 
TYPES. Each process type provides its own model or schema for construing a 
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particular domain of experience as a figure of a particular kind (emphasis in 
the original).
What is important to bear in mind is that the way a particular event, situation, 
or happening is construed, is only one possible option among many. The 
grammar – and (albeit unconsciously) - through it, the speaker(s) – has 
‘chosen’ to construe it in a particular way, thus interpreting reality, favouring 
and perpetrating a particular world-view. The sum of these grammatically 
construed (and constituted) world-views constitutes ‘ideology’. Ideology, as 
argued by Butt et al (2004: 27):
is a function of the fact that we can construct multiple versions of the ‘same’ 
physical, biological, social and semiotic events.
3.1.6 Processes and the clause
As noted, in SFG, the clause is seen as the basic unit of grammar. This is 
‘because it is at this rank that we can begin to talk about how things exist, how 
things happen and how people feel […]. It is also at the rank of the clause that 
we usually use language to interact with others21’ (Bloor and Bloor, 2004:8). 
Clearly, not all processes (or happenings) are of the same type. It is 
indisputable that, although hitting and thinking are both types of happenings, 
they also differ in some fundamental ways. The former is a more 
stereotypically ‘material’ process. It entails someone or something materially
                                                            
21 Other researchers, for example Chaika (2000) who is not — however — a systemic functional 
grammarian, consider the phrase to be the fundamental unit of grammar.
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doing something to something or somebody else. Thinking, however, can still 
be seen as a kind of ‘action’, but in a more abstract or ‘private’ way. The 
process, in other words, happens entirely inside the speaker’s mind and is a 
product and a manifestation of his or her consciousness. This is not to say, of 
course, that the act of thinking cannot present some outward manifestations 
(body language that indexical of it, for instance) or that a physical act, realised 
linguistically by a verb indicating a ‘material’ act, like hitting, does not involve 
or follows from some act of mental activity.
3.1.7 Types of process identified by SFG
The main types of process identified by SFG theory are: material, mental, and 
relational. These are not the only types of process and a full list can be found 
in Halliday and Matthiesen (2004) and Thompson (2004). However, these 
three process types are responsible for the linguistic encoding of the majority 
of events. 
The criteria for recognising a particular ‘going-on’ as typifying a certain 
process are based, according to Thompson (ibid p. 79), on ‘a combination of 
common sense and grammar: common sense to distinguish the different kinds 
of ‘goings-on’ […], and grammar to confirm that these intuitive differences are 
reflected in the language and thus to justify the decision to set up a separate 
category.’ In the following section, I shall give a synopsis of each of these 
processes and of the participants that are typically involved in each process.
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3.1.8 Material processes 
These are processes of ‘doing’, and involve physical actions, such as: writing, 
binding, hitting. These processes mainly express the experience of the world 
existing outside of the individual. In this type of process, there is most clearly 
a ‘doer’, which is given the label Actor. In the clause, the Actor can be 
mentioned explicitly or omitted. When the action of a material process 
involves two participants, the ‘done-to’ is labelled Goal ‘since the action is, in a 
sense, directed at this participant’ (Thompson, 2004: 90). Halliday and 
Matthiesen (2004) note that another term sometimes used in other traditions 
for this function is patient, ‘meaning the one that “suffers” or “undergoes” the 
process.’ (p. 181). The two scholars comment that, in reality, neither of the 
two terms is completely adequate, the relevant concept being more like that of 
‘one to which the process is extended.’ As Fine (2006: 40) notes, ‘some of 
these material are rather abstract but nevertheless express happenings in the 
world (e.g. ‘They were absolved of all wrong-doing’; emphasis in the original). 
Interestingly, from a pragmatics point of view, to absolve, for example in 
reporting on the decision taken by a court of justice, would be an example of a 
speech-act: a verbal action which effectively alters a state of affairs in the real 
world.
In a material process, the Actor may be human and the Goal inanimate, but 
this need not be the case. It is perfectly possible, and indeed quite common, 
to have an inanimate or abstract Actor and a human Goal. Figure 3.1 shows 
some examples of this, the first of which is taken from the ALOMAR Plus 
corpus:
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Participant 
1
Actor
Process Participant 
2
Goal
Circumstance
The coach hit me beneath my foot [the sole of my 
foot
The rock hit her leg
The fear paralysed the crowd
Figure 3.1. Material processes.
3.1.9 Mental processes 
Clearly, not all verbs can be easily described as ‘verbs of doing’. It follows that 
the labels of Actor and Goal given to the participants in a clause where such is 
the case are not really appropriate. Verbs that refer to happenings going on in 
the speaker’s mind, such as liking, agreeing, seeing, hearing, thinking, 
intuitively belong to a separate semantic category. They relate to the 
individual’s inner world and include processes of perception (e.g she heard 
the phone ring), of affection (e.g. he loves her), and of cognition (e.g. they 
realised what he was up to). The person in whose mind they occur is labelled 
Senser, with whatever is liked, agreed to, seen, heard, and so on labelled as 
Phenomenon.
All mental processes potentially involve both a Senser and a Phenomenon.
This does not mean that they must be overtly expressed in the clause each 
time. There can be a Senser without a Phenomenon: Lucy understands; and 
also a Phenomenon but no Senser: He only did it to surprise. 
Unlike material processes, mental ones are ‘reversible’. What this means is 
that in a mental process, the role of grammatical subject can be filled either by 
the person in whose mind the process occurs, or by the Phenomenon itself. 
Compare he was surprised by her arrival to her arrival surprised him.
115
3.1.10 Relational processes 
Relational processes ‘serve to characterize and identify’ (Halliday and 
Matthiesen, 2004: 210). They are processes of being and having. They allow 
the individual to make generalisations by relating one kind of experience to 
another one. Typically, as Bloor et al. (2004: 120) note, relational processes 
are ‘realized by the verb be or some verb of the same class (known as copular 
verbs); for example, seem, become, appear (as in ‘she appeared cheerful’) or 
sometimes by verbs such as have, own, possess.’ 
Consider the following clause, uttered by one of the informants, Annamaria 
(3.1) era un dolore, acuto ‘it was an acute pain’ (Am I: 6).22 Here a relationship 
is established between two concepts (‘pain’ and, in this case, ‘acute’); here 
the predicator (‘is’) does not so much indicate a process as establish a 
relationship between an entity, labelled Carrier, and an Attribute of that entity. 
Indeed, in SFG this is called an attributive relational clause. Unlike for 
processes of doing, in the real world there is only one participant in this kind of 
process.
But there is also a second type: identifying relational processes. Here, one 
entity is identified in terms of another; in this type of process, the Predicator
functions more or less like an ‘equals’ (=) sign. The promotion was his goal is 
an example (the promotion=his goal). In identifying clauses, the order of the 
                                                            
22 The codes following quotations in chapters 3 – 6 refer to the participant, type of data, and the page 
of the original first version of the transcript (in Italian) where the quotation appears. The page 
number refers to the single interview transcript. In this case, for example Am I=Annamaria’s 
interview; 6=page six of the original transcript. The codes for each informant are: Am-Annamaria; 
A=Anna; S=Sandra; G=Gina; V=Veronica; M=Marta; F=Fabio.
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participants is reversible (his goal was the promotion is also possible), 
although not fully interchangeable23. To reflect the difference in functions 
between the participants in identifying clause and those in an attributive one, 
those in the former are given the labels Identified and Identifier, as shown in 
Figure 3.2:
Carrier Process: 
relational, 
attributive
Attribute
The pain Was acute
The promotion Was his goal
Identifier Process: 
relational, 
identifying
Identified
Figure 3.2. Relational processes.
Two additional relational processes are behavioural and existential. They both 
share some of the characteristics of the main types and can in fact be sees as 
‘sub-categories rather than as groups on a par with the four main types’ 
(Thompson, 2004: 103).
Behavioural processes are processes of physiological and psychological 
behaviour. They share similarities with material and mental ones. They are 
typically human processes and include, following Halliday et al. (2004: 248), 
breathing, smiling, dreaming and staring. Characteristically, behavioural 
processes have only one participant, which is the human Behaver. However, 
in some cases, there might be what Thompson (ibid p. 104) calls another 
‘apparent participant’, which normally functions as a complement. This other 
                                                            
23 See Thompson (2004: 118-19) for a discussion of the reasons for the non-interchangeability of 
‘reversed’ identifying clauses.
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apparent participant is referred to as Range, or Behaviour. It is not, writes 
Thompson (ibid p. 104), ‘a real participant but merely adds specification to the 
process’. 
One should note that ‘many of [the] verbs [in behavioural clauses] also occur 
non-behaviourally’ (Halliday and Matthiesen, 2004: 251): ‘contrast think as 
behavioural process, in Be quiet! I’m thinking, with think as mental process, in 
they think we’re stupid.’
Finally, existential clauses are those that represent something that exists, or 
happens. The clause there are two additional processes: behavioural and 
existential is an example. These are very common in narrative texts: (for 
example: there was once a princess). The element or event whose existence 
is thus predicated, is labelled Existent. The Existent can be concrete or 
abstract, human or non-human, as long as it can be construed as a ‘thing’.
In order to better illustrate the way language configures experience into 
processes, and by way of summary, let us look in closer detail at an extract 
from one of the interviews (the speaker is Annamaria). 
(3.2) I had a very strong pain when breathing (Am I: 4)
In the above example, Annamaria has set up, through the grammar, a 
configuration where two separate entities (things) are identified (I and a very 
strong pain). 
In this instance, one of the two entities — or participants — is the speaker 
herself. The particular configuration that she has set up is one which indicates 
possession (albeit, as we shall see in more detail later on, of a somewhat 
118
peculiar kind), where X possesses A. A process where a relationship is set up 
between participants is identified, as we have seen, as relational. Admittedly, 
it can seem quite odd to consider ownership as a relational process. The 
reason for its inclusion – according to SFG theory – within such processes is 
that ‘something possessed can be seen as a kind of attribute’ (Thompson, 
2004: 94). This is more apparent when ‘the thing possessed is an inherent 
part of the possessor: ‘She’s got long, dark hair’ (ibid p. 94, emphasis in the 
original). Yet, as Thompson argues (ibid p. 94), other kinds of possession (like 
the above quotation from Annamaria’s interview shows) differ from the 
prototypical relation of ownership ‘not in essence but only in terms of how 
temporary the possession is.’ For this reason, in a relationship of this type, the 
possessor is identified as the Carrier, while the possessed is seen as the 
Attribute. Figure 3.4 illustrates this:
I Had a very strong pain when breathing
Participant Process Participant Circumstance
Carrier Process Attribute
Figure 3.4. Possession as a kind of relational process.
As previously noted, this (the possession of pain) is indeed a peculiar kind of 
possession. For a start, the owner has not acquired it willingly and cannot get 
rid of it when she pleases. Semantically, it is not the prototypical kind of 
ownership. It is now therefore easier to see, from a semantic point of view, the 
similarities between this special type of possession and a personal attribute 
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(like hair colour), as well as their relationship with the Owner/Carrier of that 
attribute.
We can also note that this configuration construes pain as a separate entity; it 
is ‘other than’, although related to, the possessor. This has several 
advantages, one of which is that it allows, through the grammar, for different 
degrees of proximity to (or of distance from, depending on the point of view) 
the ‘owning’ subject. Through the use of possessives and demonstratives, for 
example, speakers are able to increase or reduce the cognitive and 
psychological space between themselves and their pain. They can, in other 
words, construe pain as more or less disembodied, more or less alien. This is 
an example of reality not only being represented but construed in and by
language. Especially in the case of pain – which we cannot observe other 
than by observing the words of the sufferer - language becomes the means 
whereby the experience of pain is presented both to the sufferer him/herself 
and to the outside world. The fact that the grammar of pain is so varied and 
multifaceted should not surprise us, since it not only construes pain (in itself 
highly variable) but also the experience of it by the individual. 
3.2 The lexical realisation of ‘pain’ in the ALOMAR Plus corpus: ‘key lexical 
items’
As explained in the preceding section, language — through the 
lexicogrammar — configures the experience of pain in a number of ways. As 
we shall see, analysing language in terms of the system of transitivity (within 
the ideational metafunction) can shed light on the ALOMAR Plus speakers’ 
‘theory’ of the pain experience.
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However, to begin with I shall look at the individual items in the corpus which 
lexicalise the entity ‘pain’. What I have termed ‘key lexical items’ are the 
lexical realisations of pain in the corpus. They comprise nouns, verbs, and 
adjectives, reflecting the way in which the experience is construed and 
(re)presented. 
In the following sections, a quantitative account of these ‘key’ items will be 
provided and become the focus of analysis. Such items belong to different 
word classes. They are summarised in Figure 3.5 below:
Lexical Item English Equivalent Word Class
dolore pain noun
sofferenza sufferance/suffering noun
doloroso painful adjective
dolente sore adjective
dolorante painful adjective
far male to do (give) pain verb
far soffrire to make/cause to suffer verb
Figure 3.5. Key lexical items for 'pain'.
Italian nouns and adjectives are morphologically marked for gender and 
number. As customary, the above list gives forms in the masculine singular, 
although in the corpus each form is analysed separately. The list is a relatively 
short one; and yet, as will become apparent, it is in the high number of 
configurations in which pain enters that the complex, multifaceted nature of 
the pain experience is revealed. This apparent paucity in the lexicon of pain 
might be perplexing at first. Cohen (2010), in her studies of pain in the late 
Middle Ages, gives a first answer by suggesting that, in order to make 
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accurate communication and diagnosis possible, the lexicon of pain has to 
remain fairly stable and relatively limited.
The relative scarcity of lexical items denoting the concept ‘pain’ in its various 
manifestations and effects should not mislead us. For a start, pain, when 
construed nominally, can be modified adjectivally in order to portray and 
specify all its nuances. This can clearly be seen if one has a cursory look at 
the Italian version of the shorter McGill Pain Questionnaire (1985). This widely 
used diagnostic tool asks sufferers to choose from among seventy-eight 
adjectives the ones that best describe their pain. These include, tremolante
‘trembling’, stancante’ tiring’, intenso ‘intense’, torturante ‘torturing’. But the 
lexicon, it must be kept in mind, is not the only means whereby meaning is 
created. Speakers of natural languages have a very powerful tool: the 
grammar. It is through the grammar, ‘the semiogenic powerhouse of 
language’ (Halliday, 2000), that a great deal of meaning potential is actually 
realised. A similar point is made by Wierzbicka (1998: 9). She argues that 
meaning is jointly conveyed by grammatical constructions and words. 
Meaning, she argues, ‘is conveyed by the utterance as a whole’.
What element does more of the work in the transmission of meaning depends 
significantly on the mode of communication. As Halliday and Matthiessen 
(2004) note, different modes of communication – written as opposed to 
spoken, for example – rely more on one than the other. These modes respond 
to different communicative and pragmatic constraints. The state of constant 
flux of the spoken language – especially in its less constrained forms, like 
conversation – is reflected in its rich patterns of semantic, and hence also 
grammatical, variation. The spoken language relies more on grammar to 
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achieve what the written language achieves lexically. It would be interesting to 
look closely at a corpus of written language dealing with pain, like literary 
texts, to see whether the inventory of lexical items used is somewhat richer. 
This is beyond the scope of the present work; however, it may represent a 
future direction and an expansion of the current study. 
As will become clear in the presentation and analysis of the data, speakers do 
make use of the full range of grammatical resources at their disposal to 
convey their experience. It is interesting to note how, on more than one 
occasion, they comment on the difficulty in finding the ‘right word’ to describe 
their pain. After all, the lexicon represents, for the majority of people, the most 
visible example of what constitutes language. We commonly say that we lack 
the words for something that we find difficult to express, not the grammar. 
However, the ALOMAR Plus speakers immediately resort to the richness of 
the grammar to compensate for it.
3.2.1 Different lexicogrammatical realisations of ‘pain’ in the corpus
Already from the brief list of key items given above, it can be seen that pain is 
at times realised by a noun, at times by a verb, and at times as an adjective; 
this is as true of Italian as it is of English (as shown by Halliday, 1988). Given 
the complexity of the pain experience, this is hardly surprising. A closer look at 
the frequency with which each realisation appears in the corpus will begin to 
reveal some patterns.
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3.2.2 Frequencies for different lexicogrammatical realisations of ‘pain’ in the 
ALOMAR Plus corpus
‘Dolore’, in the singular and plural forms, appears 197 times; its quasi-
synonym male, six times. The adjectives doloroso and dolorante both appear 
three times; dolente also occurs three times. Sofferente, used in the same 
sense, appears twice. Far male ‘to cause pain/to hurt’, in its various 
realisations according to tense and person, occurs thirty-one times; far soffrire
(lit. ‘to make/to cause to suffer’) is only found once. A summary is given in 
Table 3.1 below:
Type Occurrences Percentage of total
Process (verb) 32 12.95%
Participant (noun) 203 82.18%
Quality (adjective) 12 4.85%
Total number of lexical 
Items referring to pain
247 100%
Table 3.1. Pain realisations in the corpus.
As the preceding table clearly shows, speakers in the ALOMAR Plus corpus 
overwhelmingly construe pain as participant, nominally. Doing so is likely to 
be due to the context in which talk about pain occurs. The informants in the 
present research are — for the most part — narrating their past experiences 
of pain and not relating an extant painful sensation as one would do when 
communicating the problem during a medical consultation. Other researchers 
have obtained different results. Lascaratou (2003; 2007), who investigated a 
larger corpus of doctor-patient interactions, is an example. Her participants 
mainly construe pain as process, which led her to conclude that the Greek 
language in general favours this configuration. Part of her conclusion is that 
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the degree of the patient’s involvement of self in the painful experience is a 
determining factor in the choice of the linguistic framing. She also argues that 
when pain is construed and communicated via nominal constructions (through 
the word ponos ‘pain’ in Greek), ‘the role of pain utterances is undoubtedly 
descriptive’ (2003: 18); whereas when construed verbally, their role is more 
‘expressive’, resembling in function the primitive, spontaneous groan of pain. 
It is possible that, as stated above, the overall aim and the context of the 
verbal exchange are important factors in the way the pain experience is 
encoded linguistically. Someone who is actually in pain at the time of 
speaking, who might be seeing a doctor at the local surgery, like Lascaratou’s 
participants, or in a casualty department in order to seek help, is clearly under 
specific constraints. Such an individual’s aims and priorities are quite different 
from those of a chronic sufferer being interviewed by an academic researcher.
Nevertheless, when construed as thing, pain can easily enter configurations 
where it is represented as a foreign entity. As such, it can also be seen as 
possessing and showing agency to varying degrees: not only does it exist, it 
also does something to you, often displaying a high degree of volition. The 
following are three examples, from the corpus:
(3.3) Like it had disappeared, similarly it came back again (F I: 1)
(3.4) When the pain got to here there was [it felt like] an explosion (A 
I: 1)
(3.5) It would get slightly inflamed, then it [the pain] would affect [take] 
all the tendons (A I: 2)
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In all three cases, pain appears as participant in processes that are normally 
associated with a volitional Actor. To disappear and to reappear, to arrive, and 
to take (in the sense of ‘to take hold of something or somebody’), are all 
processes of this type. In all the examples above, pain is construed as 
participant – an Actor – in material processes, occupying the position of 
grammatical subject. This type of configuration, with pain as a discrete entity, 
is consistent with the common view of it (and, more generally, illness) as 
external to the body, ‘other than self’, an example of which is the first of the 
three above extracts. An ‘objectified’ pain, in addition to allowing a 
representation of it (the pain) as foreign, also makes the very act of talking 
about it possible.
Before continuing, additional comments on the aforementioned scarcity of 
lexical items in Italian – nouns, to be precise – to denote pain should be 
added. As already highlighted, one of the ways in which language construes 
experience is by giving things a name. Since it is not uncommon to see 
culturally relevant aspects of reality encoded in, and reflected by the richness 
in the lexicon of a particular domain of experience, the scarcity of synonyms 
for pain can be, as mentioned earlier, puzzling.
One of the ways that language compensates for such scarcity, is by providing 
lexical items which can be seen as metaphorical; bruciore, ‘burning (noun)’ 
(the body, or body part is not actually on fire, but it may feel as if it were), fitta
‘a piercing pain’, and the like are, after all, kinds of pain. They imply an ‘as if’ 
scenario: un bruciore alla gola ‘a burning at the throat’ is a pain ‘as if it were 
burning’. Yet, even if one considers words like bruciore, fitta, and so on, as 
synonyms for pain, they are still relatively infrequent in my corpus.
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So, the full scale of the variety of pain and of its experience by the suffering 
individual is encapsulated by the transitivity system. By alternately construing 
it as thing, process, quality and circumstance, the grammar allows the 
speaker to encode differently the various aspects of pain, often within the 
same text. The ‘semantic work’ is therefore conveniently split – albeit rather 
unequally – between lexicon and grammar.
3.3 The grammatical properties of pain as participant
Having established that in the majority of cases pain – in the Alomar Plus
corpus – is construed as participant and realised by a noun, I shall now look in 
more detail at the types of process it takes part in.
In his work on the grammar of pain Halliday (1998: 11-13) lists ‘seven 
grammatical properties that are associated with pain as a participant’ (i.e. an 
entity or ‘thing’ that takes part in a process). They are ‘grammatical’ in the 
sense that they are inherent properties of pain that find a reflection in the 
lexicogrammar. 
The fact that pain has temporality, for example, is made ‘visible’ in the 
grammar through – among other devices – the tense system. Consider the 
following clauses: I got a headache this morning, and it still hasn’t left me. 
Here, through the tense system (as well as the adjunct ‘this morning’) the 
grammar is able to capture the fact that the entity we call pain has temporal 
extension; the moment of its inception can be precisely located in time. The 
temporal extension of pain can also be seen in the use of the present perfect 
tense in the second clause. 
127
As mentioned, temporal adjuncts, such as this morning and still also 
contribute to giving this property of pain a lexicogrammatical instantiation. Of 
course it is not only verbs that can be relied upon to show the temporal 
qualities of pain. Adjectives can be used to the same effect; a pain can be 
described as costante ‘costant’ or continuo ‘continuous’. In the case of 
adjectives, however, the temporal extension is given by their semantic content 
and of course both (adjective and the tense/aspect systems) can be used 
jointly for greater accuracy and effect as in: ho avuto un dolore 
costante/intermittente per quattro giorni‘ I’ve had an intermittent/constant pain 
for four days.’ The complete list of the grammatical properties of pain that 
Halliday (1988: 13) identifies is reproduced below: 
a) -pain may be a bounded thing, realised as a count noun;
b) -it is a thing which is possessed. As such, it can be acquired, kept in 
possession, and lost. Such possession may be in the past;
c) -pain has temporality, i.e. location in time and duration;
d) -it has variable intensity and there may be an external agency 
bringing about the degree of intensity;
e) -it has various locations within the body. The location may be 
construed circumstantially as a locative of place or as a class of pain, 
such as mal di testa ‘headache’; 
f) -pain has different qualities; these include burning, aching, throbbing, 
stabbing, shooting, etc. It is obviously not a closed system and –
interestingly – ‘it lies at the intersection of the technical register of 
medical practice with the non-technical register of the everyday 
discussion of personal ailments’ (ibid p. 13);
g) -pain has conditions; these ‘can be construed as a temporal nexus, 
showing accompanying (simultaneous) circumstances.’
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In the following section, I shall refer to these properties to verify if and how 
they appear in the ALOMAR Plus corpus. 
3.4 Possession
Italian, together with many other languages, frequently configures pain as an 
entity in possession of an individual, as in ‘Mary had a pain in her shoulder’. 
This individual is the one affected by the pain. As we have seen this is, in SFG 
terms, a relational process of possession. There is a Carrier (in this case the 
person who has the pain), and an Attribute, the pain itself. This type of 
configuration does indeed appear frequently in the ALOMAR Plus corpus, 
although the frequency with which individual speakers use it varies. Only one 
informant (Fabio) does not use it at all; two of them (Anna and Gina) use it 
once, while all the others (Annamaria, Veronica, Sandra, and Marta) use it 
more frequently.
In the vast majority of cases, the speaker is the Carrier, realised either by a 
verb ending or – as it is often the case – by an overt subject-pronoun. Unlike 
English, Italian is a pro-drop language and the presence of the subject-
pronoun in the clause is marked. However, from the point of view of the 
clause as representation – the ideational metafunction of language – this does 
not make any difference. It is interesting to note that, although the grammar 
allows it, never in the corpus do we find configurations of possession with a 
body part as Carrier. So, although a clause like: la mano ha un dolore ‘the 
hand has a pain’ is perfectly grammatical, it is never employed. Although the 
question of the centrality of the individual will be explored in more detail in 
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chapters 4 and 5, here it is possible to briefly suggest a possible reason for 
this. To do so, it is necessary to temporarily shift our attention away from the 
ideational metafunction of language and onto the textual.
3.5 The textual metafunction of language: language as text-language in 
context
The textual metafunction can be broadly defined as the one that deals with 
the way we structure our messages, and ‘how they fit in with the other 
messages around them and with the wider context in which we are talking and 
writing’ (Thompson, 2004: 30). Within the textual metafunction, a number of 
structural and non-structural relations that express different kinds of meaning 
are included. One of the structural devices is the thematic structure, through 
which the speaker encodes information as given and new, and in so doing 
assigns topical prominence.
The theme is ‘the point of departure of the message’, or ‘that which locates 
and orients the clause within its context’ (Halliday and Matthiesen, 2004: 64). 
Earlier, Halliday (1995: 39) had suggested glossing the theme as ‘I’ll tell you 
about…’. The theme, in other words, is what the message is about. 
A clause like: ho un dolore al polso, ‘(I) have a pain in the wrist’, from the point 
of view of the textual metafunction has ho (have-PRES: 1Sing., which 
conflates io ‘I’ and ho, ‘have’) as the theme, making the speaker the theme 
that the rest of the clause elaborates on. The speaker, in other words, and not 
the pain or the wrist is what the message is about. So, although possible (and 
possibly more accurate) a clause like: il (mio) polso ha un dolore, ‘the [my] 
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wrist has a pain’ is not favoured by speakers. Such a configuration would in 
fact make the clause about a body part. Yet, it is the person in its entirety —
holistically, one might say — not body parts that experiences pain. Figure 3.6 
sets out the relationships in the SFG framework. It is worth reiterating, 
however, that language attends to all the three metafunctions simultaneously 
and it is only for convenience that here we deal with them separately.
Carrier Process: relational. 
possession
Phenomenon
Io
I
Ho
Have
un dolore al polso
a pain at the wrist
Theme
Figure 3.6. Message structure of a 'pain clause'.
The use of possessive markers ‘also brings out the understanding of pain as a 
possession’ (Lascaratou, 2004:121). Yet, remarkably, in the present corpus 
both interviewer and participants never use them; a finding consistent with 
Lascaratou’s, in whose corpus possessive markers are used only marginally 
and predominantly by doctors when examining their patients.
This lack of possessive markers in conjunction with the noun dolore, is 
consistent with the treatment, in Italian, of body parts, which are not normally 
accompanied by possessive markers but by the definite article: ha le [definite 
article, feminine plural) mani sottili e i (definite article, masculine plural) capelli 
neri, ‘she/he has got thin hands and black hair’. 
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In turn, this is consistent with SFG’s understanding of possession as a 
relational process akin to the possession of a physical attribute (hair length, 
colour, and so on). Just as it does with physical attributes, the grammar of 
Italian allows the use of possessive markers with pain, yet it does not favour 
them, and when used they appear to be marked. In this aspect, the 
possession of pain appears to be quite unlike ordinary possessions (at least 
from a grammatical point of view).
Like other possessions, though, pain can be acquired and received, owned 
and lost. Yet, unlike prototypical possessions, pain becomes the property of 
its owner entirely on its own terms. It is not usually sought after and – once it 
makes its appearance – it is certainly not welcome. Again unprototypically for 
a possession, the owner cannot get rid of it when she pleases: it is the 
possessed that ‘decides’ to leave the owner, not the other way around. This 
understanding is enshrined in the grammar of the language and is likely to be 
at the base of popular models of pain and illness. As Butt et al. (2004) point 
out, it is these grammatically-construed world-views that constitute ideologies. 
In some cases, these construals have undergone a further process of 
crystallisation; proverbs and sayings – which may well be universal – are a 
case in point. Following is a Lombard proverb about the apparently capricious 
nature of illness, its quick onset and slow departure:
El mal el ven a cavall e el torna a pé
disease [or pain] arrives on horse back and leaves on foot
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The grammar of the two clauses above is quite revealing. In both of them, 
disease is the Actor and grammatical subject; by assigning it roles that are 
normally occupied by humans (riding a horse and walking on foot), the 
volitional nature of disease is highlighted even further. An already quoted 
extract, from Fabio’s interview, portrays in a similar manner the 
unpredictability of pain by casting it in the role of Actor and grammatical 
subject of an intransitive verb in a material clause: 
(3.6) Like it had disappeared, similarly it came back again. (F I: 1)
Similarly, Sandra recollects the following remark (possibly by a doctor) on an 
occasion when, while on holiday, she began experiencing severe pain in her 
knees: 
(3.7) They explained to me that the only thing [to do] was rest; when it [the 
pain] felt like it, it would leave. No point in [taking] tablets; no point in 
[using] creams. (S I: 3)
It is interesting to note not only the volitional, but also the capricious nature 
attributed to pain by the speaker. Pain – Sandra is told – will leave quando 
c’ha voglia ‘when it feels like it.’ Again, it is the construal of pain as thing that 
allows its ‘personification’ and this type of characterisation. There are 
therefore many insights to be gained on an individual’s and a culture’s 
understanding of how pain works by scanning the grammar of the clauses in 
which it appears, in particular as a possession.
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3.6 The temporality of pain
As noted, pain has temporal location as well as duration. Often temporal 
location and extension are represented in the clause as Circumstance, often 
realised by an adverb or adverbial group but also by prepositional phrases. It 
is worth remembering that, in SFG, circumstantial elements are ‘optional 
augmentations of the clause rather than obligatory components. [They] are 
not directly involved in the process’ (Halliday and Matthiesen, 2004: 176-7). 
That is not to say that they are not relevant; on the contrary, they can provide 
information which is essential from a narrative and textual point of view. For 
example, to say that a particular pain is experienced at night or, say, after 
eating can be an essential piece of information but is not, strictly speaking, 
part of the process itself. Circumstantial elements ‘augment [the experiential 
centre of the clause] in some way – temporally, spatially, causally and so on’ 
(Halliday and Matthiesen, ibid p. 176).
(3.8) In October I’ve had, at night a pain here, at night I had very strong pains 
in my hands. (Am I: 8)
(3.9) [the pain] made its appearance in the hand. (V I: 1)
(3.10) it is constant thing pain in the sense that more or less intense: I’ve 
always had it. (V I: 4)
(3.11) I remember that one afternoon it was an acute pain, fixed, uh: that […] 
as it had appeared so it left. (V I: 2)
(3.12) I had many joint-pains […] joint-pains especially went on for about ten 
years. (Am I: 1)
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However, as both Halliday (1998) and Lascaratou (2003: 122) point out (for 
English and Greek respectively), ‘the duration of pain may also be 
metaphorically expressed as a quality in the form of an adjective’. In this case, 
the adjective may function as either an Epithet or an Attribute. In the latter 
case, a quality (labelled Attribute) is ascribed to an entity (labelled Carrier). 
(3.13) Annamaria: They were, they were, yes, yes; they were persistent. (Am 
I: 10)
(3.14) Fabio: [the pain] was a constant thing; that is a constant pain. (F I: 6)
Contrary to initial expectations, in the ALOMAR Plus corpus there are not 
many occurrences of duration being construed as Attribute in a relational 
clause with pain as Carrier. This could be because of the relatively little 
precision that such a construction offers; the duration of pain in an attributive 
clause gives pain a temporal dimension but it does not anchor it 
chronologically. If the overall aim of the linguistic exchange is to give a 
‘history’ of one’s pain, it might be that the speaker is more likely to encode 
references to time circumstantially, situating pain by giving it a beginning and 
an end, rather than merely characterising it as, say, constant or intermittent.
The onset of pain and its duration are obviously particularly relevant, both for 
the sufferer and for those around her or him. The moment that pain started 
can often take on quasi-mythical status for a sufferer, and it can be 
remembered (and mentioned) with a high degree of precision. There is a 
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‘before’ and an ‘after’; entirely new identities can come into existence following 
the appearance of pain. Following is an example of the precision with which 
the genesis of illness and pain are remembered: 
(3.15) Well, I am 32 years old. I became ill in 1983. I was 11 years old; I have 
been ill for 21 years […] I began to have fever pains. (S I: 1)
Apart from the general onset of pain, sufferers can also be quite specific about 
the occurrence of specific pains within the more general experience of pain. 
Pain can be both intermittent and constant.
(3.16) While before it was a constant thing now, at intervals it reoccurs, the 
pain. But in a sudden way. (F I: 6)
Since a correct understanding of the temporal characteristics of a sufferer’s 
pain are important for a precise diagnosis and prognosis, references to it 
appear often especially in questions by doctors and medical staff (Lascaratou, 
2003). Yet, one ought to remember that, for the person in pain, there are two 
types of time: one objective and the other subjective.
(3.17) Luckily it didn’t [last] I think more than a minute a minute and a half; for 
me it was an eternity. (A I: 7)
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As well as with adverbials or adjectives, the temporal dimension of pain can 
also be expressed by means of accompanying (i.e. simultaneous) conditions, 
in the form of a temporal nexus. Each temporal nexus simultaneously shows a 
particular condition or situation that seems to favour the onset of pain; at the 
same time it indicates the point in time when the pain begins.
(3.18) I had a very strong pain when breathing. (Am I: 4)
(3.19) The moment in which I’d fall asleep, there was this pain. I’d wake up 
and it would reappear. (F I: 4)
(3.20) Whereas those at the feet where pains [that would appear] while 
walking. (V I: 3)
(3.21) Even if I’m still the pain is there. (S I: 3)
3.7 Pain has variable location within the body
The entity we call pain, although immaterial, resides within the body. Often it 
is static, but it can also move and make its way from one point in the body to 
another, and back again. It can make its presence felt in a very definite, 
circumscribed area or it can be perceived over a wider, less precisely defined 
(and definable) portion of the person’s body.
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Perhaps even more than its temporal location, the topical aspect of pain is of 
particular relevance, both for sufferers and for those around them, especially 
doctors and, more generally, those in charge of diagnosing and curing 
disease. It is therefore of little surprise that requests as to where exactly pain 
occurs are to be found in the questions of doctors and, more generally, those 
who have to assess and cure.
Certain areas of the body seem to be more prone to aching than others. A 
minor pain in the head is – for instance – more common and, arguably, less 
worrying (unless particularly intense or persistent) than one in the chest. This, 
however, is a highly idiosyncratic matter. One of my informants, Antonio 
(whose interview was later left out of the corpus (see chapter 3, on 
methodology) mentioned that to him, a pain is all the more worrying the closer 
it is to the head, regardless of its intensity. 
Some languages, English among them, lexicalize pain in some areas of the 
body by means of compounding. So we have words like headache, and 
backache. A kind of thing, an ache, is assigned to a class through a lexeme 
denoting a body part, head. The result, headache, ‘is a complex entity, and it 
forms part of a taxonomy of aches’ (Halliday, 1988: 3). These kinds of 
compounds, where the compound is a hyponym of the grammatical head are 
also known as endocentric compounds (a headache is a kind of ache, an 
armchair a kind of chair). This type of compounding (in English), however, is 
not possible with all parts of the body; one cannot have a *fingerache or an 
*elbowache, although one can, and does get pain in a finger or an elbow. It 
appears that, because of their high frequency and cultural relevance certain 
locations of pain have become linguistically ‘formalised’. 
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Unlike English, Italian does not allow this type of compounding, which is 
characteristic of the Germanic languages24 (cf. Dutch, hoofdpijn; German, 
kopfschmerz, Swedish, huvudvärk, and so on). More typically for Italian, these 
common pains are lexicalized with the locus of pain as circumstance in a 
nominal group: mal(e) di testa ‘headache’, di pancia ‘tummy ache’, di schiena 
‘backache’, and so on, that – like compounds – behave like single lexical 
items. Perhaps surprisingly, there is only one occurrence of this kind of 
structure in the corpus. It was used by the speaker to compare a phase of his 
pain to a mild headache: un mal di testa con intensità bassa, ‘a headache with 
low intensity.’ One of the possible reasons for this is the highly idiosyncratic 
nature of the pain experienced by the speakers in the ALOMAR Plus corpus. 
It is often unlike any other pain they may have experienced before; and 
perhaps one of its main characteristics could be said to be its unpredictability 
and mobility. In other words, the locus of pain has to be specified each time. 
This explains why, by far, the most used means of expressing the location of 
pain in our corpus is circumstantially, through locatives of place.
(3.22) I had pains in the thorax. (Am I: 4)
(3.23) These strong pains in the muscles. (F I: 3)
(3.24) Because I feel them from, in the toes, under the toes. One feels them, 
at the sides, at the metatarsum or, on top, even at the heel let’s say. (A I: 4)
                                                            
24 Compounds made up of two common nouns are, in English, ‘by far the most productive type of 
compounds’ (Bauer, 1983: 204).
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Adverbials such as qui/qua, ‘here’, are also employed (with varying frequency) 
by my informants, together with gestures. The use of these deictics is 
obviously dependent on the context of the linguistic exchange: oral and face 
to face, in this case. Verbal deixis occurs with a lot of actual, extralinguistic 
pointing. Interestingly, not all speakers in the corpus rely on these adverbials 
of place with the same frequency; some of them do not use them at all 
whereas one of them, Anna, uses them often.
Before continuing, it is worth considering the possible reasons for Anna’s high 
use of adverbials. To do so, we must give some background information on 
her interview. Of all the participants, Anna came across as the more 
distressed. Although she told me during the interview that she was not in pain, 
her appearance, posture, gestures, and manner of speaking were very much 
those of somebody in pain or for whom pain was still a very vivid memory. As 
she began articulating, her speech was characterised by false starts and was 
also slightly agitated. Tellingly, the initial part of her account is in the present 
tense, bringing her experience vividly to the fore as something ongoing and 
still affecting her.
That pain had had a devastating effect on Anna soon became clear. She 
displayed a high number of devices to illustrate her pain: metaphor, simile, 
onomatopoeia among them. What soon became apparent was that what she 
was doing was giving a ‘dramatic’ representation of her experience. The use 
of adverbials as locatives of the pain was always accompanied by pointing 
gestures, and in fact one of the most striking features of the whole encounter 
was its ‘dynamicity’. Anna, like the other speakers, could have easily resorted 
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to a wholly linguistic account, with locatives of place used to inform about the 
location of pain; but she did not.
Although a detailed analysis of the role of para and extralinguistic features, 
such as gestures, is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth referring briefly 
to what Heath (1989; 2002) has to say on the subject. In his work, which looks 
at the visual and verbal aspect of doctor-patient interactions, he highlights 
how the patient’s gestures serve to transform generic and ‘invisible’ 
complaints into subjective, relevant, and visible ones; how through gestures:
Patients can render their experience of their difficulties visible […]. Through 
gesture and bodily conduct, patients transpose inner suffering, their personal 
subjective experience of their complaint, to the body’s surface and particular 
parts and areas of their physic. The inner and the subjective are overlaid on 
the outer surface of the body and rendered visible and objective. Moreover, 
[…], patients take symptoms experienced on another occasion and transpose 
them to the present. They reveal their symptoms, and their experience of their 
symptoms, here and now, revealing the very characteristics that they have 
been invited to describe (Heath, 2002: 603; my emphasis)
Therefore gestures in this case are to be seen not as an alternative but rather 
as a complement to Anna’s verbal rendition of her experience. In her account 
the linguistic and the extra linguistic are used together to give her story a more 
vivid character.
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3.8 Pain has different degrees of intensity and variable qualities
As one informant explicitly acknowledged, describing pain is not easy: ‘It is not 
easy. Well, there are different types.’ The different qualities of pain can be 
probed by questions such as: What is the pain like? Indeed such questions 
often appear in doctors’ consultations with their patients, or whenever 
someone is interested in finding out about somebody else’s pain. The fact that 
pain can take many guises, that both its quality and intensity vary, is probably 
obvious to all human beings. It is part of our experience of everyday life; as 
such, this knowledge is incorporated into the grammar. We all know, and 
language shows an awareness of this knowledge, that the pain of a toothache 
is not like the pain of a broken leg, or a scalding. These types of pain vary 
mainly in terms of quality.
The different types of pain are part of a semi-structured taxonomy which, 
however, is not a closed system. If it is true that some of the labels used to 
describe types of pain are routinely employed both by doctors and sufferers 
(for example, burning, shooting, stabbing, acute, chronic, dull, sharp), some 
are new, ad-hoc creations produced in response to specific need. Some of 
these new labels are used only once and subsequently discarded; others may 
remain in the individual's repertoire for much longer, even be adopted by 
those around him or her, like family or friends.
As noted earlier, it was the difficulty in assessing painful sensations that 
prompted the creation of verbally-based tools of evaluation by researchers like 
Melzack & Torgerson (1971). But pain descriptors do not always distinguish
between quality and degree of intensity of pain clearly. As Lascaratou notes 
(2003: 128), ‘[pain descriptors] seem to merge in the form of adjectives that 
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often combine semantic features related to both.’ Lascaratou (ibid p. 128) 
reports the use, in her corpus, of adjectives such as one meaning ‘sweet’, 
which, together with a particular (possibly idiosyncratic) quality, also refers to 
low intensity. Even in terms of quality, she goes on to comment, the same 
adjectives can be interpreted as expressing more than one quality. ‘Deep’, for 
example, ‘refers to spatial characteristics of the sensation but may also imply 
sharpness, by virtue of its ability to be sensed deep in the body’ (ibid p. 128). 
In addition, ‘duration of pain may also be metaphorically configured as a 
quality’. An example she quotes is ‘continuous’, which with a synonym, is also 
found in the ALOMAR Plus corpus, as shown by the following examples:
(3.25) The pain […] was a constant thing; I mean a constant pain. (F I: 3)
(3.26) They were all acute pains but fixed [not moving, static but also 
continuous]; it was not that they alternated, one moment more or less 
strong. They were always fixed. (V I: 2)
The speakers seem to favour as descriptors nouns that embody both the 
quality and intensity of the pain sensation: bruciore ‘a burning sensation’ (note 
that English construes the ‘burning’ element adjectivally, whereas Italian 
incorporates it in a noun), fitta ‘a quick, sharp pain’, pugnalata ‘stab’, fastidio ‘a 
fastidious light ache or sore’, lampo ‘lightning’, deflagrazione ‘deflagration, 
detonation25’, dolorino ‘a little pain’ are some examples. 
                                                            
25 Technically, a deflagration is not the same as a detonation. The former is a slow, rapid burning, 
whereas the latter is defined as a rapid chemical reaction, an explosion. It is clear from the context 
that the speaker who used this term meant it in the latter sense.
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All of these nouns are complex pain descriptors, in the sense that they 
amalgamate quality, intensity and in some cases physical extension of pain. 
They all incorporate the basic notion of pain plus quality, intensity and – in 
some cases – extension. A pain defined as a stabbing (una pugnalata) 
presumably implies depths as well as acuteness. Similarly, a pain referred to 
as a ‘deflagration’ (una deflagrazione) carries similar connotations.
3.9 Traces of the subjective
As already noted, pain is a very personal experience; it is not solely what it is
that matters, it is also what it is for and what it does to the experiencing 
individual that matters. There is, in other words, an affectual element to the 
experience of pain which is often – if not always - captured by language. It 
was this observation that prompted Melzack and Torgerson to include words 
describing affective qualities under a separate section in both versions of their 
famous pain questionnaires (MPQ and SFMPQ). Although Melzack and Wall 
(1988: 38) distinguish between words that describe ‘affective’ qualities and 
‘evaluative’ words, my use of the term affectual includes all those cases where 
the personal experience and perceptions of pain by the sufferer are 
foregrounded; where the subjective rather than the objective is highlighted. 
In the Alomar Plus corpus, these mainly take the form of adjectives, such as 
tremendo ‘tremendous, terrible’, atroce ‘atrocious’, sopportabile ‘bearable’, 
insopportabile ‘unbearable’, controllabile ‘controllable’, fastidioso ‘fastidious’. 
There is clearly an evaluative component here, but it is a subjective 
evaluation; what is unbearable or atrocious for one person, may not be so for 
another.
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It is to this inherent complexity of pain that we should attribute the variety of 
ways in which its quality and intensity are realised linguistically. De Souza & 
Frank (quoted in Lascaratou, 2003: 128-9) note that the majority of people 
provide varied and rich accounts of their experiences of pain. This ‘may be 
due to their inability to discriminate between various components of pain. […] 
subjects may envisage the amount of pain […] as a concept of time, while 
others may use spatial characteristics to quantify [it].’ It is often the case that 
sufferers use a combination of concepts and lexicogrammatical resources. 
The lexicon and the grammar are thus exploited in all their semiotic potential 
in order to give voice to the individual’s experience and construal of pain. 
Some examples follow:
(3.27) It is not easy to describe pain. It is not easy: well, then there are 
different kinds, because pain I’d say a burning sensation but it isn’t, it 
isn’t a burning, it’s really something acute. (Am I: 9)
(3.28) Pain, of the kind, like, initially cramps, lightly, afterwards the intensity 
was much higher, these, these very strong cramps. (F I: 3)
(3.29) Almost immediately pain […] strong, and it grows, and, at least in my 
case becomes very acute, so much so that there have been times … 
before, and even during the cure that it would get so acute (A I: 1)
(3.30) The pain is really strong, even this one, bearable let’s say certainly 
then, pain becomes like lightening [tchin, tchin]. (A I: 5)
(3.31) And then, at least the one I feel is really a pain, an acute pain, really 
dull, of the really strong kind. I can’t find a term, an appropriate term, 
pains that do not allow you to, to live, to live let’s say a normal life. (S 
I:2)
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What extracts 3.27-3.31 above show is a common verbal strategy used by 
sufferers to describe their pain. Rather than relying on a single descriptor, an 
adjective for example, speakers use a combination of lexicogrammatical 
devices. False starts, self repairs are common, indicating that it is often the 
case that descriptors are looked for and found in ‘real time’.
In extract 3.27, Annamaria begins her turn with a metalinguistic comment on 
the difficulty of describing pain and the multiplicity of pain-types. She then 
describes her pain with a noun bruciore ‘a burning sensation’, which identifies 
a particular quality of the pain. However, obviously feeling that the 
characterisation she has given is not accurate, she adds that ‘it isn’t a 
bruciore, it’s really something acute.’ A burning sensation can indeed be 
acute, yet she felt that the term did not convey precisely the intensity, which 
was obviously foremost in her mind. In her rephrasing, pain is construed again 
as thing-participant, but this time realised as the more general cosa, ‘thing’, 
with the intensity, acuta ‘acute’ as its Attribute.
Extract 3.30 demonstrates an interesting combination of lexicogrammatical 
devices to characterise the pain, in particular its quality and intensity. Anna 
begins with a configuration of pain as a relational process, where pain is the 
Carrier and forte ‘strong’ its Attribute. She goes on to add another Attribute: 
sopportabile ‘bearable’, which is an even more subjective element. Anna’s 
pain, however, is not static, it has a ‘progression’. Pain – she adds – ‘really 
becomes like lightning’ (diventa proprio un lampo). Here we find a complex 
pain descriptor in the form of the noun, which can indicate quality, intensity 
and presumably also spatial extension. Interestingly, in an attempt to get the 
message across more clearly, she resorts to paralanguage ([tchin, tchin]), in 
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an attempt to evoke verbally the repetitive, flashing nature of the pain 
sensation, like that of a blacksmith hitting an incandescent piece of iron. 
Asked if the pain is intense, she confirms and specifies twice, with a 
superlative, that it is indeed ‘very intense’: intensissimo. 
Finally, in extract 3.31, Sandra provides a more discursively built 
characterisation of her pain, its quality and intensity. She begins by relativising 
the experience: this is her experience; it may be different for other people. 
She then goes on to characterise it twice more attributively, with adjectives 
(sordo ‘dull’, forti ‘strong, masc. plural), each time preceded by the intensifier 
proprio ‘truly, really’. Following is the familiar comment on the inability to find 
appropriate descriptors (non riesco a usare un termine vero e proprio, ‘I can’t 
find an appropriate term’). Equally familiarly, where the lexicon fails, grammar 
comes to the rescue: these are pains – Sandra says – that ‘do not allow you 
to lead a normal life’. The quality and intensity of pain are thus realised as a 
relative clause, where pain is represented as a volitional agent that does
something to you.
In conclusion, we can say that the intensity and even more so the quality of 
pain are its most problematic and varied aspects of it. It is in these two 
domains that the complexity of pain is most apparent, as well as its 
subjectivity: no two pains are alike. Unsurprisingly then, the grammar of pain 
dealing with these aspects reflects such richness; nouns, adjectives, similes 
and – in one case in the corpus – onomatopoeia are among the devices 
deployed for the task. 
Even a cursory look at the data tells us that single lexical items alone are not 
preferred pain-descriptors. Sufferers generally prefer to rely on a combination 
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of lexicogrammatical tools as descriptors of pain intensity and quality. Even 
when single pain-descriptors are utilised, speakers resort to a variety of terms, 
often idiosyncratic ones. This is supported by Lascaratou (2003 138), who 
notes that ‘the pain descriptors observed in [her] authentic doctor-patient 
dialogues, cannot easily be mapped onto those of the [SFMPQ] questionnaire’ 
she (ibid p. 139) goes on to conclude that:
[T]he variety of observed quality descriptive adjectives and the difficulty of 
mapping them onto the GR[eek]-SFMPQ terms indicates that it is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to devise exhaustive lists of pain descriptors so as to 
classify types of pain. It appears that new pain categories and new members 
of the categories can actually result from everyday experience and medical 
practice.
It should also be noted that it is by construing pain as participant (in the SFG 
sense) that it can be shown to possess all these different qualities. The 
‘objectification’ of pain, which – as seen – allows its construal as participant, 
presents the speaker with a visible (if only linguistically) entity that can be 
measured, assessed and described. It can become part of a taxonomy and 
categorised, thereby losing some its power to frighten. In other words, its 
elusiveness is reduced, at least partially.
3.10 Pain as process
In the previous section, I have looked at those cases where pain is construed 
as thing-participant in a process of some kind. In this section, I shall look at 
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the instances in which it is represented as the process itself. I shall illustrate 
the frequency with which it is done, how it is done (through which grammatical 
means), and what some of the advantages of representing pain this way might 
be. 
3.11 The complexity of pain
As previously argued, pain is typically a complex phenomenon, both 
inherently and from a perceptual point of view. It varies along parameters 
such as quality, intensity, temporal and spatial location. It can be present in a 
relatively limited area, or extend over larger portions of one’s body. It can be 
felt on the surface, or penetrate the inner layers of the body. It can be static or 
move around the body, continuously or intermittently. Pain can arrive 
suddenly and then leave as quickly, or linger on before disappearing. Once 
gone, there is no guarantee that it will stay away.
In addition, the entity we call ‘pain’ is not something that, once there, merely 
exists, like an object whose presence we merely acknowledge. We become 
aware of it because it does something to us. In its mildest forms, it may merely 
make its presence felt; and even this type of pain can hinder one’s everyday 
activities. We cannot perceive pain other than when it is doing something to 
us. Pain, then, is the constant ‘doer’. It is never immutable and cannot be 
entirely ignored; in its constant flux, it can be thought of as epitomising what it 
means to be active. As Van Hooft (2003: 255) writes:
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[P]ain is an experience. It makes no sense to say that a person is in pain but 
that he does not feel it. A person may suffer an injury or a malady of a kind 
that typically causes pain but, unless they feel it, they are not in pain.
It is this variability, this state of constant flux that I refer to as the dynamic 
nature of pain. This characteristic is perhaps best captured by it being 
construed by the grammar as a process of various kinds, through a verb. In 
addition, the processual construal of pain, as we shall see in more detail 
below, allows more than one of its aspects to be attended to. 
For example, an excellent way of capturing its temporal dimension is through 
the categories of tense and aspect. Duration and temporal location are, as we 
have seen, very important dimensions referred to by sufferers, doctors, and 
those who care for patients. Pain can be represented as having existed in a 
very distant past, or definitely subsisting in the present. A language like 
English, for example, can rely on the present continuous (what Halliday refers 
to as ‘present-in-present’: my leg’s hurting), and on the implied contrast with 
the simple present, to situate the event firmly in the here and now and 
evolving.
3.12 Pain as process in the ALOMAR Plus corpus. Constructions by type
In the ALOMAR Plus corpus, as we have seen, the construal of pain as 
process is not prevalent. Of all pain construals, there are a total of twenty-nine 
occurrences of (mi) fa male ‘to me (it) hurts/is hurting’, and one of mi fa 
soffrire ‘me (it) makes suffer’. Included in the number are those cases where 
the tense and/or mood employed are something other than the simple present 
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(indicativo presente), as in mi faceva molto male ‘it would/used to hurt’ or 
sapevo che mi avrebbe fatto male ‘I knew it would hurt’. It should be noted 
that the occurrences of pain-as-process are unequally distributed among the 
speakers in the corpus. As previously noted, the majority are to be found in 
the accounts of two speakers, Annamaria and Veronica; and two of the 
participants, Fabio and Gina use none at all.
Lascaratou (2003: 73) provides a classificatory grid to give a taxonomy 
(reproduce in Figure 3.8) of the processual pain constructions in her corpus. 
She assigns each expression to one of the following types of structure:
-intransitive-personal;
-intransitive-
impersonal;
-intransitive+body 
part;
-transitive-impersonal;
-transitive+body part;
-intransitive-agentive;
-transitive;
-transitive-personal.
Figure 3.8. Taxonomy of processual pain constructions (Lascaratou 2003).
This classification follows from the specific characteristics of her corpus, and 
can only be used in part to catalogue the constructions that appear in the 
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ALOMAR Plus interviews. I shall therefore use it where appropriate, departing 
from it when the particular nature of my data requires it.
3.13 Intransitive-personals
These are constructions of the ‘I hurt/am hurting’ type. It should be 
remembered that, like Greek and unlike English, Italian is a pro-drop 
language. Consequently, subjectless structures and those where the 
grammatical subject is overtly expressed are not computed separately. 
Furthermore, Italian does not display a simple present – present continuous 
morphological distinction that matches the one in English. There exists the 
possibility of using a construction reminiscent of the ‘progressive’ in English. 
This is the stare+gerund (sta leggendo/dormendo/parlando ‘s/he’s 
reading/sleeping/talking); such constructions ‘serve to present the verb as a 
progressive, sustained, developing action’ (Maiden and Robustelli, 2000: 
302). However, ‘there exist a number of constraints on the sta leggendo type. 
[And] the difference between, say, Legge il giornale and Sta leggendo il 
giornale is not necessarily that between English ‘She reads the newspaper’ 
and ‘She’s reading the newspaper’ (ibid p. 303). Unlike English, even when 
the action is simultaneous with the time of speaking, Italian allows both. So, 
although a construction like mi sta facendo male (in questo momento), ‘it’s 
hurting me (at this very moment)’ is possible – and it would underline the 
developing nature of the event – there is no instance of it in the corpus. This, 
of course, does not mean that it would not be found in a larger, or simply a 
different one.
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According to Lascaratou (2003: 75), the intransitive-personal construction is 
particularly important; not only does it function ‘as a pain avowal 
approximating the primitive cry’, it is also used by sufferers to introduce 
themselves as ‘suffering sel[ves] before describing [their] painful condition’. It 
has, in other words, a discursive function as a statement announcing the 
suffering self; both justifying the patient’s presence at the doctor’s surgery and 
as an introduction and a preamble to the narrative which generally follows. 
The grammar of Italian allows an intransitive-personal construction of this type 
with the verb soffrire ‘to suffer’. (Io) soffro ‘I suffer/am suffering’ does indeed 
appear in our corpus, although only four times. Yet, the semantics of the verb 
soffrire ‘to suffer’ are quite complex. It can refer to both the experience of 
physical as well as moral or psychological pain. Its meaning can comprise the 
perceptual experience of physical pain but rarely – and never in the ALOMAR 
Plus corpus – only that. Out of the four occurrences we find, three appear to 
indicate mainly physical pain but never in a clear cut-manner. In each case, 
contextual evidence is necessary to disambiguate. In the following extract, 
Annamaria expands on the topic of the intense thoracic pain she experienced 
at some point during the course of her illness:
(3.32) Yes, sharp pains at the thorax, yes, yes, yes. Yes and that was the 
thing that made me suffer the most, because obviously it limited my 
life. Also the fact of having had to sleep sitting [on the bed with a 
number of pillows behind the back, as opposed to lying] all this time, 
because lying down wouldn’t let me, I mean lying on the bed would not 
let me breathe. (Am I: 3 )
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Here soffrire can be interpreted as referring both to the physical pain 
experienced, as well as having to live with the ensuing emotional impact. 
Suffering includes feeling pain, but is not limited to it.
There are, in Italian, other expressions that can be thought of as 
approximating not only the meaning but also the discursive function of the 
English ‘I hurt/am hurting’. Stare male ‘to be in a bad state/unwell’ is one. It 
indicates a condition that can range from malaise to intense pain, both 
physical and psychological. Like the English construction in question, it can be 
used to introduce the individual as a whole, suffering self. However, in the 
Alomar Plus corpus it is only used once, and again not in a straightforward 
way, appearing to indicate more than just the sensation of physical pain.
A corpus of Italian medical consultations, or simply a larger corpus of what we 
may call ‘health talk’ is needed if we are to generalise on what constructions 
are normally used as pain avowals, to use Lascaratou’s (2003) terminology. 
For the moment, anecdotal evidence and native speaker’s intuitions (which, 
however, should be tested against a corpus of real data) suggest that general 
statements such as sto male (or its variant mi sento male), soffro, sono pieno 
di dolori ‘I am full of pains’, or ho i dolori ‘I’ve got the pains,’ can be used to 
that effect.
In one of the interviews – for example – following a question on the evolution 
of her illness, Veronica characterised her form of RA as ‘aggressive’. She then 
went on to say that she had never experienced truly unbearable pains and 
illustrated one of her coping strategies. After a brief pause, she stated that 
‘she’s got pains’ and – in a transition from the personal, but still general, to the 
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more specific – she said that while speaking to me she was experiencing 
some pains, but they were bearable:
(3.33) I think I have never had pains like many say they have, that one 
cannot bear. I have the pains, and for example now my hands are 
hurting, but I have, they are bearable pains. (Am I: 6)
3.14 Intransitive-impersonals
These constructions are those of the ‘it hurts/is hurting’ type. Lascaratou 
(2003) terms them ‘impersonal’ because in them, the painful event is not 
located within the individual as a whole. From a grammatical point of view, a 
clause like ‘I hurt’ has the individual – the suffering individual – as grammatical 
subject and, typically for English, as focus of the message in thematic (initial) 
position. The message of the clause, in other words, is about ‘I’. 
In the intransitive-impersonal structure, however, the suffering individual is not 
the focus of the message; pain itself is. Like its Greek counterpart, the Italian 
third person singular suffix ‘incorporated in the verb form [fa, in fa male ‘it 
hurts’] functions as an impersonal setting, like the it in it hurts’ (Lascaratou, 
2003: 94). This, of course, is not to say that here there is no understanding of 
the individual as sufferer, as the one being affected; there is, however, a shift 
of perspective and of focus. What this kind of clause predicates, is the 
existence of pain somewhere in the body. Pain is seen as an existential 
process; existential clauses being those that simply represent that something, 
or someone, exists or occurs. 
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Halliday and Matthiesen (2004: 257), note that, overall, existential clauses are 
not very common in discourse. They do, however, make an important 
contribution in some kinds of texts, like narratives, for example. There they 
introduce central participants in the initial or subsequent stages of narration 
(cf. There was once a princess …). Although existential clauses typically have 
the verb be, other verbs can also occur: exist, remain, happen, and these are 
only some of the possible candidates. Existential clauses often contain ‘a 
distinct circumstantial element of time or place, as in there was a picture on 
the wall’ (ibid p. 258). In the Greek corpus, this is often realised by eo ‘here’ 
as in it hurts here.
Thus, hurt in this type of clause functions existentially. However, it is also 
similar to verbs indicating atmospheric phenomena in ‘weather clauses’, like 
it’s raining/snowing/hailing (piove, nevica, grandina, in Italian). This is still an 
existential process, but of the occurring type. Whereas in English existential 
clauses of the latter type normally employ a verb in the present-in-present, 
Italian can have both the present indicative and the sta+gerund construction, 
with the aspectual distinctions referred to above. It is appropriate to interpret 
these intransitive, impersonal clauses as existential ones, since what they do 
is announce the presence of a kind of atmospheric condition or other 
phenomenon or, in this case, the presence of pain. Fa male could be 
rephrased as, ‘there is/exists a pain’. Or, highlighting the similarities with the 
weather example, ‘pain is happening (here)’.
As noted, in the fa male construction the sufferer is, in a way, absent. 
However, in the corpus we find a construction which shares characteristics of 
both the personal and impersonal intransitives identified by Lascaratou 
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(2003). Mi fa male ‘to me (it) hurts/is hurting’, which can be subjectless or 
accompanied by a body part (or the disease itself) as subject, as in Veronica’s 
statement: (3.34) mi accorgo che anche quell’articolazione mi fa male ‘I 
realise that also that joint (to me it) hurts’ (V I: 3). In Lascaratou’s (ibid) 
classification, the former are called transitive-impersonal (it hurts me), while 
the latter are transitive+body part (my+body part hurts me). 
In the ALOMAR Plus corpus, of all the instances of pain as process, the 
transitive+body part are the majority. Because of the pro-drop nature of 
Italian, it is often the case that the entity that functions as grammatical subject 
has to be recovered from the co-text. In some instances, this is easy, and the 
grammatical subject can be found within a span of just a few words either side 
of the verb:
(3.35) The moment in which to me it hurts even only a finger. (S I: 4)
(3.36) [walking] is very difficult because it hurts anyway, the foot. (A I: 5)
(3.37) If for example I am here sitting, for example, (to me it) hurts the knee. 
(V I: 5)
It is worth noting that, in extract (3.36) above, the process is an intransitive 
one, where foot is the subject, the originator and locus of pain. There is, 
however, no visible presence of the sufferer, unlike in the first and last 
quotations, where it appears in the shape of the familiar mi.
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In other cases, however, the subject is to be found relatively far away, making 
it more difficult to determine whether we are dealing with a structure 
transitive+body part or if it a case of a subjectless mi fa male type. Lascaratou 
(2003: 102-103) argues that by locating pain in a body part, the sufferer 
configures it as a more ‘localised’ experience, rather than ‘holistically’, residing 
in the self as a whole; it represents a way of distancing him or herself from it. 
This construction (transitive+body part: my arm’s hurting me) is indeed very 
interesting. The grammar sets up a configuration where there is a process 
involving two entities: the body part and the individual. The process shares, at 
least in its grammar, characteristics of mental (of perception, for instance), 
material, and existential processes. If interpreted as a material process, what 
are the roles that the two participants (body part and person) assume 
respectively? Lascaratou (ibid p. 103) argues that, unlike in a typical material 
process, they are that of Phenomenon/Agent (the body part) and Senser (the 
individual), rather than Actor and Goal in a typical material process. This is 
also Halliday’s (1988) position. 
This view, however, is not without problems. For if it is true that, if interpreted 
as ‘I feel/perceive a pain in my joint/arm/etc.’, those roles of Phenomenon and 
Senser are appropriate, an interpretation where the body parts are assigned 
quasi-personified status can be seen as an entity afflicting pain upon the 
individual. In support of her argument, the Greek researcher quotes 
Theophanopoulou-Kontou (p. 115). The latter argues that the body part, 
‘despite the fact that it functions as an external argument, cannot be the 
Theme and receive the functions of Agent or Cause, because it is part of the 
self, i.e. of the Experiencer. Hence, this pattern is distinguished from 
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causative structures.’ This, in my view, is not necessarily the case. The 
interpretation where the body part is an Agent is acceptable, especially if seen 
as a further trace of disembodiment. One should keep in mind that linguistic 
construals of reality are done subconsciously. It is also worth pointing out that 
the two understandings are not mutually exclusive and can coexist.
If interpreted as a mental process of perception, then the person is obviously 
the Experiencer. It can also be interpreted as an existential process, where 
the pain is obviously the Existent. At this stage, what should be noted about 
this construction is that it introduces the person in the picture by thematising it. 
In Italian, as in English, there is a tendency for the theme to appear in initial 
position (Vincent, 1988; Maiden and Robustelli, 2000).
These are complex clauses in that they share aspects of the process types 
mentioned above. They present a picture where a body part is the locus in 
which pain resides as well as being the cause of it. If it is true that by situating 
pain in a body part it is somehow pushed away from the whole self, it is also 
true that the personal pronoun in thematic position does not allow it to be 
pushed too far. Since Italian, as mentioned above, has no exact grammatical 
equivalent to the ‘I hurt/am hurting’ type, this structure can function 
discursively as pain avowal and introduction/justification for subsequent, more 
detailed pain talk.
There are no instances, in the ALOMAR Plus corpus, of intransitive-agentives. 
These are constructions of the ‘that hurts’ type, where that refers
exophorically to ‘some entity or nominalised process […] ‘what you just did to 
me’ (Halliday, 1988: 21). It is ‘agentive’ because of the presence of an Agent, 
the external cause of, in this case, the pain.
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It is not surprising that this construction is not attested in the corpus. All the 
participants were relating their experiences of pain; there was no action 
occurring at the time, some kind of physical contact, for example, that might 
have caused pain. A corpus of doctor-patient (or, even more, of, say, 
physiotherapist-patient) interactions is likely to contain a fair amount of these.
Equally absent from our corpus are transitives, of the ‘that’s hurting me’ type, 
where that, again refers exophorically to an event, a happening in the real 
world which causes pain. This differs from the previous construction in that a 
second participant (me, in this case) is present. Again, the nature of the 
communicative situation in which our interviews were gathered accounts for 
the absence of this construction from the data.
3.15 Pain as quality
As well as a noun and a verb, ‘pain may be worded as an adjective, realizing 
a quality’ (Halliday, 1988: 13). It is to this type of construal that I shall turn my 
attention in this section. As for the previous sections, I shall mention which 
lexical items are used, in what constructions, and subsequently comment on 
the findings.
In the ALOMAR Plus corpus, the lexical items realising the construal of pain 
as a quality are, doloroso (3), dolorante (3), sofferente (3), and dolente (3); all 
could be translated into English as ‘painful’, ‘sore’, or ‘aching’. So, given that 
pain here is a quality, it follows that the next question to ask is, as Halliday
(1988) does, of what it is a quality. Halliday (1988) identifies (based on his 
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limited corpus) four settings in which this particular construal appears. They 
are:
1) -Pain as a quality assigned to a part of the body, where it may 
function as Epithet, as in a sore stomach26; such body part may of 
course be possessed, as in my sore throat. 
2) Pain may also function as Attribute, as in it [the stomach] didn’t seem 
to be particularly tender.
3) -Pain may be ‘a quality assigned to the whole person’ (p. 13); this is 
a case in he’s sore there, he’s just a bit more tender. In this case, it 
functions only as an Attribute.
4) -Pain as quality ‘may be assigned, as Attribute, to a general setting, 
with impersonal it and often with spatial location: it’s tender there, 
show me where it’s sore.’ However, it is not always easy to decide 
whether ‘it is functioning in this way, with the clause as an existential 
attributive (cf. The weather, as in it’s cloudy today), or is anaphoric to 
a previous pain or ache. But such instances seem to be blends rather 
than ambiguities - a listener does not need to resolve them one way 
or the other’.
Using the above principles as guidelines in this analysis, I shall look at the 
examples taken from the ALOMAR Plus corpus and make adjustments 
wherever required by the particular nature of the data.
                                                            
26 All examples are from Halliday, 1988: 13.
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In the majority of the constructions, adjectives function as Attribute. An 
Attribute, in SFG, is defined as one of the two participants in a relational 
clause. Relational clauses, as mentioned, are those of being and having, and 
there are two parts to the ‘being’ and ‘having’. A relationship is set up between 
two separate entities, one of which is a ‘quality’, rather than a ‘thing’. As 
Thompson (2004: 96) rightly points out, it should be remembered that ‘strictly 
speaking, neither of the basic experiential terms, ‘process’ and ‘participant’, 
are completely appropriate for this category.’ There is no process in the sense 
of something happening. Besides, ‘although there are always two concepts -
one on each side of the relationship - there is only one participant in the real 
world.’ Keeping this in mind, let us consider the following two examples:
(3.38) If a joint is painful. (V I: 3)
(3.39) But it is a painful finger. (A I: 4)
Here dolorante ‘painful’ is an Attribute and the second participant in the 
relational clause. Although, strictly speaking, it is true that, as Thompson 
points out, this is not a process in the canonical sense, there is something in 
the choice of adjective that maintains a trace of pain as a ‘doer’ and, 
consequently, of a more prototypical process. Dolorante is one of a number of 
adjectives in Italian originally derived from verbs. Often, these adjectives 
maintain a meaning closely related to the verb they came from. Traditionally 
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referred to, in Italian grammars, as ‘present participles27’, they are normally 
almost identical to the gerund; the former ending in –ndo, the latter in –nte: 
occupando-occupante ‘occupying’. Frequently, adjectives ending in –nte are 
very close in meaning to English verbal adjectives ending in –ing. Therefore, I 
suggest that although not a prototypical process with one or two participants 
and a ‘happening’, or ‘doing’, the choice of dolorante over doloroso preserves 
traces of the dynamic nature of pain referred to above.
3.16 A quality of what?
In fifty per cent of cases (six out of twelve), we are dealing with a quality of a 
body part: a joint, a finger, hands, knees, and a foot. In two cases, it is a 
physical, ‘abnormal’ entity on the sufferer’s body possessing the attribute of 
painfulness: ‘spots’ (macchie) on the skin in two cases and small lumps 
(noduli) under the skin in the other. In the two remaining instances, the quality 
is ascribed to pain itself. In one case (F I: 6), it is a quality ascribed to an 
action (here expressed nominally), a series of ‘small pinches’ (questi 
pizzicottini). Finally, in one case painfulness is ascribed to a series of events 
affecting the body. Following Marta’s description of a number of symptoms 
(burning sensation and acute night pain in the hands, swelling of the ankles 
etc.), I asked her whether the first ‘manifestation’ (manifestazione), meaning 
the first symptom to appear, was pain itself. To which her reply was:
                                                            
27 For reasons why this label is potentially misleading, see Maiden and Robustelli, 2000: 58.
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(3.40) No no […] the hands, it [the ‘manifestation’] was painful. (M I: 4)
In this case, painfulness is ascribed to a physical event; what Marta is saying 
is that the first symptom was the appearance of pain itself rather than, say, a 
painless swelling or colouring of the skin.
A first observation is that, in the ALOMAR Plus corpus, in no case is pain 
represented as a quality ascribed to the whole person, holistically. Sono 
dolorante (‘I am [all] sore’), which is grammatical in Italian (but less frequent 
than its English counterpart), is not used by my informants. Pain, in other 
words, is almost exclusively a localised phenomenon, the attribute of a body 
part or an entity located somewhere on the body.
3.17 Identifying relational clauses
All the clauses referred to above exemplify attributive relational clauses. This, 
however, is not the only type of possible relational process; the second type is 
called an ‘identifying relational process’. These serve to identify one entity in 
terms of another. Consider the following example from the corpus:
(3.41) The hands and the knees have always been the most painful parts. 
(Am I: 3)
Here Annamaria equates her hands and knees with the most suffering body 
parts; one entity is identified in terms of another. In an identifying relational 
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process the predicator (sono sempre state ‘have always been’, in this case) is 
- in the words of Thompson (2004: 96) - ‘equivalent in a way to an equals 
sign’. This explains why they are reversible, so that ‘the most painful parts 
have always been the hands and knees’ is propositionally equivalent28.
In an identifying clause, a specific realisation is related to a more 
generalisable category. In SFG, the former is labelled Token, while the latter 
Value. So, in this example the hands and the knees are the Token, the 
specific embodiment while the most painful parts the Value, as shown in 
Figure 3.9:
Figure 3.9. Identifying clause.
The second example of relational, identifying clause is the following, by Gina:
(3.42) The most acute, fastidious, let’s say painful pain is when it gets me 
here. (G I: 3)
                                                            
28 However, as Thompson points out, the two versions are not interchangeable in use. For a detailed 
discussion of why this is the case, see Thompson (2004: 118-20).
Le mani e le ginocchia sono sempre state le parti più sofferenti
Token Process: rel, ident Token
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Here the embodiment, the token of a more general category, the value, is the 
most acute, fastidious, It’s let’s say painful pain. In these latter two examples 
too, as in the previous ones, the locus of pain is not the whole self, nor a 
general setting; it is again a body part, or body space.
3.18 Localisation as detachment?
Talking about pain, like talking about other experiences, implies a structuring 
of the experience itself, achieved, as frequently pointed out, through the 
lexicogrammar. It was quite surprising to observe that in the constructions 
examined in this section, pain was always located at the periphery and did not 
reside in the whole person. The painful entity is always, for the ALOMAR Plus 
speakers, a peripheral, localisable part. 
Even in the constructions considered in the previous sections, this ‘peripheral’ 
construal is prevalent. A natural question to ask is, therefore, whether this de-
centring is determined by the language itself or whether it is somehow 
favoured, if not determined, by the context in which the stories were told.
I have already pointed out that the grammar of Italian does allow constructions 
where the quality of painfulness is ascribed to the whole individual (sono 
dolorante or sono tutto dolorante, ‘I’m (all) sore’29). It is therefore not because 
of a linguistic lacuna that we do not find holistic adjectival constructions in the 
corpus.
                                                            
29 The expression sto male ‘I’m unwell’ might be added to the list.
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A promising avenue in the exploration of why it is only body parts that are 
referred to as ‘painful’ might be to look at their possible discursive function. A 
common characteristic of all the collected interviews is that they are told by 
chronic sufferers; that is people who have been living with their particular 
condition for a long period of time. The telling of their stories does not possess 
the same urgency it would have if told in another context like, say, a 
consultation with a doctor where the novelty of the problem guarantees its 
foregrounding. When illness and pain make their first, often sudden 
appearance, they tend to occupy a centre-stage position in the sufferer’s 
world; they are often overwhelming. This pre-eminence of the pain experience 
can have its linguistic counterpart in the way it is structured and presented. As 
seen in the previous section, when pain is construed as a process the 
centrality of self can be reflected in what I referred to as personal-intransitive 
constructions of the I hurt/am hurting type. This holistic approach can be 
maintained when configuring pain as a quality, by making it a quality of the 
whole person. 
However, for patients experiencing chronic pain, pain acquires a certain 
familiarity; it gets, in other words, ‘historicised’. By making pain more 
localised, suffers may be signalling, albeit unconsciously, their detachment, 
their ability to talk about it more objectively. One should also note that of all 
the adjectival constructions none appear in a configuration of possession, 
accompanied by a possessive adjective. In a language like English, this might 
be a further sign of disembodiment. This is not the case in Italian, where one’s 
body parts are normally referred to using the definite article, rather than the 
possessive.
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3.19 Concluding remarks
The aim of this chapter has been to present and discuss an inventory of the 
lexicogrammatical forms through which the experience of bodily pain finds its 
linguistic embodiment in the speech of a group of Italian chronic pain 
sufferers. In the opening section of the chapter, I presented a brief overview of 
Halliday’s Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG), the main theoretical 
framework which informs the analysis. In particular, I outlined the part of SFG 
that deals with the ‘clause as representation’ of reality: the so-called 
‘ideational function’, introducing and explaining the relevant terminology. 
Reasons were given for selecting this particular framework; they include 
SFG’s view of grammar as a ‘theory of human experience’. 
Having identified a number of ‘key lexical items’ present in the corpus for each 
possible construal (i.e. participant, process, quality), the items were counted. 
It emerged that by far the most common construal of pain is as a thing-
participant, normally realised by a noun. In second position, for number of 
occurrences, is the ‘processual’ construal of pain, through a verb. Finally, with 
a total of twelve occurrences, the least common construal is that of pain as a 
quality of either a body part, or of what I have termed a ‘body formation’. 
When construed as thing-participant, pain is realised lexically by dolore and 
only marginally by the less specific male and sofferenza. In only one case a 
more complex figure is set up, where the location of pain is used to construe a 
particular kind of pain: mal di testa: ‘headache’. This kind of compounding 
(body part+ache) is common in English and other Germanic languages.
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As a participant, pain may enter into various configurations of possession. 
Ownership can be indicated with a possessive, such as il mio ‘my’. However, 
although grammatical in Italian, constructions of the il mio mal di testa ‘my 
headache’ or il mio dolore ‘my pain’ do not appear at all in the corpus. This is 
not, however, the only way through which possession can be encoded by the 
grammar. Far more commonly in the corpus, speakers configure possession 
of pain through a relational process, where the possession of pain (the 
Attribute) by the individual (the Carrier) is indicated with the verb avere ‘to 
have’, as in io ho un dolore al polso ‘I’ve got a pain at the wrist.’
Interestingly, although the grammar of Italian allows it, there are no 
occurrences of a configuration where a body part is the Carrier. It was 
suggested that a possible explanation for this is that such configurations 
would shift the focus of the message to the body part in question, by 
thematising it. The speakers are, after all, telling a story about themselves; 
and it is they who are suffering and have suffered, not a body part. 
Throughout their narratives it is their point of view, their perspective which is 
constantly represented and carried through.
Pain is a prototypical possession in that it can be acquired and received, 
owned and lost. Unlike other possessions, however, it cannot be disposed of 
as easily. It is not uncommon for pain to occupy the position of grammatical 
subject, often displaying a degree of agency. It was noted that often pain 
becomes the property of its owner entirely on its own terms. It was also noted 
that this understanding of pain as a free-agent is at the base of many folk 
models of both pain and illness.
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Pain has temporal location as well as duration. When pain is a participant, 
these are normally represented in the clause as Circumstance through 
adverbials, adverbial groups, and prepositional phrases. The duration of pain 
can also be represented through adjectives, which may function both as 
Epithet and Attribute. It was observed that, contrary to expectations, there 
were not many instances in the corpus of duration of pain construed as 
Attribute in a relational clause (cf. il dolore era costante ‘the pain was 
constant), with pain as Carrier. It was therefore suggested that this might be 
due to the relatively little precision that such constructions offer. The precise 
onset of pain is highly relevant for the sufferer and for those in charge of 
treating it.
Pain has spatial as well as temporal dimensions. The locus of pain is normally 
represented circumstantially, through an adjunct of place. For some kinds of 
pain, - normally more common ones – where English resorts to compounding 
(headache), Italian lexicalizes them by making the locus of pain a 
prepositional phrase following the head in a noun group (mal di testa ‘pain of 
head’). 
As well as linguistically, it was noted that speakers resort to extra-linguistic 
devices, namely gestures, to indicate the locus of pain. With reference to the 
work of Heath (1989; 2002), I suggested that such gestures have more than a 
simply deictic function: they help the sufferer to ‘re-enact’ (‘dramatically’, so to 
speak) the progress of pain on the body surface for the interlocutor to see.
The intensity and quality of pain are obviously very relevant, both for the 
sufferer and for those in charge of assisting her or him. When pain is 
construed as participant, its quality and intensity are often represented 
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adjectivally. In many cases, where English resorts to an adjective to represent 
the quality of pain (as in a burning pain), Italian construes it nominally, as in 
un bruciore. Some terms are blends of type and intensity of pain; a pugnalata, 
(a ‘stab wound’) for example, is presumably a deep, sharp, intense pain. As 
noted, pain is a highly personal experience. Traces of this subjectivity are to 
be found in many of the adjectives used to describe it. Sopportabile ‘bearable’, 
controllabile ‘controllable’ obviously embody a subjective perspective and an 
evaluative component.
As intensity and quality of pain are two very problematic and varied aspects of 
the pain experience, speakers in the corpus rely on a combination of 
lexicogrammatical strategies to construe it. Construing pain as a participant in 
a process of one kind or another allows the speaker to attribute to it a number 
of characteristics. What I referred to as the ‘objectification’ of pain makes its 
assessment, measurement, and evaluation easier. Through its nominalisation, 
pain can be categorised, thus allowing the sufferer to gain a degree of control 
over it and consequently reduce its power to frighten, as the unknown tends to 
do.
Second in number of occurrences is the construal of pain as process, realised 
by a verb-form in a number of tenses. Construing pain as a process, it was 
argued, highlights its ‘dynamic nature’, its changeability, its persistence 
through time, and the fact that pain is something that does something, and it 
does it to the individual. Following Lascaratou (2003), a classificatory grid was 
used to offer a taxonomy of the various constructions where pain appears as 
a process. I have commented on the fact that Italian lacks a personal-
intransitive construction equivalent to the English ‘I hurt/am hurting’, soffro ‘I 
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suffer/am suffering’ being more generic in meaning and occurring only four 
times in the whole corpus. A construction of the ‘I suffer/am suffering’ type 
configures the experience holistically, residing in the whole individual. 
Preferred by the ALOMAR Plus speakers are constructions which place pain 
in more impersonal settings, such as fa male ‘it hurts’, akin to existential 
clauses. Also common are transitive constructions which thematise the 
individual, with or without a body part as grammatical subject: mi fa male 
anche solo un dito ‘to me it hurts even only a finger’. In the corpus, 
constructions of the latter type are the majority. Such constructions could also 
be paraphrases as in I feel/perceive a pain in my arm. The body part, in other 
words, is depicted as the locus where pain resides. It was suggested that this 
‘de-centring’ may follow from the historicisation of the pain experience by the 
chronic sufferer.
Pain is construed as quality, adjectivally, only nine times in the corpus. In the 
majority of cases it is construed as an Attribute of a body part in a relational 
clause. There is no instance of pain being attributed to the whole person; it is 
almost exclusively a localised phenomenon. It was suggested that this 
localisation may be a result of the diminished ‘urgency’ of the experience, 
deriving once again from the chronic nature of the patient’s problems and 
signalling a degree of detachment. 
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Chapter 4: Evaluation in experiences of bodily pain and chronic 
illness: An analysis based on Appraisal Theory (AT)
Pain: […] an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience […]. Pain is perceived in 
the cerebral cortex […] and is always subjective (Marcovitch, 2005: 27; my 
emphasis)
The previous chapter looked at the lexicogrammatical encoding and construal 
of bodily pain and its experience by speakers in the ALOMAR Plus corpus. It 
analysed the different ways in which the lexicogrammar of Italian allows 
speakers to encode and construe the complex phenomenon which is physical 
pain. 
As already noted, this particular domain of human experience – which is 
complex and multi-faceted - is highly subjective, in the sense that its 
experience (by a socio-historically located individual) varies greatly from 
person to person. In other words, the ‘lived’ experience of being in, and coping 
with pain and chronic illness (or not coping, as the case might be) shows great 
variation from one individual to another, adding to the apparent ineffability of 
pain. 
The opening quotation, which is taken from a medical dictionary, illustrates 
how, in recent years, this particular insight (i.e. the ‘subjectivity of the pain 
experience’) has also become part of current medico-scientific thinking. More 
than other areas of human experience, bodily pain appears to be the realm of 
subjectivity and perhaps an ideal breeding ground for it. This was insightfully 
and poetically expressed by the French writer Alphonse Daudet, in his La 
Doulou (Pain), where he annotated the feelings and sensations caused by 
advanced syphilis, a disease which — typically for his times — he had 
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contracted in his youth and that in its final stages burdened him with 
considerable pain: 
No general theory about pain. Each patient discovers his own, and the nature 
of pain varies, like a singer’s voice, according to the acoustics of the hall30.
As Scarry (1985) notes, the lexicon of pain is often limited (it certainly is in 
English and Italian, as the previous chapter illustrated). However, language 
amounts to more than just the lexicon, as also discussed in the previous 
chapter. At clause level and beyond (e.g. at discourse level), it offers the one 
in pain several tools with which to encode his or her experience. Furthermore, 
the lexicon sits at one end of the expressive spectrum: it can pinpoint the 
specific nature of an ache (stabbing, throbbing, and so on) but it does not 
exist in a vacuum, linguistic or experiential. Thus, structures of increasing 
complexity like the clause and the surrounding contextual and co-textual 
resources aid sufferers to voice their experiences and to provide additional 
information.
4.1 Subjectification through APPRAISAL
One of the ways in which speakers ‘subjectify’ their accounts is by ‘colouring’ 
them with personal evaluations, or opinions, concerning the events, entities, 
and characters which populate them. The ‘personal’ thus makes its way into 
language in several ways. 
                                                            
30 Daudet, Alphonse. La Doulou (1930). English translation by Julian Barnes, (2002: 15).
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As I explain below, the study of the individual’s point of view offers numerous 
insights into this kind of lived experience and, if approached systematically, 
can also reveal a great deal about the tools offered by language to achieve 
encode the individual’s point of view.
4.2 What the study of the linguistic encoding of subjectivity can reveal
First, the encoding of subjectivity as expresses by evaluation, it is one of the 
main tools whereby the ‘linguistic individual’ (Johnstone, 1996) takes shape 
and is maintained. Furthermore, Huntston and Thompson (2000: 6) argue for 
the importance of studying evaluation (their term of choice for speaker’s 
perspective, or point of view) on the basis that it serves three important 
functions in discourse, and these are ever-present (only the first two are 
addressed in this chapter):
1. it expresses the speaker’s or writer’s opinion […];
2. it constructs and maintains relations between speaker or writer and 
hearer or reader;
3. it organizes discourse.
Of course, these functions are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, a 
single evaluative utterance may perform, and usually does, all three 
simultaneously.
Using one particular analytical paradigm (see below), the aim of this chapter is 
to look at how informants in the ALOMAR Plus corpus ‘subjectify’ their 
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experiences by evaluating things (entities), situations, events and people, and 
especially by expressing their own feelings about being chronically ill and in 
pain, (with all that this entails). 
In what follows, I shall argue that telling their experiences, and especially 
mentioning their feelings, serves social, as well as ‘descriptive’, functions for 
sufferers, such as the creation of solidarity and the building of rapport with 
interlocutors — actual or potential — thus enlisting them as supportive 
listeners and, in a way, as ‘co-authors’ of their narratives.
The analysis in this chapter will also serve to further problematize Scarry’s 
(1985) notion of bodily pain as ‘language-destroying’. As the analysis in this 
chapter demonstrates, the experience of bodily pain may indeed be 
challenging for language, but it also shows how resourceful an instrument it 
can be. 
4.3 Terminological issues in the study of perspective or point of view: stance, 
evaluation, appraisal
One of the main ways in which speakers achieve this ‘subjectification’ – in 
which the ‘personal’ makes its way to, and through, language - is through 
what has been variously referred to as stance (or stancetaking), evaluation, or 
appraisal. By using these terms, as we shall see, researchers may be 
referring to different (albeit similar) phenomena, and showing allegiance to 
different theoretical orientations and research interests. However, broadly 
speaking it can be said that all these terms refer to the displaying by speakers 
of personal attitudes and points of view. 
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4.4 Stance, appraisal, evaluation
Both in its common and more specialised meaning, stance is a good 
superordinate term under which a number of phenomena of the linguistic 
display of self, personal attitude, and so on can be grouped. One of the most 
recent scholarly contributions to the study of stance is Jaffe (2009). This study 
offers a number of contributions on stance from a sociolinguistic perspective. 
Jaffe (ibid p. 3) writes that stancetaking - taking up a position with respect to 
the form or content of one’s utterance – is central because speaker 
positionality is built into the act of communication. She makes the important 
point (ibid p. 5) that all acts of communication are acts of evaluation and they 
all act as ‘alignment or disalignment (thus positioning) with other subjects.’
Biber and Finegan (1988: 1) refer to stance as ‘the overt expression of an 
author’s or speaker’s attitudes, feelings, judgement, or commitment 
concerning the message’. Eggins and Slade (1997), talk of appraisal. They 
use the term to ‘refer […] to the attitudinal colouring of talk along a range of 
dimensions including: certainty, emotional response, social evaluation, and 
intensity’ (p. 124). Interestingly, they include social evaluation among the 
dimensions addressed by appraisal. Consequently, appraisal is seen as not 
only the locus for individual evaluations, but also for the expression and 
negotiation of social ones.
Huntston and Thompson (2000: 5), who as seen prefer the term evaluation, 
concede that it is ‘as slippery as any of the others in [the] field [of research of 
speaker/writer’s attitudes]’. They point out that among the wide variety of 
terms in use ‘some are in effect synonymous, while others cover slightly 
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different overlapping areas’ (ibid p. 2). Martin (2000), Martin and Rose (2003), 
and Martin and White (2005) talk of appraisal.
Because the framework of analysis that I adopt for the investigation of 
subjectivity is the one developed by Martin and his colleagues, I shall speak of 
APPRAISAL31. This is a superordinate term referring generally to the 
expression of evaluation and personal position in discourse and, more 
specifically, to its analysis within the specific framework used in this chapter. 
This is consistent with how Martin and White (2005: 2) define APPRAISAL: 
[A] cover-all term to encompass all evaluative uses of language, including 
those by which speakers/writers adopt particular value positions or stances 
and by which they negotiate [them] with either actual or potential 
respondents’. 
4.5 Overview of AT
In this section, I shall give an overview of the theoretical framework adopted in 
the present chapter and explain the reasons for its selection. 
AT has been developing within SFG over a period of 17 years and has 
received contributions from, and has been applied by, a number of 
researchers (e.g. Adendorff, De Klerk, and Van Genechten, 2009). Just like its 
‘mother theory’ (SFG), AT has aimed from the beginning to be both a theory 
and a practical tool for analysing texts. 
AT emerged out of what was initially a model for analysing interpersonal 
meaning which ‘could handle AFFECT alongside modality and mood’ (Martin 
                                                            
31 In AT (Appraisal Theory), it is customary to capitalise this label, as well as those identifying types of 
attitudes (see below), such as AFFECT, APPRECIATION, and JUDGEMENT. I shall follow this convention
here.
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and White, (2005: xi). In the process, the focus of research broadened beyond 
AFFECT and began considering lexical resources for judging behaviour as 
well as appreciating the value of things. Significantly, it also recognised the 
existence of ‘syndromes of appraisal’ (Martin and Rose, 2003) in different 
types of texts and discourses. What this means is that evaluation develops 
dynamically and unfolds prosodically in discourse and in texts, hence the 
need for a more global approach to its study. AT is still evolving and being 
added to. Of all the different but related strands of AT in existence, the one 
that I am following more closely in my analysis is the one developed 
principally by Martin and which has resulted in a number of published works, 
often co-authored. Of these, the main ones that form the basis for this work 
are: Martin (2000a), Martin and Rose (2003 and 2007), and Martin and White 
(2005).
As previously mentioned, AT is overtly discourse-based and user-oriented, as 
well as firmly grounded within a specific, easily recognizable theoretical 
framework (SFG). The framework captures well the dynamic nature of 
interpersonal meaning, bringing it nicely together under one label. AT
acknowledges that the task of evaluation is performed in language through a 
number of lexicogrammatical devices and across whole texts. Usefully, it 
introduces the concept of ‘prosody of attitudes’ (Martin and Rose, 2003: 27). 
Attitudes and interpersonal meanings in general ‘are often realized not just 
locally [e.g. at clause level], but tend to sprawl out and colour a passage of 
discourse, forming a ‘prosody’ of attitude.’ Therefore, through AT one can look 
at evaluation as a more global phenomenon and therefore pick up traces of it 
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that might be overlooked under other, more ‘local’ and lexically-based 
approaches. 
A question then can be asked, in relation to this section of the present 
research: In a personal story of suffering and pain, which elements are 
foregrounded, what becomes the object of a speaker’s evaluation? Are such 
evaluations mainly positive or negative? 
One of the starting assumptions with which this project began was that – on 
the whole – pain and illness would be overwhelmingly evaluated negatively. 
Surprisingly, this – as will be shown – turned out not to be always the case. 
The evaluations expressed by the ALOMAR Plus speakers are manifold and 
variously nuanced. This is made possible by the lexicogrammatical choices 
afforded by the system. A ‘holistic’ analytical approach – such as that offered 
by AT – helps the researcher to better identify these phenomena. AT looks not 
only at the linguistic means used by speakers to encode and present their 
feelings and evaluations; it also considers ‘those means by which they more 
indirectly activate evaluative stances and position readers/listeners to supply 
their own assessments.’ (Martin and White, 2005: 2). These evaluations - the 
authors argue – are relevant not only because of what they reveal about the 
speaker’s stance but also because they ‘operate rhetorically to construct 
relations of alignment and rapport between the writer/speaker and actual or 
potential respondents’ (p. 2). This is apparent in the language of my 
informants where one can detect a preoccupation with, and attention to, the 
possible responses of not only the interviewer, but also of ‘possible 
audiences’, whether present, past, or future.
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4.6 The linguistic realization of APPRAISAL
When looking at the linguistic instantiation of APPRAISAL, one soon notices 
that it is realised lexicogrammatically through adjectives, adverbials, nouns, 
and verbs, as well as whole clauses. This is not surprising; just as a musical 
composition relies on overall structure and tempo to build a coherent, yet 
complex, piece that is able to evoke a number of emotional responses, so 
language spreads the burden of the representation and communication of the 
self over a number of loci and uses a variety of means32. AT is also concerned 
with the linguistic phenomena that have been studied traditionally under 
headings such as ‘modality’ (especially. ‘epistemic modality’) and 
‘evidentiality’: if one is to be believed when she tells a personal story, then she 
must present evidence (linguistic and, where possible, extra-linguistic) to 
support her claims. 
Martin and White (2005: 2) extend traditional accounts ‘by attending not only 
to issues of speaker/writer certainty, commitment and knowledge but also to 
questions of how the textual voice positions itself with respect to other voices 
and other positions’. 
                                                            
32 The task of attitudinal positioning is carried out by para- and extra-linguistic, as well as linguistic 
means: body posture, intonation, voice pitch and gaze should be taken into consideration as well. 
Obviously, the scope of this work does not allow such multimodal analysis; hopefully, future studies 
will.
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4.7 The functions of APPRAISAL in AT
In the APPRAISAL system, evaluation as a whole (i.e. APPRAISAL) achieves 
three main, overall functions: attitudinal, dialogistic, and intertextual
positioning. Of these, the most relevant for the discussion in this chapter is 
attitudinal positioning. This function is used by authors (speakers and writers, 
as noted) to provide gradable positive or negative assessments of people, 
places, things, happenings, and states of affairs: the ‘entities’ which populate 
the world around us. Perhaps this is the most familiar of the functions of 
APPRAISAL under the various labels with which it is studied. 
4.8. The three Attitudes encoded by APPRAISAL
Attitudes constitute, within APPRAISAL, a sub-system for the expression of 
what one can generally term ‘feelings’; these include emotional reactions, 
judgements of behaviour and evaluation of things (Martin & White, 2005: 35). 
Figure 4.1 shows the three attitudes identified by AT:
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Figure 4.1. Attitudes encoded by the APPRAISAL system.
When operating within the system, a speaker selects one of the attitudes to be 
encoded. It is worth remembering that, in SFG, a system entails the possibility 
of making choices. Once the author chooses to resort to it, he or she has to 
select the attitude/s to encode and the lexicogrammatical means with which to 
do it. 
4.8.1 AFFECT
Consider the extract (4.1). Fabio, who, as seen, suffers severe pain due to a 
protrusion of one of the spinal discs, is talking of the effects that the constant, 
intense pain had on him. Underlined in the passage is the expression of 
AFFECT:
Extract (4.1) (F I: 3-4)
Fabio: [The pain] was always there. So it, it wasn’t enough to say, well, I 
shall go to bed and rest, no. It was, I’d fall asleep and this pain was 
there, I’d wake up and it would be there again. So the nights were 
Attitudes:
AFFECT (resources for 
expressing feelings): 
e.g. I was sad.
JUDGEMENT
(resources for judging 
character): e.g. He’s a 
bad doctor.
APPRECIATION
(resources for valuing 
the worth of things): 
e.g. This book is very 
informative.
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really bad; I repeat, it was more, an unnerving thing, stressful,
more than the pain itself [the fact that the pain was constant].
The extract is interesting because it shows this speaker using APPRAISAL to 
do, typically, more than one thing at once. He generally evaluates his 
experience of living with pain (which, as we shall see, constitutes 
APPRECIATION) and to encode AFFECT. In so doing, he voices, in this 
instance, his feelings about having to live with pain constantly, day and night. 
As mentioned, what transpires here is Fabio’s exasperation at never being left 
alone by his pain. What the passage foregrounds is neither the quality of the 
pain (its type), nor its intensity. What the speaker wants us to ”see’’ is the 
effect that pain had on him, especially because of its persistence. To this end, 
he uses a number of relational clauses where qualities (stressante ‘stressful’, 
snervante ‘unnerving’) are attributed to nominalised events: falling asleep and 
waking up, in both cases with the attendant circumstance of being in pain. 
Pain itself, in this passage, is not evaluated at all: its effects are. By so doing 
the speaker lets us know, obliquely, how he felt. The underlined parts neatly 
illustrate one of the two ways in which AFFECT can be codified: as evoked
(i.e. implicit) rather than inscribed (i.e. direct33). Martin (2000: 155) argues that 
APPRAISAL markers may be ‘directly construed in the text, or implicated 
through the selection of ideational meaning.’ As we shall see, the latter is 
something that speakers in this corpus do quite often. Especially when 
expressing affective meanings, speakers appear to favour the inscribed (i.e. 
direct; explicit) mode. This, as will be argued, has the advantage of positioning 
                                                            
33 In the first edition (2003) of their book, Martin and Rose use the terms evoked and inscribed. In the 
latest edition (2007), they use direct and implicit.
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the speaker’s statement as factual, whilst simultaneously a disfavouring an 
‘emotional’ persona.
Using evoked (implicit) AFFECT is also an effective strategy for aligning the 
interlocutor. One cannot really ‘access’ or understand another’s pain, but it is 
certainly easier to sympathise with the condition of having to go to sleep in 
pain and having to wake up still in pain. It is through a number of existential 
clauses (e.g. ‘the pain was always there; well, it was there, it was there; I’d fall 
asleep and this pain was there’, as Fabio in extract (4.1) says) that the 
speaker invites the hearer into his world of constant pain. Here he relies on 
his interlocutor’s cooperation and shared world-knowledge to provide an 
accurate depiction of his inner world and his lived experience. 
As Martin and White (2005: 6) note, ‘[r]eports of one’s own emotional 
reactions are highly personalising. They invite the addressee to respond on a 
personal level, to empathise, sympathise or at least see the emotion as 
warranted and understandable.’ It is easy to see, then, how the three 
functions of APPRAISAL mentioned above cannot easily be separated from 
one another. The implicit request for sympathy, for example, involves a 
degree of dialogistic positioning. AFFECT, then, is ‘concerned with emotions, 
with positive and negative emotional responses and dispositions’ (Martin, 
2008: 12). It is a lexicogrammatical window on the individual’s inner-world and 
can be expressed through a variety of lexicogrammatical means. A synopsis 
of the lexicogrammatical means used to encode AFFECT is shown in Figure 
4.2. 
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Lexicogrammatical means which can be used to encode AFFECT
verbs of emotion (mental processes) love/hate
adverbials happily, sadly
adjectives denoting emotion happy, sad, pleased
nominalisations joy despair (‘his fear was obvious to 
us all’)
whole clauses the sadness was there
Figure 4.2. The lexicogrammatical encoding of AFFECT.
It is not surprising that, given the great variety and complexity of the ‘inner-
life’, language resorts to a variety of lexicogrammatical resources to encode it. 
Of course, the identification and study of AFFECT as a relevant linguistic 
phenomenon does not begin with AT. Ochs and Schieffelin (1989) published a 
now-famous article whose epigrammatic has rightly become a classic: 
Language has a heart. For the two authors, affect has a broad meaning. It 
includes ‘feelings, moods, dispositions, and attitudes associated with persons 
and/or situations’ (p. 7). They then go on to define their research agenda as 
the ‘conventional displaying of affect through linguistic means.’
4.8.2 JUDGEMENT
Within AT, this label refers to the following (Martin, 2008: 30, 31): 
[An] attitudinal evaluation in which human behaviour is negatively or positively 
assessed by reference to some set of social norms. [...] Under JUDGEMENT, 
we are concerned with language which criticises or praises, which condemns 
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or applauds behaviour – the actions, deeds, sayings, beliefs, motivations etc. 
of human individuals and groups.
Like AFFECT, JUDGEMENT can be implicit (‘evoked’) or explicit (‘inscribed’). 
When overtly expressed, ‘the evaluation is explicitly presented by means of a 
lexical item carrying the JUDGEMENT value, thus skilfully, corruptly, lazily, 
etc.’ (p. 33). JUDGEMENT values can be ‘triggered’ by elements presented as 
simple ‘facts’, which apparently are only unevaluated statements of events or 
states of affairs. But the important, often-overlooked fact is that “these 
apparently ‘factual’ or informational meanings nevertheless have the capacity 
in the culture to evoke JUDGEMENT responses (depending upon the reader’s 
social/cultural/ideological reading position)” (my emphasis). 
This again shows the construction of the pain and illness story (or any story, 
for that matter) as a ‘cooperative’ effort. It shows how the interlocutor may 
appear to be a passive receiver of a narrative whereas instead s/he is actively 
involved – albeit often unconsciously – recruited into the building of the 
emerging story, because the author relies on his/her world view to sustain a 
particular ‘reading’ of events. In the following analysis, I shall look at these 
judgements (when present), explicit and implicit, and the function(s) they may 
serve within the emerging narrative. 
4.8.3 APPRECIATION
This last subcategory of attitude deals with:
[E]valuations which are concerned with positive and negative assessments of 
objects, artefacts, processes and states of affairs rather than human 
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behaviour. In some cases, however, human participants may also be 
‘APPRECIATED’ – in cases where the assessment does not directly focus on 
the correctness or incorrectness of their behaviour (Martin, 2008: 44). 
Along the subjectivity spectrum, APPRECIATION, together with 
JUDGEMENT, is at the lower end. At the top of the spectrum is AFFECT. This 
is because it is in the expression of what might be generally referred to as 
‘feelings’ that a speaker has the highest degree of ‘involvement’. Of all the 
attitudes, AFFECT is the one which allows for the highest degree of subjective 
involvement and exposure. As will be seen, this affectual colouring (evoked
more than inscribed) is prominent in the interviews that constitute the 
ALOMAR Plus corpus and, as will be shown, this is in large part responsible 
for their personal, subjective tone. 
4.9 Previous application of AT in the study of health communication
The use of AT to analyse health communication is not new. Adendorff, De 
Klerk, and Van Genechten (2009) have adopted it to describe and analyse the 
use of evaluative language in a corpus of transcribed interviews collected over 
a period of four years with Xhosa English speakers. Informants varied in 
gender and age; they were all of direct Xhosa descent; their exposure to and 
proficiency in standard South African English varied and all belonged to 
disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds. 
The recorded conversations did not specifically aim at eliciting evaluations 
about HIV/AIDS. However, given the high levels of infection in South Africa 
and considering that the socially disadvantaged, such as the informants, tend 
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to experience a higher prevalence of HIV/AIDS infection, the topic appeared 
often.
Like pain and chronic illness (which — thanks to current treatment with 
antiretroviral drugs — HIV infection now is), HIV/AIDS were seen as triggers 
for emotive speech. In addition, the importance of language in raising 
awareness about crucial health issues was seen by Adendorff et al. (bid). This
— notwithstanding the important differences between HIV/AIDS and the 
conditions that affect the participants in the present study — is also true for 
the issues raised in the ALOMAR Plus corpus.
Adendorff et al.’s research clearly illustrates the usefulness of AT in 
uncovering linguistic features and patterns related to emotion in health 
communication. Health is a central matter in the individual’s perception of 
his/her own identity and sense of self. Ill-health causes a breakdown not only 
in the biological functioning of the body but also — crucially — in overall 
emotive well-being. This latter aspect is often overlooked in biomedically-
informed encounters with health professional and others. Crucially, a patient’s 
distress cannot be picked up even by the most sophisticated diagnostic tools 
and — as previously noted — may only be visible in language. To this end, AT 
can be usefully used as a linguistic ‘diagnostic tool’. It is perhaps in this 
linguistic environment (i.e. evaluation) the traditional distinction between 
bodily and mental pain loses most of its meaning.
Adendorff at al. also look at the different effects — in terms of interlocutor’s 
alignment, that evoked (indirect) and inscribed (explicit) attitudes (in particular 
AFFECT) have on interlocutor alignment. They convincingly argue that 
evoked options, which are less ‘precise’, allow for greater ‘interpretative 
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latitude’ (p. 143), as opposed to inscribed options which, being more explicit, 
are ‘less open to such negotiations […]. [They] make[…] resistance or non-
compliance with one’s interlocutor invitation to accept a specific listening 
position much more difficult’ (p. 143). 
This chapter addresses this issues and it takes up Adendorff et al.’s invitation 
to utilise AT beyond the realm of SFG because of the precious insights it can 
offer in understanding the illness experience and in particular, as I shall argue, 
the experience of pain.
4.10 Attitudinal positioning in the ALOMAR Plus corpus
One of the first questions one asks when told by somebody that they are in 
pain is: ‘How do you feel?’ Not uniquely among human experiences, illness 
and pain generate in the experiencer various responses. Asked how she or he 
is feeling, the afflicted person might offer a report of the particular pain or 
condition afflicting her/him. However, soon enough the interlocutor is likely to 
be informed about how the sufferer feels about it; about the emotional 
response that pain engenders. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I shall be looking at the encoding of 
APPRAISAL in the corpus, usually beginning with AFFECT and then moving 
on to the other attitudes. As the analysis will show, identifying a particular 
token as a representative of a single attitude is not always as straightforward 
as might be expected. With regards to AFFECT, I shall be focussing on its 
type (e.g. positive or negative), and function. 
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Unlike for the previous chapter, the analysis will consider each informant 
separately, becoming in effect a series of smaller-scale ‘case-studies’. This 
choice will allow a better appreciation of the evaluative richness of each 
speaker’s contribution. All the single sub-sections will then be considered 
together in the concluding section of the chapter, which will offer a kind of 
‘panoramic’ view of APPRAISAL choices in the ALOMAR Plus corpus.
For the classification of AFFECT, I shall follow Martin and White (2005: 42-
52). What they offer is ‘a framework for mapping feelings’ (p. 42). For the two 
authors, attitude is viewed as a ‘discourse semantic system’ whose 
realisations ‘diversify across a range of grammatical structures’ (p. 45). As 
noted, similarly to what happens with the construal of pain by the 
lexicogrammar, the encoding and construal of AFFECT is a task shared by 
various elements of the lexicogrammar. So, for example, AFFECT too can be 
construed as a ‘quality’ that describes participants (a happy doctor: Epithet), 
attributed to participants (the doctor was happy: Attribute), or as a manner or 
process and realised as a Circumstance (the doctor smiled happily). 
Different types of ‘processes’ are also used, like affective-mental: her words 
saddened him; affective-behavioural: the patient laughed. Also, in narratives 
AFFECT can and often does appear as a ‘comment’ and is realised through a 
Modal Adjunct: sadly, she didn’t stay. Other means include grammatical 
metaphors, nominalised realisations of qualities (joy, sadness, sorrow) and 
processes (grief, sobs, constriction in his throat) (p. 46). To begin the analysis, 
the interviews were scanned to identify ‘tokens’ of APPRAISAL, which were 
then identified as being examples of AFFECT, JUDGEMENT, or 
APPRECIATION.
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4.10.1 Anna
Anna’s interview, although not particularly long, stands out for its high number 
of tokens of AFFECT (19). The term ‘token’ is meant to refer to any 
lexicogrammatical item or items encoding — in this case — AFFECT. As 
previously mentioned, ‘tokens’ of any attitude can vary in complexity: from a 
single lexical item to a whole clause. 
Of all the informants, Anna appears to be the one least ‘adjusted’ to her 
condition. The impression one forms when listening to her account is one of a 
highly emotive response to her current predicament, as demonstrated, for 
example, by the frequent use of emotionally charged lexical items, such as 
lancinante ‘lancinating’. The number of AFFECT tokens clearly contributes to 
rendering this account highly personal, both offering and eliciting personal 
involvement.
As Table 4.1 below shows, in the majority of cases, the tokens of AFFECT are 
example of negative AFFECT (13 out of 19, only one of which is ambiguous). 
Martin and White (2005: 49) provide a further, finer classification of affect. 
This ‘variable’ in the classification of affect ‘groups emotions into three major 
sets’ (p. 49), which have to do with ‘un/happiness’, ‘in/security’, and 
‘dis/satisfaction’. Each token of AFFECT can be, according to the theory, 
classified as pertaining to one of these categories. Martin and white (ibid) go 
on to explain that the un/happiness variable is concerned with ‘affairs of the 
heart’: sadness, happiness, and love. The in/security variable pertains to 
‘ecosocial well-being’: anxiety, fear, confidence, and trust. Finally, the 
dis/satisfaction variable refers to emotions ‘concerned with telos (the pursuit of 
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goals)’, such as ennui, displeasure, curiosity, and respect. In Anna’s case, 
most tokens are representative of the insecurity subset of feelings classified 
by Martin and White.
Number of tokens of 
AFFECT
Total: 19
Type of AFFECT 
encoded
Type of 
subset
13 Negative insecurity
5 Positive confidence
1 ambiguous ?
Table 4.1. AFFECT in Anna's interview.
As will be remembered, at the time of the interview Anna was in her sixties 
and suffering from an acute form of RA. Her experience is characterised by a 
series of wrong diagnoses and extreme pain resulting in great disruption to 
everyday life and also disruptive of her sense of self. 
As she admits, she has a long experience of telling about her experience, 
especially to medical professionals. During the interview, punctuated by highly 
factual statements, it takes some time before her feelings are given voice. 
Extract (4.2) shows a passage where tokens of AFFECT in her account have 
been identified and underlined:
Extract (4.2) (A I: 1)
Anna: Almost immediately the pain: [inaudible] strong and, by and by it 
grows, and in my case at least, then it becomes really lancinating, so 
much so that. There have been moments, before, and even during 
therapy that it would get so intense, that at the thought that it would 
come back this pain, after a few minutes, after a few hours, I really 
thought that I couldn’t, I wouldn’t be able to continue living like this. I 
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would tell my husband, “look [here, at me], I can’t do it, I feel like 
throwing myself out of the window, it’s not possible.”
This passage appears at the beginning of the interview. It is rather striking 
that, after some factual statements about the quality and quantity of her pain 
(instances of APPRECIATION), which give an objective tone to her account, 
she offers these two tokens of AFFECT (underlined in extract (4.2) above), 
encoded by a succession of clauses. Both are quotative: the first of what we 
might term an inner dialogue (I thought that ...); the second of a past 
conversation with her husband. In both instances Anna’s hopelessness is 
triggered by the thought of the future as a continuous repetition of her painful 
present. 
First, she tells herself that she feels she cannot cope with the pain. Then she 
actually voices her desperation and her belief that she might not be able to 
continue living under such conditions to her husband: ‘I can’t do it, I feel like 
throwing myself out of the window, it’s not possible.’ The quoted passage is a 
relatively lengthy one and is particularly useful in illustrating Anna’s ‘style’, her 
‘linguistic self’. It is also exemplary in that it shows characteristics that will 
reappear throughout her account which include an attempt at ‘factuality’ and 
the indirect, or evoked, expression of AFFECT. The latter can be seen in her 
evaluation of her pains as lancinanti (‘lancinating’). On the surface, this is a 
case of APPRECIATION, as noted above, but, sharing her cultural world, it 
can also be read as evoked AFFECT and one that would normally elicit 
sympathy from a listener. The interlocutor becomes co-author in that he/she, 
faced with this factual token of APPRECIATION can easily read its true import 
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in term of AFFECT. He/she will ‘know’ how Anna must have felt because of 
the lancinating pain.
Another noticeable characteristic of extract (4.2) is its ‘fragmented’ syntax. By 
this, I do not mean that it is in any way ungrammatical (Anna is a perfectly 
competent speaker of Italian). It is ‘fragmented’ in that it consists of a series of 
false starts and abrupt changes of grammatical constructions. In addition, 
from a textual point of view it clearly favours parataxis. Chafe (1982) identifies 
all of these traits as typical of spoken discourse. This is certainly true but in 
this passage, they also contribute to endowing the passage with a more 
‘dramatic’ tone. 
As mentioned, in this passage (which is typical of the interview) of all the 
attitudes encoded by Anna APPRECIATION appears to be prominent. In it, 
various types of bodily pain are the entities which are evaluated the most. We 
are given pain’s quality, quantity, and temporal attributes (how long it would 
last, how sudden its onset might be). Importantly, the lexical items employed 
to describe the pain are ‘charged’, meaning that they convey a strong 
emotional response and are likely to generate an equally intense reaction in 
the interlocutor: (proprio) lancinante ‘(really) lancinating’, (talmente) acuto ‘(so) 
intense’, (molto) forte ‘(very) strong’. 
The other entity to be evaluated in extract (4.2) is the period of time in which 
these strong pains were occurring: it lasted three years and is described as un 
bel periodo where bel (‘beautiful’) actually means both ‘bad’ and ‘long’. As 
noted, this passage too is quite typical of this speaker’s style and the way she 
manages to convey AFFECT while not being entirely overt about it and to 
elicit sympathy. The passage in particular and her account in general is fairly 
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factual: it is about entities, like pain, and how negative they are for her. The 
interlocutor is bound to draw conclusions on how she must have felt, to 
identify, to an extent, with her and to offer sympathy. As mentioned, Anna 
resorts to emotionally charged lexicon to convey the character of her 
experience. Pain is represented mainly as an entity (nominally) to which 
descriptors such as ‘lancinating’ lancinante, ‘tremendous/terrible’ tremendo, 
‘terrible’ terribile are attached. It is interesting to observe the semantic field 
from which many of the pain descriptors she employs are drawn. In extract 
(4.3) the pains experienced are described in the following terms:
Extract (4.3) (A I: 3)
Anna: Those [pains] in the foot are quite tremendous they too, because they 
are just like, you know, when the blacksmith hits the hot iron?
Further on, as shown in extract (4.4), commenting on the frequency, quality, 
quantity, and intensity of the pains experienced in her fingers she says:
Extract (4.4) (A I: 5)
Anna: There are moments, suddenly, that I can count tens, tens at a time 
[...]. it’s really like lightning [tchin, tchin] in my feet [...] intense, yes, 
very intense.
Hot, fast, bright; temperature, speed, light. These are some of the adjectives 
Anna resorts to in order to characterize her pains. ‘Like lightning’ and ‘like an 
explosion’ are two striking similes which can be seen as pertaining to the 
lexicon of war. In this speaker’s account, pain is represented like (or described 
in terms of) an entity waging war against the individual; its consequences and 
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its effects on the sufferer are described in ways that would not be out of place 
in a journalistic account of a conflict, as extracts (4.5-4.7) shows:
Extracts (4.5-4.7) (A I: 7-8)
Anna: (4.5) after the pain was gone [after having taking immunosuppressant drugs] 
without the pain, afterwards there was only the pain of the disaster.
(4.6) and afterwards the illness would do the damage.
(4.7) in October I had at night a pain here, by the sternum, right in between 
the breasts here, which started slowly from here [she points to her left 
side], and grew stronger and stronger. When it arrived here there was an 
explosion, as if you saw a bomb go off.
For this speaker, then, the experience of pain is obviously terrible and 
terrifying. With words she paints a very effective picture of what it must have 
been like. Interestingly, she does not say that her pain was or felt like an 
explosion; with an existential clause she says that ‘there was an explosion’, 
and it was as ‘if you saw a bomb go off’. These images convey at once the 
sensory experience of pain, both its quality, and quantity. They are also 
particularly effective in eliciting empathy from the listener who is likely to have 
recalled visual images of bodies damaged by explosions. 
Avenati and Agliotti (2006) claim that witnessing other people’s pain has very 
real effects. These two cognitive scientists report how in people who witness 
the pain (presumed or real) of others, neurological investigative techniques 
show the activation of the same areas of the brain that become activated in 
the individual experiencing the original noxious stimulus. Although the 
experiments conducted by the aforementioned authors involved subjects 
being shown images of people experiencing painful experiences, it is plausible 
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to assume that through language sufferers can achieve very similar, perhaps 
identical, results.
Summary
This speaker’s account is rich in evaluative language. Among the attitudes, 
AFFECT has a prominent place, especially negative of the insecurity type. 
‘Charged’ lexical items are often used as are metaphors reminiscent of the 
language of war and destruction. These devices, together with syntax typical 
of spoken language contribute to painting the image of a highly distressed 
individual and are witness to the multi-dimensional nature of the pain 
experience. 
Unsurprisingly, pain is evaluated negatively, as shown by the emotionally 
charged adjectives used, but even more so are the pharmacological 
treatments received. It is interesting to note that, in this speaker’s account, the 
true impact of RA and the pain it causes is almost entirely communicated 
through AFFECT.
4.10.2 Annamaria
Annamaria has been living with Lupus for decades. Her interview was the first 
to take place and is the lengthiest in the corpus. She gives the impression of 
being well-adjusted to her condition, demonstrated, among other things, by 
her involvement with the support-group, which she values highly, her very 
active life-style, and her willingness to talk of her experience and to offer 
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support to other people in the same predicament. AFFECT, is displayed in 
several places throughout her account: the feelings and innermost sensations 
triggered by the experience of living and coping with a disruptive and 
potentially life-threatening condition. Interestingly, however, contrary to 
Anna’s, one would not label her account as ‘emotional’, in the colloquial sense 
of the word: she is in control of her feelings, which are presented for the most 
part as positive or leading to a positive outcome. Through her words, 
Annamaria comes across as someone consciously displaying a positive 
attitude vis-à-vis her condition and, more generally, life. 
The apparent effort to paint a positive picture of her experience and, 
ultimately, of herself, is not undermining of her sincerity. Through a skilful use 
of language she offers the overall impression of a balanced personality, of a 
woman who has successfully been coping with a chronic disease for a 
number of years without succumbing to it.
It is in large part through evoked AFFECT that this balance is achieved and 
presented discursively. Through it, the speaker informs her interlocutor of her 
unique point of view, her feelings and perceptions as she tries to make sense 
of what she has been experiencing. The skilful combination of evoked and 
inscribed AFFECT and, more generally, of Appraisal allows her to achieve the 
equilibrium that obviously matters so much to her.
As noted, APPRECIATION rests along a spectrum of involvement/subjectivity. 
Together with JUDGEMENT it stands at the lower end of the spectrum, while 
at the top we find AFFECT. An account rich in AFFECT will be read as highly 
subjective, as showing more involvement on the speaker’s part and also, one 
might argue, it will engender more empathy in the interlocutor. 
199
APPRECIATION and JUDGEMENT, on the other hand, can contribute to a 
more ‘detached’, more objective, less ‘emotional’ reading. Obviously, one’s 
evaluation of an entity or of someone’s character are highly subjective but 
they can be presented in more objective terms. One ‘infers’ or ‘reads’ the 
speaker’s stance by paying attention to what is said about a person, an entity, 
an event, and so forth. With AFFECT, however, the evaluation and the 
evaluator are more ‘fused’ together and more difficult to disentangle. 
There is also – it can be argued – a degree of ‘iconicity’ in the lexicogrammar 
of Attitude which fuses the evaluator more with her judgements in AFFECT 
than in JUDGEMENT and APPRECIATION. When a speaker says, of an 
entity, that it was/looked/etc. horrible/interesting/etc., one can imagine the 
speaker standing outside of the scene and doing the evaluating. 
Lexicogrammatically, the ‘evaluator’ is separated from the judgements. This, I 
believe, enhances objectivity, or the appearance of it. However, with AFFECT 
evaluation and evaluator are more difficult to disentangle. Compare, for 
example, an utterance such as I felt sad or, even more so, I cried/smiled, etc.; 
here the Attitude and its Experiencer are closer together. The feeling 
expressed and the person expressing it are more entwined, even in terms of 
lexicogrammar and therefore the account appears ‘more involved’.
Perhaps surprisingly, of all tokens of Appraisal in Annamaria’s account only a 
small number can be classified straightforwardly as instances of inscribed 
AFFECT. An example of this is extract (6), where she is talking about a period 
before she was given an exact diagnosis and her symptoms were thought to 
be indicative of a rheumatic disease but her blood tests would show no 
confirmation for it. For a period of about ten years, she lived in this kind of 
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limbo with her condition more or less stable. This all changed when she 
entered a period of psychological as well as physical distress which, in her 
view, caused her condition to deteriorate:
Extract (4.8) (Am I: 3)
Annamaria: And then I did indeed get worse, in the sense that, it’s not 
something one just says but I’ve experienced on my own 
skin, that when one’s not well psychologically, in moments 
of crisis these illnesses take over. And in fact, I was going 
through a moment of crisis, I put myself under a remarkable 
physical and moral [psychological] stress and I began to 
have bigger problems.
Stavo passando un momento di crisi ... uno stress sia fisico che morale ‘I was 
going through a moment of crisis ... a remarkable physical and moral 
[psychological] stress’. These clauses clearly give voice to Annamaria’s 
feelings, mainly through lexical choices: crisi ‘crisis’, and stress. This is an 
obvious example of negative AFFECT, triggered by some unspecified 
circumstance, which opens a window on her inner-world. Yet, as Table 4.2 
shows, of the total 23 tokens of Appraisal in Annamaria’s account less than 
50% (eleven) are clearly identifiable as straightforward instances of AFFECT. 
Of these, five are examples of positive AFFECT.
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Total number of tokens of 
APPRAISAL
Type of attitude 
encoded
Positive Negative
23 AFFECT 5 6
Table 4.2. AFFECT in Annamaria's interview.
However, it is interesting to note that apart from these instances of explicit or 
inscribed AFFECT, Annamaria informs the interlocutor of her emotions more 
ambiguously (or indirectly), through expressions that need interpreting 
because of the potential for multiple readings. One of the ways in which this is 
achieved grammatically is through the use of expressions that have a ‘double’ 
reading: clauses that can be construed as referring to her physical as well as 
her psychological state. For example extract (4.9): 
Extract (4.9) (Am I: 1)
Annamaria: I was [doing; feeling] very well, with cortisone I was [doing] 
very well.
Here this speaker begins painting an image of well-being notwithstanding her 
illness (the extract is from early in the interview), thanks to the medication that 
she was first prescribed (cortisone) that eased some of her symptoms. 
Although a ‘physical’ reading is obvious, one that refers to her mental state 
(one that, in other words, could be seen as an instance of AFFECT) is also 
plausible. ‘To do/feel well’ sentirsi bene, in Italian as in English, can refer to 
both physical and psychological well-being. Here, the co-text helps to 
disambiguate and reveals that in this case the well-being that Annamaria is 
referring to is pre-eminently physical. The passage comes from the opening 
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part of the interview; immediately prior to it, Annamaria has been listing all the 
physical symptoms that characterised the initial phase of her illness and the 
prescription of cortisone following the diagnosis. In addition, the quoted 
passage is in reply to the interviewer’s specific question as to whether 
cortisone made her feel physically better. As Eggins and Slade point out 
(1997: 125-126), in analysing Appraisal the co-text is often crucial: ‘it is often 
not possible to state whether a lexical item [or clause, for that matter] has 
attitudinal meaning until it is used in context.’ Similarly, the kind of attitude 
encoded can only be interpreted successfully once the linguistic and cultural 
context is considered. However, even this unambiguous example carries, it 
can be argued, the possibility of more than one reading. The sympathetic 
listener is bound to discern traces of AFFECT in this statement of physical 
well-being. Being culturally positioned as sharing Annamaria’s assumptions 
about health and illness, and the desirability of being free from pain, one can 
infer that her physical well-being also meant mental well-being. Eggins and 
Slade (ibid p. 126) stress the importance of taking into account ‘the 
sociocultural background and positioning of the interactants’ in interpreting 
utterances. In their view, ‘[a]ppraisal analysis must [...] be sensitive to the 
potential for different readings [...] of attitudinal meanings’ (p. 126). 
Annamaria’s use of sentences that allow a “double reading” is clear in extract 
(4.10): 
Extract (4.10) (Am I: 1)
Annamaria: [Referring to her doctor’s suggestion to wait until the 
symptoms got worse before making a more precise 
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diagnosis] ‘I was only 21, the thing [waiting until the 
symptoms got worse], I didn’t like it very much.’ 
Obviously, here the speaker is evaluating (appreciating) negatively a 
nominalised proposition (la cosa ‘the thing’: having to wait longer before 
receiving a surer diagnosis). However, what transpires from this utterance is 
also a general, negative emotion of dissatisfaction with a state of affairs: her 
doctor’s proposed course of action and, more broadly, being left in the dark as 
to the true nature of her condition. 
So, although an instance of APPRECIATION on the surface, the statement 
can also be classified as belonging to the insecurity group of Martin and 
White’s typology of AFFECT (see above). The speaker resorts to a mental 
process (piacere: ‘to like’) which lends itself to a double reading, one more 
‘emotive’ than the other. In the less emotive reading, Annamaria is evaluating 
a proposition negatively (la cosa); however, a second reading also offers an 
insight into her inner world, her emotive state. And these are clearly feelings 
of dissatisfaction and insecurity. It is quite easy to sympathise with this 
informant’s state of mind: in the realm of pain and illness uncertainty is 
particularly distressing and likely to cause anxiety.
To complicate (or to enrich) things even further, a reading of the passage 
above as an instantiation of JUDGEMENT could also be suggested: the 
doctor’s behaviour is evaluated negatively, albeit in a rather “veiled” manner. 
Annamaria here (as throughout her account) positions herself as an active 
individual who challenges both the ability of pain to paralyse her and her 
clinician’s inability to name her illness and thus somehow control it. It is 
interesting to note that she could have chosen to express AFFECT and 
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APPRECIATION separately, using distinct clauses. This, however, would 
have contributed to a less ‘restrained’, more emphatic or emotive reading. By 
being less explicit, Annamaria has the listener ‘do more work’, while 
simultaneously maintaining more equilibrium. In addition it should be noted 
that the clause in question is an example of what Martin and White (2005) 
refer to as ‘mental processes/states’ in opposition to ‘behavioural surges’ (the 
captain disliked leaving/the captain felt sad vs. the captain wept). Behavioural 
surges ‘involv[e] some kind of embodied paralinguistic or extralinguistic 
manifestation’ (p. 47), and certainly make for more ‘dramatic’ reading.
Later on, when mentioning the time when she suffered from pericarditis, and 
experienced severe, debilitating pains because of it, Annamaria says:
Extract (4.11) (Am I: 7)
Annamaria: It was a really hard period ...it was hard. 
We are again faced with two instances of APPRECIATION (the evaluation of 
things, events, and so on) which can also be read as examples of evoked
(implicit) AFFECT. Here ‘period (of time)’ is being evaluated through two 
clauses representing relational processes where periodo is a participant role 
to which the Attribute hard has been assigned. But crucially, through this 
evaluative stance we are also informed of how the speaker felt during that 
time. The period of time was hard for her. This reading is reinforced by the 
prosody of the two clauses. In between the two, the speaker inserts a pause, 
as if the mere mention of this difficult period had brought back a vivid memory 
of it. This is confirmed by the second clause which simply states that ‘it was 
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hard’, but for whom? For the speaker, whether a time-period is more or less 
hard depends a lot on the person’s frame of mind. 
As previously, one can detect two strands of meaning. The use of clauses that 
can be interpreted as expressing mainly, or primarily, APPRECIATION but 
which also offer an affectual reading contribute to a balanced, not over-
emotional rendering and reception of the account. The grammar of these two 
clauses does not show a human Emoter (Annamaria) but an inanimate, 
abstract Carrier (time) which is a participant in a relational process. The 
speaker has thus transferred the ‘harshness’ of having a heart condition to a 
particular period of time, of which it is a quality; it is an ‘objective’ observation, 
rather than a ‘felt’ emotion. However, the experiential, subjective import of the 
clause is apparent to any native speaker of the language sharing in the same 
cultural values.
As Scheibman (2002: 120) observes, in conversation the prototypical function 
of relational clauses ‘is evaluative and not descriptive.’ She goes on to say 
that ‘[e]ven the more objective locutions are not without subjective import’; this 
is because simply ‘choosing what to say [...] is the most basic expression of 
subjectivity in language’ (p. 168). Included in Scheibman’s use of the term 
‘subjectivity’ are ‘mental states, AFFECT, preference and evaluation’ (p. 7). 
We are therefore presented with clauses that on the surface are instances of 
APPRECIATION (in itself a subjective endeavour) but that a closer reading 
will reveal as expressing also, or primarily, AFFECT: the speaker’s feelings, 
broadly speaking. Evoked AFFECT incorporated in APPRECIATION clauses, 
can also be seen in extract (4.12):
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Extract (4.12) (A I: 3)
Annamaria: And consequently if it [the illness] takes [attacks] vital 
organs, it goes without saying that…it isn’t very easy.
Here Annamaria is talking of one of the effects of lupus which she has 
experienced, namely, its ability to attack the body’s vital organs (like the heart, 
in her case). After a long pause, she uses again a negative relational clause 
(non e’ molto facile ‘it isn’t very easy’). Typically for Italian, the grammatical 
subject (it) is unexpressed. We can interpret the Carrier of the Attribute (facile
‘easy’) to be the situation of having one’s vital organs attacked by the disease. 
But by using this particular wording, she indirectly informs the listener of her 
feelings about this (for her very real) possibility. Similarly to what was seen 
previously, by resorting to APPRECIATION through this relational clause she 
achieves two effects. First, the account is more detached (it is, in fact, a major 
understatement): there is no Emoter, so the feeling is distanced from the 
speaker. Secondly, the proposition is presented as a general truth with which 
it is difficult to disagree. This reading is reinforced by her premising it with the 
evidential clause, va da sé ‘it goes without saying.’ These general statements, 
by virtue of their appeal to a common, uncontested understanding, align the
listener as well as presenting the speaker’s reactions and emotions as 
‘normal’ and perfectly understandable, given the situation. It is interesting to 
note, in passing, the rhetorical effects of the juxtaposition of the evidential va 
da sé to the clause non è molto facile ‘it isn’t very easy’, which frames the 
whole sentence as an understatement. Thus, the use of these relational 
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clauses allows the speaker to express AFFECT (albeit ambiguously) while 
simultaneously establishing her reliability. 
In her study of mood and modality in Spanish history textbooks, McCabe 
(2004: 3) speaks of the clause as an ‘interactive event between writers and 
readers’. Of course the same can be said of speaker and interlocutor. Citing 
the frequent use of unmodalised declaratives in the texts she examines, 
McCabe highlights how these help to build consensus around propositions. 
Particularly relevant is the use of the present tense which, cross-linguistically, 
is used to make generic statements and enhance factuality. The use of these 
‘generic statements’ in the present tense abounds in the ALOMAR Plus 
corpus. It is testimony to the resourcefulness of language how they can be 
used to convey simultaneously factuality, subjectivity and, as I argue, 
AFFECT. Further on in the interview, Annamaria mentions a period when she 
would experience brief spells of mental confusion, probably due to minor 
vascular constrictions caused by lupus. She describes how, for example, she 
would attend her clinic and, on leaving, would not – for a brief moment – know 
where she was. Understandably, this was the cause of major distress. Extract
(4.13) is how she describes it:
Extract (4.13) (Am I: 8)
Annamaria: Oh well, it was ... unpleasant. A sensation 
of...insecurity. And then well, it’s clear that any
physical pain, I think one can...one can deal with it, 
but a mental thing...I think that that is what scares 
the most.
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Annamaria is talking about the clouding of one’s mental faculties (‘but a 
mental thing’) and says that, in her opinion, that is ‘what scares the most’. It is 
interesting to note that, in reality, she is talking about her own lived 
experience; but again she does so in general, rather impersonal terms. When 
she says that this temporary mental clouding is ‘what scares the most’, she is 
making a general statement which, however, is also an indication of her 
personal state of mind at the time. The verb spaventare ‘to frighten’ has 
obvious connotations of AFFECT (somebody is frightened; an Emoter is 
needed) but here it is not tied to any particular Emoter. Instead, it is presented 
as a mental process with an unspecified Experiencer. 
Although not actually voiced, what the hearer understands is that Annamaria 
herself must have been quite frightened. The ‘toning down’ is also achieved 
through the use of ‘uncharged’ lexical items. The sensation is described 
euphemistically as antipatica which could be translated as ‘not very nice or 
pleasant’; it was, Annamaria informs us, una sensazione di insicurezza ‘a 
sensation of insecurity.’ Both descriptors, which again allow Annamaria not to 
position herself overtly as an Emoter, are example of lexical choices which 
suggest a certain detachment and that favour a reading which is not too 
‘emotive’, in the common sense of the term. 
Again, we see a tendency on Annamaria’s part to ‘distance’ emotional 
responses from herself and to present them as general propositions that are 
generally valid, even commonsensical. The view discussed here is not 
attributed to any specific individual or group, although she takes some
ownership of the comment by prefacing it with ‘I think (that that is what scares 
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the most)’. Again talking of her memory blips, she makes another of these 
general statements: 
Extract (4.14) (Am I: 8)
Annamaria: If you are out of your head, it is hard.
The pattern is by now familiar: through a relational clause this speaker makes 
a general statement about being fuori di testa ‘out of one’s mind; i.e. having 
lost one’s mental integrity and informing the listener that ‘it’s hard.’ Yet, in light 
of all that has occurred so far in the conversation the sympathetic listener will 
know that this is not only a general (and, crucially, sharable) statement about 
the difficulty of living with impaired mental faculties, but also an instance of 
AFFECT: an expression of the speaker’s own feelings at having to endure 
such difficulties. 
One last example, extract (4.15), of this strategy occurs shortly after the one 
just discussed. Still reminiscing about the time when she experienced 
respiratory problems, she makes the following general statement:
Extract (4.15) (AM I: 9)
Annamaria: It is a dreadful thing.
Understandably, the interlocutor will sympathise with the evaluation of having 
respiratory problems as ‘a dreadful thing’, yet by now he or she will know that 
s/he has been listening to a woman who has had that very same experience; 
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the listener will know the terrible nature of Annamaria’s emotions and 
sensations while experiencing pleurisy. He/she will also know that this general 
statement is also a very personal one; it is a statement of the speaker’s own 
lived feelings. Notice also the lexically charged adjective ‘dreadful’.
Throughout her account, Annamaria uses the lexicogrammar of Italian to 
inform the listener of her experience as a lupus sufferer. Through the
resources of Appraisal she expresses her point of view. In her account, one 
finds numerous instances of AFFECT but these require a degree of 
interpretation and disambiguation, for they convey more than one strand of 
meaning. 
The examples discussed above can be read as instances of APPRECIATION 
as well as of AFFECT. Annamaria favours the use of relational clauses, which 
allow her to present her inner states as general statements with which the 
listener can sympathise; as attributive relational processes, often with an 
impersonal Carrier rather than with overt instances of AFFECT with herself as 
the Emoter.
This recontextualisation of both JUDGEMENT and APPRECIATION as 
AFFECT has also been noted by Adendorff et al. (2009) in their analysis of 
HIV/AIDS talk. This might be a tendency of health communication in general, 
especially by patients. Further analysis of this type of communication using AT
is therefore necessary to establish whether this is actually is the case. The 
‘recontextualisation’ of AFFECT in terms of APPRECIATION might derive —
at least in part — from a desire on the part of the informants to appear as 
‘rational’, believable, and not overly emotive. As Macken-Horarik (2003: 314) 
notes, ‘it is implicitly evaluative meanings that are most coercive of the reader 
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[or speaker] simply because they appear to pass beneath the threshold of 
conscious awareness.’
Summary
Probably owing to its length (as stated, Annamaria’s interview is the lengthiest 
in the corpus), this speaker’s account is ‘rich’, from an Appraisal point of view. 
AFFECT appears often, both of the negative and positive type. Interestingly, 
for the expression of negative AFFECT, this speaker often resorts to relational 
clauses which, it has been argued, can also be read (on the surface) as
instances of APPRECIATION or JUDGEMENT. This allows her to present her 
story as more ‘balanced’ and less ‘emotive’. AFFECT is more often evoked, 
i.e. indirectly expressed, that inscribed. When it comes to APPRECIATION, 
this speaker evaluates pain mostly negatively, especially for its life-
fragmenting consequences. However, on the whole, she resists evaluating 
SLE in an overtly negative way. As will be argued in chapter five, this is 
because following her diagnosis she was able (not without effort) to style a 
new self, more in tune with what she feels is her true personality. This too 
contributes to presenting a positive, rather balanced persona. Like other 
speakers in the corpus, Annamaria appears to leave her more negative 
evaluations for the treatments she has received over the years.
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4.10.3 Veronica
To fully appreciate Veronica’s story, one has to be reminded of the 
circumstances in which the interview took place. I interviewed her while she 
was in hospital following her 18th surgical procedure which, this particular 
time, was required to adjust her badly deformed knee.
Veronica’s account is remarkable because, notwithstanding the severity of her 
condition (as well as its temporal extension) for the most part she refrains 
from the overt expression of feelings, with the result that it comes across as 
particularly ‘factual’. Appraisal is present and among the attitudes expressed 
APPRECIATION is prominent. Of the entities this speaker evaluates pain is 
foremost. JUDGEMENT is present too, but in only one case.
As stated, pain features prominently in the account. This is not particularly 
surprising, given that she was asked specifically to talk about it and her 
condition. Interestingly, Veronica overwhelmingly construes her pain as ‘thing’, 
nominally; it is an entity to which particular characteristics are then ascribed. 
These are: quality (erano come dei bruciori ‘they were like burnings’), intensity
(erano tutti dolori acuti ‘they were all acute pains’) and temporal 
characteristics (come e’ venuto se n’e’ andato ‘as it came it left [suddenly]’). In 
a few cases, she establishes a relationship of ownership with her pain through 
the possessive ‘to have’, where pain is again an entity that she possesses 
(albeit unwillingly). However, she never construes it as a ‘quality’, through 
adjectives, and only once as ‘happening’, through a verb. Interestingly, in the 
latter case, pain does not occupy the whole of her self but only a part of her 
body:
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Extract (4.16) (V I: 2)
Veronica: At times I fall asleep on pain, because it makes me focus. Yes 
if it isn’t a really strong pain, but if it’s a pain typical of my 
illness, which is there, still, I focus on the point where it hurts 
[me], the limb, and afterward if I’m isolated, calm with/by 
myself, I even manage to go to sleep on the pain.
Construing pain as an entity allows this informant to place it outside of the 
self, or on the periphery of it. Pain is thus discussed objectively as something 
coexisting with the speaker but not coterminous with her. ‘Pain as Entity’ can 
be spoken of, described, possessed but, crucially, it remains separate. It is as 
if, by nominalising it, Veronica managed to ‘contain’ and, somewhat, tame it. 
Indeed, the image of her ‘going to sleep on it’ does not lack a sort of poetic 
beauty. 
Obviously, one could also construe pain as an entity, objectifying it 
linguistically as a noun (’thing’), while at the same time giving a representation 
of it as entirely negative, evil and ferocious (a pain that devours you and kills 
you, for example). Yet this is not what this speaker chooses to do. The 
clauses in which pain appears are existential and relational ones. 
Even when probed explicitly as to whether she is experiencing any pains 
during the interview, Veronica resorts to relational clauses of being and of
having, as in extract (4.17):
Extract (4.17) (V I: 4)
Veronica: I have it [the pain] at the knee, where they operated me; I have 
it going up [it moves upwards]; if it happens to have a pain in a 
foot, in a hand; I’ve had strong pain, strong rather than 
constant, in the cervical [vertebra].
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Veronica’s pain is an entity that is rather than does. If one keeps in mind 
Halliday’s description of grammar as a ‘theory of experience’, it is easy to see 
how this speaker, through specific lexicogrammatical choices, has chosen to 
construe and encode her lived experience. Lexically, the account is also 
noticeable for the limited presence of emotionally-charged lexicon, a feature 
which, together with the aforementioned lexicogrammatical choices, 
contributes to presenting the speaker as calm and in control. It is this serene 
self that the interlocutor is asked, successfully, to align with. One does feel for 
Veronica, and the difficult reality of her situation is all too real; yet the picture 
she paints is one that inspires admiration and optimism, rather than dread and 
pity.
Summary 
Veronica’s experience has been a particularly hard one: it began early in her 
life and changed the course of it by, among other things, putting an end to her 
athletic ambitions. She has been experiencing a particularly aggressive form 
of RA, which has resulted in frequent hospitalisations and numerous surgical 
interventions. Pain figures prominently in this speaker’s experience, taking 
various forms and degrees of intensity.
The resources of Appraisal are used by this speaker for the representation of 
mainly one attitude: APPRECIATION. Of all the possible entities, it is pain that 
is most often evaluated, through relational and existential clauses. The result 
is one of objectivity and apparent detachment, akin to that of medical and 
scientific literature about pain. This does not mean that Veronica’s story is 
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devoid of AFFECT. AFFECT is recontextualised mainly as APPRECIATION 
and has to be ‘interpreted’ by the interlocutor, who is skilfully and gently 
enlisted as co-author in this speaker’s story.
4.10.4 Sandra
Sandra’s account is quite rich and detailed as to the genesis of her illness, the 
type of pain she experiences, and the kind of treatments received. She also 
relates information about her private life, like her marriage, voluntary activities, 
and work. Of the attitudes encoded, several are examples of 
APPRECIATION. The vast majority of examples of those concern her pain, in 
its various guises. Unsurprisingly, the totality of evaluations it receives are 
negative. However, they all group towards the lower end of the emotional 
spectrum. Thus, her pain(s) is molto acuto ‘very acute’, molto forte ‘very 
strong’, but at times also molto gestibili ‘very manageable’, molto relativi ‘very 
relative’. Since Sandra’s illness is characterised by what she defines as fasi 
acute ‘acute phases’, so her pains, during those times are ‘acute’, ‘really 
strong’, as well as ‘dull’. They are also localised (in the joints, for example) 
and distinguishable (distinti) from each other. None of the descriptors used to 
characterise her pain can be considered as emotionally charged. Yet, 
Sandra’s story does not appear cold or somehow ‘technical’, in spite of the 
‘matter-of-fact tone’. 
On more than one occasion, APPRECIATION is communicated by this 
speaker by nominalising pain and placing it in the grammatical role of Actor, 
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thus endowing it with a degree of volition, or in relational clauses, as in extract 
(4.18):
Extract (4.18) (S I: 2)
Simone: What type of pains are they? how do you describe them?
Sandra: What I experience, It’s really an acute pain, really dull, of a 
really dull type. I can’t even find an appropriate term [to 
describe them]. Pains that don’t allow you to...to do, let’s 
say...to lead a life, normally. But even the most trivial things, 
like writing, or wash oneself, or get dressed...It’s really a strong 
pain that doesn’t allow you to lead a normal life, yes, the daily 
activities one engages in, yes.
Here pain is introduced as an entity that does something: it impedes, when 
present, the leading of a normal life, making even the simplest activities, like 
washing oneself, getting dressed or writing, almost impossible. What the 
speaker foregrounds is the evaluation of her pains; yet those evaluations can 
also, as is the case with other speakers, be read as instances of evoked 
AFFECT, recontextualised as APPRECIATION.
Further on, while narrating an episode when, while on holiday and after years 
of remission, she started to experience intense pains in her knees, she quotes 
an unnamed source who informed her that there was nothing she could do 
about it because the pain ‘would leave when it felt like it’:
Extract (4.19) (S I: 3)
Sandra: They explained to me that the only thing [that might help] was 
rest. When it felt like it, it would go away. There were no 
tablets, there were no creams.
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Although AFFECT is not expressed overtly, like other speakers Sandra 
implies it. For example, in a revealing passage, she relates how when she is 
experiencing a relapse, especially if acute, her condition (with its associated 
pain) is lived as ‘other’, psychologically and lexicogrammatically away from 
self:
Extract (4.20) (S I: 3-4)
Sandra: When I’m not unwell I talk positively of my experience of being 
ill. When I’m in an acute phase [of the illness], don’t talk to me 
about my illness. Because it’s a thing that doesn’t belong to 
me, really, I tend to dissociate [from it].
It is interesting how in extract (4.20) she lexicalises her illness as una cosa ‘a 
thing’ with which she has no formal relationship: non mi appartiene ‘it doesn’t 
belong to me’. Behind this simple declarative, the attentive interlocutor can 
read Sandra’s inner state of profound distress. Again, AFFECT is just below 
the surface.
Before joining the support group, Sandra would rarely, if ever, discuss her 
condition, thus experiencing that ‘loss of voice’ so common among chronic 
sufferers. This, she informs us, is not ‘for a desire to hide, rather for a feeling 
of inferiority’. Illness and pain thus build a wall between her and the world of 
the healthy; an invisible one, but a wall nonetheless. And although here she is 
ostensibly talking about her illness in general, it is clearly pain which achieves 
this silencing effect, albeit temporarily. The ‘flare-ups’, in fact, are announced 
and characterised throughout by intense pain. 
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When experiencing a relapse, she retreats to an inner space. Through silence 
she shows her rejection of her illness (è un rifiuto ‘it’s a refusal or a rejection’). 
The effects of pain, coupled with the strong medication to combat it, is 
addressed in extract (4.21):
Extract (4.21) (S I: 4)
Sandra: [they] really entail mood swings, changes in physiognomy, and 
that is something that’s really heavy [to bear], that’s very 
heavy, really heavy. There I truly feel very different.
Simone: From what you normally are like?
Sandra: yes, I’m not like myself anymore, I truly change, my 
personality changes, yes.
The passage above is particularly revealing because it is representative of 
how this speaker skilfully weaves the emotional tapestry that finally allows us 
to glimpse, however partially, her inner world; a world of resilience but also of 
intense suffering. She moves from the general to the particular by reporting 
first that the pains and medications ‘cause mood swings, changes of 
physiognomy’. After this general statement, whose truth-value is reinforced by 
the main verb (comportano ‘entail’) in the indicative, present-tense, she 
informs us that ‘that is a thing that’s heavy, that really weighs, really does’. 
The statement is still expressed as a general truth but through repetition, and 
the epistemic stance expressed twice by the intensifying adverb proprio ‘truly, 
really’, Sandra’s feelings have now made their way to the surface. In the 
tapestry metaphor, these moments can be considered spots of brighter colour. 
And now that the gates have been opened, emotions pass through; not 
uncontrollably but certainly more distinctly: ‘there I truly feel very different [...] 
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I’m not like myself anymore, I truly change, my personality changes. Yes’. 
One can detect a shift from general, impersonal statements to personal ones, 
as indicated by the use of verbs in the first-person singular (mi sento ‘I feel’, 
cambio ‘I change’), by the superlative diversissima ‘very different’, which has a 
clearly emotive (AFFECT) value and the repeated use, again, of the epistemic 
evidential proprio ‘truly’ and, finally, by that peremptory sì, ‘yes’ made even 
more prominent by the fact that it is spoken as a single, separate intonational 
unit.
AFFECT, then, is always in the background and at times is brought to the 
fore. Generally it is evoked rather than overtly mentioned. But even when 
noticeable for its supposed absence, it is provided by the interlocutor who 
correctly decodes the instances where, for example, the speaker has 
recontextualised it as APPRECIATION, as in the above extract. One could go 
as far as suggesting that upon hearing this kind of story, the absence of 
overtly expressed AFFECT generates a sort of implicature (almost in the 
Gricean sense) and it is then provided by the interlocutor. Sharing a common 
humanity he/she ‘fills in the gaps’, verbally or non-verbally, and becomes co-
author of the story, having been enlisted as a sympathetic listener.
In extract (4.22), where she describes the consequences of her treatment 
(mainly, as for the other informants, with cortisone) the emotive ‘volume’ is 
turned up. Resorting to lexically charged lexicon she says:
Extract (4.22) (S I 4)
Sandra: My body has been ravaged, consequently I don’t have a good 
relationship with my body [...]. The doses of cortisone that I’ve 
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taken, unfortunately on my young body, it really has ravaged it. 
Luckily, there aren’t very many of who have been so ravaged. 
But it’s happened, amen, what can one do? I don’t look at 
myself a lot.
Cortisone, we are informed, has ‘ravaged’ (in the sense of: ‘laid waste to’) 
Sandra’s body. She states that, fortunately, not many other patients have 
been so ‘ravaged’ (notice the repetition). Yet, shed, though on the surface is 
accepting of the situation, does not like to look at her own body which, in a 
way, has become alien to her. When probed on the latter point she explains 
that she does have a husband who loves her but tellingly concludes with one 
of those declaratives that are on the surface just a statement of fact but that 
represent truly implicit AFFECT:
Extract (4.23) (S I: 5)
Sandra: If I really have to dig deep inside of me ... it really is all very 
difficult.
Sandra, then, offers an account rich in factual detail which, upon a first 
reading, is not as rich in AFFECT. Yet, closer reading shows this not to be the 
case: AFFECT is indeed present but in a rather understated manner. In this, 
this speaker is not atypical among the other informants.
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Summary
This speaker’s account is quite rich in factual detail. Like Veronica, Sandra 
appears to favour construing pain nominally, which – in turn – allows her to 
objectify and evaluate it. The speaker tells us about its quality and quantity 
and, unsurprisingly, provides negative evaluations of it. All of this contributes 
to the image of the account as objective and factual, and of the narrator as 
reliable. However, ‘objectivity’ and ‘factuality’ are not an impediment to the 
encoding of AFFECT. More or less overtly, we are informed of how Sandra
felt through her various encounters with pain and illness. Fear and insecurity 
are never too far from the surface (e.g. the feeling of being very different from 
other women, healthy women). In common with other speakers, Sandra’s 
emotional reactions are often triggered by pharmacological treatment. It is 
when speaking of the usual culprit, cortisone, that the listener witnesses the 
use of emotionally-charged lexicon and metaphors of war and disaster.
4.10.5 Marta
Marta’s experience did not begin dramatically. Her pain and related problems 
were initially mild; only with time did they grow, until the illness, finally, took 
over. When it comes to APPRECIATION, it is interesting to note that pain is 
the first and almost the only entity to be evaluated in this speaker’s account. 
For her, pain is always encoded as ‘thing’ and is always spatially situated. 
This can be seen in extract (4.24), where she succinctly relates the genesis of 
her illness:
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Extract (4.24) (M I: 1)
Marta: Suddenly, from a small pain, from a finger.
Pain appears suddenly. It is ‘small’ and its initial location minute: a finger. With 
time this apparently inconsequential event evolves: the pains multipliy, 
growing in number, location, and intensity. Marta informs us that she then 
began experiencing dolori fortissimi ‘very strong pains’ in her hands, which 
especially at night became insopportabili ‘unbearable’. Interestingly, these are 
almost the only instances not only of pain-appreciation but of APPRECIATION 
in general. 
However, like other informants, in evaluating the pains (which were 
‘unbearable’), Marta also encodes, indirectly, her emotional state. Thus, 
APPRECIATION and AFFECT coalesce into one. As for the other speakers, 
APPRECIATION here can be read as ‘evoked AFFECT’. Elsewhere, Marta 
qualifies her pain in terms of quality. She tells us that her pains became 
bruciori ‘burnings’, rigonfiamenti ‘swellings’, indurimenti ‘hardenings/rigidities’ 
but although more specific, these definitions do not receive further evaluation. 
The other entity to be evaluated, shortly afterwards, is the initial (wrong) 
diagnosis she received: una semplicissima tendinite ‘a very simple/mere 
tendonitis’. Keeping in mind that both speaker and interlocutor know what the 
real diagnosis and the consequences will be, the minimizing statements about 
the initial pains and the first diagnosis are obviously in stark contrast and only 
intensify one’s amazement at the final outcome. In addition, pain is given pride 
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of place by being almost the only entity to be explicitly and directly evaluated 
by this speaker.
With regards to AFFECT, the picture Marta paints is characterised by light 
brushstrokes. In her life, there is definitely a ‘before’ and an ‘after’. Before the 
onset of the illness, she felt she was lucky (mi consideravo fortunata ‘I 
considered myself lucky’) for never having been ill, a situation obviously 
modified by the onset of RA. This, in Martin and Withe’s (2005) typology of 
affect can be considered as a token of the satisfaction subgroup, which — as 
the past tense used indicates — contrasts with the present situation. It is 
therefore interesting to note how an alternation of tokens of affect (positive vs. 
negative) help the speaker characterise the transition from health to illness. 
Although we are not explicitly told about how she feels about developing RA, 
we can infer it: her luck ended and she is now one of the ‘unlucky’. Although 
the issue of agency will be addressed in more detail in the following chapter, 
suffice it to mention here that whenever an individual is faced with pain and 
illness, the precarious nature of health and the vulnerability of the embodied 
self are suddenly revealed to her. Attention to the way AFFECT colours and 
gives voice to the speaker’s inner states — his/her emotions — in relation to 
the onset of illness, helps illustrate how – to use Sontag’s (1978) metaphor –
the healthy and the ill inhabit different worlds.
Crucially, this is also revealed to the attentive listener who, upon hearing of 
the ill person’s predicament, immediately has a glimpse of his or her own 
vulnerability. AFFECT, then, is present in a broader sense, whether 
linguistically instantiated or not. Although this may pertain more to psychology 
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than linguistics, one wonders whether it might be appropriate to investigate it 
in the decoding, as well as the encoding, of linguistic messages.
Similarly to other speakers, Marta limits the expression of her inner states 
more in relation to the treatments received and the overall experience of living 
with a chronic illness than to the experience of pain itself. Referring to the by 
now familiar cortisone, she says: (4.25) ‘sono stata bastonata di 
antiinfiammatori: cortisone’ ‘I’ve been bludgeoned/clubbed with anti-
inflammatory drugs: cortisone’ (M I: 5). 
The expression is interesting because is depicts both a state of affairs as well 
as letting the hearer infer the feelings of this individual. The metaphor 
treatment = weapon which is used against the person before it affects the 
disease is particularly powerful. It invites sympathy while simultaneously 
communicating the psychological and physical state of the patient. Like 
Sandra, Marta resorts to emotive metaphors of violence where the treatment 
is a weapon intended to subdue the disease but, ultimately, ends up harming 
the entire embodied self. Bearing in mind that our perception and appreciation 
of the world is always an embodied experience, it is easier to see how a 
pharmacological treatment can arouse such negative emotions and elicit such 
negative evaluations, before and even more than the disease itself. This is 
even clearer (and more widely appreciated) with other diseases, such as 
cancer. There the mention of the treatment — chemotherapy — elicits 
responses and evaluations that at times compete in harshness with cancer 
itself. Indeed, Marta’s interview illustrates an interesting trend in the ALOMAR 
Plus corpus which will have become apparent by now: the tendency to 
evaluate the treatments more negatively than the disease and disease-related 
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pain themselves. For Marta, for example, the metaphor used to describe the 
effects of cortisone is the only instance of emotionally charged lexicon. 
Negative AFFECT is expressed again in a passage where Marta talks of the 
way she felt for being housebound following a flare-up of the disease. She felt 
like a malata grave ‘one seriously ill’ but could not behave otherwise, since 
she felt ‘scared’ to use public transport, due to her weakness. On the contrary, 
whenever she feels well enough to be independent she feels realizzata
‘fulfilled’.
Between the two extreme poles of positive and negative AFFECT, there exists 
a fluid space occupied by a feeling that can be more or less negative: 
insecurity. This is the result of not knowing how the disease will develop in the 
future, as extract (4.26) shows:
Extract (4.26) (M I: 6)
Marta: From a physical point of view [...] an ache passes, therefore 
one overcomes it. But there comes a point, this kind of disease 
has no return, well also, you always think well, if I’m like this, 
will I still be able to drive? Will I?
Here too, Marta hints at her inner states, rather than declare them openly. The 
interlocutor is ‘transported’ into her inner space and left to draw his or her 
conclusions. ‘Opening up’ exposes one to the risk of not being understood or 
of being misunderstood. Worse: the ill person may be disbelieved. This might 
account for a speaker’s (this one’s, for example) apparent reluctance to ‘share 
all’; paucity of words may therefore be a ‘strategy’ and their scarcity is not 
evidence of absence of feelings, rather it is an awareness of the possible 
different ‘uptakes’ of one’s emotions in relation to illness.
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Summary
In the encoding of attitudes, this speaker resorts to mainly direct 
APPRECIATION of pain, which, unsurprisingly, is evaluated negatively. This, 
however, is not done in emotionally-charged ways, resulting in a balanced, 
‘matter-of-fact’ account. The telling of her experience is also an opportunity for 
displaying AFFECT. This mainly relates to feelings of insecurity and 
apprehension and the ‘volume’, to use Martin and Rose’s metaphor (2003) is 
only ‘turned up’ in relation to the effects of the pharmacological treatment, 
through emotionally-charged metaphors of violence and war. As seen, this is 
a common, and by now familiar, trope in the ALOMAR Pluscorpus. It is worth 
noting how this speaker expresses, among her attitudes, no JUDGEMENT: no 
one is blamed, no one is praised but this is not because other characters are 
not present in Marta’s story: they do exist, yet she chooses to focus on 
herself.
4.10.6 Gina
In common with other RA sufferers, Gina began developing symptoms over a 
long time. Initially, they were relatively mild. Paralleling this development, 
throughout her account her emotional responses develop in a similar fashion: 
from milder to more intense, in response to particular symptoms. So, when 
she first began experiencing stiffness in her legs accompanied by mild pain, 
she was ‘not very worried.’ As time went on and the increasingly frequent 
pains in her hands, legs, and joints became began to have a limiting effect on 
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her daily activities, such as looking after the house and the children, her 
emotional responses intensified too:
Extract (4.27) (G I: 2)
Gina: At first it was hard, because my children were still young, 
consequently they were traumatised too.
Like other speakers, Gina uses relational clauses to recontextualise AFFECT 
as APPRECIATION, on the surface attributing the quality of being ‘hard’ to a 
period of time. But of course such encoding also reveals her state of mind. 
Interestingly, she then goes on to talk of her children’s feelings with a lexically-
charged adjective such as ‘traumatised.’ Yet, by saying that the children were 
‘traumatised too’ the implication is that that is how she felt. It is again 
elliptically that, later on in the interview, the listener is informed that all the 
pains and other symptoms that this speaker experienced made Gina feel ‘not 
normal’ anymore:
Extract (4.28) (G I: 2)
Gina: Now I feel like a normal person, if I don’t look at my [deformed] 
hands, I feel normal. I’ll tell you the truth, at times I feel 
embarrassed, with these hands. But you get over it.
It is only ‘now’, at the time of speaking, that Gina feels normal, and then only if
she refrains from looking at her own deformed hands. Inscribed in the body, 
her pain and illness act as a reminder that, in pain or not, Gina is no longer a 
member of the ‘realm of the healthy’. Emotional states are thus once again 
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revealed as being embodied, in the sense of ‘passing through’ the body and 
— in good part — dependent on it.
The effect that physical deformity, or visible disability, has on onlookers is 
itself interesting. Often, it acts as a validation of the sufferer’s claim to be in 
pain, or to have a disability. Speakers in this corpus (Annamaria, for example) 
and elsewhere (Heshusius, 2009 and Frank, 1995, inter alia) often comment 
on the frustration of not being able to show doctors and other people visible, 
tangible signs of their suffering. 
However, visible signs of disease can often be over-interpreted, as confirmed 
by Gina herself later on in the account. She relates an incident when she met 
up with her sister and some former work-colleagues to catch up (Gina is now 
permanently off work). After Gina left, these women, who had noticed her 
deformed hands, told the sister that they could see Gina was ‘really in a bad 
way’. Extract (4.39), however, shows her comment on this paradox:
Extract (4.29) (G I: 4)
Gina: They must have imagined God knows what; just because they saw 
these hands. But this is nothing, for me it’s nothing; they would not 
have guessed how I felt before, when there were no deformities. 
Yes, at times I would feel terribly, but there was nothing to see.
Physical signs, it appears, are not always sure indicators of an individual’s 
inner states; words, however scarce, are more reliable.
For Gina, with time came a degree of acceptance. Yet, there is the fear that 
the future might be bleaker, as she readily acknowledges in extract (4.30):
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Extract (4.30) (G I: 3)
Gina: I think I’m ok now about my illness, the pain and all that [laughs] 
even if now the big problems start, maybe. The liver, kidneys, eyes 
and now there is [laughs] there’s the other thing, the drugs. I’ve 
been taking them for twenty-two years.
In common with most speakers in the corpus, Gina expresses negative 
AFFECT of the in/security type triggered by uncertainty about the future. 
However, in places her experience of illness and pain are the source of 
positive AFFECT too. This is the case in relation to activities gravitating 
around the support-group, with the opportunity they afford for the sharing of 
experiences, feelings, and talents though volunteering.
Unsurprisingly, pain and RA are evaluated negatively but in rather mild tones. 
The ‘volume’ is never turned up in Gina’s narrative. Unlike other speakers in 
the corpus, Gina refrains from giving very negative evaluations of the 
pharmacological treatments she has undergone; her criticism of them is toned 
down, albeit not entirely absent, as the following example illustrates:
Extract (4.31) (G I: 4)
Gina: Well, the drugs, they’re good in one way but they’re bad in 
another.
Gina’s account is mainly about herself. When other characters appear, they 
are either not evaluated (her children and, husband, sister), praised (medical 
230
professionals), or very mildly and obliquely criticised (her former work-
colleagues).
Summary
For this speaker, the experiences of illness and pain have entailed a series of 
changes and adjustments, at times difficult ones. Overall, the pre-eminent 
attitude encoded in her account is negative AFFECT, mainly of the insecurity 
type. However, the expressions of negative AFFECT are always rather ‘mild’ 
as is the one, indirect criticism (JUDGEMENT) of other characters in her story 
(her former colleagues). Again, in what seems to be a common trope of the 
ALOMAR Plus pain and illness narratives, here too we find negative 
evaluation (APPRECIATION) of the pharmacological treatment. Again, this 
type of evaluation too is expressed mildly and rather obliquely. This is 
probably due to Gina’s ‘personal style’ than to the mildness of either her 
symptoms or the treatments received.
4.10.7 Fabio
As noted, Fabio is the only male in the corpus and the only interviewee not to 
suffer from an autoimmune disease. In addition, he is the only informant with a 
background as a medical professional, being a registered nurse with several 
years of experience.
In common with the scientific literature about pain (and possibly because of 
his training and familiarity with medical language), this speaker tends to 
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construe pain nominally as a ‘thing’. This allows him to conceptualise it as a 
circumscribed and circumscribable entity that can be talked of as, among 
other things, having spatial and temporal characteristics, as well as quality 
(i.e. type of pain) and quantity (i.e. intensity). As an entity, pain thus displays a 
number of qualities; in other words, it receives, or is the object of, 
APPRECIATION. 
Evaluative relational clauses abound in Fabio’s account, with his pain being 
described as, fastidious, strong, intense, massive and shocking. The 
adjectives are in ascending order of intensity; this is the order in which they 
appear in the speaker’s narrative and they trace the evolution of his condition, 
right up to the point when he had to undergo surgery to try to rectify the 
problem but achieving only partial success. At that point the pains were 
shocking; this is the only instance of an emotionally-charged adjective. This 
type of overall balanced APPRECIATION contributes to the image of the 
speaker as competent and able to provide detached evaluations. This kind of 
evaluative language is reminiscent of the language of medical case-histories 
which focus on the symptom (in this case pain) but seem to obliterate the 
sufferer. However, under the surface one can detect AFFECT being encoded 
as well as APPRECIATION, a pattern that — as seen — is typical of this 
corpus.
As well as pain, both the pharmacological treatment to control the pain and 
the surgery he underwent are the objects of APPRECIATION. The latter is 
evaluated in mildly negative terms (‘it didn’t work’), mainly as a consequence 
of the speaker’s failure to comply with his physician’s instructions to fully rest 
over a certain period of time. However, in contrast to the other participants the 
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pharmacological treatments, only partly based on cortisone, do not receive a 
strongly negative evaluation. This negative evaluation has more to do with 
what the treatment failed to do than with what it did:
Extract (4.32) (F I: 2)
Fabio: I did take painkillers, very many, and they didn’t give me 
any respite. Well, I never, I never received any relief from 
painkillers. I, I followed a therapy for a certain period of 
time, prescribed by the doctor, with painkillers, cortisone, 
and other things, but never got any relief. Absolutely zero.
This is in stark contrast with the views of more or less all the women in the 
ALOMAR Plus corpus. Unfortunately, given the composition of the corpus, it is 
not possible to determine whether the difference has to do with the gender of 
the informants, the nature of the medical problems experienced (autoimmune 
vs. non-autoimmune diseases), or a combination of the two.
As stated, Fabio’s evaluation of his pain comes across as mostly precise and 
factual. As shown, and possibly because of his medical training, pain 
APPRECIATION in this speaker’s account resonates with the language of 
medical reports and case-histories. However, this degree of apparent 
impersonality (one might speak of detachment) dissipates somewhat once 
Fabio is probed further on the nature, its quality and quantity, of his pain. Then 
he resorts to vivid similes and metaphors which, again, indicate a difference 
between this informant and the others. Examples of some of these are 
reproduced hereafter (4.33-4.38):
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Extracts (4.33-4.38) (F I: 5-6, 8)
(4.33) It was like pins, from inside, pins pricking you from the inside.
(4.34) It is like something that blocks you, which stops you from doing the 
things you want.
(4.35) It was like something that would take its place inside of you, and 
annoy you. 
(4.36) Then it becomes pain, but pain that would still annoy you, remain a 
nuisance, psychologically more than physically.
(4.37) And this problem, well the pain, the problem was more the stress 
that the pain caused than the pain itself.
(4.38) If I had to give an image of my pain, well, it’s a workman, on the 
road, you know when they’re doing road works, and this workman 
uses a pneumatic drill ... well, I’m the person near this drill and I 
hear the noise, this deafening noise, continuous, that causes you 
problems. Something that reaches a maximum level, right? 
Because it’s like this drill, this noise, always there, which goes on 
and on. Yes, that’s how I see my pain, like that, rather than 
something utterly catastrophic.
The similes and metaphors employed by Fabio have some common 
characteristics. First, they highlight the persistence of pain through time: the 
tap dripping, the pins that keep pricking, and finally the continuous noise from 
the drill. Although, as the speaker himself points out, none of these events is 
tragic per se, their relentlessness is a major cause of stress and, ultimately, 
suffering.
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It is interesting to note that when the speaker shifts from using simple 
adjectives to metaphors and similes to describe his pain, the narrative 
immediately becomes more vivid and personal. Figurative language also 
allows the speaker to communicate another attitude effectively: AFFECT. 
He does so by telling us explicitly how the continuous presence of pain makes 
him feel (namely, stressed). This stress also derives from the fact that 
continuous pain interferes with the ability to carry on ‘normal’ activities. 
Talking of the experience of serious illness, Charteris-Black and Seale (2010: 
17) note that it “necessarily entails a break in the life story, since it interferes 
with the ‘normal performance of social roles.” This statement can certainly be 
extended to include life with constant pain. 
The kind of figurative language used by this informant is very effective in 
eliciting an emotive response in the hearer, who becomes co-author of the 
narrative by providing AFFECT in his/her responses to what he/she hears. It 
does so whilst preserving the informant’s chosen persona: factual, resilient, 
and — ultimately — truthful. Figurative language also allows this speaker to 
simultaneously encode APPRECIATION and AFFECT, to encode involvement 
whilst, at the same time, maintain credibility through descriptive accuracy. 
This is why, in linguistics encoding of pain, figurative language is almost 
always present. Figurative language combines the referential power of 
language with the evocative potency of images (albeit linguistically evoked). 
The interlinked nature of metaphors with our thought-processes has been 
famously discussed by Lakoff (1981). 
Sontag (1978, 1988) pointed out how, in some cases, the type of metaphors 
used to talk of illness and pain can be criticised for the way in which they 
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direct, even constrain, our way of thinking about these phenomena. However, 
their ubiquity is, as noted by Gwynn (2001), testament to their usefulness. The 
fact that, in talking of physical pain, we so often resort to figurative language is 
not, as hinted by Scarry (1985), a ‘limitation’ of language. On the contrary, it is 
testament to its resourcefulness.
Before concluding, it is worth making some remarks on the nature of the 
figurative language used by this speaker, especially in comparison with that of 
other speakers in the corpus. Whereas some of the other informants resort to 
metaphors of war (e.g. explosions, intense heat), violence (e.g. tearing apart, 
conquering, devastating), and violent natural phenomena (e.g. lightning), 
Fabio favours images of malfunction (e.g. the dripping tap), and annoying 
remedial activity (e.g. road works). In addition, the fastidious nature of these 
events resides mainly in their auditory qualities; these interfere more than 
totally disrupt one’s life (as, for example, a war-related event would do). It is 
likely that there is a correlation between type of illness and the kind of 
figurative language used; it is also possible that gender plays a role in such 
differences (see Charteris-Black and Seale, 2010). 
Among the attitudes expressed by this speaker, JUDGEMENT is entirely 
absent. As seen, it is rather peripheral among the attitudes expressed in the 
corpus in general. However, for this particular speaker this might be the case 
because of the rather more straightforward manner in which his illness 
developed, and the symptoms it entails, as opposed to the autoimmune 
diseases experienced by all the other informants.
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Summary
This speaker differs from the others because of his gender and the nature of 
his illness. Analysed for appraisal, his account reveals that the attitudes 
expressed are APPRECIATION and AFFECT. Through relational and 
existential clauses we are informed of the type of pain experienced (quality 
and quantity). Pain is mainly construed nominally and qualified adjectivally; 
the choice of descriptors is reminiscent of medical language (probably 
because of the informant’s professional background but also the nature of the 
illness). However, some of his adjectival choices point to a recontextualisation 
of AFFECT as APPRECIATION (e.g. when pain is described as ‘shocking’), 
which — as seen — is common in the corpus. Fabio also resorts frequently to 
figurative language (metaphors and similes). This has the advantage of 
simultaneously allowing readings in terms of both AFFECT and 
APPRECIATION, especially because they allow the interlocutor to derive 
affective meanings from the evoked images. The nature of the figurative 
language is noticeably different from that of the other informants. It is possible 
that this is because of personal differences (such as gender) and the nature of 
the illness experienced.
4.11 Concluding remarks
Pain does not subsist in a vacuum. It exists (and persists) in a world that gives 
it cultural meanings and is experienced by individuals that are also culturally-
situated. 
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Pain is always experienced subjectively: no two pains are alike. This is a 
principle that, as previously mentioned, has been recognised by science and 
is increasingly acknowledged in medical practice. When language re-emerges 
from the silence, from that ‘pre-language’ that Scarry (1985) refers to where 
pain has banished it, it is a language rich in ‘subjectivity’. 
The aim of this chapter has been to uncover and systematically analyse this 
subjectivity as it appears in the ALOMAR Plus corpus of interviews. To do 
this, it has adopted Appraisal Theory as its analytical tool. Each interview has 
been individually ‘scanned’ for tokens of APPRAISAL and the aim of these 
concluding remarks is to summarise what the analysis reveals about the way 
(or ways) in which the experience of bodily pain and chronic illness is 
assessed by the speakers in the corpus, especially from the point of view of 
the emotional responses these experiences engender. 
As the preceding analysis has shown, chronic pain and illness ‘personalise’ 
language. Their experience is highly salient for the individual. Their overall 
impact is different, and often far greater, than the mere quality and quantity of 
the pain experienced. Chronic illness, with its attendant circumstances of 
bodily pain and various degrees of discomfort, alters the person’s life-course 
— often irrevocably — and this disruption is often only discernible in the 
language used by the chronically ill to encode their experiences. APPRAISAL 
analysis of the collected interviews has revealed a number of things, 
summarised below. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, most speakers in the corpus evaluate the experience 
of bodily pain and of chronic illness in negative terms. However, the majority 
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of speakers do so without resorting to ‘emotionally charged lexicon’. This is 
surprising; to the external observer the majority of the narrated experiences 
appear to be objectively ‘extreme’ both in their nature and for the 
consequences they have entailed for the participants. Such consequences 
include (but are not limited to) repeated hospitalisations, multiple surgeries, 
and the need to redesign one’s life-course, often abandoning cherished 
careers, such as professional athletics as in Veronica’s case.
In order to understand this phenomenon, one has to fully appreciate both the 
situational context of the interviews and the informants’ personal life-stories. In 
terms of situational context, one has to keep in mind that all the speakers in 
the corpus have been living with their respective conditions for a number of 
years. Although for some of them, Anna and Veronica for instance, aspects of 
their conditions were still very much present when the interviews took place, a 
degree of ‘habituation’ had occurred. Perhaps an individual experiencing an 
episode of acute pain related to an accident or to a non-chronic condition 
(such as myocardial infarction), or the first acute manifestation of a hitherto 
absent chronic condition, would make the degree of fear and distress more 
‘visible’ in the language used. 
With regards to the informants’ personal histories, one has to keep in mind the 
numerous times when they have had to “rehearse” their stories, in both 
medical and non-medical encounters. Each of the informants in the ALOMAR 
Plus corpus is acutely aware of the possibility that their account will be met 
with doubt or even disbelieved. One of the accusations that chronic sufferers 
encounter often, especially when their conditions do not show outward signs, 
is that they are exaggerating their symptoms or, in some cases, faking them. 
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This has an impact on the structure and ‘texture’ of their accounts; whilst the 
more emotive aspects get backgrounded, speakers tend to present their 
accounts, and thus themselves, as less emotive, more factual and, by 
implication, more credible. By using the resources of APPRAISAL skilfully, the 
ALOMAR Plus informants demonstrate a desire, albeit an unconscious one, to 
appear as ‘credible’ witnesses to their own condition. They often express the 
desire not to ‘exaggerate’ their experiences, seemingly equating an emotive 
(or emotionally-charge account with lack of, or minor, credibility.
Of all the attitudes encoded, AFFECT is the most common. However, 
speakers in the corpus appear to favour evoked (i.e. implicit), rather than 
inscribed (explicit) AFFECT. I have suggested that this is probably in order not 
to detract from the ‘factuality’ of the experiences described; having had their 
pain and suffering doubted before, these speakers want to make sure that the 
factual nature of their experiences is not questioned. Therefore, the second 
most frequent expressed attitude is APPRECIATION. By using it, the 
speakers are able to voice factual statements that, especially when expressed 
as declaratives in the indicative, can also be read as instances of evoked 
AFFECT. AFFECT, to put it differently, tends to be recontextualised as 
APPRECIATION which, as noted, also has the advantage of presenting a 
more objective, truthful persona. 
Expressing emotive states in this manner, below the surface as it were, 
highlights the dialogic nature of much health communication. What is meant 
with this statement is that, not uniquely in human communication, in health 
communication there is a relevant role to play for the interlocutor in the 
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meaning-making of the speaker who chooses (or has to) tell of her troubles. 
By adopting a more ‘detached’ stance, the speaker is thus able to protect 
herself from a degree of emotive exposure that, based on previous 
encounters, might be face-threatening. Thus, when AFFECT is not inscribed 
into the speaker’s language, it is provided by the interlocutor. He or she 
inhabits the same cultural space as the sufferer and although not privy to their 
innermost feelings is very likely to provide a degree of empathy. Not offering a 
degree of empathy, as some of the medical professional in our speakers’ 
stories appear to do, is – to adopt a sociolinguistic label – marked.
Surprisingly, although the experiences of body pain and of the chronic 
condition that has caused it elicit mainly negative evaluations, it is the
pharmacological treatments used to control it that act as a catalyst for the 
most overtly negative evaluations. Treatment, especially when cortisone-
based, is construed discursively and lexicogrammatically, as an entity that 
does unpleasant things to the sufferer. Often, it appears in the role of Actor in 
material processes with the speaker occupying the role of Goal. This, I 
suggest, is something that medical professionals ought to give more 
consideration to if they are to gain a more accurate understanding of the 
chronic illness experience. Speakers are obviously fully aware that the 
treatment is necessary and, ultimately, beneficial. Yet they perceive it and 
evaluate it in consistently negative terms.
Although this may be due to the type of communicative-encounter (the semi-
structured interview), the speakers in the corpus do not, in their accounts, 
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often evaluate other individuals and their behaviour. JUDGEMENT is used 
rather sparingly and mainly to appraise the behaviour of medical professional 
and family members. Criticism of the former is mainly mild and relating to their 
inability to provide a prompt and precise diagnosis. Positive JUDGEMENT is 
used to appraise the behaviour of family members, especially for their support 
and desire to help. Negative JUDGEMENT for family members is present too 
but is much milder, indirect or ‘veiled’ and mainly relates to their perceived 
inability to fully understand the sufferers’ predicament.
This chapter has shown the advantages of using Appraisal Theory for the 
analysis of health communication. It has shown how a theoretical tool that fully 
appreciates the way in which the subjective import of communication is 
spread across the entire communicative act and – crucially – relies on an 
array of lexicogrammatical features can be useful in obtaining a fuller 
appreciation of the impact of pain and chronic illness on the experiencing 
individual. Such impact is much more nuanced than originally expected and 
requires attentive listening (or reading) in order to be fully decoded. The 
approach shows that evaluating the impact of pain and chronic illness by only 
relying — for instance — on questionnaires is unlikely to reveal the patient’s 
point of view and unique experience.
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Chapter 5: The (re)shaping of identity in the experience of bodily 
pain and chronic illness through language and narrative
Chapter 3 dealt with the encoding of the experience of bodily pain caused by 
chronic illness through the lexicogrammar of Italian by the speakers in the 
ALOMAR Plus corpus. The subsequent section, chapter 4, widened the 
scope of analysis by considering the use of evaluative language, and the 
function it achieves, by the ALOMAR Plus interviewees. 
Here, the aim is to broaden further still the scope of analysis by investigating 
the informants’ understanding of their own situation. This overall aim will be 
pursued by looking at how, through narrative activity (see section 5.2 below 
for an explanation of the way the term is employed here) embedded in their 
accounts, they present and structure their experiences. Attention will also be 
paid to how, in turn, these shape their sense of self as the normal life course 
is interrupted by chronic illness and the capricious nature of the 
accompanying bodily pain. Here ‘self’ and ‘identity’ are used as more or less 
synonymous. Following McAdams (1993), what is meant here by ‘self’ is the 
individual’s sense of what constitutes the ‘real me’. This is what persists 
‘behind the many roles [one] play[s]’; it is what continues and exists ‘in space 
and time as a causal, continuous, and independent agent’ (p. 44).
The main questions that the analysis will ask are the following: 
1. What type of self, or identities, emerges from the accounts of the 
participants in the present study?
2. Who are the ‘actors’ in their narratives and what roles do they play?
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Question 2 will be addressed by paying particular attention to the notion of 
personal agency (to be defined below). It will be argued that an appreciation 
of the individual and of their integrity as an agentive being is crucial for a full 
understanding of the individual’s experience of both pain and illness. 
5.1 The understanding of the experience of illness through narrative
Riessman (2008: 14) traces the ‘flowering’ of ‘the practice of treating narrative 
as an object for careful study’ to the mid-1980s. However, as she points out, 
attention to and an appreciation of the importance of narratives in structuring 
personal experience can be seen as early as the 1960s and 1970s. She also 
notes (pp. 14-15) that the study of narrative is not the prerogative of any 
scholarly field and that ‘the narrative-turn is part of larger moves in the social 
sciences away from discipline-specific and investigator-controlled practices’ 
(my emphasis). In sociolinguistics, the work of Labov (Labov and Waletzky, 
1967; Labov, 1972, 1982; Labov and Fanshel, 1977) was crucial in 
highlighting the frequency, structure, and functions of narrative in everyday 
talk in structuring, understanding, and presenting experience. 
Since the so-called ‘narrative turn’, various researchers have turned to 
narrative in order to shed light on the ways in which individuals and groups 
use narrative to make sense of their experiences, to present a preferred 
sense of self, and to create — or re-create — coherence in lives disrupted by 
traumatic events such as divorce (Riessman, 1989, 1990) and illness. The 
latter, as noted by Frank (1997; 2002), is especially prominent in its ability to 
fracture the individual’s sense of self and to create what he terms 
‘incoherence’. Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that through narrative, 
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affected individuals attempt to re-establish a degree of wholeness. Williams 
(1984) makes a similar point; it is to his work that we owe the concept of 
‘narrative reconstruction’. Williams’ study is of particular interest for the 
present research. Using a thematic approach, he investigates how individuals 
affected by rheumatoid arthritis explain the biographical disruptions they have 
to endure. Furthermore, a number of researchers with different backgrounds 
have looked at patients’ narratives to investigate their use of ‘narrative power’ 
to reconstruct and present to the wider society a new, still coherent self. Such 
researchers include Williams (op cit), Kleinmann (1989), Riessman (2000a) 
and, more recently, Cheshire and Ziebland (2005). In discussing the story of a 
patient affected by chronic pain, Kleinmann (op cit: pp. 96-97) states that 
attention to the patient’s narrative allows the clinician (and, it can be argued, 
his/her interlocutor generally) to simultaneously attend to both the 
noxious/pathological event and to the illness and pain as a ‘personal crisis’. 
Crucially, she states (p 97) that ‘[a]ttention to either bodily or personal pain 
alone distorts the psychosomatic integrity of the problem. Illness (especially 
chronic) is a dynamic entity.’ Although, from a scientific point of view, it may 
be possible to circumscribe it to a set of biological malfunctions with their 
resulting symptoms, from the point of view of the sufferer the symptom(s) and 
the experience of it do not make sense. It is through narratives that affected 
individuals attend to and — hopefully — cope with both.
Georgakopoulou (2007: 31-32) points out that the belief in the therapeutic 
functions of sharing events from one’s life has become ‘a guiding assumption 
within the framework of the narrative-interviewing method in biographical 
research [...]’, resulting in the method being ‘often seen as offering chances 
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for a healing process for the informants involved.’ Undoubtedly, in social 
research the belief in the therapeutic value of narrative, however loosely 
defined, is widespread. In good part this is related to the notion that the 
ordering of one’s life events in narrative form, and especially in the strict 
Labovian manner, is somewhat mirrored by a re-orderings of one’s life 
following a disruptive event, such as illness. 
This can be true but is not always so. Narrative can just as well reproduce 
chaos, disruption, disorder, paradox and contradictions. In my view, what is of 
value is primarily the verbalisation of one’s experiences and mental activity, 
not necessarily its reproduction in ‘strict’ narrative form in the sense 
mentioned above. Verbalisation is often the only way of making visible the 
hitherto inaccessible. It is this principle that, fundamentally, lies at the root of 
Freudian psychoanalyses, Jungian analytical psychology, and their 
‘descendants’. It is within this process that, for the linguist, the linguistic 
product – in whatever form it occurs – is of interest and especially Halliday’s 
concept of grammar as a ‘theory of experience’. Recently, Ramanathan 
(2010) has written of the need to investigate the language of the ‘ailing bodies’ 
she advocates the use of a variety of data, gathered in a variety of ways. 
Whilst acknowledging the contributions to the study of the experience of 
illness by applied sociolinguistics and narrative studies, she advocates 
approaching the embodied experience of the ailing body by investigating ‘the 
language by which experiences around bodily breakdowns and ailments 
occur’ (p. 2), without limiting oneself to ‘narratives’ – whether strictly defined, à 
la Labov – or even more loosely understood. Her opinion, which I share here, 
is that ‘the language of ailments / disability experiences and body breakdowns 
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matters’ (p. 15). This language includes narrative forms but is not limited to 
them. Ramanathan’s invitation has been successfully pursued in McPherron 
and Ramanathan (2011), which explores the ways in which ailing bodies get 
‘languaged’. This endeavour has practical and political implications. This is 
because it can show how often ‘patients’ voices and experiences with their 
bodies run counter to those held by the medical world’ (McPherron and 
Ramanathan, 2011: 4).
5.2 What is a narrative?
The term ‘narrative’ has been thus far used without providing a definition of 
what is meant by it. Since several disciplines have appropriated the term, it is 
inevitable that its definition should have acquired a degree of heterogeneity. 
Intuitively, it can be said that a ‘narrative’ has something in common with a 
‘story’. Indeed, the terms are often employed interchangeably, as more or less 
synonyms. From a narrative point of view, a story must contain a minimum of 
two events, which are connected sequentially and temporally.
In sociolinguistics (Labov and Waletzky, 1967; Labov, 1972), what constitutes 
a narrative is its structure. There has to be a sequence of narrative clauses. 
These are clauses that contain a verb in the simple past tense or in the 
historic present tense. The order of the narrative clauses in the narrative has 
to mirror the order in which the events they describe occurred in the real 
world. A second criterion is that to be defined as such, a narrative must be 
tripartite; it must contain a beginning, middle, and an end. This, as observed 
by Riessman (2008: 4), goes back to Aristotle’s examination of the Greek 
tragedy. 
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The Labovian model stipulates that a narrative contains the following 
elements: Abstract, Orientation, Complicating Action, Evaluation, Resolution, 
Coda. The Abstract consists of a brief summary, normally to be found at the 
beginning of a story. The Orientation contains background information: who; 
where; when. The Complicating Action refers to the key events of the story as 
encapsulated by narrative clauses. The Resolution tells what happened in the 
end. The Evaluation is — in a way — the point of the story; the reason that 
prompted the narrator to tell it in the first place (e.g. ‘it was so scary’). Finally, 
the Coda is a final comment appearing after the resolution. For a narrative to 
count as such, the only two essential elements are Complicating Action and 
Resolution. As noted, the idea of narrative has been adopted as an analytical 
tool by various disciplines. As Riessman (2008) notes, not all traditions adhere 
to the Labovian model for identifying a narrative. 
The work of Labov and his colleagues has been particularly influential and has 
given rise to a sort of ‘prescriptivism’ in the understanding of what constitutes 
a narrative and how to analyse it. Georgakopoulou (2007) points out that 
narrative research within linguistics, and indeed in many social science 
disciplines, tends to employ ‘specific kind of data and methodologies that in 
turn generate a specific analytic vocabulary’ (p. 31). She then goes on to 
suggest that ‘it is not an exaggeration’ to suggest that this process of 
canonisation is directly traceable to Labov. As Georgakopoulou points out, the 
typical ‘Labovian narrative’ (or ‘prototype’, to use her definition) is ‘invariably 
about non-shared, personal experience past events’ (p. 31) and is produced in 
response to the researcher’s elicitation. In this sense, the interviews 
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presented in this thesis are ‘canonical’, being the product of elicitation by the 
researcher. The second ‘prototype’ identified by Georgakopoulou (and directly 
ascribed to Labov) is ‘a short-range narrative that gives an account of a 
certain landmark or key-event or experience that is considered to be pivotal in 
the formation of the interviewee’s sense of self’ (p. 31). Some of the 
‘narratives' identified as such here are ‘prototypical’ in this second sense too. 
Among them, I identify the telling of the onset of symptoms as well as the 
moment when a correct diagnosis was first obtained. 
In this chapter, some of the stories that my informants tell do indeed conform, 
in terms of structure, to the Labovian model. When this is the case, such 
model is mentioned and commented upon. However, even during a 
researcher-led semi-structured interview, less polished forms of telling can 
and do emerge in ways that are similar to what occurs in casual conversation.
To refer to the less polished, less coherent, ‘non-canonical’ stories that 
emerge, for example, in casual conversation (i.e. departing from the canonical 
form in structure and momentous nature of the content), Georgakopoulou 
(2007) uses the phrase ‘small stories’. These stories are not only literally 
‘small’, i.e. short; they are also metaphorically so, i.e. less ‘momentous’ and 
life-defining in a grand sense. For Georgakopoulou, ‘small stories’ range from 
literally ‘small and fragmented tellings to refusals to tell and deferrals of telling’ 
(p. 148). Whilst warning against the substituting of one set of hegemonic 
criteria for another in the definition of narrative, Georgakopoulou (ibid) 
proposes a set of features that identify a narrative. However, the prototypical 
characteristics she suggests are – crucially – ‘part of a more or less rather 
than as an either or approach’ (p. 37). These are: ‘temporality’ – the temporal 
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organisation of narrative events, then matched onto a sequence of clauses –
‘disruption’ – the transition from one state of affairs to another, more or less 
‘problematic’ one (an alteration of an existing equilibrium) – ‘consciousness’ –
the presence of a ‘filtering consciousness (normally human) that makes sense 
of the events, interprets them, is emotively and psychologically affected, 
develops more or less strategic and rational responses’ (p. 38). In this 
chapter, the two elements of disruption and the presence of a filtering 
consciousness are certainly criteria for the inclusion of a particular stretch of 
language in the analysis. 
It should be noted that in illness interviews and more generally in social 
science studies, ‘narratives’ are defined in somewhat looser terms. The term 
is often employed simply to individuals (patients, in the case of illness 
research) telling their experiences. In this sense, a ‘narrative’ is therefore 
more akin to the relating of an experience, including inner states. Here, in 
order to address the research questions mentioned above, I tend to use the 
term ‘narrative’ in this looser sense. By ‘narrative’ (unless otherwise 
specified), I mean the (elicited or spontaneous) re-telling of relevant (from the 
informant’s point of view) events which have either occurred in the past or the 
relating of events which are ongoing and convey, among other things, inner 
states. My use of the term ‘narrative’ also refers in general to the linguistic 
organisation of experience in tellable form. The ‘tellability’ of the narratives or 
stories here refers both to their being suited to linguistic encoding as well as 
their being emotively relevant to the filtering consciousness of the speaker. 
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Like Ramanathan (2010), my focus here is on the ‘languaging’ of the ailing 
body, whether in strictly narrative form or not.
5.3 Pain, illness, and the loss of agency
A very common view of illness and especially bodily pain (at least in 
contemporary Western culture) is that it reduces its host to a passive 
experiencer; pain – in other words – is the active partner in an unequal 
relationship: it acts and the individual experiencing it is acted upon. 
Linguistically, this view is reflected in the very lexicons that several languages 
use to talk of both illness and, in particular, pain. In English, the individual 
who is ill and/or in pain is often a ‘patient’ (especially when in the care of the 
medical profession), a word that has its etymology in the Latin for “to suffer” 
and “to endure”. To remain with English, the word pain ultimately derives from 
Lat. poena, “punishment” or “penalty”; both are commonly understood as 
phenomena normally inflicted or administered by an entity (human or 
institutional) on an individual (or group), originating outside the self and 
therefore possessing varying degrees of ‘otherness’. 
Obviously, words change their meanings and we should not expect any 
lexical item to carry its entire semantic weight over time. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to reflect on the etymological origin and semantic development of 
words such as pain and patient and their implications for our understanding of 
such experiences. It is also true that pain can be self-inflicted, as is the case 
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in self-harm34 (Faber, 2000; Strong, 2000). In some cases, it may even be 
welcomed, or yearned for (one only has to refer to the vast corpus of 
Christian martyrology to get an idea of willingly sought pain). Yet, even in 
such cases, the idea of “being acted upon” persists. However, is it always 
appropriate to think of the chronically ill and in pain as being inevitably 
“victims”? Are they invariably the passive partners in their encounters with 
pain and, more generally, illness? If so, to what degree? 
In what follows, I resort to the notion of ‘agency’ to problematise the notion of 
the chronic patient as passive ‘experiencer’ of both pain and illness. It will 
become apparent that my informants’ representations of their respective 
relationships to pain are rather more nuanced than might be expected.
An analysis of agency (defined below) in the narratives of individuals affected 
by chronic pain can prove fruitful for more than one reason. Among other 
things, it can contribute to a better understanding, and a more accurate 
appreciation, of the pain/illness experience. Although pain can undoubtedly 
be, and very often is, isolating it is not isolated: pain is an embodied 
experience lived by a socially situated individual. As mentioned, pain does 
not only affect bodies, it also affects lives; one of the most severe ways that it 
                                                            
34 The issue of self-harm is a complex one and a proper discussion of it is well beyond the scope of this 
work. Suffice to say that the position of self-harmers is ambiguous: they are both victims and 
perpetrators. In addition, more than the physical pain derived from it, it is the physical evidence of 
self wounding that self-harmers ‘seek’. Self-harming highlights the complex interrelatedness of so-
called psychological and physical pain and the problematic nature of expressing pain (psychological or 
otherwise). In a sense, self-harming might be considered a consequence of the failure to capture 
one’s pain linguistically: words are taken over by scars. Interestingly, Strong’s study on the topic 
(2000) bears the title, “A Bright Red Scream: Self-mutilation and the language of pain.”
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does so is by eroding personal freedom: the freedom to operate in the world 
as a free agent. 
In their study of the gendered experience of illness (which includes pain), 
Chateris-Black and Seale (2010) point out that such experience ‘often entails 
a break in the life story’ (p. 17). This is often the case because it makes the 
person ‘dependent – to a greater or lesser degree – on carers, whether family 
or friends, on health support workers and professionals’ (p. 17). Illness and 
pain entail, in other words, a reduction of agency. The focus on agency can 
also help highlight the multiplicity of roles that chronic sufferers experience, 
often simultaneously, (victim, hero, sufferer, and so on) as parts of their 
different personas. All this is captured, construed and simultaneously 
constructed, by language. 
Consequently, attention to the lexicogrammar (without losing sight of the 
wider discursive context) is again an important tool to achieve the 
aforementioned aims, especially if one agrees with the already-mentioned 
Hallidayan view of grammar as ‘a theory of experience’ and with the view that 
speakers’ ‘cognition of agency and the extent to which [they] invest an entity 
[...] with agency influence various levels of human language a great deal’ 
(Yamamoto, 2006: 6). Indeed, Yamamoto’s observation, in line with Halliday, 
that, through the concept of agency we ‘observe and interpret the world 
around us’ (2006:2) is particularly pertinent and, as I aim to show, can be 
fruitfully employed to examine how speakers in the Alomar Plus corpus view 
their relationship with pain and their illness. 
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5.4 Agency: definitions
To proceed with the discussion, it is first necessary to find a satisfactory 
working definition of “agency”, albeit a rather general one. The concept can 
be (and indeed has been) approached from a number of perspectives: 
linguistic and philosophical for example. Any discussion of agency requires 
the mention of what Yamamoto (2006) refers to as its ‘satellite concepts’: 
intentionality, or volition (the two terms often used interchangeably), 
awareness of action, control, causality and responsibility attributed to an 
entity. It is quite common for agency to be attributed to, and associated with, 
humans; perhaps humans are (from our anthropocentric perspective) the 
quintessentially agentive beings precisely because they are seen as being 
capable of both intentionality and volition. Humans can and do initiate actions 
willingly, more or less appreciating their consequences (they claim 
responsibility and establish a causal link between their actions and certain 
results). However, non-human and even inanimate and intangible entities are 
often invested (by us agentive humans) with varying degrees of agency and 
its corollaries of volition and intentionality. It would be beyond the scope of 
the present work to examine in any detail all the cognitive and philosophical 
issues surrounding the concept of agency35. From the perspective of this 
thesis, what matters is which entities, if any, speakers in the corpus treat, 
                                                            
35 The literature on agency is vast and the concept, as mentioned, has been approached from a 
variety of perspectives. A good overview of philosophical discussions on the matter can be found in 
Yamamoto (2006, especially chapter 2); the same work also discusses concepts pertaining to agency 
from the point of view of various Case Grammarians and Functional Linguists.
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linguistically and – arguably – cognitively, as if they possessed their own 
volition and acted in what could be termed an ‘agentive manner’. 
As Osterman et al. (1999: 128) note, it is often the case that people who are 
affected by chronic pain experience feelings of ‘frustration, hopelessness, 
despair, anger, anxiety, and depression’. In the case of SLE, Danoff-Burg and 
Friedberg (2009) identify stress, anxiety and depression as accompanying 
symptoms. Similar observations have been made by Spanwick36 (2008). 
Disempowerment and loss of control were found to be part of the experience 
of women in RA-related chronic pain by Skuladottir and Halldorsottir (2008). 
All these states can reasonably be correlated, or be expected to co-occur, 
with a general sentiment of loss of agency and freedom to act; the sensation 
of being somewhat constrained and imposed upon. It is with these findings in 
mind that I shall therefore look at the degree of agency speakers attribute to 
themselves vis-à-vis their illness and pain. How disempowered or, perhaps, 
how empowered do the speakers in the corpus see and, consequently, 
represent themselves? I shall adopt a working definition of agency as 
provided by Duranti (2004: 453): 
Agency is [...] understood as the property of those entities (i) that have some 
degree of control over their own behavior, (ii) whose actions in the world affect 
other entities’ (and sometimes their own), and (iii) whose actions are the 
object of evaluation (e.g. in terms of their responsibility for a given outcome). 
                                                            
36 Spanswick, in his study of patients referred to a specialty pain-clinic, reports that patients affected 
by conditions characterised by chronic pain present ‘high levels of distress’ (p. 94). The emotions they 
display include (but are not limited to): worry, anxiety, sadness, depression, anger, frustration, 
exhaustion, fatigue, various sleep disorders which result in (and in turn are generated by) reduced or 
impaired physical and social functioning.
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In discussing agentive behaviour, Ostermann et al. (1991: 143-145) talk of 
non-accomplished agency and real agency. Under the label of non-
accomplished agency, they include negated actions (e.g. I couldn’t sleep 
anymore), intended actions and wishful thinking (e.g. I’m trying to get back to 
my normal routine, before the RA I mean; I wish I didn’t have to do this). Both 
are indexical of diminished agency. On the other hand, the label real agency 
refers to those actions, activities, or ‘moves’ that social actors engage in when 
they are ‘actual agents’ (Ostermann et al., ibid p. 144) in their own life-stories. 
These ‘moves’ obviously have grammatical encodings, but the labels
themselves also refer to ‘extra-linguistic’ behaviours. 
5.5 Analysis
As in the preceding chapter, each of the interviews will be addressed 
separately and will be followed by a summary of the findings relating to that 
particular interview. The chapter will conclude with final remarks relating to 
the entire corpus.
5.5.1 Annamaria
From a thematic point of view, two macro sequences can be discerned in 
Annamaria’s account. The first is relative to the appearance of the symptoms; 
this phase lasts until shortly after her first diagnosis. During this initial period 
(narrative and actual time here coincide), Annamaria appears as relatively 
passive: ‘things’ happen to her and she simply takes notice. Subsequently, 
she follows advice and visits a doctor (therefore not as a result of her own 
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initiative). He gives her a diagnosis and prescribes pharmacological treatment 
(cortisone). In a narrative passage at the beginning of the interview, 
Annamaria starts to present herself as ‘active’:
Extract (5.1) (A, I: 1)37
Simone: And initially the doctor, well, did you go to see a doctor right away, 
to…when the pains began…did you see someone right away or did 
they…what were they saying to you?
Annamaria: I went to, went to an orthopaedist, who gave me cortisone. Without 
doing any tests, he told me right away I had rheumatoid arthritis and 
he gave me cortisone, er, just looking at my hands, er, I…well for a 
month I took this cortisone but then I could see that without a 
diagnosis, in spite of only being twenty-one…I was still young but I 
was telling myself: “without a diagnosis I’m taking cortisone…and 
then? What happens?” So after a month I stopped taking it.
As noted, this passage is found early in the interview. It also refers back to an 
early stage in Annamaria’s illness. However, it is already revealing of this 
informant’s mental attitude towards her illness. It also illustrates how she 
portrays herself as unwilling to succumb to the disease and, crucially, 
unwilling to passively follow her doctor’s orders and to accept his diagnosis. 
In fact, her comments juxtapose her own sound judgement with that of the 
doctor, which is implicitly criticised (“without doing any tests”; “just looking at 
my hands”). Even this relatively short extract already problematises the idea 
of the patient as powerless vis-à-vis the medical establishment, which is often 
repeated in the literature. Annamaria paints a picture of a woman whose 
cognitive and critical functions are intact and who is clearly able to act 
                                                            
37 The codes following each extract refer to the participant, type of date, and page where the extract 
appears in the original version of the transcript. So, here A=Annamaria; I=interview; 1=page one in the 
original Italian transcript)
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following her own better judgement, even if this means acting against medical 
advice. The kind of behaviour displayed by this speaker is indexical of real 
agency (see above); it is antithetical to ideas of patient passivity and the 
power imbalance in the doctor-patient relationship. However, the narrative 
passage exemplifies an ‘evolution’ of the speaker. In it, Annamaria portrays 
herself as transitioning from one role, that of the compliant patient, to another, 
more ‘active’ one. McAdams (1993) uses the term ‘imago’ to refer to the 
personified and idealised concept of the self. He argues that our ‘imagos’ are 
part of our ‘personal myths’:
Each of us consciously and unconsciously fashions many characters for our 
life stories. These characters function in our myths as if they were persons; 
hence, they are “personified.” And each has a somewhat exaggerated and 
one-dimensional form; hence, they are “idealized.” Our life stories may have 
one dominant imago or many (1997: 122). 
This ‘active’ stance contributes directly to forming Annamaria’s ‘imago’ (and 
each of the informants in the ALOMAR Plus corpus works toward presenting 
and sustaining one or more preferred imagos) and also appears in a 
subsequent passage: Extract (5.2), which appears further on in the interview 
and refers to a time when, having stopped taking cortisone, her symptoms 
reappeared and once again she sought medical help:
Extract (5.2) (A I: 1-2)
Simone: And, the symptoms were…during the therapy with cortisone was…did 
you feel any better?
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Annamaria: Yes, I felt much better, with cortisone I felt much better but after a 
month, when I stopped taking it, I began experiencing pains again. My 
GP wasn’t saying anything [to me] and my son’s paediatrician realised 
I wasn’t feeling very well because I brought him the child for a check-
up and he saw I found it hard to move, so he asked what was the 
matter and I told him. So he advised I come to the [name of hospital], 
where there was a rheumatology centre. I did come to the [name of 
hospital] and did the first tests and the doctor who saw me, since all 
tests were negative, said that...that for him it could be something…but 
he thought it was only…only psychosomatic.
Simone: So…he thought it was…
Annamaria: A psychological factor. He told me that according to him it was only a 
psychological factor because…each time that I came for tests, I never 
had anything to show to him, because my hands would swell up and 
then get normal again and the same my knees and each time I came 
to see him I had nothing…to show him.
Simone: And the pain was always there, was it there only when it was swollen?
Annamaria: The pain was there mainly when [the hands and knees] would swell, 
and so, he told me to come again once I had something swollen, 
without making an appointment and after two days I arrived with a 
swollen knee and he goes “well, then it’s not a psychological problem 
because otherwise the knee wouldn’t have become swollen.” So he 
tested the liquid [from the knee] and…he told me I had rheumatoid 
arthritis, but that from the blood tests it didn’t show. So he didn’t give 
me strong medicines, only anti-inflammatories…and he told me to go 
on…well, he told me: “signora, I don’t know what to tell you anymore, 
come back when you feel worse.” I was only 21, I didn’t like what he 
said but that’s exactly how it went, to tell the truth, I only took anti-
inflammatories…when I needed them, which was often […] then these 
knees would swell up and swell up, they would stay swollen for a 
week. I had quite a heavy job, I was a weaver, so, with the walking 
and all, but I always kept on doing it [working], in spite of everything, 
me, with my swollen knees, I would still go to work but well, even 
staying at home wouldn’t have changed my life. No, I managed to 
keep on working in spite of it all. 
This rather lengthy extract is interesting because it reiterates three themes 
which are paramount in Annamaria’s story. First, the encounter, especially in 
the first part of her illness, with a number of well-meaning but, ultimately, 
ineffectual clinicians. Secondly, Annamaria’s portrayal of herself as affected 
but ‘unbroken’ by SLE. Thirdly, the problem of living with an ‘invisible’ chronic 
condition. SLE often results in reddening of the skin of the face; it is from this 
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‘wolf-like’ feature which it derives its name. However, the visibility of the illness 
is intermittent and often not present for long periods of time.
The doctors she consults first cannot make a diagnosis, then dismiss the 
symptoms and attribute them to ‘psychosomatic factors’, and finally give a 
diagnosis which is the result of ‘guessing’, albeit – one might argue –
‘educated’ guessing. It is interesting to note that Annamaria does not openly 
criticise the doctors. Her criticism is implicit; it can be inferred from the 
surrounding text and, ultimately, its interpretation as such is left to the 
interlocutor. 
Her encounter with the hospital doctor highlights one of the recurrent themes 
in the interviews of the ALOMAR Plus corpus: the ‘invisibility’ of the illness 
which often results in the de facto delegitimization of the patient and of her 
suffering. As Okada (2011: 161-162) notes, the ‘invisibility’ of one’s illness is a 
mixed blessing; although it allows the affected person to conceal the extent of 
their pain and suffering, it also results in the illness not receiving social 
recognition. The problem is particularly acute when, like for Annamaria, there 
is a ‘double invisibility’ (Okada, ibid p. 162), where the illness is ‘invisible not 
only to lay people but also to (most) medical practitioners.’ 
Paradoxically, the situation is made worse by Annamaria’s attempts to portray 
herself as an active person and her showing a high degree of agentivity. This 
is the second of the themes apparent in her account: her self-portrayal, 
through narrative, as active and ‘unbroken’. She goes on to effectively paint a 
picture of a resilient woman; although her job is heavy, she carries on doing it. 
However, to carry on ‘working in spite of it all’ is precisely the type of 
behaviour that, although it allows her to keep playing an active role in society, 
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impedes her chronic illness and her suffering to receive full social and, 
crucially, medical validation. In the quoted extract, Annamaria uses ‘habitual 
narrative’. This type of narrative, which uses the auxiliaries used or would (or 
their equivalent in other languages), is – as noted by Cheshire and Ziebland 
(2005) – less ‘dramatic’ than one where the simple past tense or historical 
present is used. In the latter, the ‘blow-by-blow effect of a story about a single 
occasion’ (Cheshire and Ziebland, 2005, pp. 23-24) is effectively conveyed. 
Habitual narratives – on the other hand – are better at conveying repetition 
and routines. Interviews in the ALOMAR Plus corpus seem to lend credibility 
to Cheshire and Ziebland’s (2005) observation that habitual narratives:
are likely to occur in talk about the experience of chronic illness because that 
experience inevitably includes a series of repeated events and everyday small 
decisions about the management of the illness (pp 24-25).
This particular example of habitual narrative is also very effective as a tool for 
building a particular type of identity for this speaker: resilient and unwilling to 
let chronic illness have too heavy an impact on her life. It is through narratives 
like these that Annamaria is able to ‘reclaim’ her life and her identity as a 
wilful, active, ‘agentive’ operator in the real world.
In extract (5.2), Annamaria challenges again the view of the patient as 
somehow ‘passive’. Once again, she challenges her doctor’s proposed course 
of action, (although not by directly confronting him) with her decision to take 
anti-inflammatories only when needed. Again paradoxically, it might well be 
that this ‘act of resistance’ resulted in the deterioration of her condition.
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Speakers often construct their identities by comparing their behaviours with 
those of others. Annamaria employs this strategy, although – typically for her 
– she does so in a rather oblique and understated manner. Extract (5.3) 
shows her doing so in a non-narrative passage produced in answer to a 
request to describe her experience of pain:
Extract (5.3) (A I: 9)
Annamaria <DEEP BREATH> it isn’t easy, to describe pain <LAUGHS> it 
isn’t easy. Well, then there are different kinds because, pain, 
erm…I’d like to say a burning but it isn’t a burning, it’s really 
something intense. In some cases, it seems like, well, often 
one hears these phrases, that appear exaggerated, but it feels 
like somebody is twisting a knife inside of you, isn’t it? Well, 
truly, often it is like that, even if these are things that I never 
say because I don’t...just hearing them bothers me; to me it 
feels like, like you’re emphasising, isnt’ it?
Simone: mhm mhm…
Annamaria: Yes, to make them [things] even heavier that they are but in 
truth it’s like that, at times pain just as if a knife was piercing 
you.
Extract (5.3) is interesting for more than one reason. First, it reveals 
Annamaria’s difficulty in encoding the precise nature of her pain. As noted, in 
works about bodily pain as well as in lay people’s observations about it, this 
difficulty is often commented upon. However, Annamaria does offer some 
characterisations of her pain. The fact that the most appropriate descriptor 
she can find is a simile is not, as Scarry (1985) claims, a limitation of language 
but a clear example of its resourcefulness. The evocative power of the image 
used by this speaker conveys well the type of sensation, its emotional impact, 
and the sense of powerlessness felt. The agent causing the pain is encoded 
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as a generic ‘somebody’ and the ‘patient’ (in the grammatical sense) as a 
generic ‘you’. Then Annamaria provides a configuration where the ‘actor’ is ‘a 
knife’ and the ‘patient’ still a generic ‘you’. However, the interlocutor knows 
that this ‘you’ is really the speaker, Annamaria. 
Discursively, as noted in previous sections, by utilising generic statements in 
the indicative and generic pronouns Annamaria is able to convey the emotive 
impact of her experience effectively. Yet because of the absence of emotive 
language, the image which is projected is that of an individual who is ‘in 
control’ and whose account has therefore credibility. Simultaneously, the 
interlocutor is enlisted as a sympathetic listener (a ‘believing’ listener, one 
might say). It is interesting to note Annamaria’s use of tag questions. Not only 
do they ensure that the interlocutor is still following but as discourse markers 
they also work to align the listener to the speaker’s position.
Related to the point that has just been made is that in extract (5.3), Annamaria 
presents her identity by indirectly comparing and contrasting her behaviour (in 
experiencing and reacting to bodily pain) with that of other lupus sufferers. 
She attributes the encoding of the pain experience in terms of a knife piercing 
the body as something that ‘one hears’. She skilfully pre-empts the 
interlocutor’s possible disbelief by saying that this might appear ‘exaggerated’. 
Her stoical identity is thus put forward but without realising the contradiction, 
she states that ‘these are things [she] never say[s]’ (she is, in fact, saying 
them now). She is ‘bothered’ just hearing them; she fears that speaking in 
these terms might reduce her credibility. Annamaria is thus performing the 
role of the ‘good patient’, comparing her behaviour (albeit indirectly) with that 
of the ‘bad patient’, with whom she wishes not to be identified. Undoubtedly, 
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this behaviour is the result of previous encounters with medical professionals 
and lay people. It reacts to and pre-empts possible objections as to the 
veracity of the account. Encountering disbelief of one’s condition and suffering 
(both by medical professional and lay people) is evident in Annammaria’s 
account as well as in other of the participants’ interviews. As noted (Okada, 
2010), it is particularly common in the experience of patients with chronic, 
‘invisible’ illnesses.
As stated at the beginning, Annamaria’s experience can be subdivided into 
two macro-sequences: the initial phase of her illness and her experience after 
certain diagnoses and ‘fully-blown’ lupus. In spite of her effort and of her 
desire to continue her life as before the onset of illness, ultimately she has to 
adapt to this new reality. However, as the following passage (extract 5.4) 
illustrates, she is able to maintain coherence in her life-story, and to remain 
the principal ‘actor’ in it.
Extract (5.4) (A, I: 12-13)
Simone: Can you remember what life was like for you, before this all began?
Annamaria: Yes, I’ve always been a very active person, erm, I’ve always very 
much enjoyed working, even toiling has never been a problem for me. 
I’ve always done it willingly, I must always move [be physically active], 
always feel useful, do something and I must say that in spite of 
everything I’m still able to do it today, even with the pains. Clearly, I’m 
a bit limited compared to before; I can’t bend down anymore, kneel 
down, do these things, I have difficulties, now I have nephews and 
nieces, my brother’s children, I’d love to go for a run [with them]. 
Sometimes the younger one says: “come on auntie, catch me”, Well, 
it’s easier said than done <LAUGHS>.
In spite of her efforts and resilience, ultimately Annamaria has to acknowledge 
that her life cannot remain the same. There are adjustments she has to make 
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(in another passage she tells that after some time she had to leave 
employment). Extract (5.4) is important because in it Annamaria presents her 
‘new’, post-illness identity. This identity is not diametrically opposed to her 
previous one. The continuity is illustrated by the passage referring to the 
‘before’, immediately followed by the depiction of her current self. Pain in 
particular, Annamaria tells us, has not been able to change her. In her 
resilience there is continuity; hers is a coherent, unbroken identity. What 
changes there have been, like – for example – diminished physical strength, 
are downplayed.
Finally, what is the overall image of her illness that Annamaria gives? Extract 
(5.5) illustrates this very well. In it, I asked her to elaborate further on an 
image of lupus provided earlier in the interview:
Extract (5.5) (A, I: 14)
Simone: Finally, just one thing, I was struck by the image you used earlier of 
lupus as, as an illness, this kind of monster, something inside of you...
Annamaria: No, it’s not a monster!
Simone: A...
Annamaria: A little wolf.
Simone: A wolf, a small friendly thing...the illness but...lupus...but if you had to 
picture, well I don’t know, picture the pain, independently from...well 
pain in itself, what kind of image would you think of?
Annamaria: Not a bad one.
Simone: Not a bad one?
Annamaria: No...no, something that’s part of my life, then...I have to say that I 
don’t know if I’d really like to be cured of this illness.
Simone: Oh?
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Annamaria: Because it’s taught me many things. And...I was able, in my life, to do 
something I really like, which is taking care of other people. And I was 
able to do it thanks to lupus, because I wouldn’t have been able not to 
have a job [...] so this allows me to come to Milano and do voluntary 
work and be close to the ill. It’s something I truly enjoy.
In extract (5.5), Annamaria displays an integral, reconstituted identity. The 
‘breakages’ in her life story are repaired and this is presented as a coherent 
whole, where even illness and pain have an ultimately positive role. This can 
be seen as an example of what Frank (1997) calls a “restoration narrative” but 
also has elements of the “quest narrative”. In spite of the illness’s disruptions 
and the ruptures it caused, the integrity of Annamaria’s life-narrative has been 
restored. Indeed, illness has been instrumental in ‘unveiling’ this speaker’s 
true identity, which had remained hidden underneath the burdens and the 
constraints of the life of an ordinary, healthy, working woman. Paradoxically, 
for Annamaria, the arrival of lupus has strengthened her role as ‘actor’, as an 
agentive force in her own life.
Summary
For this speaker, the arrival of chronic illness and the related bodily pain have 
obviously been disruptive. However, in her account – through both typically 
narrative as well as non-narrative passages – she presents an identity which 
is fundamentally unaltered. Before the onset of lupus, through the initial 
stages and thereafter, she remains a highly volitional individual. Her sense of 
self may have been temporarily disrupted but she was soon able to recover a 
coherent life-story and an intact – indeed strengthened – sense of self. 
Although powerful forces have intruded on her life, Annamaria remains a 
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powerful actor in her life. Perhaps paradoxically, chronic illness and even her 
experience of pain are invested by this speaker with positive, often ‘liberating’ 
attributes. The narrative truth here is one of ‘reconstitution’, rather that fatal 
disruption.
5.5.2 Sandra
Sandra’s interview covers a long period of biographical time since, as stated 
previously, she is the one who began experiencing symptoms at the earliest 
age amongst the participants in this study. Indeed, the topic of age is a 
recurrent theme in her account. Thematically, it develops in ways analogous 
to those of the other participants: onset of symptoms, first referrals to various 
practitioners, prescription of pharmacological treatments and their side-
effects, and subsequent life with the condition (lupus).
As mentioned, the theme of the very young age at which Sandra began to 
experience the symptoms of lupus is prominent in her story. Extract (5.6) –
which opens the interview – immediately brings this to the fore. 
Extract (5.6) (S, I: 1)
Simone: So, would you like to begin by telling me a bit of...of your experience, 
in general...of when you began...?
Sandra: Well, I am 32 years old. I became ill in 1983. I was 11 years old. 
I’ve been ill for 21 years. So, I began...I was at ‘scuola media38’ and I 
had...I was listless, you could say. I began to have temperatures, 
                                                            
38 Part of the compulsory cycle of state education, scuola media (‘middle school’) is for pupils aged 11 
to 13.
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pains, but my temperatures were not continuous. I just had a low 
temperature, it would come and go, so I wouldn’t always show I wasn’t 
feeling well, then once my arm would hurt, another time the bottom of 
my foot would, and the pains would move about until one day I went to 
the doctor’s and that day my temperature was actually 39 [degrees 
Celsius]. It was very high. From that time, well, practically I kept 
getting worse.
The first clauses of Sandra’s turn – which were spoken as three distinct, 
clearly separate intonational units – are highly indicative of the temporal value 
in this speaker’s story. These introductory lines signpost Sandra’s experience 
and – for the interlocutor – provide the emotive interpretative key for all that 
follows.
To begin with, there is Sandra’s age at the time of speaking is 32, which in the 
western world, is very young. Then there is the date of the appearance of the 
first symptoms, 1983. Significantly, this is followed by the statement of 
Sandra’s pre-pubescent age at the time: 11 years and by the length of her life 
as a chronically ill person: 21 years. As noted, each piece of information is 
spoken in a clearly distinct intonational unit; this – together with the fact that it
appears at the beginning of the account – foregrounds the information and 
signals its importance for the speaker. For this speaker, what is significant is 
not only that she became ill but that she did so at such a young age. In 
Sandra’s case, it is not so much that there is a ‘before’ and an ‘after’ the onset 
of chronic illness; the latter and her life have been running an almost entirely 
parallel course. The significance and the impact of this fact are apparent in a 
subsequent non-narrative (in the Labovian sense) passage (extract 5.7), 
which – in a way – functions as a Coda to the entire interview (although it 
actually appears in the middle of it):
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Extract (5.7) (S, I: 3)
Simone: How would you say that, that you were influenced...what’s the effect 
that on you, that having this illness and the pain has had on you?
Sandra: The illness? Not that much, because, because apart from the acute 
phases, then one can live with it. So after having stopped it with drugs, 
one can...how can I say...to...to go about one’s business, it’s not like 
you aren’t able to...however, as far as...the fact of being...well...oh 
God. I am...how can I say it...explain it. Every choice I’ve made...let’s 
say that every choice that I’ve had to...that I’ve made in my life has 
always been influenced by the illness, because it’s always been 
present, since I was a child and everything has always been...a 
problem; a problem going to the seaside; going out with friends; a 
problem...everything. And still, and I’m married, there are problems. 
Every choice has...I mean a consequence, because the illness 
developed when I was a little girl and I grew up with it. 
Consequently...a parallel journey.
Interestingly, bodily pain does not play a crucial role; it does not appear as a 
main actor in the story. Lupus, or chronic illness in its entirety, does. In 
Sandra’s life, chronic illness exerts a definite, altogether malign influence. This 
is not so much in the physical symptoms it causes (e.g. fevers, various pains, 
and so on), but rather in its power to limit freedom of choice and the leading of 
an ordinary existence, especially for a young woman. 
Particularly problematic for Sandra is the fact that lupus has – de facto –
always been with her. In other words, practically, there has not been a time 
when its influence has not been felt. Hurwitz (2004: 422-423) notes that 
patients’ narratives often differ from medical histories in the role time plays in 
them. In the former, although accounts are frequently ‘segmented into 
medico-biographical eras, such as “before”, “at the start”, “during”, and “at the 
end” of an illness’, the biological factors around which the events of the illness 
evolve are organised around an ‘inner time’, which often stands still and 
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distorts ‘real time’. Sandra’s perception of her life’s (and her own) timeline is 
certainly influenced by her having become ill so young.
It is interesting to note that, from a grammatical point of view, in extract 5.7 
illness appears as grammatical subject only once. Initially, the role of illness is 
presented through a passive sentence (‘every choice that I’ve had to...that I’ve 
made in my life has always been influenced by the illness’). By thematising 
the phrase ‘every choice’, the active role plaid by the illness is somewhat 
muted. What are foregrounded are the consequences, the ‘results’ of having 
lived with lupus for such a long time. Lupus, in other words, more than in the 
role of potent, negative actor (in the sense of an entity with the visible, obvious 
power to impede the exercise of free will), is cast in the role of eminence 
grise, a force operating from behind the scenes.
Although, as discussed above, Sandra appears to attribute more importance 
(and more negative value) to the fact of having been chronically ill for such a 
long time than to bodily pain per se, the latter cannot be entirely ignored. 
However, as a coping mechanism Sandra differentiates sharply between the 
‘woman in pain’ and the woman who may be chronically ill but is not in pain. In 
so doing, effectively she creates and sustains two distinct identities. This is 
not to suggest that she suffers from some kind of dissociative disorder 
(although ‘dissociation’ is a term she uses), but that she distances the self-in-
pain as much as possible from her everyday self. This can be seen quite 
clearly in extract (5.8):
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Extract (5.8) (S, I: 1)
Simone: These pains you were talking about, at the foot or in the arm, what 
type of pains were they? Can you remember them?
Sandra: Well, I have a difficult time remembering them because as soon as I’m 
well I delete them from my memory the pain I’ve felt. But then when I 
hurt, when even just a finger hurts the memory of pain re-emerges 
[...]. When I’m not unwell I speak positively of my experience of illness. 
When I’m in an acute phase [when experiencing a relapse] don’t talk 
to me about my illness because it’s something that doesn’t belong to 
me, really. I tend to disassociate.
In (5.8), Sandra very effectively conveys her rejection of at least one aspect of 
her illness: bodily pain. This is in spite of having stated before that bodily pain 
is not much of a problem for her. 
The separating of the ‘hurting self’ from the ‘not-hurting self’ might result in an 
apparent fracture of the self. However, Sandra’s effort to present a coherent, 
unbroken identity is successfully achieved in extract 5.8, thanks in good part 
to her skilful use of because narratives. As Cheshire and Ziebland point out 
(2005: 27-28), ‘[b]ecause clauses occur frequently in conversation, 
presumably because of their semantic role of explaining the speaker’s 
thoughts, feelings or actions’ (p. 28). In (5.8), Sandra states that she has a 
difficult time remembering her experiences of pain. She explains why this is: 
she forgets the experience as soon as it is over. She does so with a wilful act 
that exemplifies her agentive power, her status as an actor: ‘I delete them 
from my memory, the pain I’ve felt.’ Following Osterman et al. (1999: 144), I 
refer to these wilful actions on the speaker’s part as examples of real agency. 
The label indicates actions, activities, or ‘moves’ that speakers engage in 
when they are ‘actual agents’ (ibid p. 144) in their own life-stories. These 
‘moves’ obviously have grammatical encodings, but the label also includes 
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(and refers to) extra-linguistic moves represented discursively. These ‘moves’ 
include ‘deleting’ painful memories, as well as – for example - deciding to see 
a particular specialist or stopping a treatment, as in Annamaria’s case (see 
above). Interestingly, from the point of view of the clause as representation in 
SFG, the clause ‘I delete them [the memories of the pains] from my memory’ 
looks like a ‘material’ clause (it could also be thought as a mental process, 
since it entirely occurs in the speaker’s mind), with Sandra as the Actor and 
the memories in the role of Goal. For Frawley (1992), in this clause Sandra is 
the stereotypical agent: a semantic category with corresponding grammatical 
manifestations. He defines the agent as, ‘the deliberate, potent, active 
instigator of the predicate: the primary, involved doer’ (p. 203). To return to 
Sandra, this ‘deletion’ is an act of resistance, as well as a coping mechanism. 
However, when she experiences a relapse – with its attendant pain – Sandra 
does not want to hear about her illness. The because clause explains the 
reason in no uncertain terms: ‘because it doesn’t belong to me’. Therefore, 
thanks to these because clauses embedded in a ‘descriptive’ (i.e. non-
narrative, in the traditional sense) sequence, Sandra is able to provide a 
rationale for what – on the surface – might look like contradictory statements 
(and behaviour) regarding her acceptance of her illness. Thus the separation 
of the ‘self-in-pain’ from the ‘non-suffering self’ appears entirely 
understandable to the interlocutor and a coherent identity is preserved and 
presented.
The ‘strategy’ used by Sandra to maintain coherence and to cope with the 
harsher aspects of her illness may come at a cost. In chronic illness – and 
especially where pain is present – lack of communication about any aspect of 
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one’s illness can make “invisible illnesses even more invisible, as language is 
‘the medium through which... [the] collective notions of disabilities and ‘able’ 
bodies get discoursed into place” (emphasis in the original). In extract (5.9), 
which follows immediately extract (5.8) in the interview, Sandra explains how 
being a member of ALOMAR helped her to regain a voice that was partly lost:
Extract (5.9) (S I: 4)
Simone: When you’re experiencing a relapse?
Sandra: Yes, yes, right. I...it’s only since I began coming to the group that I can 
talk of my illness...otherwise...if you saw me...you wouldn’t see I am ill 
because it doesn’t show and I would never have told you. Not out of a 
desire to hide, more because of a sense of inferiority in relation to 
others, yes. Whether it’s right or wrong I don’t know, maybe it’s 
because of my personality...I’m very sensitive, yes, that’s the truth but 
let’s say that I’m trying to overcome it...to become more confident.
Extract (5.9) exemplifies Sandra’s re-empowerment though membership in the 
support group and the re-emergence of – quite literally – her voice. In other 
words, being a member of ALOMAR has allowed Sandra to forge a new 
identity. Whereas before joining the group, her sensitivity and shyness 
resulted in insecurity (and silence), she now feels more confident. It is 
important to note that, for Sandra, this is an ongoing process; she uses the 
present continuous (stare+gerund, in Italian) to indicate her efforts to change. 
Being a member of the group, in other words, has allowed Sandra to find a 
find a voice and construct new narratives – where before there were none –
that, as Ramanathan (2010) points out, have enabled her to move away from 
an undesired positioning. This is what Ramanathan (2010) and McPherron 
and Ramanathan (2011) have termed ‘languaging’ of the body; through 
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‘languaging’, the ill are able to engage again with other human beings, with 
themselves, and with their bodies.
Extract (5.9) shows the reconstitutive power of language and the emerging of 
a new identity. Chronic illness (and lupus in particular) is a complex, 
multifaceted experience. It would be inaccurate not to point out some of the 
challenges that – for people like Sandra – persist. In extract (5.10), Sandra 
talks about the effects of pharmacological therapies on her body and –
crucially – on her sense of self as a person and, more specifically, as a 
woman. 
Extract (5.10) (S, I: 4)
Sandra: Because the drugs they give you are really strong, and they really 
entail [cause] mood changes, changes in physiognomy, and that’s 
something that’s really heavy [to bear], really heavy. There I truly feel 
very different.
Simone: From what you normally are like?
Sandra: Yes, I’m not myself anymore. I really change, my personality changes, 
yes.
Simone: Would you say that...if it has changed, how’s your relationship with 
your own body changed?
Sandra: Mhm, what a tricky little question...
Simone: <LAUGHS>
Sandra: Well, my body, my body has been ravaged so consequently I don’t 
have a good relationship with my body. Because maybe you can find 
out, yes, from doctors, the doses of cortisone that I took, 
unfortunately, on my still young body, it really ravaged it. Luckily we’re 
not many to be so ravaged...but it happened, amen. What can one 
do? I don’t look at myself a lot <LAUGHS>.
Extract (5.10) is of crucial importance because it illustrates very effectively 
how the experience of chronic illness is extremely complex. In it, it is entirely 
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possible to come across as strong and resilient – forging new identities –
whilst acknowledging weaker areas. It is not rare, in reading the existing 
literature on the experience of illness, to form the impression that the shaping 
of new identities through narrative (and experientially), the shifting from 
dispreferred positions to newer, preferred ones, is a coherent process which 
takes the patient from older positions to a new, altogether better place. 
Sandra’s experience, and that of the other informants in the present research, 
shows that the shaping of a new identity is fluid; and so are the experiences of 
illness and pain. It is precisely to keep the whole picture together that the 
individual has to strive continually, to re-adjust her narrative, to take this fact 
into account. The result is that she does not look at her own body very much.
Extract (5.10) is also interesting because it highlights an often underestimated 
factor in discussions on chronic illness: the impact of therapies. It is only in 
discussing this topic that Sandra utilises emotionally charged lexicon 
(‘ravaged’). She says that the drugs cause mood and personality changes; 
using a because clause, she explains that the drugs used to treat lupus are 
‘really strong’. So much so that at times, whilst taking the drugs, she doesn’t 
feel like herself anymore. Furthermore, the drugs have also caused body 
changes. As mentioned, she reports that her body has been ‘ravaged’ (It: 
devastato) by the therapies, which is the most emotionally charged lexical 
item in the entire interview. However, it is interesting to note that Sandra 
portrays her behaviour and her responses to treatment as entirely reasonable, 
and in line with that of other patients. With another because clause, she 
invites the interviewer to make his own enquiries and seek confirmation from 
medical professionals that what Sandra is saying is accurate. This again 
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portrays her reactions as reasonable and justified, given the situation; it also 
aligns her with other sufferers in the same condition. Thus, not only is it 
important to build and present a coherent – perhaps new – identity; it must 
also be a believable one.
Summary
For this speaker, the experience of illness and pain has been a long one. She 
has literally grown up with it. By choice and necessity, she has had to show 
resilience in order to carry on with her life as normally as possible. In terms of 
agency, there is a contrast between the severity and duration of her condition 
and the reluctance in portraying herself anything other than a full agent. 
Interestingly – and consistently with what other speakers in the corpus do –
the entity endowed with negative agency (agency whose effects are 
evaluated negatively) is the pharmacological therapy, rather than the overall 
experience of living with lupus. One should not underestimate the negative 
effects (physical and psychological) that such treatments often have.
The identity that emerges from this speaker’s narratives is one of resilience 
and adaptation. However, it is a ‘fluid’ identity in the sense that it has weaker 
areas and requires constant attention. If, on the one hand, Sandra has been 
able – perhaps because of her illness and, even more, thanks to the support 
group – to draw on sources of strength that she did not know she possessed, 
on the other hand her embodied self remains a problematic area. Her illness 
and pain are, therefore, both an opportunity and an impediment. It is on the 
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balancing of these contradictions that her stability and well-being ultimately 
depend.
5.5.3 Anna 
As noted (see biographical notes, chapter 2), Anna comes across as the 
most distressed of all the interviewees. The memory of the onset of her 
condition (RA), its fast progression and the often devastating effects endured 
are still vivid in her memory and come through vividly in her account. The 
distressing nature of Anna’s experience, and the role that physical pain plays 
in it, is apparent from the inception of the interview. Asked to talk in general 
terms about her experience, she immediately discusses pain. Anna knew that 
part of the interest of the research was the experience of bodily pain; this may 
have influenced her choice of opening topic. However, so did the other 
participants. The topic of bodily pain is decidedly prominent in this speaker’s 
account. Extract (5.11) – which opens the interview and, as stated, was given 
in answer to an invitation to tell me about her experience – immediately takes 
the interlocutor into this speaker’s world of pain and suffering. It is in the form 
of a habitual narrative:
Extract (5.11) (A, I: 1)
Anna: So, the fact of the illness, clearly, because, even before but, maybe it 
isn’t connected to the illness, clearly, almost suddenly the pain 
[INAUDIBLE], strong, and...by and by it grows, so much so that...there 
have been moments, before, mmm, and even during the therapy, 
that...it would become so intense that...just at the thought that it would 
come back, this pain......after a few minutes, a few hours, erm, I would 
really think I couldn’t go on with a life like this. I would tell my husband: 
277
“look here, I can’t take it, I feel like jumping out of the window, it’s not 
possible.” My heart would beat very fast, so much so that, that I would 
pass out. So this lasted for a period of at least three years and then, 
finally, some treatment, let’s say that it eased a bit, these periods were 
not as frequent and when it would come this pain was still very intense 
but, it would last less...
As stated, Anna produced this narrative section in response to a general 
question on the nature of her experience. What is immediately striking, from a 
linguistic point of view, is the fragmented nature of extract (5.11). It is 
characterised by false starts and self-repairs. The immediacy of the onset of 
pain is rendered by a nominal clause, where the verb is absent. All this is 
clearly indexical of the disruptive effect of the arrival of pain in Anna’s life. 
Unlike other speakers in the corpus, she is unique in the apparent lack of 
gradualness of the inception of the symptoms. The experience of this kind of 
pain is clearly devastating for Anna. In general, it is instructive to analyse how 
patients report their interactions with health care professionals and people 
around them. First of all, in this passage, quoting herself using direct speech, 
the immediate effect is of heightened drama. This foregrounds her sensations 
and immediately and effectively draws the interlocutor into her world of pain.
For this speaker – and especially in this passage – bodily pain is clearly a 
potent actor; it appears suddenly, obviously uninvited, and causes disruption. 
Anna is at the mercy of it. It is interesting to note that in extract (5.11), Anna 
does not appear in any material process (processes of doing, in SFG), only 
twice in mental process (expressed circumstantially), and once in a verbal 
process (a process of saying). It is only pain that does: it comes; it goes; it 
increases in intensity, while Anna is reduced to a passive, powerless host. 
It is common for people affected by chronic conditions to have to wait a 
considerable amount of time before receiving a sure diagnosis. This 
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uncertainty, as noted, is a common experience for the people in the Alomar 
Plus corpus. It was the case for Anna and this is undoubtedly a contributing 
factor to the distress and overall uncertainty felt. Extract (5.12) illustrates the 
progression of Anna’s symptoms (i.e. pain) in the absence of a sure 
diagnosis:
Extract (5.12) (A I: 1-2)
Simone: Where would you get the pains?
Anna: Well, I began with the hands.
Simone: The hands.
Anna: It would starts from here [POINTS TO OWN WRIST].
Simone: From, from the wrist?
Anna: Yes, or here.
Simone: Okay.
Anna: It would become inflamed lightly, it would take me [i.e. affect] all the 
tendons up to here, to arrive here.
Simone: Up to the armpit?
Anna: Yes, yes, yes, and then regularly, it would take here, my back.
Simone: Your back?
Anna: And it seemed I had something nasty...nasty precisely because...the 
doctors still could not understand...at the beginning...this went on for, 
always going on with the drugs, trying, that’s it.
Simone: After how long did you finally receive a diagnosis?
Anna: The diagnosis, let’s say, I got it … because first I had been followed by 
an orthopaedist, let’s say, and the orthopaedist hadn’t really 
understood well himself then, when he saw the tests, and the 
rheumatest kept getting higher and higher and well, he couldn’t assist 
me anymore and the illness, it was [another] orthopaedist who 
understood it, on holiday.
Simone: Mm…
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Anna: It was on holiday, in the building where I was staying, and so he saw 
me, holding the little girl who was screaming because she’d hurt 
herself and he saw my hands like this and...he asked me, he says: 
“but you [INAUDIBLE] have RA? I said: “yes”, well I said: “yes..but” 
“excuse me, but you, have you got RA?” I said: “I don’t know, I know I 
have pains”. He said: “well, in Milano there is the [name of hospital]
since you live there”, I didn’t even know where it was.
Prompted by my questions, Anna relates the various pains experienced and 
their progression. In a brief passage, she relates the inability of a doctor to 
arrive at a diagnosis. This resulted in increased worry. Anna believed it could 
be something very serious (‘nasty’, It: qualcosa di brutto ‘something ugly’) 
precisely because the doctor could not arrive at a diagnosis, as the 
conjunction because indicates. Therefore, this because clause casts Anna in 
a positive light; she is acting rationally and her conclusion (that it is something 
nasty) is justified in light of the doctor’s inability to properly diagnose.
It is only because of a chance encounter with (yet another) orthopaedist that 
Anna began to have an inkling of what her illness might be. Another passage 
dramatises this fortuitous encounter. The encounter is reported through direct 
speech. Both the location of the reported encounter and the fact that the 
narrator uses direct speech for herself and the doctor indicate that the 
encounter is de-medicalised. Although of the two interactants one is clearly 
the ‘expert’, his behaviour and diagnostic acumen are clearly, albeit implicitly, 
contrasted with the ability of those that came before him. In addition, both 
interactants are given equal amounts of direct speech, which indicates the 
narrator places both on an equal footing. In this apparently insignificant 
interaction, we can detect the re-emergence of Anna’s integrity of identity; it is 
from here that she begins to become once again an actor in her own life-story 
by – for example – going to the hospital and taking steps that will help her 
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manage her condition. As a result of this chance encounter, Anna’s illness is 
given a name and she begins to re-acquire a voice.
Finding a name for one’s illness and beginning to find a voice do not 
necessarily mean that one’s identity has remained unaltered. In the following 
extract (5.13) Anna relates the change of personality she experienced as a 
consequence of having RA:
Extract (5.13) (A, I: 6)
Simone: How would you say that your life has changed, because of this 
Illness?
Anna: Because of this illness? Well, it changed a lot, in my personality 
especially. I was...I used to be a jester type of person...I 
was...erm...but...I enjoyed the things I did with my family...various 
things...well, it’s changed a lot because now I’m irritable, really, it 
takes a little.
Simone: I see…
Anna: Even though…
Simone: It changed your personality...?
Anna: It changed my personality, yes. The days when I feel better...a little is 
enough to feel better but I go up and down. It takes a little to go up, 
and a little to fall back down.
Prompted by my question, Anna establishes a causal connection – through a 
because clause – between the onset of RA and a change in her personality. 
Anna clearly portrays a ‘before’ and an ‘after’; the former positive and 
desirable, the latter negative and unwanted. Extract (5.13) shows how – in the 
presence of chronic pain and illness one’s emotional equilibrium is often 
precarious. Although in extract (5.12) we saw Anna taking on an active role 
(the role of actor) by finally going to see a specialist, here she is again a 
patient (in the grammatical sense). Significantly, illness (“it”) appears as Actor 
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in a material process where “my personality” – which stands meronymically for 
Anna – is the Goal. Here, Anna portrays herself as literally transformed by her 
illness.
For Anna, a consequence of the awareness of having been changed by her 
illness is a sense of isolation. The healthy and the ill inhabit different worlds 
and often speak different languages; hence the frustration. In extract 5.14, 
Anna relates her sense of isolation, even when in the company of her family:
Extract (5.14) (A I: 6)
Anna: And...let’s say that, like this, yes, even though...even though I have 
everyone around me but...sometimes I think they don’t understand me 
because it’s difficult...even always telling you...how can I put it? 
Always, always pampering you because that’s what I need, and they 
do it, but it doesn’t alleviate it...
In this passage, the psychological reality of chronic illness is highlighted. 
There is – at least for some of the time – a chasm between Anna and her 
loved ones. There is isolation and the belief that those around her do not 
really comprehend the whole impact of illness. Such a statement is 
‘dangerous’, from a psychological and interpersonal point of view; it risks 
portraying her loved ones as somehow uncaring. Thus, understandably, Anna 
is quick to justify their lack of understanding using a because clause (‘because 
it’s difficult’). Even if she acknowledges that her loved ones are responsive to 
her need for tangible signs of affection, ultimately, this does not necessarily 
help: ‘it [their ‘pampering’] doesn’t alleviate it’. A possible consequence of this 
realisation is then a sort of self-imposed silence. Convinced that it is not 
possible to truly communicate the full impact of their situation, the chronically 
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ill person often retreats into isolation. This sensation is made more acute by 
the fact that – unlike for non-chronic conditions – there is no ‘way out’. As 
Anna puts it in a later passage (extract 5.15):
Extract (5.15) (A I: 8)
Anna: Always problems and therefore...you spend entire days...in the various 
hospitals...doctors...and...well, you never get out of it, you never get 
out of it...
The last clause (‘you never get out of it’), repeated, perfectly makes the point: 
chronic illness, at least for Anna, is like a prison where personal time does not 
exist anymore, having been substituted by ‘illness time’, meaning that a 
chronic condition of this type leads to loss of ownership of one’s most 
precious resource: time. The imprisoning power of this cycle is very well 
rendered by the repetition of the clause in line 3 (‘you never get out of it’). For 
Anna, and for many chronically ill persons like her, this constitutes the ultimate 
loss of agency.
Summary
RA has proven to be a traumatic, highly disruptive experience for Anna. 
Reflected in her language is a sense of powerlessness vis-à-vis her 
condition, with its fast onset and unpredictable course. For this speaker, what 
seems to be particularly relevant (relevant enough to require linguistic 
embodiment) are her inner states, which she sees as often inaccessible to 
others, even her loved ones. For Anna, RA has had a transformative power 
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and there is clearly a ‘before’ and an ‘after’. Although she does appear as an 
actor in her life-story, illness is invested by her with considerable agentive 
power. Anna favours habitual narratives to blow-by-blow accounts and this 
might be because habitual narratives are better at capturing and transmitting 
the sense of ‘entrapment’ that she often feels. This speaker foregrounds the 
negative impact that illness and pain have had and continue to have on her 
life. Pain in particular has had a particularly distressing and disruptive impact, 
as the fragmented syntax exemplified by extract (5.11) vividly illustrates its 
‘force’ is clearly encoded by the number of ‘material processes’ in which it 
appears as Actor.
5.5.4 Marta
At the time of the interview, Marta was in her 60s. She was 58 when she 
received a diagnosis of RA. For this speaker, there are clearly a ‘before’ and 
an ‘after’ and the onset of the symptoms, or – more accurately – receiving a 
diagnosis of RA, acts as the demarcation line. A brief narrative passage at 
the beginning of her interview effectively depicts Marta’s identity before the 
onset of the first symptoms:
Extract (5.16) (M, I: 1)
Simone: The first question...I just wanted to ask you if...if you wanted to talk a 
little bit of your experience with the illness, when it started...just to 
give?
Marta: [INAUDIBLE] I began when I was fifty-eight and I was, I had never had 
any illness in my life. I was truly...I considered myself lucky 
because I had never had anything, and suddenly from a small pain, 
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from a finger...was born a whole sequence of this pathology 
which is RA.
Extract (5.16) neatly illustrates Marta’s perception of herself before the onset 
of symptoms. Most importantly, she was a healthy woman, for which she 
considered herself lucky. The link between her sense of having been 
fortunate and physical health is clearly indicated in the because clause. 
However, at some point things changed. What on the surface might have 
appeared as a small, inconsequential event, turned out to be the beginning of 
life with chronic illness. 
The section of the interview where Marta presents her life before the onset of 
illness is characterised by numerous clauses expressing ‘real agency’: 
clauses presenting a highly active self, engaged in a number of endeavours. 
For example, Marta the great lover of outdoors activities. A number of 
clauses display her agency by presenting the speakers in activities such as: 
driving, taking long walks, and going hiking on the Italian Apennines. 
Ironically, it was on one of these holidays that Marta began experiencing an 
almost insignificant symptom (fatigue) that signalled the imminent change in 
personal circumstances. This can clearly be seen in extract (5.17):
Extract (5.17) (M I: 4)
Marta: Oh well, I used to...to run...to hike like I said, before becoming ill. it 
was in June 1997. I...twenty days earlier...and in fact I blamed it on 
this hike I went on. I went on a hike on a...on a mountain on the 
Apennines.
Simone: Mhm.
Marta: At two-thousand metres. Well, actually from a thousand to two-
thousand. I came back that it was, well at one point I had to leave it 
because...I left the group <LAUGHS> because I went back on my own 
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because I couldn’t continue anymore. I made an effort. Maybe I 
couldn’t...walking for so long...but I was feeling well...like I say...I was 
a healthy person and I had the desire to do things and naturally my life 
has changed in the sense that I can’t say anymore: “tomorrow I’ll 
go...I’ll go on a trip”. Tomorrow I’ll have to see how I feel...if I can 
go...if I can do...even this morning...I had an appointment with a friend 
but honestly...I didn’t feel like it and even if...even if it had been 
urgent...one thing, I can’t plan my life anymore, yes...first...I can’t plan 
my life anymore and this, obviously, changes many things.
The transition from the before to the after stage in her life is illustrated very 
well by the passage reproduced in extract (5.17). In the opening lines, Marta 
presents her pre-illness identity as that of a very active woman, exemplified 
here by her love for outdoor activities. This reinforces the positive self-image 
given previously. Having gone on a hike, she has to abandon the group and 
go back, on her own, because she became fatigued. Marta remembers that 
she initially blamed this hike for her early symptoms.
It is interesting to observe how she encodes the transition from the world of 
the healthy — with it possibilities and unfettered agency — to that of the 
chronically ill; the latter characterised by a number of impossibilities and 
limitations. This shift, in the story and in Marta’s life, is clearly signalled by —
among other things - negative clauses signalling impossibilities. It is at this 
point that a change in the degree of her agency can be seen. What up to that 
point was possible, normal, and taken for granted, suddenly becomes fraught 
with difficulties.
This new identity is highly embodied and is characterised by what Ostermann 
et al. (1999) refer to as ‘non-accomplished agency’. ‘Non-accomplished 
agency’ means that the individual’s freedom to operate, to move and act in 
the real world as a free agent, is progressively reduced (in which case, one 
might speak of reduced agency) and — in some cases — completely 
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eliminated. For Marta, as for many other affected individuals, RA, with its 
corollary of symptoms, results in a series of impossibilities. Quite simply, life 
is not the same anymore. The fact in the narrated episode may appear as 
relatively minor and, ultimately, inconsequential. However, it is precisely the 
mundane nature of the incident (the inability to attend an appointment with a 
friend) that starkly highlights what the transition from before to after the onset 
of illness has meant for this speaker. This is especially true because of the 
textual proximity of the highly-active self portrayed by the previous narrative. 
So, whereas before Marta was able to engage in physically demanding 
activities, now even meeting a friend can prove too taxing. This speaker, 
because of her illness, is no longer able to make plans, which ‘obviously 
changes many things’. The repetition of the two forms of the verb ‘to change’ 
is indicative of the frustration deriving from this state of affairs. The 
diminished agency, at least initially, results in a lessened sense of ownership 
over one’s own life, as noted by many chronic pain sufferers (Goldstein, 
2000; Heshusius, 2009; inter alia) and in the fragmented sense of self 
indicated by Frank (1997). 
Answering a question on whether her pain is continuous, later on in the 
interview, Marta recounts how, on the previous day, she had gone shopping 
for food and had to carry a couple of carrier-bags on her forearms. This 
resulted in pain that is still present during the interview:
Extract (5.18) (M I: 3)
Marta: Well, sometimes even when one is resting, sometimes there are pains 
that appear even when one is resting but obviously, resting allows 
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you...and I yesterday, yesterday I told myself I was a stupid woman 
because I carried a carrier bag.
Simone: Mhm.
Marta: Stupidly, I go out to do the shopping and stupidly even just from the 
car to, the thing, instead of picking up with my hand as one would 
normally do, I carried it on my forearm and this morning I feel all 
[INAUDIBLE]. It must be that the nerve got inflamed and so I said: 
“absolutely I can’t carry a bag anymore, not even on the forearm.”
What is relevant here is that although the degree of pain resulting from 
carrying the bags is not extraordinary, the outcome is: a housewife who 
cannot even buy her own groceries without assistance. Had Marta been 
asked to quantify her pain on one of the commonly used pain-questionnaires, 
it would have barely registered. Yet, the consequences in her life are at least 
noteworthy. This fact highlights how pain is invisible in more than one way; its 
power lies not only in the capacity to cause unpleasant physical sensations, 
but also in its often unacknowledged ability to take away or limit one’s 
agency.
However, for Marta, like for other sufferers, not all agency is lost. Her ability 
to act, to steer her life in the preferred direction, is displayed in activities such 
as seeking medical advice, taking part in ALOMAR’s activities, and – most 
importantly – being able to drive. The latter is especially important for Marta 
in maintaining a sense of independence:
Extract (5.19) (M I: 5)
Marta: Yes, I’ve had an operation on my hand...so...as I say, being able to 
drive has helped me a lot, truly, and this...
Simone: In order not to depend on...
288
Marta: Yes, yes, absolutely. Also because of the illness we have. I would 
always have to ask my husband to accompany me for tests, to 
accompany me to the doctor’s, to accompany me to get all the forms.
Extract (5.19) illustrates how Marta is able to maintain a degree of continuity 
with her non-ill self. She achieves this by driving to places, which allows her 
not to have to rely entirely on others, especially her husband. Interestingly, 
this continuity is also illustrated by a further passage in which Marta reflects 
on how good it was that, in the past, she had insisted on obtaining a driving 
license, even in the face of her husband’s opposition.
A final comment on extract (5.19) relates to the shift from the first-person 
singular pronoun to the inclusive first-person plural. Here Marta not only 
situates herself within the community of the chronically-ill (both the immediate 
one of the other ALOMAR informants, some of whom are present while she is 
being interviewed) but also to the wider group of RA sufferers. In doing so, 
she also compares her behaviour favourably with those of others and implicitly 
justifies it to her interlocutors, present and potential.
Aside from what is left of it to her, what other ‘characters’ in Marta’s account 
display agentive behaviour? Pain is certainly one of them, as extract (5.20) 
shows:
Extract (5.20) (M I: 1)
Marta: The pain got hold of my hands, my feet, the carpal tunnel was 
compromised by the inflammation. It would give pains, especially at 
night.
Characteristically, this speaker has something to say about the 
pharmacological treatment she has undergone. Like other speakers in the 
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corpus, it is not that she does not acknowledge the necessity of drugs such 
as cortisone or their benefits. It is clear, though, that they too have an impact 
on the sufferer’s life and that this is not entirely positive:
Extract (5.21) (M I: 3)
Marta: Well, I’ve been bludgeoned with anti-inflammatories, cortisone, at the 
beginning. So the burning I would feel in my hands, well, these things 
became less intense.
This passage is interesting in the way it configures the therapeutic 
experience. From a lexical point of view, ‘bludgeoned’ (bastonata) is an 
example of emotionally-charged lexicon (Martin and Rose, 2003), with clear 
connotations of violence. By resorting to a passive sentence with no visible 
human Actor, the speaker does not apportion blame (bludgeoned by whom?). 
Yet, interestingly, the use of the passive and the charged lexical choice 
conspire to present a picture where therapy equals a weapon used against 
the sufferer. As previously stated, this at least problematises the expectation 
that therapy will be viewed as unequivocally positive.
Summary
For Marta, living with a chronic illness is a relatively recent experience. In her 
account, its onset, with all the typical accoutrements such a pain, is a clear 
watershed: on one side are the possibilities, the ‘I can’; on the other, the 
impossibilities, the ‘I can’t’ anymore.’
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The picture she paints thorough her careful use of language is one of ever 
decreasing freedom, of limited agency, though not one of absolute 
powerlessness. Like other speakers in the corpus, Marta too highlights, 
almost in passing, the difficult relationship so many ill people have with their 
treatments. 
For Marta, the onset of chronic illness has meant a transition from an identity 
characterised by high embodied agency (her outdoor activities) to one of 
reduced agency, in some cases severely so. Bodily pain has obviously been 
instrumental in this reduction, but so have the necessary pharmacological 
treatments. However, through narrative Marta manages to maintain a link and 
a certain sense of unity with her identity before she became ill, against which 
a considerable portion of her identity is defined.
5.5.5 Veronica
Aged 58, Veronica has RA. Unique among the informants, she is on the 
hospital ward when we meet, following surgery (her eighteenth). Her 
experience could be thought of as one of increasingly eroded agency owing 
to the ever-increasing severity of the problems she has been experiencing. 
As will become clear from the following, the situation is, once again, not as 
clear-cut. Veronica’s condition went undiagnosed for a number of years, 
owing to her blood tests being negative for arthritis. In a brief passage that 
opens the interview, she succinctly but effectively presents her life’s 
trajectory:
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Extract (5.22) (V I: 1)
Simone: Nothing, could you maybe tell me a bit about your 
experience...when...how it began?
Veronica: So, I was 17. I was doing athletics professionally and distance 
running, 800metres. I began to experience these pains, and to sum 
up...instead of ending up doing the running I ended up at [name of 
hospital].
This opening, very brief narrative is quite interesting: it pinpoints the beginning 
of Veronica’s experience of chronic illness. It sums up the main events in her 
story and it is also a window into the kind of identity she is keen to present.
Immediately, we are informed of her age and her activity at the time. The 
image of a young professional athlete is enough to conjure up, in the 
interlocutor’s mind, an idea of a very determined, strong individual, 
characterised by dedication, self-sacrifice, and — crucially — a promising 
future ahead of her. However, for Veronica this was not to be. 
Then we are told us of the early onset of symptoms. The sentence beginning 
with ‘instead’ is particularly interesting. In it, Veronica juxtaposes the possible 
to the real; instead of ending up running, she ended up in hospital. Not only 
back then, once, but several times afterwards, as the rest of the interview 
reveals.
The disruptive effect of illness and injury in the life of athletes, and the 
reconstitutive power of narrative, has received considerable attention 
(Sparkes, 2005; Stewart, Smith, and Sparkes, 2011). In Veronica’s case, the 
appearance of RA has impacted on three distinct, yet interconnected, 
identities: the young person, the athlete, and the woman. In all these roles 
this speaker has had to make re-adjustments, as the life-course she had 
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envisaged failed to materialise. Yet, already from this brief passage, one can 
see Veronica framing her experience along the lines of the ‘quest narrative’ 
identified by Frank (1995). 
In this type of narrative, the individual affected by illness or injury accepts it 
and tries to use it to his or her advantage. This was especially clear in 
Annamaria’s story, where the onset of lupus was presented as the 
opportunity to leave work and devote her efforts to what she really enjoyed: 
volunteering. In embryonic form, this is already visible in extract (5.22). The 
speaker presents the outcome of the onset of illness in factual terms; this 
‘factuality’ with the attendant lack of (negative) emotionally charged lexicon, 
are indicative of Veronica’s attitude which will become apparent throughout 
the rest of the interview.
Paradoxically, Veronica’s physical fitness may have contributed to delaying a 
precise diagnosis of RA, resulting in invisibility and silencing. Veronica’s 
condition went undiagnosed for a number of years, owing to her blood tests 
being negative for arthritis. In common with many people suffering from 
chronic pain and chronic illnesses that do not show visible signs, Veronica 
narrates that her pain was at times doubted. On one such occasion, while 
training, she was the object of some rather cruel behaviour on the part of her 
trainer. This incident instantiates quite literally Frawley’s (1992: 210) definition 
of patient as ‘the primary recipient [of the agent’s actions]’:
Extract (5.23) (V I: 2)
Veronica: I remember my trainer, we were training for the relay race and he was 
holding the baton to tease me [following complaints about pain], I 
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don’t think he meant any harm, he took the baton and hit me under the 
foot, where it hurt. It was an atrocious pain, acute, very intense, 
yes, he stopped teasing me, because I must have, probably I must 
have been transfigured by pain, because it was a very intense pain.
This passage is particularly interesting and revealing. Veronica appears as 
grammatical patient (‘and he hit me’) or, in SFG terms, as Goal in a material 
process where her trainer is the Actor. As a result of his thoughtless action, 
pain sets in and itself becomes the potent agent that ‘transfigures’ her; it 
changes her outward appearance. Here, Veronica uses emotionally charged 
lexicon to thus encode (in Appraisal Theory terms) simultaneously Affect and 
Appreciation. Interestingly, it is at this point, when wordless pain-behaviour
appears that Veronica is accepted as a reliable witness of her own story. 
Being able to talk about one’s pain, it appears, is not sufficient proof of one’s 
suffering; words, as often pointes out by chronic pain sufferers like Heshusius 
(2009) can and often are disbelieved. It is also interesting to observe how 
Veronica encodes her reaction and her appraisal of what might have caused 
the trainer’s change of attitude. In the line beginning with a because clause, 
introducing epistemic modality (‘I must have’). The clause however is left 
hanging; later the same epistemic modality is modulated by her use of 
‘probably’. Veronica, in other words, is making suppositions as to the true 
import of her painful reaction which must have been sufficiently out of the 
ordinary to make her coach reconsider her previously dismissive behaviour. 
Extract (5.23) shows Veronica’s identity as an ill individual – and one affected 
by great pain – emerging slowly and gradually. One gets the impression that 
it was the combined effect of her painful sensation and the observed reaction 
of the coach to the effect it had on Veronica that worked together to fully 
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awaken Veronica’s consciousness to her own new condition. However, it was 
still some time before this speaker was finally able to receive a sure diagnosis 
and thus gain full visibility. This, as mentioned, was because of her athletic 
body, as well as the absence of visible signs.
Extract (5.24) (V I: 2)
Simone: But there were still no signs that could be seen, there weren’t…
Veronica: No, also I had two very agile hands, so much so that many would say:
“you’ve got the hands of a pianist”.
Simone: <LAUGHS> yes, I was going to tell you...
Veronica: Yes, so...erm, they would tell me: “move your hands” and I would 
move them. I would do all they asked. Says39: “no there’s no arthritis 
here” and I’ve told you, I had a nice pair of legs with good muscular 
tone, because...being a distance runner I would run every day. I 
would run kilometres upon kilometres, so...mhm...it could make one 
think...that it was <LAUGHS> psychosomatic. But then no then it 
was...
In the second speaking turn in (5.24), Veronica animates some undefined 
third-parties (they) who would comment on her nice hands. Thereafter, one 
begins to form the idea that these they might in fact have been doctors who, 
presumably during consultations, would instruct her to move her hands. 
Veronica portrays herself as compliant; indeed the whole situation is 
presented in entirely de-medicalised language. Later, Veronica animates one 
of these professionals who diagnoses (wrongly, as it turns out) that it is not a 
case of RA. Cheshire and Ziebland point out (2005: 28-29) that for patients, 
interactions with clinicians may be highly charged occasions. 
                                                            
39 This literally translates It. dice ‘he or she says’, a quotative frequently employed to introduce direct 
speech.
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It is instructive to analyse how patients report their interactions with health 
care professionals, both in terms of what they choose to report, and in terms 
of how they report it.
It appears that, at least initially, Veronica deems the doctor’s (or doctors’) 
words to be more quotable than her own (of which there is no trace). 
Importantly, the general statement in lines 18-19 ambiguously relates a 
statement that may or may not have been uttered by one of the doctors; the 
fact that the pains might have been psychological (i.e. unjustified and 
unverifiable) in origin. Such statement is presented as a possible explanation 
for reaching this conclusion. The fact that only Veronica’s interlocutor’s 
speech is reported directly and that the conclusions it relates are presented 
as reasonable suggest a compliant identity, at least in the initial stages of the 
illness. Subsequently, she contradicts this early ‘diagnosis’; however, she 
does not apportion any blame. Just like with the episode with the coach 
mentioned earlier, what might be construed as criticism is very light and 
indirect.
Pain in RA is present and it is often very intense. As mentioned, Okada (2011) 
looked at the experience of two chronically ill women, one of whom had a 
herniated disc. The woman whose experience Okada analysed (Mia), was 
compelled to hide her condition and the resulting pain from her husband. 
Okada argues that because Mia’s pain was warranted biomedically (i.e. it had 
a diagnosis) but not socially, Mia was effectively silenced and her suffering 
increased because of it.
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Silence — however — can be empowering and a weapon of choice in the fight 
against pain. On condition, however, that it be freely chosen. This is the case 
for Veronica. In extract (5.25) she explains how she does this and in the 
process presents a resilient identity:
Extract (5.25) (V I: 2-3)
Veronica: As time went by, I’ve always had a slow but aggressive form [of RA], 
in the sense that...I have, I have no memory. I could have suffered 
them [the pains] because I delete. So...if now I’m in pain, in fifteen 
minutes...if I’m not in pain anymore I forget...the pain. It’s a form of 
defence of mine…I think I’ve never had, as many say, pains you can’t 
stand. I have pains...for example now my hands are hurting but, 
I...they are bearable pains. It’s rare that I’ve had pains so strong you 
couldn’t talk with others and feel the need to isolate myself. Because 
when I’ve had these crises, regularly, I isolate myself. I need to curl up 
inside myself and get my strength back, and then it passes [...].
Simone: Is this a technique you’ve developed yourself...or something?
Veronica No no no, I’ve done all by myself, little by little...I did. I can’t even say if 
I’ve made myself do it; it came natural for me to behave in this way.
Simone: So this self-imposed isolation is...to better face?
Veronica: To better isolate the pain and overcome...earlier, much earlier the 
crisis, because I realised...even with the operations I’ve had and with 
this one it’s 18, I realised that if I stay calm and quiet, if I don’t 
communicate with others but concentrate...the pain is less intense. If 
instead I have to talk, maybe because I need something, then pain 
gets stronger.
For Veronica silence is a better way of coping with intense pain. Through a 
sort of mindfulness technique, she is able to control her pain. On the contrary, 
speech — about pain itself or anything else — is detrimental. 
Like other speakers in the ALOMAR Plus corpus, this one too constructs 
aspects of her identity by comparing herself with others. For example, she 
says that, unlike other sufferers, she has never experienced unbearable pain 
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and is keen to portray her condition as manageable. Her identity, in other 
words, is one of a woman who is not exceedingly affected by pain and, one 
might argue, Veronica does not entirely identify with the ‘chronically-ill’. 
However, when pain does appear, she is able to manage it and, significantly, 
using a ‘technique’ discovered and developed by herself. Crucially, this puts 
her in control not only of her pain but, more generally, of her whole situation. 
In a later passage, she reinforces this image and goes on to paint a picture of 
acceptance of her pain:
Extract (5.26) (V I: 3)
Veronica: Pain is a constant, in the sense that, more or less intense it’s always 
there [...]. It’s never been the kind of pain that would make life 
impossible to go out, go to school, but at the same time it’s always 
been with me, it’s always been a companion, yes <LAUGHS>, of 
40 years. Last year I turned 57, arthritis turned 40. I told it: “come on, 
make me get younger, you take the 57 years <LAUGHS>. It kept its 
40 years.
Extract (5.26) suggests that, for this speaker, the experience of pain (which is 
an integral part of RA) has been harmoniously integrated into the self. This is 
not to suggest that pain (and RA, which causes it) are somehow welcomed. 
Nor does it signify that acceptance of pain and illness are constant and do not 
allow contradictory behaviours. Extract (5.26) is particularly illustrative in this 
sense; albeit brief and apparently insignificant, it exemplifies Veronica’s effort 
to maintain a coherent, unbroken identity. Crucially, however, it also illustrates 
how this effort is fluid, rather than fixed. She presents her experience of pain 
in terms that indicate acceptance. She also refuses to present a ‘medicalised’ 
identity and to identify with extreme cases. This is particularly interesting 
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because it exemplifies how narrative truth is a subjective construction. This is 
not to say that Veronica is lying but rather that — through narrative and, more 
generally, language - she chooses to assemble and present a particular type 
of identity. It should be noted that to the interlocutor, who has been told of her 
medical history and witnesses Veronica’s current situation, her statements 
regarding the non-extreme nature of her condition appear remarkable. 
Veronica also jokingly highlights how, for 40 years, her life and RA have been 
developing in parallel. The passage again demedicalises her situation and 
presents a coherent, well-adjusted identity. However, the laughter which 
brackets the sequence indicates the emotive import of the topic.
Summary
Although, for this speaker, RA has clearly been the source of numerous 
problems, it is not presented as an overpowering entity, and neither is pain. 
Pain is indeed seen as an agentive entity that obviously affects the speaker’s 
life. However, this agency is primarily construed as the ability that pain has to 
make its entrance unannounced and to overstay its welcome.
In spite of the numerous obvious and understandable difficulties that 
Veronica has encountered, she retains and displays a high degree of agency. 
This is mainly employed to control her pain through a number of 
‘psychological’ techniques, such as focussing. Throughout her account, 
Veronica is keen to present a harmonious identity, not overly affected by 
either RA or the physical pain it entails. Often, she does this by minimising 
their effects, by ‘de-medicalising’ her situation’, and by not aligning with other 
299
sufferers for whom pain is a major obstacle. RA and pain, at once distinct and 
fused, are metaphorically represented as an amicable ‘companion’, spoken to 
and cajoled, unwelcome but not feared. This, perhaps, can be thought of as 
the supreme expression of agency.
5.5.6 Gina
Gina, who is in her fifties at the time of the interview, has been living with RA 
for twenty-two years. Like Marta, she loves the mountains and again, like 
Marta, began experiencing pain (for her, the first symptom of RA) on the way 
back from a hike. It is in this circumstance that pain begins displaying its 
disruptive agentive behaviour. Like other speakers, Gina construes and 
represents pain’s agency mainly in its capacity to persist temporally and 
spatially in unpredictable manners. Understandably, this is cause for concern 
and frustration. Interestingly, this speaker provides numerous examples of 
body-parts displaying agency by, for instance, swelling, stiffening, and 
hardening. In extract (5.27e), she relates the onset of her illness:
Extract (5.27) (G I: 1)
Simone: I wanted to ask you, to begin, if you could tell me a bit about your 
experience, how the illness began, the genesis of your story.
Gina: Well, I began...I kept getting pains in my knees, or feet. I would mainly 
realise when I went to the mountains because I love the mountains 
and when I had to come down my knees would swell up I would be 
blocked. Then maybe at home, erm, at times a hand would swell up, 
at times an arm, but, erm...with a temperature also but I wasn’t 
exceedingly concerned because they would tell me: “if the pains move 
it means it’s nothing serious.”
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In the above passage, Gina relates how her first symptoms (swellings of body 
parts and pain) first appeared, over a period of time. Significantly, she does 
so whilst also informing us of a passion of hers: the mountains. This love for a 
particular activity represents a persistent and enduring trait of her identity, as 
the shift to the present tense in the because clause indicates. As with other 
speakers in the ALOMAR Plus corpus, the onset of symptoms represented, 
for Gina, the beginning of a period of uncertainty marked by wrong diagnosis 
and visits to a number of physicians. Initially, encounters with medical 
professionals are represented impersonally. This can be seen, for example, 
in the latter portion of the quoted passage, where an unspecified ‘they’ makes 
her think that the fact that the pains are not fixed is a good sign, thus 
downplaying them. Gina’s journey towards a diagnosis of RA is encoded in 
the following extract:
Extract (5.28) (G I: 1)
Simone: And what types of pains were the ones you experienced initially?
Gina: They were very strong pains, at the knees. They would really block 
me...my joints and the same would happen with the hands and wrists, 
high temperature and strong pains because then the joint would swell 
up, the joint would become blocked but initially I repeat I didn’t think 
too much of it. Instead, there was one morning that I couldn’t even get 
up from my bed and I called the family doctor and he said to come 
here, to the [name of hospital] but it was far, so I let it go. Then I 
began doing some tests, blood tests…and once I went to a doctor’s, 
then he sent me to another doctor’s, and first they treated me for my 
teeth. It looked like I might have some abscesses in my teeth and then 
they’d say that it was an inflammation so...and meanwhile almost two 
years passed. When the illness was finally discovered, that I really 
couldn’t resist any more, I went to a cardiologist who was a family 
friend, a friend’s friend, and as he saw my hands he said I had RA. He 
sent me to do some tests and there everything really started. I began 
feeling a bit better but logically it’s been kind of harsh, especially at the 
beginning.
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Through habitual narrative clauses, Gina gives the background to what led to 
a degeneration of her overall condition and, finally, to a diagnosis. This sort of 
prologue was characterised by debilitating symptoms: pains, swelling, and 
fever. It is interesting that these events are represented rather impersonally, 
simply as a list of “happenings”. This changes in a series of clauses where
she appears as an Actor by going to see a number of doctors. 
Like most of the other speakers in the corpus, Gina avoids emotive 
descriptions of her inner states. In extract (5.28), there is only one instance 
where her inner states come to the surface, albeit in a rather muted way: 
“Logically it’s been kind of harsh” (It. Logicamente è stata un po’ duretta). This 
clause accomplishes two things simultaneously. First, by opening with the 
stance adverbial ‘logically’, Gina presents her emotive reaction as justified and 
as a position that the interlocutor can easily align with. Yet, this emotive 
stance (encoding affect) is clearly toned down. It represents a trend which, as 
noted, is common in the ALOMAR Plus corpus: the tendency to avoid 
linguistic encodings of the individual’s emotional responses that might 
characterise her of him as somehow unreasonable or, to use a term that some 
of the informants use, a ‘complainer’. The imperatives to appear reasonable 
and as much in control as possible therefore seem, for Gina as well as for 
other informants, overarching preoccupation.
With the progression of RA, life becomes increasingly complicated. Living 
with a chronic condition characterised by intense pain and body changes is a 
challenge not only for the ill person but also for those living around her. Often, 
this can be made worse by the fact the chronically ill person hides or 
minimises the true impact of the illness in order not to cause distress. In the 
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following extract (5.29), Gina talks about this in response to a question asking 
her to explain how RA has influenced her life:
Extract (5.29) (G I: 2)
Gina: Initially, it’s been hard because my children were still very young, and 
so...they were a bit...I’m not saying traumatised but kind of, because I 
was often blocked [It.: bloccata] and they would help their dad...doing 
house chores and consequently...well my life did change, little by little,  
but I got used to it and now I feel almost like a normal person, as long 
as I don’t look at my hands...
Extract (5.29) illustrates well the fluidity of the chronically ill person’s identity. 
For Gina, her response to RA and its attendant pain is not only determined by 
her own reaction to them. It is also greatly affected by having to observe their 
effect on her family. The harshness of the initial period is causally related to 
the young age of her children (through the because ‘because I was often 
blocked…’). Her inability to fully perform her role as a mother and wife is 
presented as the cause of a gradual change in her life and, presumably, her 
identity. The ‘impossibilities’ – or reductions in agentive power – caused by
illness and pain force the experiencer to face an emerging ‘mistmatch’ 
between the self they’ve become accustomed to and aspect of a new, 
emerging self that still hasn’t been integrated (and might never be) into the 
existing personality structure. In Gina’s case, the initial disruption, however, 
was followed by a degree of adjustment. However, she gives the impression 
that the newly found equilibrium is somewhat precarious. Revealingly, she 
says that now she feels almost like a normal person. The impediment to 
feeling completely normal seems to lie in the physical deformities caused by 
RA, so that her hands are a constant reminder of the disruptive and altering 
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power of this illness. For Gina, the alterity caused by RA is visible and 
inscribed in the body. This point is reiterated later during the interview. 
Extract (5.30) is given in response to a question asking about the influence of 
RA on her activities and whether she has ever had to be involved in activities 
that she found hard to the point of having to opt out:
Extract (5.30) (G I: 3)
Gina I refuse...because...even in church, I used to be the secretary, so...
there were some jobs...easily, I never hid my illness. Also because 
you can see it. And I say: “no, this job I can’t do because my illness 
doesn’t allow it.” Yes, I tell the truth, even if...there are times 
that...one...mhm...I feel a bit embarrassed with these hands, but one 
does overcome them.
In the opening sentence, Gina shows agency by telling how she openly 
refuses to take on jobs she feels unable to perform because of her illness. 
What on the surface might look like a fully volitional action that shows her
openly and willingly taking ownership (and acceptance of) her condition is 
partly ambiguous. As she says, it is not possible for her to keep it hidden; her 
hands speak for her. Interestingly, she does not feel embarrassed by having 
RA; it is the fact that a highly visible part of her body is clearly and visibly 
deformed. However, Gina tries to re-establish the integrity of her self-image, 
and thus her identity, by making a general ‘programmatic’ statement: one has 
to overcome. This can be read both as a statement of fact and as guiding 
principle.
As for other speakers in the corpus, one of the main problems for Gina lies in 
the fact that having a chronic illness entails fluctuations in well-being. RA can 
result in a highly paradoxical situation, a dissonance between the externally 
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visible and the internally invisible. The absence of outward, visible signs of 
discomfort can undermine legitimacy and lead to the doubting of one’s 
suffering. However, when RA does project outwardly and leaves signs on the 
body, it can mislead the onlooker as to where the real suffering is and how 
intense it is. This paradox is well illustrated by the exchange in (5.31):
Extract (5.31) (G I: 3)
Simone: Do you feel, maybe, more understood by people who...who suffer like 
you?
Gina: Yes, undoubtedly. Especially at the beginning people who are near 
you, apart from my husband and my children, but people on the 
outside wouldn’t understand, the illness because maybe I, I was in 
pain and one day I was on the floor. On the phone: “how are you?” 
“I’m not well, like this.” But the following day they’d see me, as if 
nothing had happened, and so they say: “well but this one is taking us 
for a ride.” They’re really, truly rheumatic diseases are something 
unclear, that today you feel bad and tomorrow instead you’ve 
nothing.
Simone: It’s a bit the stereotype that people have of the illness, that should be, 
in the collective imagination something...that blocks you in a way, 
constantly, in bed, for months.
Gina: Yes it’s true and...look, I found myself, no in November, with some 
former colleagues, that it was a long time I hadn’t seen them, I had 
stopped working when I had nothing. I had stopped working because I 
had had my second child and, afterwards they spoke with my sister 
because we both used to work for the same firm and they said to her: 
“oh but Gina is in a bad way, with those hands.” But I have nothing in 
comparison. I mean they imagined who knows what because they saw 
the deformed hands, isnt’ it? And on the spot they hadn’t said anything 
but they had this impact, whereas at the beginning the deformities still 
weren’t there, and then maybe you felt bad today and tomorrow you 
had nothing. It looks like today you have nothing but instead...it entails 
taking drugs that are quite heavy in order to be able to function every 
day.
Although this is by no means universal, it is often the case that people with a 
health condition feel more understood by those in the situation and, often, by 
those closest to them. This is true for Gina. Glucklich (2001) talks of 
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communities of suffering and it is precisely the sharing of a common problem 
that encourages the formation of and attendance at support groups, such as 
ALOMAR.
However, for people ‘on the outside’ understanding might be more 
problematic; misunderstandings and breakdowns in communication are an 
ever-present danger. In the above extract, Gina very effectively draws her 
interlocutor into one of these situations where her suffering is doubted 
because of the fluctuation of the illness. Through the shift to the present 
tense in reported speech, we are effectively drawn into what it feels like to 
have one’s illness and discomfort doubted. Gina’s animating her former 
colleagues’ is a very effective way of bringing the interlocutor into her world 
and conveying other people’s inaccurate — and, potentially, hurtful 
judgements — without explicitly apportioning blame. These judgements are 
more openly voiced (whilst being attributed to third parties) later on, where 
the same ‘technique’ is used.
Finally, the episode told in Gina’s second turn, relates an incident where the 
confusion as to the true extent of her suffering is brought to the fore. This 
ambiguity and the ensuing suffering are caused by the misreading of visible 
signs and the non-perception of real, but invisible to the eye, signs. Gina’s 
former colleagues comment to her sister that she must be in real pain, 
because of the state of her hand. Yet, this visible deformity (which at the time 
is, Gina informed us earlier, a source of embarrassment) does not 
necessarily cause suffering or indicate the presence of pain. It is often the 
case that the more intense the suffering, the less visible the signs.
306
I have already pointed out some of the specific limitations imposed by the 
onset and the progression of RA and pain on Gina. Life-sustaining activities 
such as breathing become extremely difficult when pain is at its peak. Other 
simple, quotidian activities become difficult too and result in diminished 
agency, or ‘freedom to act’: buying groceries, doing the housework, 
participating fully in the activities of her parish church. Most of all, RA’s 
complications (of which pain is, as seen, a major one) have made it 
impossible for this speaker to continue with full-employment. However, after 
an initial period of adaptation to her condition as RA sufferer, she once again 
takes ownership of at least part of her life. As much as she can, she becomes 
again ‘an actual agent in her life story’ (Ostemann et al., 1999: 144):
Extract (5.32) (5.33) (G I: 4, 5)
Gina: I don’t hide my illness. If people ask I tell them. I went to see a 
psychologist, because I was feeling down.
[…]
Gina: I come here to the Group, I like it, I like being with the other women.
Summary
In common with the other women in the corpus, Gina has experience of 
diminished agency. This is reflected mainly in the impossibility to carry on 
activities that were once normal and taken for granted. However, like the 
other women, Gina presents an image of self which is not entirely passive, 
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and certainly not that of a ‘victim’. She remains an active protagonist in her 
own life-story, although each move has to be negotiated against the 
difficulties and the impossibilities imposed by her pain and her status as a 
chronic-sufferer.
Her identity is one of re-established coherence although exposed to the 
contradictions forced upon her by RA. One such contradiction is the paradox 
that often her suffering is acknowledged and legitimised in the presence of 
externally visible signs, whereas it may be most acute and disabling in ways 
which are invisible to the inattentive onlooker. Credibility — and the integrity of 
the individual’s identity — has to be continually negotiated and reaffirmed in 
order for suffering to be legitimised. Interestingly, Gina does not openly 
apportion blame and her criticism of others is veiled and oblique.
5.5.7 Fabio
As noted, Fabio is the only male speaker in the corpus; unlike the other 
interviewees he does not suffer from an autoimmune disease but from SDH 
(see biographical notes above). SDH (more commonly referred to as 
“herniated disk”) does not have the same degree of recognition as a disabling 
condition that RA and lupus have. 
First, it is not an autoimmune disease and — unlike lupus — is not life-
threatening. Secondly, it can be revealed by imaging technologies and is 
normally quite easily diagnosed. However, SDH often has devastating 
consequences. The pain it causes can severely limit daily activities but, unlike 
RA, does not result in visible deformities. 
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This interview is also unique in that it took place in the privacy of his home; 
unlike the other participants, he is a medical professional,(a nurse) as well as 
a patient. This fact should be kept in mind as it might account, at least in part, 
for some peculiarities of his narrative, such as the degree of accuracy and 
detachment that seems to transpire from his words.
As mentioned, and possibly because of his professional background, Fabio is 
very precise when communicating his experience. The first narrative in the 
interview appears very early, when he answers a question asking him to relate 
how his symptoms first appeared:
Extract (5.34) (F I: 1)
Simone: And how did [the problem] first appear?
Fabio: Well, I have to say that, this kind of problem...before the surgery, it 
had happened already, circa seven or eight years before and that 
miraculously it had disappeared as it had appeared. It lasted a few 
months, well no...maybe a year, with which I lived, not comfortably but 
since that was a particular time in my life so I didn’t...I put up with it, so 
to speak, the pain. And then, miraculously, it disappeared, 
miraculously and luckily. Years later, probably because of a change, 
of job...of a different kind of ward...with different workloads, the pain 
reappeared, initially more like an ache...an ache...a something, like 
the drop from a dripping tap.
Simone: mhm mhm…
Fabio: something...like this that you’d feel...continuously...fastidiously...but 
that wouldn’t, erm, wouldn’t...when I say fastidious I mean...that 
wouldn’t allow me to make movements that until then, that time had 
been normal, but let’s say it would cause me handicaps and then, by 
and by, as well as the ache, pain began to take hold.
The ‘blow by blow’ narrative passage is very effective in conveying the 
appearance and development of symptoms. As noted, the precision with 
which the events are related could be due (at least in part) to Fabio’s 
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professional background. However, this is also indicative of the relevance —
in this speaker’s mind and life — of the onset of illness which, as will be seen 
in more detail later, had and still has a profound impact on his life and identity.
Fabio very effectively communicates the appearance, disappearance, and 
then again appearance of pain and its transformation (in the second episode) 
from an ache40 to proper pain. 
Bodily pain is represented as an entity endowed with its own volition. Fabio 
clearly depicts himself as totally powerless in this respect, except that — at 
least initially — he chose and was able ‘to put up with it’. However, Fabio’s 
evaluations vis-à-vis bodily pain are well encoded by the adverbials 
miraculously and luckily. As well as encoding affect (his relief at the 
disappearance of pain), they also encode his powerlessness towards it and, 
by implication, a view of bodily pain as ‘maximally agentive’, that is 
conceptualised and beyond the experiencing subject’s control. In this narrative 
by Fabio, pain is clearly encoded as an agentive entity, endowed with 
volitionality. 
As mentioned, strictly speaking, only volitional beings can be agents. 
However, in everyday speech we routinely endow entities that are inanimate 
or that exist at the lower end of the biological spectrum with varying degrees 
                                                            
40 The translation of this passage is not straightforward and poses some problems. The original Italian 
says: “Una cosa, così, che avvertivi, in maniera, continua, fastidiosa, ma che non mi permetteva, erm, 
di..di..di fare dei movimenti, fino a quell punto normali.” Literally, the passage translates: “A thing, 
like this, that you would perceive, in a...continuous, bothering, but that wouldn’t allow me, erm, 
to..to..to make movements hitherto normal.” Fastidio can be translated as both a ‘minor pain’ (or an 
‘ache’) or as ‘something that annoys/irritated/bothers’. As will be see, Fabio uses the term in both 
senses.
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of agency, as the following example quite clearly illustrates (quoted in 
Yamamoto 2006, pp. 1, 21, 23):
If the scallops are to be enrolled, they must first be willing to anchor 
themselves to the collectors. [...] In fact the researchers will have to lead their 
longest and most difficult negotiations with the scallops (emphasis in the 
original).
In the above example, entities at the lower end of the biological spectrum 
(scallops) are talked about as if they possessed volition. Clearly, the author of 
the sentence cannot be credited with the belief that molluscs possess volition, 
especially the same volition that human actors display, and can be somehow 
persuaded to behave in a certain way. However, in the scallops example the 
author efficiently communicates to his readers the difficulty of successfully 
cultivating St. Brieux Bay scallops by endowing them with agency. In Extract 
(5.34), Fabio does something similar in relation to his pain. However, extract 
it is devoid of emotive language. There are no instances of emotionally 
charged lexicon. This – a characteristic of the entire interview – contributes to 
portraying an identity of somebody who, in spite of everything, remains 
balanced and ‘in control’. Obviously, this is not a claim about this speaker’s 
‘real’ personality; and it is certainly possible that the projected image is due –
at least in part – to the fact that Fabio is not in pain at the time of speaking. 
What is being focussed on here is the identity that the speaker is building and 
projecting through narrative. It should always be kept in mind that narrative 
truth and reality (for lack of a better word) are not necessarily one and the 
same thing.
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As mentioned, In the ALOMAR Plus corpus Fabio is unique for the precision 
with which he describes the psychological effects of constant pain. In extract 
(5.35), he relates the impact of pain in its transition from ache (fastidio) to pain 
proper (dolore).
Extract (5.35) (F I: 2)
Fabio: Well, with “pain” I actually mean this intensity, these cramps with 
these strong burnings in the muscles.
Simone: But in the ‘ache phase’...I mean...these burnings, these cramps were 
still there? But not as intense? Or was it something completely 
different?
Fabio: No, they were there but not as intense.
Simone: I see so it was [INAUDIBLE].
Fabio: I mean an ache [It.:fastidio] is, erm, let’s say...initially it was an ache,
so it wouldn’t give you pain, well, it was something you’d 
perceive that...that would begin to take hold inside your body and then 
with this ache also came pain.
1Simone: Mhm.
Fabio: After which it became a pain, a pain that would still be annoying, and 
I’m talking more of a psychological fastidio41, more than physical.
Simone: Mhm.
Fabio: In the sense that, erm, it makes me nervous so than when pain 
reached a climax, it would create a...at least for me, something...more 
like a mental stress, so it would give me..., it would cause me…stress 
would cause me more problems than pain itself, also because pain 
was not...was not like a climax that would then go down, it was a 
constant thing. it was constant, a pain with the same intensity, the 
same...presence, that was always there. So it wasn’t enough to say: 
“I’ll go to bed, I’ll rest”, no. So, there was, it was there when I fell 
asleep, this pain was there. I would wake up and it would come back 
so the nights were bad, they’d become, well, bad. I repeat it was 
something more stressful, more unnerving, than pain itself, than pain 
in itself, yes.
                                                            
41 See previous footnote.
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in (5.35), it is interesting to note that as soon as the speaker begins to 
address the topic of pain (as opposed to ‘ache’ fastidio) there is a higher 
degree of involvement, signalled by the proximal demonstratives ‘this’ and 
‘these’. Pragmatically and discursively, these function metaphorically to 
indicate psychological proximity and signal the relevance of the topic (i.e. 
experienced pain).
Morse and Mitcham (1998) investigated the use of ‘disembodied language’ by 
burn-patients. They showed how patients in the early stages of treatments 
refer to their badly affected body parts using the definite article (the) or 
demonstratives (this/these) rather than the possessive (e.g. my, in my hand), 
which — in English — is the expected, unmarked form. Later, as the treatment 
progressed, they would start using embodied language again. However, in 
Italian one’s body parts are normally referred to using the definite article 
(historically derived from the Latin demonstrative), which is therefore 
unmarked. Although, in the quoted examples, Fabio is referring to his 
experience of pain, rather than a body part, the use of the demonstrative is 
marked. It highlights proximity to, rather than distance from, the speaker. This 
indicates that the experience is still highly relevant. Representing the 
experience of pain as ‘close to self’, through demonstratives for example, 
signals this prominence. Secondly, the dramatic nature of the experience is 
signalled by the fact that the narrative is framed as habitual. This not only 
indicated the repetitive nature of pathological events normally associated with 
chronic illness, it is also likely to engender involvement in the interlocutor by 
‘drawing’ him into the speaker’s world of incessant pain. The many roles of 
repetition in conversation have been discussed by, among others, Tannen 
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(1989). Pain, Fabio tells us, was ‘constant’; it was ‘always there’. Here 
repetition not only indexes, ‘iconically’, in a way, the reoccurrence of the 
painful event. Crucially, it reinforces the importance of the topic — its 
psychological prominence, once again.
Like other speakers in the corpus, Fabio also appears keen to represent 
himself as possessing and displaying agency (i.e. independence) in his life-
story. He may be unable to control the comings and goings of his pain but he 
shows a determination not to succumb to it. He does so by pursuing his 
interests, such as skiing and going to the gym, sometimes even contravening 
his doctor’s recommendations. Incidentally, in the sentence where he states 
this, he figures both as grammatical patient – receiving the prescription – and, 
subsequently, as agent – rejecting it. His narratives show him actively 
resisting the prescribed pharmacological treatment and, indirectly, medical 
authority. This idea is reinforced when he says that, at one point, he even 
substituted (like some of the other informants) painkillers with his own 
analgesic technique based on mental focussing.
Throughout the interview, Fabio repeatedly says that he is an ‘active’ person, 
engaging in a number of physical activities. This type of identity, the active 
persona, is a trait d’union between the Fabio ‘before’ the onset of symptoms 
and the present one. It indexes a desire, on the speaker’s part, to be identified 
thus: affected but not ‘broken’ or changed by his illness. Extract (5.36) 
immediately follows (5.35) in the interview:
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Extract (5.36) (F I: 2)
Simone: It was...it was the effect of pain on your life, on your activity in 
general?
Fabio: Exactly, on my activity, Yes, because being a person...I’m speaking 
personally, clearly, being an active person, this would hamper me.
Here, Fabio presents himself as an active individual. He does so by using the 
present continuous (the gerund, in Italian), which normally describes a state of 
affairs which is timeless, and generally true. The feeling of being ‘hampered’ is 
encoded by a because clause, which justifies and explains it.
The following extracts, (5.36) and (5.37), which refer, respectively, to the time 
following his surgery and to the present, reiterate the concept. 
Extract (5.36) (F I: 4)
Simone: And after the operation, how did the situation change?
Fabio: After the operation...well, let’s say that the operation had become a 
hope, finally being able to fully start my activity again, what I do. But it 
wasn’t so because precisely because I am very active the 
convalescence days after the operation [...], I didn’t follow the doctor’s 
recommendations like I should have, so I started my activities again 
and so...let’s say that the result [of the] operation has been almost 
negative. Let’s say half and half, at intervals the pain returns, but 
suddenly.
Extract (5.36) presents Fabio’s non compliance with his clinician’s 
recommendations, which itself resulted — in Fabio’s own judgement — in a 
less than satisfactory recovery, as a function of his being very active. The 
causal connection is clearly made with a because clause and highlighted by 
the use of the adverb precisely as intensifier. Fabio acknowledges that 
disregarding his doctor’s orders was against his best interests but depicts the 
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choice as inevitable. This demonstration of agency, in spite of its negative 
results (the return of pain), is for Fabio an act of self-affirmation and indexical 
of a coherent, unbroken identity. The fact that his identity has not changed is 
confirmed in extract (5.37), which relates to the present time:
Extract (5.37) (F I:6 )
Simone: [the pain you feel now] somehow can interfere with your 
activities?
Fabio: Clearly, clearly, clearly. Yes, because I repeat, again, being a 
person who does a thousand things, this would hamper me 
[the pain], in the sense that, apart from my job, and so when I 
work I try to do things as best I can, and so this would hamper 
me.
Simone: And still does?
Fabio: And still does. In winter, for example, I do sport, so I go skiing, 
so I ski and you say: “well, anyway, whether I ski or not the 
pain is still there.” So I prefer to ski.
First, it is interesting to note how strongly Fabio’ s feelings towards pain are. 
This is indicated by the repetition (three times) of the adverb clearly. The 
concept is reinforced by the affirmative yes and by the because clause which 
follows it. Fabio positions himself, yet again, as a highly active individual, both 
in his professional and his private life. This resilience in the face of pain —
and resistance to it — is reiterated several times and though various linguistic 
means. Fabio then makes a general statement about his personality and 
work-ethic. By reporting his inner thoughts he makes the interlocutor privy to 
his reasoning: pain may be free to come and go but Fabio is free to ignore it, 
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in an act of defiance which preserves the integrity of his identity. And in the 
final comment this is made clear.
Summary
Fabio uses narrative to manage his identity. His illness, because of the type of 
pain experience it entails, is potentially very disruptive. Pain is represented by 
this speaker as an actor which displays highly agentive power. Grammatically, 
it appears in numerous material clauses where Fabio has the role of Goal.
However, through numerous narratives, he manages to present an unbroken 
identity, reified in the continuing of a very active life-style even when the latter 
proves detrimental. HIs stance towards his illness and — in particular — the 
bodily pain it causes is one of strong opposition. In Fabio’s case, one can talk 
more of resistance than acceptance. However, maintaining the integrity of his 
identity comes at a cost: continued vigilance and unending struggle.
5.6 Concluding remarks
The analysis in this chapter shows that the lived, embodied experience of 
bodily pain related to chronic illness is highly disruptive of the life-course. 
Speakers in the ALOMAR Plus corpus show remarkable similarities in the 
issues they have had to face (and still face) following the onset of illness. 
Bodily pain has been shown to be a highly disruptive force, in particular 
because of its ‘invisibility’. 
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The analysis in this chapter has shown that of all the conditions discussed 
(SLE, RA, SDH), RA poses some of the major problems because of the 
paradoxical nature of its symptoms. Whilst the presence of deformity in the 
joints, especially the hands, can be the source of embarrassment and 
isolation, this is also the most visible sign of illness which provides the ill 
person social legitimacy. However, it is often in the absence of deformity of 
the joints that the physical pain is present and causes the most intense 
suffering. In spite of this, onlookers tend to identify deformities as the source 
of pain and suffering.
The broadly narrative analytical approach adopted for this chapter has shed 
light on a number of factors. Through narrative, speakers in the corpus are 
able to shape and present overall coherent identities in spite of the fluctuation 
in life-events, and symptoms experienced as a result of having a chronic 
illness. Unlike other forms of linguistic output, such as the case history taken –
for example – during a medical consultation, narrative (in its broader sense) 
allows speaker to weave the different strands of their experiences into a 
coherent whole, in spite of the internal contradictions and paradoxes.
The same approach has shown that in the experience of the ALOMAR Plus 
speakers, physical pain is undoubtedly a source of suffering and disruption. 
This appears to be especially the case for patients affected by RA. However, 
as the analysis in this chapter has shown that, within the experience of 
chronic illness, it is often the pharmacological treatment which is most 
disruptive and the cause of most suffering. This is likely to go unnoticed in 
medical consultations, where pharmacological treatment is — understandably 
— seen as the solution (at least in part, since for these conditions there is no 
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cure) to the problem. Rather like the deformity-pain problem mentioned 
hitherto, the underestimation of the physical and psychological consequences 
of treatment may be underestimated both in the literature and in the 
consultation room. For patients, voicing concerns regarding their treatments 
with third parties and medical professionals is potentially threatening and thus 
results in further ‘silencing’. With regards to interactions with medical 
professionals, the analysis presented in this chapter has revealed mixed 
attitudes. For most informants, especially in the early stages of their illnesses, 
these interactions have been less than satisfactory. However, there is a 
tendency to refrain from overt criticism. I have argued that, having the 
experience of being disbelieved, most informants are keen to present 
themselves as credible, factual, and rational, in which overt criticism is hard to 
place.
Finally, attention to canonically narrative and non-narrative passages has 
shown that most speakers are keen to project an ‘active’, agentive identity. 
Although various aspects of their lives may have been limited, all speakers 
use their narratives to place themselves in their social worlds as active 
participants, often having forged new, ‘preferred’ identities. In at least two 
cases, speakers overtly credited the onset of illness as the motivating force 
behind the emergence of this new identity. The analysis shows that this kind 
of operation is not devoid of contradictions but since the narrative (re)shaping 
of self is an ongoing process, rather than an achieved status, speakers are 
able to respond to new challenges as and when they appear.
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Chapter 6: Thesis conclusions
The inspiration for the present research arose from reading of Scarry’s (1985) 
important work which has as its topic — among other things — the effects of 
bodily pain on human language. 
This overall aim of the thesis has been to investigate the ways in which a 
group of Italian speakers used the lexicogrammatical resources of Italian to 
encode the experience of physical pain — within the larger experience of 
chronic illness. It has done so by assembling an original corpus of interviews 
with chronically-ill patients, six women affected by from one of two 
autoimmune diseases SLE (Systemic Lupus Erythematosus) and RA 
(Rheumatoid Arthritis) and one man suffering from SDH (Spinal Disc 
Herniation). In doing so, it has contributed to the growing body of literature on 
health communication and in particular to the body of work looking at the 
lexicogrammatical encoding of the experience of pain. 
One of the original contributions of this thesis has been the use of Systemic 
Functional Grammar and of Halliday’s (1998) approach to studying for the first 
time the encoding of bodily pain in Italian. Up to the present time, such 
approach had only been used to investigate the linguistic encoding of the 
experience in English (Halliday, 1988), Japanese (Hori, 2006), German 
(Overlach, 2008), and Greek (Lascaratou and Hatzidaki, 2000; Lascaratou, 
2003; 2007). As well as extending Halliday’s framework to Italian, this thesis 
has widened the scope of the analysis by analysing the way in which 
speakers in the corpus use the lexicogrammar of Italian to evaluate their 
whole experience of living with physical pain caused by chronic illness. It has 
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done so by using the analytical apparatus of Appraisal Theory (Martin and 
White, 2005), a framework for the analysis of evaluative language grounded in 
SFG. These two strands of analysis were brought together in chapter five 
where, by using a broadly narrative analytical approach, the attention was 
turned on what kind of identities emerge once speakers overcome the 
silencing effects of pain mentioned by Scarry (op cit).
6.1 The lexicogrammatical encoding of physical pain in Italian in the ALOMAR 
Plus corpus
For the speakers in the ALOMAR Plus corpus, the most common construal of 
pain is as thing, nominally (203 out of a total of 247 of ‘pain items’), normally 
lexicalised as dolore or, in a minority of cases, sofferenza, which I have 
referred to as ‘key lexical items’.
When thus construed, pain appears in configurations where it is a participant 
in a number of process-types, mainly relational and material ones. In one 
case, a configuration where pain is specifically attributed to a body part is set 
up mal di testa ‘headache’ appears. This type of configuration (pain + body 
part), which is common in English, is also grammatical in Italian but is not 
favoured in the present corpus.
Construing pain as an entity allows speakers to achieve a number of things. 
By encoding it as an “it”, pain is easily identified and circumscribed. It can be 
made ‘other’ and placed at a distance from the self; it can also be brought 
into proximity. Pain, when nominalised, can be ‘owned’, through the use of 
possessives, as in il mio dolore ‘my pain’, or il mio mal di testa ‘my 
headache’. Such configurations, however, do not appear in the ALOMAR 
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Plus corpus. The informants do indeed configure possession but they favour 
relational processes (in SFG, these are processes of ‘having’ and ‘being’), 
realised by a form of the verb to have, where pain, the Attribute, is possessed 
by the individual, the Carrier, as in avevo un dolore al petto ‘I had a pain in 
the chest’. 
It was suggested that the reason behind the absence, in the corpus, of 
configurations where a body part (rather than the individual) is the Carrier 
(which the grammar of Italian would allow) is that such configuration would, 
from a message-structure point of view, shift the focus of the message from 
the speaker to the body part in question, thus ‘obscuring’ the speaker.
Construing pain as an thing also allows speakers in the corpus to present it 
as an entity which ‘acts’ in the sufferer’s world and displays varying degrees 
of agency (see below). The understanding of both bodily pain and disease as 
entities possessing and showing degrees of agency are essential to many 
commonly-held folk beliefs and contribute to the process of ‘othering’ 
mentioned earlier.
The prevalence of the lexical (and, I argue, cognitive) construal of pain as 
‘entity’ in the ALOMAR Plus corpus is also likely to be due to reasons I call 
‘situational’. Although for all my informants illness is an ongoing condition, it 
has been – to a degree – ‘historicised’. Chronic illness and its attending pain 
are generally (but not always, as the case of Annamaria shows) not welcome 
but they have become familiar states; their construal as entities allows the
informants to speak of them with a degree of detachment. In turn, the 
distance and the ‘familiarity’ which have evolved are reflected in this type of 
construal. 
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Although the size of the Alomar Plus corpus does not allow for this degree of 
generalisation, it is likely that speakers for whom pain was a more recent, or 
present at or close to the time of speaking would favour construals of pain as 
a process, through, a verb. Other ‘pain corpora’, such as Lascaratou’s (2007), 
show a prevalence of verbal construals of pain; however, such corpora 
consist of transcriptions of doctor-patient consultations where patient have 
gone to see a doctor regarding a current complaint. In such cases, pain 
expressions such as I hurt, I’m hurting or, to a lesser degree ‘my+body part is 
hurting’ function as ‘pain avowals’ which declare that the individual is 
suffering and can be seen as a substitute for the ‘primitive cry’ of the one in 
pain. In addition, they mostly relate to acute, rather than chronic conditions. A 
further development of the current enquiry would be to compare linguistic 
data relating to both acute and chronic pain in order to verify if there are 
positive correlations between one type of pain and a particular kind of 
construal.
As pointed out by Halliday, pain has both temporal and spatial location within 
the body. In the ALOMAR Plus corpus, when pain is participant in a process 
its location is encoded as Circumstance, through adverbials, adverbial groups 
and prepositional phrases. In the case of its temporal extension, speakers in 
the corpus also encode it adjectivally, either as Epiteth or Attribute. However, 
contrary to expectations, the present corpus does not show many instances 
of the temporal extension of pain construed as Attribute in a relational clause 
(e.g. il dolore era costante, ‘the pain was constant’), where pain is the Carrier. 
The locus of pain too is normally encoded circumstantially in the ALOMAR 
Plus corpus, usually through an adjunct of place. For the most common types 
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of pain, whilst English resorts to compounding (headache) the lexicogrammar 
of Italian encodes them by making the locus of pain a prepositional phrase 
following the ‘head’ in a noun group (mal di testa ‘headache’), however, as 
pointed out, this is not commonly done by the ALOMAR Plus speakers.
The intensity of pain, as well as its quality, is a relevant topic, both for the 
patient and the medical professional. When pain is construed as a participant, 
its quality (type) and quantity (intensity) tend to be encoded as qualities, 
through adjectives. However, whereas English often construes pain 
adjectivally, speakers in the ALOMAR Plus corpus resort to nouns (En. ‘A 
burning pain’; It. Un bruciore ‘a burning’, noun). Some terms are a blend of 
pain type and intensity and, to an extent, refer to how and where pain 
propagates in the body. Such is the case of una pugnalata, ‘a stabbing’. The 
intensity of the pain sensation is also encoded through diminutives (un 
dolorino ‘a small pain’), which, in some cases, also encodes types of stance, 
such as affect.
Second for number of occurrences in the ALOMAR Plus corpus is the 
construal of pain as process. This type of encoding allows speakers to 
highlight the dynamic, ‘active’ nature of pain and to attribute varying degrees 
of agency to it. Italian lacks personal-intransitive constructions equivalent to 
the English ‘I hurt/am hurting’, which, I have argued, configures the 
experience of pain and suffering holistically.
Speakers in the ALOMAR Plus corpus favour constructions that, when pain is 
construed as process, place it in more impersonal settings, such as fa male ‘it 
hurts [me]’. Also common are configurations that ‘thematise’ the person, as in 
mi fa male ‘to me it hurts’. These constructions are frequent in the corpus.
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Pain is construed as a quality only in a minority of cases. When this happens, 
it is construed as an Attribute of a body part in a relational clause. There are 
no occurrences of pain residing in the whole person; it is almost exclusively a 
localised phenomenon. Again, I suggest that this ‘localisation’ is a result of 
the ‘diminished urgency’ of the experience of pain due both to the interview 
(as opposed to medical encounter) setting and to the chronic (thus 
‘historicised’) nature of the problem.
The analysis in chapter three shows that pain, perceptually and 
psychologically, is a very complex experience. Since it often the case the a 
person’s verbal output is the only window on the pain, attention to the way it is 
encoded can prove very important not only as a means of understanding the 
experience but, crucially, as a diagnostic tool which could lead to a more 
precise identification of the underlying issue. An analysis such as the one 
presented here, which focuses not only on the lexicon but also on the 
‘grammatical apparatus’ (the lexicogrammar) shows that the task of 
encapsulating an experience as complex as pain weighs on the linguistic 
system at more than one level.
Because of the size of the ALOMAR Plus corpus, these conclusions cannot 
be generalised as certain indicators of the ways in which the lexicogrammar of 
Italian as a whole construes the experience of pain. Such generalisations 
would require a much larger corpus. In spite of this, and especially because of 
the consistency of the findings within the corpus, they suggest certain 
tendencies. Further research with a larger corpus of speech produced in a
number of circumstances would be needed to make more general claims.
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6.2 Pain, illness, and APPRAISAL
The experiences of illness and of pain often coexist. Pain does not suppress 
language, although it challenges it. It can be said that pain stretches 
language, pushing it to occupy spaces that perhaps it did not occupy before. 
The language of pain is not only language that has as its referent the specific, 
though complex, perceptual experience which is pain. The language of pain 
is also language that grows ‘around’ the experience of pain. The embodied 
individual in pain perceives pain but experiences suffering. This suffering is 
language-generating; it pushes the individual to position him or herself, to 
take on a stance.
I have addressed this stance by resorting to Appraisal Theory (as developed 
by Martin and White, 2005) and used it as a tool to identify the presence of 
subjectivity in the multitude of evaluations that the individual who experiences 
pain expresses. The experience of pain triggers stancetaking; it ‘personalises’ 
language. Appraisal is therefore a highly effective tool for the identification 
and analysis of subjectivity, intended as the presence of the subject’s own 
perspective and ‘take’ on the events that have befallen her or him. 
Unsurprisingly, most speakers in the corpus evaluate pain negatively. 
However, the majority refrain from using emotionally charged language, 
which I have defined as language where, to use Martin and Rose’s (2003) 
metaphor, the emotive volume is turned up. This finding is rather surprising 
and demands explanation.
I have suggested that the main reason for this is to construct and project, 
discursively, an image of credibility and ‘objectivity’, which would be 
compromised by resorting to more emotive language. Speakers need to 
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appear as ‘credible witnesses’ of their own life-stories, which all too often are 
doubted or disbelieved outright, leading to not only the invisibility of pain and 
suffering but also — crucially — to the invisibility of the suffering individual
her/himself.
By utilising language that often appears to be mutuated from the language of 
medicine and, more generally, medical encounters, the speakers in the 
ALOMAR Plus corpus frame their accounts as credible. They especially work 
towards avoiding the charge of being overemotional and, therefore, 
unreliable. This response, encoded in a specific type of language, has its 
origin in previous experience. All participants, at some point or another during 
the interviews, express the desire not to ‘exaggerate’ their problems, 
intrinsically equating what might be generally termed ‘emotion’ with lesser or 
lack of credibility. What appears clearly in the language of such accounts is 
the echo of previous encounters with disbelieving or doubting interlocutors. It 
is therefore likely that in encoding their experiences, my informants are not 
only addressing their current interlocutor (the interviewer); their linguistic 
output is shaped by their previous encounters, their health communications, 
with a number of individuals and institutions. 
Of all the encoded attitudes, affect is the most common in the ALOMAR Plus 
corpus. Speakers, however, favour evoked (indirect) expressions of affect 
rather than inscribed (direct) ones. I suggest that the reasons behind this 
choice are to do with what I mention above: the desire to discursively lend 
credibility to their own accounts by presenting them as more ‘factual’ than 
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‘emotive’. Once again this discursive practice echoed past encounters in my 
informants have been openly or indirectly disbelieved.
After affect, the second most encoded attitude is appreciation. Through it, my 
informants are able to make factual statements. These, especially when 
expressed as declaratives in the indicative mood can also be read as 
instances of evoked affect. Again, this linguistic strategy allows the speakers 
to present themselves as reliable, by making factual statement presented as 
factual and that the interlocutor can easily align with. However, such 
statements indirectly reveal speakers’ feelings and sensations. They invite 
the interlocutor’s agreement and sympathy (albeit indirectly), thus enlisting 
him or her as ‘co-author’ of the narrative on offer.
Unsurprisingly, pain does elicit mainly negative evaluations, although in the 
majority of cases this is couched in language that can be considered 
‘measured’ and not overtly emotional. Where pain receives highly negative 
evaluations, it is also accompanied by other linguistic traces that indicate the 
high level of distress it causes the person. Such is the case of Anna. For her, 
the appearance of pain has been a highly traumatic event with enduring 
consequences. Crucially, in her case this is reflected not only in the choice of 
emotionally charged lexicon but in vivid metaphors of violence and war, of 
intense heat, light and destruction, and in fragmented syntax. I suggest that 
traditional verbally-based tools to evaluate both the intensity and quality of 
pain, but especially its impact on the individual, can be inadequate since the 
encoding of the former and the latter is encoded lexicogrammatically and 
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discursively rather than only lexically, as many questionnaires (such as the 
McGill Pain Questionnaire) used in medical settings appear to suggest.
However, the use of Appraisal Theory in chapter two has resulted in an 
unexpected finding. It is the pharmacological treatments used to control pain 
and the progress of SLE and RA that are the object of the most negative 
(both in number and intensity) evaluations. Especially when based on 
cortisone, treatment is construed discursively and lexicogrammatically as an 
entity that does unpleasant things to the sufferer, often an Actor in material 
processes with the individual appearing as the Goal. The pharmacological 
treatment is endowed by the speakers in the corpus with more agentivity than 
pain itself and is associated with a high number of violent metaphors. This 
surprising finding points to what is possibly one neglected area of the impact 
on individuals of pain in chronic illness. If the well being of the chronically ill 
individual is to be addressed holistically, this hitherto underestimated aspect 
ought to be included in considerations aimed at restoring health. Attention to 
the language of evaluation thus becomes interesting and relevant not only to 
the linguist but also to the practitioner and health professional.
The informants for this study do not often evaluate other individuals in their 
accounts. Judgement is the least frequent of the attitudes expressed. It is 
used to evaluate the behaviour of medical professionals and family members. 
Negative evaluations of the former are rare; where they appear, they are 
mild. I suggest that this is related to the speakers’ desire to project an image 
of reliability, reasonability, devoid of emotive and emotional (in the common 
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sense of the term) overtones. With regards to family members, the speakers
usually evaluate them in positive terms. Negative judgement of family 
members is present but generally indirect and mild. Mainly it is related to their 
perceived inability to fully appreciate the patient’s predicament.
6.3 Identities in pain
As noted, Scarry (1985) claimed that the process of ‘reconstruction’ of the 
person in pain’s world only occurs once she/he is able to impose once again 
coherence upon her or his world, after having ‘brought it back’, as it were, into 
existence. 
Adopting a broadly narrative analytical approach, chapter five has looked at 
the ALOMAR Plus corpus interviews to find out what kind of identities were 
constructed and presented by the participants in connection with their 
experience of chronic pain related to chronic illness. One particular concern 
has been to look at agency in the participants’ story, in particular in order to 
establish if they still appear as actors in their own life stories.
6.3.1 Identity
For all participants, the onset of chronic illness and related pain has 
represented a moment of rupture with their previous identities, requiring 
varying degrees of readjustment. Contrary to expectations, the degree of 
disruption to the sense of self does not show, in the ALOMAR Plus corpus, a 
direct link with the severity of the condition. In one case (Annamaria), the 
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onset of illness has represented the possibility of taking on a preferred 
identity, such as dedicating one’s life to a fulfilling occupation, such as 
volunteering. However, the analysis has revealed thatthe rebuilding of a 
coherent identity, or the shaping of a new, preferred one, is not a 
homogeneous process and that it is ongoing and in a constant state of flux. In 
the ALOMAR Plus corpus, identity coherence does not mean lack of 
contradiction in thought or behaviour. I have suggested that the shaping of 
identity in chronic illness and especially in the presence of pain should be 
considered a fluid rather than a solid state for which a number of linguistic 
strategies are used. Even in the presence of the same pathology, the degree 
of overall biographical and identity disruption (in the sense of alteration to a 
planned life course and sense of self) varies. Crucially, this is something that 
can be only picked up by a close reading of the linguistic datum. 
Agency
Part of the analysis in this thesis has been devoted to the notion of agency in 
the collected corpus. I have argued for its relevance in the construal and 
(re)presentation of the individual’s experience of living with chronic illness 
and chronic pain. The overall aim was to test the accuracy of the perception, 
common in popular though and folk medicine, but also in some early research 
on doctor-patient interaction, (as pointed out in chapter one), that when ill and
in pain the individual is fundamentally powerless, thus resulting in the 
common ‘victim’ image.
331
I began by providing a definition of agency based on semantic and 
grammatical criteria. I identified the notions of intentionality and volition as 
central to an understanding of agency. In the analysis, I looked at the degree 
of agency my informants attribute to themselves vis-à-vis their illness and 
pain and the resulting degree of disempowerment, loosely defined as loss of 
freedom to act and to pursue one’s own agenda. One of the overarching 
questions was whether my informants perceived a loss of agency, resulting 
from being ill, and if so to what degree. Another question was whether there 
were multiple foci of agency and, if so, what were they.
Overall, for my informants the experience of chronic illness and pain does not 
result in a complete loss of agency. They retain considerable freedom to act, 
although this might be reduced. I suggest that it is useful to distinguish 
between two levels: the micro-level (single events, isolated instances) and 
the macro-level, the more general, overall picture.
At the micro-level, the speaker’s agency is often limited both by pain and by 
the overall experience of chronic illness. Chronic illness, and especially pain, 
has a limiting effect; what was once normal, taken for granted, and generally 
possible becomes difficult or entirely impossible. Jobs may have to be left; 
everyday activities, such as shopping for food or driving may be extremely 
limited. One’s favourite activities, such as sport, may have to be given up. 
At clause level both illness and pain often appear as Actor in material 
processes; often, in material clauses, illness and pain are the Actor and the 
speaker the patient, in the grammatical sense, or Goal, in SFG terms. 
Pharmacological treatment is often represented, at clause level, as Actor
negatively affecting the speaker.
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However, when the focus is broadened, at the macro-level, the picture 
becomes more complex. My informants engage in a number of activities, 
displaying what I term ‘real agency’. In some cases, once the initial shock of 
having became ill is gone, the individual displays considerable agency, for 
instance by in engaging in activities which were not possible before, like 
volunteering.
This research confirms that the view of the ill as passive in encounters with 
the medical profession is at least problematic. My informants take the 
initiative in a number of activities, such as questioning a doctor’s prescription 
or diagnosis. Occasionally, they give up treatments that they feel are not 
beneficial. The idea of the (medical) patient as passive is not supported by 
this study. Especially in chronic illness, roles are negotiated and continually 
shifting. Even when pain is present the idea that the person affected by it 
sees herself or himself as a victim appears simplistic, at least in view of the 
findings of the present study.
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Appendix
This appendix includes the raw date – in the form of full transcripts off the interviews collected for 
this thesis. The original Italian transcripts appear before their English translations. In each section, 
the speakers appear in alphabetical order, according to their pseudonym.
Transcription conventions
... longer pause and/or hesitation (not timed)
: lengthening of word or syllable-final vowel, which in some cases indicated hesitation
? question marks show end of a strech of talk interpreted as a question or, more 
generally, rising intonation
<LAUGHS> angled brackets give additional information, especially of paralinguistic nature
{ah} curly brackets appearing in a speaker’s turn indicate overlapping talk by the 
interlocutor or other speaker
“ ... ” quotation marks indicate direct quotations of other people’s speech or a verbatim 
account of speakers’ own word as uttered on a specific, recalled occasion 
Underlined underlined words indicate emphasis
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1 Anna
Interviewer: niente, volevo, così, questo è un: un colloquio abbastanza libero quindi non ci sono 
domande particolari o risposte giuste piuttosto che sbagliate, ehm, le chiederei di 
parlarmi un po’, in modo generale, della sua esperienza, quando ha iniziato ad avere 
problemi, come, eh, come se n’è accorta, sentendosi libera di dire tutto quello che: le 
viene.
Anna: quindi non prettamente sul dolore, proprio sull’
I: inizialmente, appunto come è iniziato, come è iniziata quest’esperienza e poi che tipo 
di:
Anna: … tipi di dolore:
I: si, poi … successivo … ecco lei quando ha cominciato avere: problemi.
Anna: e: sicchè, [il?] fatto della malattia, chiaro perché: anche prima ma: forse non è: è 
inerente alla malattia chiaramente: quasi subito il dolore: … forte, e: via via cresce, e, 
almeno nel mio caso, [e?] quindi diventa proprio lancinante, al punto proprio: ci son 
stati dei momenti, prima, mhm, e anche durante la cura, che: eh: diventava talmente: 
acuto, che al pensiero che ritornasse questo dolore, dopo qualche minuto dopo 
qualche ora, eh: pensavo proprio che non potevo andare continuare la vita così, 
dicevo a mio marito, “guarda qua, non ce la faccio, mi vien la voglia di buttarmi dalla 
finestra, non è possibile”, il cuore: batteva forte forte, al punto proprio di: di perdere i 
sensi, quindi questo è durato, per un bel periodo, un bel periodo di: almeno tre anni, e 
poi: finalmente: qualche altra cura diciamo che, allentava un po’, questi periodi non 
erano così frequenti, e quando veniva questo dolore era sempre molto forte, però, 
durava meno, ehm, come come giorni diciamo, diventava quindicinale diventava: eh 
via via insomma.
I: certo, veniva ogni quindici giorni o durava quindici giorni?
Anna: no no, veniva ogni quindici giorni, se durava quindici giorni di fila era proprio da: 
niente, da finire subito perché non era possibile, era proprio, un: che: quando si, 
avvicinava, … ogni quindici giorni, questo periodo del quindici giorni, una volta al 
mese è capitato, una volta ogni due mesi, all’inizio, ‘nsomma via via, [ed 
avvicinava?] sempre di più, ah: frequente, e, era triste ‘nsomma, anche le medicine: 
pur, facendo molto uso di di più medicine, era: veramente: forte e, forte.
I: dove, dove le venivano i dolori signora?
Anna: allora io ho cominciato colle mani
I: le mani.
Anna: partiva: da qua [indica].
I: dal, dal polso?
Anna: sì, o qua [indica].
I: okay.
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Anna: si infiammava leggermente mi prendeva su tutti i tendini fin qui [indica], arrivare qui 
[indica].
I: fino alla: all’ascella …
Anna: sì sì sì, e e poi regolarmente, mi prendeva qui [indica] a: alla schiena.
I: la schiena.
Anna: e sembrava avessi qualcosa: di brutto proprio perché: i dottori ancora non capivano 
… al all’inizio, questo è durato per, sempre, andando avanti con le cure dicevamo, 
provare, ecco.
I: questo quanti anni fa, signora, è iniziato?
Anna: emh, venti: ventisei anni, venticinque anni fa.
I: venticinque anni fa.
Anna: e quindi: poi, piano piano, insomma: qualcosa si: recuperava, solo che la malattia 
faceva i danni.
I: mhm.
Anna: nel frattempo, na volta si stortava questo una volta insomma, nel nel frattempo ho 
fatto dieci interventi sulle mani …
I: le mani, dieci interventi, chirurgici alle mani?
Anna: dieci interventi sì di pulizia dei tendini, e: e una protesi perché c’era … un buco … e: 
quindi la malattia: dopo ho cominciato a diventare con: le cure più forti diciamo che 
poi in commerci si: le devo dire anche: il nome delle cure? No?
I: se se se ricorda: se no …
Anna: sì beh, si è passato dagli immunosoppre, siamo arrivati agli immunosoppressori 
diciamo, antinfiammatori cortisonici tutte queste cose: solite fino agli 
immunosoppressori, gli immunosoppressori è stato una: è stato proprio un sollievo 
diciamo, proprio, quindi: senza il dolore, e dopo c’era solo il dolore di: del disastro 
che aveva fatto: [la malattia, diciamo?]
I.: un dolore: [tipo: morale?]
Anna: però, e non era, un dolore molto più blando, magari a:
I: quindi sempre un dolore fisico, … parlare di un dolore fisico.
Anna: e: sì però ...
I: passata questa fase acuta no?
Anna: sì sì sì però; eh: diciamo che, è un dolore che si sopporta, oramai siamo un po’ anche 
allenati diciamo.
I: sì.
Anna: e quindi: perché quando viene: … forte invece adesso appunto, dopo la cura, c’è 
voluto almeno un: quattro mesi prima di, sette anni fa credo che: ho incominciato con 
336
questa: e quindi adesso: diciamo che sto riparando: semplicemente i danni, però ci 
sono ancora i dolori, adesso per esempio mi devo operare un piede.
I: dolori ai ai ai piedi, ha adesso?
Anna: già operato un piede cinque anni fa, operato il polso.
I: il polso.
Anna: ecco, diciamo che questi fanno tutti parte della:
I: e quelli ai piedi, come sono?
Anna: e, e, quelli al piede: sono: a: abbastanza tremendi anche loro perché: sono come 
proprio dele: eh: ah: ha presente, quando il fabbro: picchia il, ferro caldo.
I: sì.
Anna: che fa scintille.
I: sì.
Anna: ecco, ci sono tutte quest scintille doloranti {Marta: “cco, lei è più bravi di me [a dire 
le cose?]”, nei vari punti del piede, anche perché: evidentemente il piede eh è: 
sopporta il peso della persona.
I: certo.
Anna: evidentemente, perché li sente da, nelle dita, sotto le dita, li sente: ai lati, ah sopra al 
metatarso, eh addirittura: al calcagno diciamo, e: anche quello operato, questo che è 
quello da operare, ma anche ...
I: perché un piede l’ha già avuto operato.
Anna: sì sì.
I: mhm mh.
Anna: che sì, cammino bene però, siccome l’intervento che è stato fatto, io non avevo, non 
avendo: avuto l’alluce valgo, loro: eh non han potuto operarmi.
I: sì.
Anna: fino all’alluce perché: l’alluce non aveva niente.
I: mhm mhm, l’alluce valgo è quello che sporge? Da a lato?
Anna: sì, sì, che non è che ce l’hanno solo [i reumatoidi?] ce l’hanno mh: quasi 
ereditariamente le persone:
I: sì molte persone sì.
Anna: molte persone anche giovani, il mio era un po’ atipico come ehm quindi, diciamo che 
io, l’alluce era, normale, mentre erano scese, tutte quattro le metatarso, delle altre dita 
del piede, quindi, hanno legato eh, le quattro dita, diciamo, però no è, m’avevano 
detto anche che non: a avrei avuto dei problemi, perché non avendo fatto in 
contemporanea, dato che non c’era bisogno, l’intervento all’alluce valgo, perché non 
esisteva l’alluce valgo, eh avrei avuto problemi dopo e questi problemi sono usciti un 
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anno e mezzo due fa: quando eh il l’alluce ha cominciato a spostarsi 
involontariamente, nella parte destra, del delle dita.
I: sì.
Anna: e quindi, era come, tirare un qualcosa, che doveva essere allungato diciamo.
I: mh mh.
Anna: ma eh: e: l’alluce l’ha fatto spontaneamente quindi, non le dico i dolori, nell’osso 
proprio del: [malloppo?], perché, se io, lo metto in posizione.
I: sì.
Anna: lei vede il dito, normale.
I: mhm mhm.
Anna: però è un dito dolorante, che non so adesso neanche cosa potranno fare ma è un dito 
dolorante, e, ha delle fitte pazzesche proprio: per fortuna durano poco, ecco, quindi 
quello che posso dire io, è che, sia il piede operato che il piede m: che devo operare, 
quello operato ha il vantaggio di essere stato operato quindi il metatarso no fa male, 
perchè l’osso: è messo in linea quindi non scende.
I: mhm mhm.
Anna: mentre questo che non è stato operato: [spesso?] riscende.
I: sì.
Anna: mi buca le scarpe, mi fa male, eh: addirittura, se metto un fazzoletto dentro, cioè, 
proprio, niente, cammino col plantare ortopedico ma, è molto difficoltoso perché fa 
male comunque il piede, poi le dita sopra che diventano così: quindi, adesso questo 
insomma.
I: [curve?] si curvano:?
Anna: sì sì sì, e perché ...
I: […]
Anna: facendo male si rattrappiscono così, quindi, diventano così, ‘nfatti, le due dita del 
piede di qua: vengono se, verranno segate come quelle di [qua, legate?] proprio, di 
modo che poi si allineano così.
I: il, il suo ...
Anna: il dolore è forte, anche questo, sopportabile, diciamo.
I: in questo momento, lei, mentre noi stiamo parlando, ha dei dolori?
Anna: no.
I: no?
Anna: questo momento no, però ci son dei momenti, all’improvviso, c che posso contare a 
decine: a decine alla volta.
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I: mhm.
Anna: è proprio un: scintille <ride>
I: come, sì.
Anna: certo poi come: il dolore diventa proprio un: lampo, [cin cin? … piedi?].
I: intenso?
Anna: sì intensissimo, ecco, intensissimo.
I: e: lei come direbbe che è cambia e la sua, la sua diagnosi è di artrite reumatoide?
Anna: sì sì,e:
I: dopo quanto l’ha avuta la diagnosi?
Anna: la diagnosi diciamo che l’ho avuta: perché prima mi ero curata da un ortopedico 
diciamo, e: l’ortopedico non aveva capito bene neanche lui poi quando ha visto, gli 
esami che: ehm il reumatest eh era sempre più alto e sempre più alto, eh ‘nsomma 
non ha potuto più curarmi e la malattia diciamo che, l’ha capita un ortopedico, in 
vacanza.
I: mh mh.
Anna: era in vacanza:, nel palazzo dove abitavo anch’io, e quindi: m’aveva visto: con in 
braccio la bambina, che urlava perché si era fatta male, e m’ha visto le mani così e 
m’ha chiesto, dice “ma lei … c’ha l’artrite reumatoide?” Ho detto “sì,” cioè ho detto 
“sì non: scusi:, ma lei, dice, è malata di artrite reumatoide?” Ho detto “non lo so, so 
che ho dolori”, ha detto “ma guardi che a Milano c’è il [nome ospedale] visto che lei 
abita” io non sapevo neanche dov’era.
I: sì.
Anna: perché, voglio dire, quando uno sta bene non:
I: non ci pensa non …
Anna: non ci pensa non va a cercare gli ospedali, e quindi: m’ha detto guardi così così, c’è il 
professor B., che poi io non ho conosciuto ma lui comunque c’era, e: così ho 
cominciato la mia: via crucis a curarmi, con i farmaci dovuti, perché prima un po’: … 
aspirine: le e: iniezioni di vitamina: queste cose qua, ma: nie niente proprio di ehm: di 
veramente: eh curato dal reumatologo, dal reumatologo ecco.
I: lei come direbbe che: è cambiata la sua vita, grazie, cioè, per questa malattia?
Anna: per questa malattia? Sì si è cambiata molto, nell’umore soprattutto, ero: normalmente 
ero un burlona, ero: eh, però: diciamo così impegnata, anche nelle cose che facevo: eh 
colla mia famiglia insomma, una serie di cose, ecco e: è cambiato molto perché 
adesso sono irascibile proprio: basta poco insomma.
I: mh mh.
Anna: anche se poi ...
I: le ha cambiato il carattere quindi …
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Anna: m’ha cambiato il carattere sì, e i giorni che sto bene invece riprendo abbastanza:
I: ad essere ...
Anna: però: vado su e giù, basta poco per salire basta poco per scendere.
I: certo.
Anna: eh: diciamo che così ecco, anche se: ho tutti intorno a me però: eh: alle volte penso 
che non mi capiscano ma non perché non mi capiscono perché è difficile eh: anche 
dirti sempre: come dire, venire sempre a coccolarti.
I: sì.
Anna: perché, io ho bisogno di quello {sì} e loro lo fanno sì, però nel frattempo, m: non mi 
alleviano diciamo {sì} perché: quando poi c’hai eh anche tutti questi: movimenti di 
giornate che {mh} passi: da un medico all’altro {sì} perché poi la reumatoide non 
finisce con {sì} con la reumatoide, provoca un sacco di altre:
I: di altri problemi.
Anna: problemi e quindi, eh si passano proprio delle giornate a: nei vari ospedali nei vari 
medici e: ‘nsomma, n’se ne esce mai, non se ne esce mai.
I: lei trova ...
Anna: si convive.
I: trova difficile: coi suoi familiari o col dal medico, spiegarsi?
Anna: no.
I: comunicare, quello che è il suo dolore?
Anna: no comunico spiego molto bene, nel senso che io cerco di spiegare bene, a qualsiasi 
medico, cerco di dir di farle capire proprio il come, per esempio faccio un esempio, a 
ottobre ho avuto, un di notte un dolore qui.
I: alla al pe, al al allo sterno {proprio qui al torace}.
Anna: allo sterno {sì} proprio in mezzo al seno {sì} qui, che è partito piano piano di qui 
I: d al fianco? {che[viene?] sempre più forte}
Anna: sì da così, quando è arrivato qui: c’è stata un’esplosione, come se: vedesse scoppiare 
una bomba.
I: sì.
Anna: mh, deflagrazione.
I: sì.
Anna: questo, è la parola esatta di, dolore che ho sentito io, per fortuna non è [durato?] 
penso più di un minuto un minuto e mezzo {sì}, per me era un’eternità, anche perché, 
alle due di notte non sapevo, eh: sì, ho dovuto chiamare mio marito e mia figlia, però, 
eh: o vai subito al pronto soccorso però, anche loro han cercato di ehm: questo non mi 
era mai successo quindi io {sì} a: avendo avuto la nonna {mh} il papa  la sorella del 
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papà morti d’infarto, questo mi ha preoccupato molto, quindi po mi prende 
l’agitazione, e man mano che vado avanti con l’età.
I: sì, il dolore an anche a me è capitato dolore al, al petto {allo sterno} che ti spaventa 
[…] allo sterno magari non così forte {… sentito} e magari dopo … io tra l’altro mi 
ricordavo una volta ho avuto problemi di riflusso, gastrico {sì} e dà un dolore molto 
forte qua, al basso sterno che io non avevo mai provato, ero in aereo mi ricordo mi 
sono molto spaventato pensavo che fosse qualcosa al al cuore non avevo idea che 
fosse una cosa del genere {e il riflusso che torna su qualcosa:} sì dallo stomaco {dallo 
stomaco}, ma comunque è molto comune che la gente si preoccupi {sì sì beh io} che 
alla gamba {certo} non so.
Anna: io ripeto, mi sono: poi al mattino alle sette e mezza perché poi me n’è 
venuto: ah: ancora uno due {mh mh} però n: n: sempre inc così no, sempre [in?] 
forte, magari non partiva di qui {dall’altro lato} e arrivava piano piano piano mi 
prendeva fino a qui sotto.
I: fino al petto poi sotto l’ascella:
Anna: sì, [poi?] sotto l’ascella sì, e ho sentito anche: molta gente anche il mio medico m’ha 
detto che ce ne son stati parecchi quest’inverno di: {mh mh} quindi: ho fatto un sacco 
d’esami in fatti ho finito, la settimana scorsa di fare: […] doppler, ecodoppler, e 
quindi al pronto soccorso, subito, han visto che non c’era: non c’è stato, nessun 
infarto nessun inizio m’han fatto l’esame: degli enzimi {sì} cioè, e: niente, non c’è 
stato niente {mh} il cuore: va bene, solo che: io malgrado il cuore va bene, quando 
sento, che magari, c’è qualche dolorino, che penso che mi arrivi a fare così: eh: mi 
spavento {certo} e quindi lì, io eh: devo proprio: chiedere aiuto, ai miei o a chi c’è 
perché: svengo proprio mi sento proprio male.
I: sì c’è un timore che viene dal: dal dolore in sé e dal timore di qualcosa che potrebbe 
venire.
Anna: sì adesso c’è proprio la paura.
I: sì.
Anna: la la paura, che è quella di eh non farcela, di, che mi capiti un infarto: roba del 
genere, perché: poi insomma via via, [quando ne ho proprio tante] ho avuto un 
carcinoma della pelle: qui, ne ho avuto un altro qui.
I: e sono sempre legati alla: all’artrite reumatoide {no} o anche a altre cose.
Anna: però sono legati forse allo stress, … io sono molto stressata, sono una che mi mi 
stresso, e cerco anche <ride> quasi quasi cerco … come dire, cerco sempre di 
complicarmi le la vita mio marito mi dice perché è vero, compro le cose le devo 
comprare sempre che mi: che mi rendono fatica ecco {mh} sono un po’: masochista 
in questo senso, come dire mi faccio male da me, ecco, ‘nvece dovrei lasciare perdere 
sono un po’ testona ecco {mh} un po’ un carattere così insomma.
I: e lei pensa che questo sia influenzato molto dalla malattia? Questo suo modo di 
essere?
Anna: e. certamente, poi adesso c’è anche la vecchiaia perché (mhm) io sessantasei anni 
quindi voglio dire, c’è anche, da mettere in conto gli anni che passano (mh mh), poi 
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problemi in famiglia, non so mio marito che è stato male, quindi son tutti stress che: 
si subiscono.
I: certo.
Anna: perché di mio sono sensibilissima proprio come un: una corda di violino.
I: già lo era, prima del (sì sì io: sì) [quando c’è stato?]
Anna: a me mi basta vedere: un cane che soffre che: che già mi prende insomma.
I: senta u un’altra cosa, come: quando ha visto cambiare il suo corpo, per la malattia.
Anna: e: l’ho visto quasi subito.
I: come:
Anna: fisicamente lei dice?
I: fisicamente come cioè esteticamente? sì, la deformazione, ma no come lo ha m: è 
qualche cosa che: ehm l’ha turbata, oltre al al al al dolore in sé era qualche cosa.
Anna: no anche perché, devo dire, che grazie anche alle cure poi ehm per chi ci crede grazie 
anche a dio, io penso che, si è fortunati tante volte no, pur nella malattia perché è e: 
‘ciamo c’è gente, ho visto gente passare davanti a me molto più, molto più disastrate 
diciamo, quindi, io con le mani ci faccio ancora tante cose ancora.
I: certo.
Anna: le uso e ne abuso, a mio discapito però, dico vabè insomma, intanto le uso perché se 
no che me le sono aggiustate a fare, come dire <ride> ma diciamo che dovrei, usarle 
ma non abusarne, io invece sono un po’, un po’ stupida in questo senso, ecco, anche 
se i miei mi dicono lascia stare lascia stare ma, io sono un po’, così, e: però devo dire 
insomma sì le mani sono disastrate ma: non so se lei ha visto altre mani.
I: alcune, non è che ne ho viste.
Anna: però non è che mi importi molto se la gente mi guarda le mani o cosa, mi dà fastidio 
perché cammino male e e quindi adesso facendo l’intervento penso di camminare 
meglio, penso di mettere su un paio di scarpe non così eh: che son dolenti, anche: le 
scarpe non vanno mai bene, però: no non, poi nessuno, per adesso nessuno mi ha fatto 
mai pesare questa cosa, poi c’è sempre qualcuno che magari ti guarda ma non, non 
me ne importa per niente insomma.
I: va bene signora la ringrazio per:  c’è qualche cosa che vuole aggiungere.
Anna: no: penso di avere detto tutto nei:
I: grazie.
Anna: di niente.
I: grazie mille.
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2 Annamaria
Interviewer:  bene, ah, lei signora da quanto ... da quanto tempo so ..., prima di tutto posso 
chiederle esattamente di cosa dal punto di vista medico, di che patologia lei soffre?
Annamaria: io soffro di un lupus eri [inudibileible] sistemico.
I: da … quando ha avuto questa diagnosi?
A: la diagnosi l’ho avuta nel 1985, mentre i primi sintomi mi sono iniziati nel ’74, dopo 
la nascita di mio figlio.
I: nel ’74, e che tipo di sintomi erano?
A: avevo molti dolori articolari, le ginocchia si gonfiavano, le mani anche, e, tant’è che 
non riuscivo neanche a prendere in braccio il bambino, quindi facevo fatica ad 
accudirlo, e niente, i dolori articolari soprattutto sono andati avanti per una decina 
d’anni solo quelli.
I: ma erano, non erano però continui, cioè erano persistenti oppure periodici?
A: erano, erano, si si, erano persistenti, soprattutto le ginocchia  sempre gonfie, eh, e le 
mani, le mani e le ginocchia sono sempre state le parti più sofferenti.
I: e inizialmente il medico, cioè, lei è stata subito da un medico, per …, quando sono 
iniziati, ha visto subito qualcuno o le hanno …. cosa le dicevano?
A: o sono andata, sono andata da un ortopedico, il quale mi ha dato del cortisone, senza 
farmi fare nessun tipo di esame. Mi ha detto subito che io avevo un’artrite 
reumatoide, e mi ha dato cortisone, eh, guardando solo l’aspetto delle mie dita, delle 
mani, eh io vabè, per un mese ho preso sto cortisone, però poi mi rendevo conto che 
senza una diagnosi, pur avendo io solo ventun’anni, ero ancora giovane, però mi 
dicevo, senza una diagnosi prendo il cortisone, e poi? Cosa succede? Quindi dopo un 
mese io ho smesso di prenderlo.
I: e, e i sintomi erano …. durante la, la terapia con il cortisone era … si sentiva meglio 
….
A: si, io stavo molto bene, con il cortisone stavo molto bene, però dopo un mese quando 
ho smesso di prenderlo ho ricominciato con i dolori. Il mio medico di base non mi 
diceva niente …. e il pediatra di mio figlio si è accorto che io non stavo bene perché 
ho portato il bambino a fare una visita, ha visto che avevo difficoltà a muovermi, e mi 
ha chiesto cos’avessi. Gliel’ho detto, e lui mi ha consigliato di venire al [nome 
ospedale], dove c’era un centro di reumatologia. Io sono venuta al [nome ospedale], 
ho fatto i primi accertamenti, e il medico che mi ha vista, siccome gli esami erano 
tutti negativi, mi aveva detto cheee, … secondo lui poteva essere qualcosa ma, 
pensava che fosse solo … un fattore … psicosomatico.
I: quindi…. pensava fosse ….
A: un fattore psicologico, lui mi ha detto che secondo lui era un fattore psicologico 
perché qua … ogni volta che venivo a fare una visita non avevo mai niente da fargli 
vedere, perché le mie mani si gonfiavano e si sgonfiavano e le ginocchia la stessa 
cosa, e ogni volta che venivo da lui non avevo niente … da far vedere …
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I: e il dolore c’era sempre, c’era solamente quando c’era il gonfiore?
A: il dolore c’era maggiormente quando si gonfiavano,  certo. E quindi … vabè, poi mi 
aveva detto …. di venire a farmi vedere una volta che avessi avuto qualcosa di 
gonfio, senza appuntamento, e dopo due giorni sono arrivata con un ginocchio gonfio, 
e dice: bè allora non è un problema psicologico, perché altrimenti non si sarebbe 
gonfiato il ginocchio, quindi mi ha analizzato il liquido [inudibileible] ginocchio, e … 
mi ha detto che avevo un’artrite reumatoide. Che però dagli esami del sangue non si 
era ancora manifestata. Quindi lui non mi ha dato niente di farmaci importanti, mi ha 
dato solo degli antinfiammatori … e mi ha detto di continuare  cioè … m’ha detto 
“signora io non so più cosa dirle, venga quand’è peggiorata.” Io avevo ventun’anni, la 
cosa non mi è piaciuta molto … però le cose sono andate  così, in effetti, perché io 
sono andata avanti solo con antinfiammatori … al momento del bisogno, che era 
abbastanza frequente, vale a dire che, magari, cioè per  tre  quattro giorni alla 
settimana, anche cinque, io avevo bisogno di prendere antinfiammatori. Poi queste 
ginocchia che si gonfiavano e poi si sgonfiavano, stavano gonfie una settimana …. io 
facevo anche un mestiere abbastanza pesante, perché ero tessitrice, di conseguenza, 
cioè, con il continuare a camminare, però io ho sempre continuato a farlo, nonostante 
tutto, io anche con le mie ginocchia gonfie andavo al lavoro, ma  … tanto anche 
stare a  casa non avrebbe cambiato la mia vita. Niente, riuscivo a lavorare 
ugualmente …
I: ma quindi la, la, la diagnosi di questo secondo medico era sostanzialmente 
simile … o uguale a quella del primo? 
A: eh, si, il primo l’aveva detta, senza ...
I:  Senza però fare nessun tipo d’esame.
A: fare nessun tipo di esame, solo avendo visto le mani che erano gonfie, mentre l’altro 
ha analizzato il liquido che mi ha tolto dal ginocchio. E niente, però poi  appunto, 
m’ha detto: Signora io non so più cosa farle perché gli esami del sangue son 
sempre negativi quindi venga quand’è peggiorata. Io son andata avanti per dieci anni 
così. E poi in effetti sono peggiorata, nel senso che, … eh: non è un … una cosa che 
si dice solo ma io l’ho riscontrata sulla mia pelle, che quandoo: non si sta bene 
psicologicamente, nei momenti di crisi queste malattie prendono il sopravvento. E 
infatti, stavo passando un momento di crisi… eh … mi sono sottoposta a uno stress 
sia fisico che morale non indifferente e ho iniziato ad avere maggiori problemi. 
Quindi problemi sulla pelle, i dolori si erano fatti più acuti.
I: Sulla pelle che tipo di problema aveva?
A:  avevo dei … delle macchie rosse, proprio sotto la cute, che al tatto erano dolenti e 
non capivo cosa mi stava succedendo insomma, perché erano dei sintomi che non 
avevo mai avuto prima. E quindi sono ritornata a farmi vedere, però da un altro 
medico,  non più da quello di prima perché nel frattempo in questi dieci anni era nato 
un day-hospital, qui al [nome ospedale], io sono… mi han consigliato di andare da, 
dal reumatologo, che è il mio reumatologo tuttora, e mi ha fatto una diagnosi, dopo 
aver fatto diversi esami, e mi ha detto che avevo una malattia da un nome molto 
brutto ma di non spaventarmi, perché non era niente di così tragico, che si poteva 
tenere sotto controllo…mi ha detto quali sarebbero state le fasi peggiori della 
malattia. Purtroppo vabè l’ho saputo dopo ma tanto non cambia niente, che è una 
malattia per la quale si può morire
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I:  Mh.
A: perché, mh, prende prevalentemente gli organi non solo le articolazioni.
I:  [certo?]
A: E di conseguenza se prende organi vitali, va da se che… non è molto facile. E niente, 
io comunque sono riuscita a convivere bene con …
I: Questo nell’Ottantacinque, la diagnosi…
A questo nell’Ottantacinque.
I: la certezza.
A: Si
I: e il fatto di aver avuto … una diagnosi certa ha cavi… ha cambiato qualcosa per lei, 
nella sua esperienza della malattia o … come ha reagito …
A: ma, io devo dire che non … la cosa non mi ha sconvolta. Cioè, l’ho presa abbastanza 
tranquillamente … non … io devo dire che poi sono una persona con un carattere 
positivo, che non … non faccio drammi, vabè, voglio dire, ho cercato di prenderla 
meglio che potevo. Io ho continuato la mia vita, come se niente fosse … avevo un 
problema che aveva, finalmente tra virgolette, un nome, però … questo voleva anche 
dire iniziare a fare una terapia più pesante.
I: [Inudibileible].
A: di conseguenza, certo, ho dovuto iniziare a prendere il cortisone, e lo sto prendendo 
tuttora, perché è una malattia che si tiene sotto controllo solo col cortisone, poi,  man 
mano che son passati gli anni si sono aggiunte diverse cose, perché poi anche se … 
non sono cose tragiche però, dopo poco, che ho iniziato a fare il cortisone mi è venuta 
una pleurite, una pericardite, e questo mi ha segnato molto perche ho dovuto … per 
tre mesi sono stata costretta a stare a casa dal lavoro. E ho dovuto dormire per tre 
mesi su una sdraio perché non riuscivo più a respirare. E quando ho iniziato a tornare 
a letto, in ogni caso ho dovuto dormire, quasi per una decina d’anni con tre cuscini, 
perché non potevo più sdraiarmi,  perché avevo dolori al torace. Perché purtroppo, 
dopo che … eh … ho iniziato ad avere questi dolori al torace, non si era capito subito 
che avevo una pleurite, io poi, all’inizio della malattia, avevo paura di disturbare il 
mio medico no? Perché … gli avevo telefonato per dirgli che avevo questi problemi 
…
I: mhm.
A: … lui mi ha fatto fare delle lastre al torace, e mi ha detto “e poi mi legga l’esito per 
telefono.” Io ho fatto le lastre, siccome appunto abito fuori Milano ho fatto fatto 
queste lastre … avevo difficoltà a muovermi, perché con questa mancanza di respiro 
… venire a Milano non era facilissimo. E quindi, quando ho fatto queste lastre la 
diagnosi era che non avevano riscontrato niente quindi quando io ho telefonato al mio 
medico, mi dice: bè, io avevo paura che fosse una pleurite, però visto che non lo è 
sarà solo un dolore intercostale. E questo era il mese di aprile. Io non avevo un day-
hospital fino al mese di giugno..
I: che tipo … scusi che tipo di dolore era?
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A: io avevo un dolore molto forte, a respirare. Avevo delle fitte al torace, e … e non 
solo, sentivo anche che il cuore era interessato. Eh, non batteva con la frequenza 
solita, no? Quindi mi sentivo … proprio un dolore molto forte al torace, quindi … è 
stato un periodo veramente duro. Eh, non mi ricordavo più, adesso che ci ripenso 
[ride] è stato un periodo duro. E quindi niente … potevo camminare solo piano, 
perché solo, solo affrettare un pochino il passo anche  solo in casa, eh, mi … sentivo 
queste fitte che mi impedivano di respirare. E quindi … anche se i miei mi dicevano: 
ma vai a farti vedere dal tuo medico a Milano, ma no, ma tanto adesso il day-hospital 
… quindi … sempre per la paura , di … poter sembrare una lagna, no?
I: si.
A: e quindi … quando sono finalmente arrivato … il giorno del day-hospital e sono 
arrivata qua in ospedale, a fatica, il mio dottore si è spaventato perché poi mi ha fatto 
questa lastra e ha visto che avevo un versamento pleurico, tutti e due i polmoni e 
avevo una pericardite, quindi il cuore ingrossato, il pericardio.
I: questi erano delle …[inudibile.] effetti collaterali della cura del cortisone, o erano 
legati al fatto …
A: no, no, al fatto della malattia.
I: della malattia.
A: era la malattia proprio che aveva … si era sviluppata e quindi iniziava a dare questi 
sintomi.
I: e dopo qua, tre mesi è durato più o meno questo, questa crisi …
A: si questa crisi è durata così, si, poi ..eh … doveva aumentarmi subito il cortisone, la 
dose di cortisone, eh, solo che non avendo..cioè era poco che mi conosceva come 
paziente, e allora mi ha mandata a fare un’indagine allo stomaco. Perché il cortisone 
va da sé che può rovinare lo stomaco. Mi dice, “vediamo che lo stomaco sia a posto, 
poi le aumento il cortisone.” Purtroppo avevo un’ulcera che non sapevo di avere 
quindi per un altro mese non ho potuto aumentare la terapia.. e quindi le cose si sono 
protratte … e questo ha fatto si che mi venissero delle aderenze, tra le pleure e.. e di 
conseguenza il mio respiro affannoso è diventato tale proprio a causa delle aderenze, 
non mi permettevano più di espandere il torace, per respirare. E questa è una cosa che 
mi sono, poi vabè: dopo un mese ho potuto aumentare la terapia, i dolori si sono.. eh 
.. non dico che sono finiti perché non è vero.. eh.. però stavo molto meglio …
I: sempre queste, queste … quando parla di queste, di queste fitte …
A: si fitte al torace, si, si, si. Si che è stata la cosa che mi ha fatto soffrire più di tutto, 
perché ovviamente ha limitato la mia vita anche, anche il fatto di essere rimasta 
seduta a dormire per tutto questo tempo … perché abbassarmi non mi permetteva di 
… cioè sdraiarmi sul letto non mi permetteva di respirare …
I: di respirare
A: … non è stato facile … <coughs> anche perché mi ha portato una conseguenza, anche 
se non ne abbiamo la certezza, eh, mi è venuto un tumore … al fondo schiena 
[inudibile] continuando a stare seduta in quella posizione a letto, si vede che questi 
tessuti erano sottoposti ad uno stress … eh … non comune e ho iniziato ad avere una 
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ciste, che mi è stata tolta in day-hospital pensando che fosse solo una ciste invece era 
un tumore maligno. E quindi … 
I: questo le dava dei, dei, de … se .. se n’è accorta semplicemente per la, perché, per 
averla sentita o comunque …[inudibile.].
A: mi sono accorta perché standoci, standoci seduta sopra mi faceva molto male.
I: che tipo di dolore le dava?
A: era un dolore …. acuto, solo al tatto comunque, solo quando mi sedevo: oppure se la, 
se toccavo questa, questa ciste eh e mi faceva molto male, come se mi bruciasse 
anche, no? E niente, quindi quando ho avvisato il mio medico, il mio reumatologo, 
dico: guardi che ho questa cosa proprio sul, vicino al coccige che mi fa male, e m’ha 
detto: vabè la, la togliamo,, poi come tutte le cose la analizziamo. Perché pensavamo 
proprio che fosse dovuto al continuo …
I: alla pressione …
A: si infatti. E invece poi, quando è stata analizzata era … un tumore maligno.
I: questo in che anno?
A: e questo è successo nel novantasei.
I: nel novantasei. E: lei quindi è rimast, è rimasta in ospedale per questo.
A: si ho dovuto essere ricoverata per accertamenti, subito per fare tutte le indagini del 
caso, poi sono stata rioperata perché ovviamente avevano tolto pensando ad una ciste 
e invece poi han dovuto fare: la pulizia completa. Sono stata fortunata perché sono 
riusciti a togliere tutto, non ho avuto bisogno di fare né chemioterapia né radioterapia. 
Dopo un anno pareva che ci fosse una recidiva, perché il problema si era ripresentato, 
facendo le indagini di controllo avevano trovato che c’era ancora: un nodulo e quindi 
sono stata rioperata, però si sono accorti che non era una recidiva ma era solo un 
nodulo che era andato in necrosi, proprio dovuto alla posizione, sempre stando ancora 
seduta, e da allora mi sono imposta di dormire sdraiata, adesso non riesco a dormire 
con : un cuscino solo, però con due cuscini da sdraiata ho imparato … 
I: ma, adesso quindi, lei ha ancora un problema del …. polmonare per cui, il respiro le 
…. comunque ha ancora dei dolori, o ….
A: mi succede, mi succedono dei periodi in cui ho parecchi dolori ancora al torace, e … 
I: sempre di quello stesso tipo di cui mi parlava prima?
A: si, si. Molto meno intenso rispetto a quel periodo … eh … che però, mi impediscono 
comunque di .. di avere una respirazione corretta, di conseguenza quando ho questi 
dolori io non posso camminare in fretta come sono abituata, non posso sdraiarmi, e di 
conseguenza … sono leggermente limitata insomma, ecco.
I: Si. E poi da quel periodo invece, da allora fino, fino oggi, il resto … cioè la malattia, 
il male ha avuto anche qualch  si è manifestato anche in qualche altro modo …
A: si ho iniziato ad avere dei problemi al nervo ottico.
I: mh mh.
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A: ho iniziato … cioè mi veniva una macchia nera, davanti all’occhio vedevo una 
macchia nera, che nel giro di un’ora e mezza cambiava colore, diventava bianca. No, 
se chiudevo gli occhi diventava bianca, eh, questa macchia la vedevo bianca. Se 
invece li aprivo rimaneva nera, e poi si riassorbiva e si rimpiccioliva nel giro di 
un’ora e mezza circa. Sono andata a fare le indagini, dall’oculista che mi aveva già in 
cura, perché queste terapie possono colpire ….
I: mh.
A: …. gli occhi, e lui, l’oculista non vedeva niente. M’ha detto “se lei . Il momento che 
ha questo problema riesce ad andare in un pronto soccorso, e farsi valutare la 
situazione …”
I: un po’ la storia vecchia del …
A: [inudibile.] 
I: …. gonfiore, per cui non c’era …. 
A: erto. E allora ... sono riuscita, in un momento così ... anche perché, essendo un 
problema che si risolveva nel giro di un’ora e mezza, cioè, dovevo fare in fretta a far 
valutare la cosa. Quindi sono riuscita ad andare in un pronto soccorso, e mi han detto 
che era un’ischemia al nervo ottico. E siccome il lupus, tra le … i vari problemi, può 
aver quello del: il problema della …. il problema della coagulazione del sangue ...
I: mh mh.
A:  e io sono a rischio di trombosi.
I: mh mh
A: quindi … me n’ero già accorta perché ho avuto delle tromboflebiti eh, in … negli 
anni passati. Quindi prendevo già l’Aspirina 500 per … cercare di tenere il sangue più 
fluido. Però, quando sono capitati questi episodi agli occhi poi ho iniziato ad avere 
problemi: qualche volta non mi ricordavo dov’ero … non era una sensazione 
piacevole. E quindi il mio reumatologo ha deciso di farmi … entrare in terapia 
anticoagulante, e quindi adesso sono in terapia anticoagulante. Vado a fare i miei 
controlli del sangue, dipende, una volta alla settimana, ogni quindici giorni, al 
massimo ogni tre settimane … e mi dosano la terapia del farmaco per rendere il 
sangue fluido.
I: questo però era un pro … non le dava ... sensazioni di dolore il problema all’occhio 
….
A: No, dolore no, era proprio … il fatto di non vederci …
I: [inudibile.]
A: … oppure … quello di … non avere …. eh …. la lucidità è una cosa: brutta. E’ una 
brutta sensazione quella di non … capire dove sei, di ...
I: ma mentre le succedeva lei si rendeva conto che qualcosa le stava capitando, o solo a 
posteriori?
348
A: no, no, no, me ne rendevo conto, perché magari … uscivo dall’ospedale e … c’era un 
momento che dicevo: boh, cosa sto facendo qua? Dove sono? Cioè, erano cose di …. 
cioè, frazioni di secondo. Però … cose veramente … <ride> poco piacevoli …
I: si spaventava …
A: e beh, era … antipatica. Una sensazione …. di insicurezza. E poi insomma, è chiaro 
che, qualsiasi dolore fisico, io penso che si possa … anche gestire, ma una cosa 
mentale … penso che sia quella che spaventa più di tutto.
I: mh mh. Quindi questo l’aveva più …. forse più … l’aveva preoccupata più di … 
rispetto ai suoi  dolori … non so, alle articolazioni o: 
A: si. Si, senza dubbio si
I. erché?
A: e perché il fatto di non essere più presente con: con il cervello <ride> cioè perché il 
dolore io penso di poterlo gestire. Qualsiasi cosa, mi fa male, lo sopporto, lo gestisco. 
Però, se sei fuori di testa: è dura.
I: e questa .. per quello invece .. i primi sintomi che ha vissuto, appunto, i dolori, i 
gonfiori, i dolori alle articolazioni, sono qualcosa che lei ha ancora, di cui soffre 
ancora?
A: si, … si, si, si. Si, si. Ormai ci facciamo compagnia tranquillamente. Io dico sempre 
che io e il mio lupus siamo diventati amici. Lui: mi lascia un po’ di spazio e io faccio 
altrettanto con lui. Poi quando magari mi dà qualche problema in più, in genere dico 
“si vede che ha bisogno di un po’ di pappa”, allora devo aumentare un po’ la dose 
della terapia, poi si mette tranquillo e conviviamo bene.
I: <ride> è interessante come immagine del …
A: <ride>
I: come se lei lo visualizzasse, quasi come fosse .. 
A: si, si, si. E infatti quando: mia mamma provato a dire “questa maledetta, questo 
maledetto lupus [inudibile,]”, “non chiamarlo così, che poi se la prende con me. 
Teniamocelo buono, cerchiamo di convivere tranquillamente, senza: farlo 
arrabbiare”.
I: se: vabe, immagino che probabilmente l’avrà fatto quando, parlando con i medici. 
Ma: se anche dovesse, se qualcuno le chiedesse che tipo di dolore è, il dolore che lei 
sperimenta, per esempio nell’articolazione, lei come lo descriverebbe?
A: <deep breath> non è facile: descrivere il dolore, <ride> non è facile: vabè, poi ce ne 
sono di diversi tipi, perché, il dolore eh .. vorrei dire un bruciore ma non è, non è un 
bruciore. E’ proprio una cosa acuta. In alcuni casi, sembra di: cioè tante volte si 
sentono queste frasi che ti sembrano esagerate, però, sembra che qualcuno ti stia 
girando un coltello dentro, no? Cioè: e in effetti molto spesso è così, anche se sono 
cose che io non dico mai perché non : anche sentirle dire mi da fastidio, mi sembra 
quasi che, che si voglia enfatizzare , no?
I:  mh
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A: cioè renderlo ancora più: più pesante, però in effetti è così, qualche volta il dolore è 
proprio come se fosse un coltello che ti entra: quello al torace è stato comunque: 
tremendo, quelle veramente sembravano delle pugnalate <long pause>
I: si, penso sia difficile immaginarlo. Credo sia, appunto una delle difficoltà, no? Ma, 
quando … parlando con il medico, con le persone intorno, il fatto che per lei è 
difficile descriverlo: eh .. la frustrava …
I: stavamo dicendo, era, non so il fatto che .. questa difficoltà nel riuscire a descrivere 
quello che le stava succedendo, quello che lei ..sente a livello fisico, le: come .. l’ha 
vissuto in modo particolare, non, non, aveva qualche effetto su di lei ..c’era, c’è della 
frustrazione quando non riesce ..
A: no, quello che, mi dava fastidio era il fatto di arrivare senza niente di visibile quando 
dovevo fare la visita dal medico. Anche perché, dire mi fa male, il medico ..cioè se è 
competente in materia … probabilmente capisce che cosa s’intende “mi fa male”, 
però il “mi fa male” voleva dire anche non riuscire ad usare un’articolazione, quindi 
vuol dire non riuscire a piegarla, non riuscire a: eh, cioè la sofferenza di questo 
genere. Ma, eh, l’aspetto visivo, era quello che avrebbe dato al medico la sicurezza di 
questa: perché ..
I: cioè, se avesse visto qualche cosa …
A: le articolazioni, si, ecco, le articolazioni si gonfiavano, erano tumefatte e calde. Di 
conseguenza avrebbe capito che in effetti c’era qualcosa. Perché descrivere così, “mi 
fa male”, “non posso usare il polso, piuttosto che questo dito” cioè molto spesso il 
medico non può capire in effetti quanto male hai. Non è facile. Perché poi ognuno ha 
la sua soglia del dolore. C’è quello che riesce a sopportare un dolore fortissimo, 
quello che con un dolore molto basso: cioè, va già in crisi.
I: E invece nel rapporto con: i familiari, gli amici questo .. spesso incapacità di riuscire 
a descrivere precisamente quello: il tipo di dolore, [inudibile.] la preoccupava, 
frustrava, riusciva comunque a: rapportarsi alle persone, o comunque si sentiva 
magari, forse isolata per non riuscire …
A: no, no, io devo dire che, eh, i miei sono sempre stati molto comprensivi nel senso che, 
poi mi conoscono e sanno che se mi lamento è perché c’è qualcosa effettivamente che 
non va, altrimenti non non mi sarei lamentata. Io poi non sono una che drammatizza o 
che racconta molto, nel senso che, vabè, mi fa male ma poi non è che mi interessa di 
entrare in particolari. Anche perché, se dici a un familiare “mi fa male” generalmente 
ti credono. Non pensano che tu la stai mettendo giù dura, per intenderci. Mentre farsi 
capire da un medico è diverso, insomma. Il medico non ti conosce quindi, magari può 
immaginare che tu: sei tragica, che magari è una cosa meno pesante di quella che stai 
cercando di descrivere. Mentre in casa no. In casa: anzi, non mi piace essere 
compatita, assolutamente. E’ una cosa che non, che non mi interessa, anche perché 
non mi serve essere compatita. E molto spesso sono io che devo dare coraggio agli 
altri, perché: questo anche quando ho avuto il tumore, perché gli altri erano disperati, 
e la meno disperata di tutti ero io alla fine.
I: beh, è strano perché sembra che capiti abbastanza spesso, che alla fine chi si trova ...
A: è quello che deve dar coraggio agli altri.
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I: ad aver: il problema, comunque sia, deve poi farsi carico degli altri, che sembra che 
riescano a, a gestire …
A: io mi ricordo quando ho avuto il problema respiratorio, una sera in particolare che ero 
sul letto, sempre seduta, con questo respiro affannoso, ed è una cosa tremenda, e mio 
marito sulla porta della camera che mi guardava con un’aria come per dire “dimmi 
cosa posso fare”, e io l’ho mandato via, “vai via che non ti voglio vedere” <ride>. 
Perché veramente, è stato un periodo nero ed ero … cioè non respirare fa diventar 
nervosi, eh, innervosisce molto <ride>
I: Immagino <ride>, immagino che sia …
A: ecco, e per il resto: no per il resto, i miei, diciamo che non, penso che non , non che si 
rendano conto, sanno benissimo che io ho questi problemi però non li ho mai fatti 
pesare a nessuno. Perché innanzitutto non pesano tanto neanche a me. Di 
conseguenza …
I: quest, questo … prima mi aveva parlato delle macchie che ogni tanto le comparivano 
….
A: si.
I: …. sul corpo. Le succede ancora?
A: ma: sono queste macchioline che mi sono, queste macchie che sono uscite sotto pelle, 
ma sul palmo delle mani e dei piedi. Eh, queste ogni tanto escono, dipende dal 
periodo, eh, mi sono uscite poi, altri, dei noduli sulle gambe, queste cose sono 
abbastanza frequenti. E anche lì devo aumentare un po’ la dose di cortisone fino a che 
non …
I: e queste fanno male?
A: si, sono molto dolenti.
I: sta parlando dei noduli o delle macchioline?
A: Dei noduli.
I: Dei noduli.
A: dei noduli sulle gambe, perché pare che siano dei noduli che si appoggiano proprio 
sul nervo, di conseguenza, ogni volta che fai un movimento con la gamba, col piede, 
senti questa fitta continua.
I: uindi sono tipo delle fitte?
A: Si.
I: Non dei bruciori, fitte?
A: si, no, no, no, proprio: una fitta, si.
I: però se lei rimane [inudibile.] se rimane immobile non le fanno male?
A: fa male. Non come quando cammino ovviamente, non come quando mi muovo.
I: e invece le macchie? [inudibile.] che tipo?
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A: e invece le macchie: no le macchie erano soffe… erano dolenti se le toccavo. 
Altrimenti no, non è che facessero male. Erano come, anche quelli, come dei nodulini 
che si erano formati sotto pelle, sul palmo delle mani e dei  piedi. E quando mi 
succede, ancora mi fanno male, chiaramente, camminare sento. Perché si arrossa, sia 
la pianta del piede che quella delle mani, si arrossa proprio a macchie, e diventa 
sofferente. Comunque è anche una mancanza di circolazione anche.
I: lei ha, cioè ha dei momenti in cui è completamente libera dal dolore adesso?
A: si.
I: quindi non è un .. ci son dei momenti …
A: si, si ci stavo pensando <ride> …. son talmente abituata. No, una cosa ad esempio 
che, che ho capito sin dall’inizio che: devo riuscire ad apprezzare i momenti in cui sto 
bene. Ad esempio se ho le ginocchia gonfie ho delle difficoltà a scendere le scale, 
salirle, camminare. Ma quando sto bene, io posso scendere le scale saltellando, sono 
felicissima. Cose che persone che stanno sempre bene non si rendono neanche conto 
di avere. E questa è una felicità che non tutti riescono a provare.
I: si ricorda com’era la vita prima che cominciasse tutto questo per lei?
A: si, io sono sempre stata una persona molto attiva, eh, mi è sempre piaciuto molto 
lavorare, ma anche fare fatiche non mi è mai pesato. L’ho sempre fatto volentieri, 
devo sempre essere in movimento, sempre sentirmi utile, fare qualcosa. E, devo dire 
che nonostante tutto riesco a farlo ancora oggi, anche con i dolori. Chiaro, sono un 
po’ limitata rispetto a prima, non riesco più ad esempio, ad abbassarmi, mettermi in 
ginocchio, fare queste cose, ho delle difficoltà. Adesso ho dei nipotini, i bambini di 
mio fratello, e mi piacerebbe poter fare una corsa. Ogni tanto c’è il piccolino che mi 
dice ”dai zia, prendimi”. Eh, è una parola <ride>
I: e’ difficile …
A: correr dietro a un bambino è diventato per me molto pesante.
I: correre dietro a un bambino è difficile un po’ per tutti <ride>. Se, se le capita di 
provare un .. del dolore che, probabilmente non legato alla malattia, come può essere, 
non so, il mal di testa che a tutti viene, o un taglio, una bruciatura, lei lo vive in modo
..pensa che lo vive in modo diverso? Vive, cioè, non so, perché pensavo a ... lei prima 
ha parlato di questo, questa figura, questo lupus, che si nutre, quindi dà dei problemi 
in qualche modo. Però probabilmente, siccome essendo ancora viva e: avendo delle 
sensazioni, come a tutti capita di avere altri problemi che non sono legati. Non lo so, 
lo percepisce in modo diverso? Cioè c’è come, per lei, c’è come il dolore del lupus e 
gli altri dolori? E se si, come sono diversi, come li percepisce? Oppure, è tutto 
comunque alla fine ...
A: no, no, no, sono diversi. Ad esempio, stavo pensando, forse per quello mi sono 
scottata l’altro giorno, perché dovevo rispondere alla sua domanda, forse ho sentito 
<ride>
I: ah si? Grazie per la collaborazione <ride>
A: ho sentito un bruciore molto intenso, e chiaramente molto diverso dai dolori che sento 
di solito. Quindi, scappare subito sotto l’acqua fresca, e mettermi un po’ di crema, ed 
era fastidioso sentire questa, eh, molto più fastidioso che sentire dolore alle ginocchia, 
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piuttosto che i dolori alle mani. A questi dolori ci sono anche probabilmente abituata. 
E poi un: dolore di una bruciatura è un dolore molto forte, molto intenso, quindi … si 
spera che passi in fretta.
I: mh, mh, ehm, per esempio se dovesse paragonare, non so, le fitte che aveva, che non 
son stati molto forte, dolorose.
A: Si.
I: vome, in che modo pensa che, secondo lei che differe… come descriverebbe la 
differenza del, della fitta che era comunque una cosa legata …
A: on quelle al torace, ad esempio?
I: si. E’ un dolore intenso quale può essere .. invece uno … quando avevo sedici anni ho 
rovesciato <ride> una pentola di acqua bollente sulle gambe ...
A: noo.
I: …. e la ricordo come l’esperienza più terribile della mia vita <ride>
A: me lo immagino. No io devo dire che: il dolore di una bruciatura è un dolore forte, eh, 
che però sai che passa. Nel senso che, eh, è una cosa che dici “vabè adesso vado sotto 
l’acqua fresca” [inudibile.] certo, è chiaro la bruciatura di un ferro da stiro non è che 
sia: una pentola d’acqua bollente che ti cade sulle gambe. Quindi dici, “vabè, passa, 
mi metto qualcosa di fresco”, mentre un dolore come le fitte che provavo al torace: mi 
condizionavano molto. Quelle mi condizionavano molto la vita, perché avevo 
difficoltà a respirare, e questa era una cosa … Mi impediva di fare tante cose.
I: per finire, solo una cosa. Mi ha colpito molto l’immagine che aveva usato del lupus 
come una, il lupus come malattia, come questa specie di mostro, qualcosa che c’è 
dentro di lei.
M. A: No che non è un mostro.
I: Una ...
A: un lupetto.
I: un lupo, una piccola cosa amichevole ... la malattia però, e il lupus. Se invece dovesse 
immaginare, non lo so raffigurare invece, il dolore, indipendentemente dal, il dolore 
in sé. Che, che immagine le verrebbe in mente?
A; non brutta.
I: non brutta?
A: no, no, una cosa che fa parte della vita. Poi: devo dire che non so neanche se mi 
piacerebbe guarire da questa malattia.
I: ah.
A: perché mi ha insegnato tante cose. E, io sono riuscita a, a fare nella vita una cosa che 
mi piace molto, che è quella di rendermi utile agli altri. E ho potuto farlo grazie al 
lupus. Perché io non avrei potuto permettermi di non lavorare. Io ho l’invalidità, ho 
lavorato 24 anni, quindi: io sono a casa con la pensione di invalidità, anche se non è 
tanta, ma io mi accontento di poco.
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I: mh, mh
A: quindi questo mi permette di: venire a Milano e fare volontariato ed essere vicino ai 
malati. E’ una cosa che mi piace molto.
I: grazie.
A: a lei.
354
3 Gina
Interviewer: volevo chiederle se magari per iniziare mi parlava un po’ della sua esperienza, di 
come è iniziata {la mia malattia} eh ... la malattia, e di come appunto, un po’ la 
genesi della sua storia.
Gina: ma, io ho incominciato ... che m: mi venivano dei dolori sul, sulle ginocchia, o magari 
ai piedi, e maggiormente me ne accorgevo quando andavo in montagna, perché sono 
appassionata della montagna. E quando dovevo fare la discesa, mi si gonfiavano le 
ginocchia rimanevo bloccata. Poi magari a casa, eh: a volte mi si gonfiava la mano, a
volte il braccio, però mh, con febbre anche, ma non mi preoccupavo più di tanto 
perché mi dicevano, e ma tanto se i dolori girano vuol dire che non è una cosa grave.
I: che, che dolori erano questi che, provava inizialmente?
G:  erano dolori molto forti, alle ginocchia proprio mi bloccavano: l’a ... l’articolazione. 
E lo stesso succedeva sulle mani o sui polsi. Febbre alta e dolori forti, perché poi si 
gonfiava: l’articolazione rimaneva bloccata. Ma: al momento ripeto, non non ho dato 
peso più di tanto, invece c’è stato una mattina che non riuscivo neanche alzarmi dal 
letto. E: telefonato al medico di famiglia: al momento ha detto di venire qui: al [nome 
ospedale]., però: era piuttosto lontano, ho passato sopra alla cosa, e dopo: ho 
cominciato a fare alcuni esami: del sangue così, però, na volta sono andata: da un 
medico poi m’ha mandato da un altro medico, prima m’hanno curato per i denti, 
sembrava che avessi degli ascessi ai denti, poi invece dicevano che era: 
un’infiammazione così, e intanto son passati: quasi due anni. Quando è stata scoperta 
la malattia, che non ne potevo più, sono andata: dal: da un cardiologo, che era: amico 
di famiglia, del della mia amica, e: e lui come mi ha visto le mani ha detto che avevo 
l’artrite reumatoide. M’ ha mandato a: a [nome ospedale] a fare degli accertamenti, e 
da lì è incominciata: proprio tutto, la cura vera e propria dell’artrite reumatoide. 
Cominciato a stare un po’ meglio, però: logicamente: è stata un po’ duretta, 
specialmente i primi tempi.
I: questo scusi, quanti anni fa sono iniziati: i problemi?
G: e: dunque, venti: due anni fa.
I: ventidue anni fa. E la diagnosi: è stata dopo quanti anni?
G: due anni.
I: dopo due anni.
G: da quando ho iniziato ad avere i dolori, si.
I: da allora come è progredita poi la malattia?
G: è progredita con le deformazioni varie, sulle mani, e sui piedi. Ho già fatto:  due 
operazioni ceh ho messo delle protesi: alle mani, specialmente: eh: … articolazioni 
qua, e, però sto abbastanza bene … a parte magari qualche episodio: magari che si 
fanno dei lavori senza accorgersi che maga, ieri per esempio ho tagliato, un po’ di 
verdura e oggi ho, tutto il dito gonfio che non riesco a, {e le fa male?} ad avere la 
forza di, di prendere una cosa ecco.
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I: e: {si, fa male} è è dolente? {si} questi dolori, è innanzitutto, solamente alle 
articolazioni? Sono solo alla:
G: alle piccole articolazioni: poi prende a volte le spalle, e: il dolore più: acuto e più: 
fastidioso, diciamo, doloroso, è quando mi prende: qua dietro alla schiena e si vede 
che proprio c’è: la muscolatura che si infiamma, e anche a respirare: proprio non non 
riesco. Magari quando devo andare a letto, solamente fare questo movimento di di 
scendere giù, e: un un dolore fortissimo, che mi blocca persino la respirazione.
I:  quindi molto intenso?
G: molto intenso.
I: e invece quelli alle: alle articolazioni che tipo di, come li descriverebbe?
G:  son sempre forti, che a volte proprio: sente quasi: che glielo stanno strappando, metto 
il ghiaccio: se no altro qualcosa: mi, [allevia?]
I: sono simili a bruciori oppure no? … sono anche di diverso tipo?
G: son proprio come delle, non so, non come degli aghi, che che son proprio come un 
qualcosa che strappa, sinceramente non c’ho mai fatto caso, se è più: non so, non so 
descriverlo, so che è forte.
I: e vanno: e quando, quando le vengono durano: durano diverso tempo: sono: eh:
G:  ma, i primi tempi duravano magari un giorno, desso invece: magari due tre giorni, 
prima di: di alleviare proprio il dolore completamente.
I: nonostante, prenda: gli ...
G: nonostante antinfiammatori e tutto, e la cura di fondo.
I:  ahm: lei come, come direbbe che è: eh la malattia ha influenzato la sua vita?
G: all’inizio: è stata dura, perché avevo ancora i bambini piccolini, e di conseguenza: 
anche loro sono stati un po’: non dico traumatizzati però quasi. Perché due per tre ero 
lì bloccata e loro, aiutavano il papà insomma, nelle faccende domestiche. E: di 
conseguenza: cioè la mia vita è cambiata, a poco a poco però: c’ho fatto l’abitudine, e 
adesso, mi sembra di essere una persona normale, se non mi guardo le mani, mi 
sembra di essere.
I: anche perché, mi sta dicendo che comunque, gli episodi dolorosi non sono più come:
G: non sono più frequenti come prima, adesso è abbastanza controllata diciamo come 
malattia.
I: e lei ha trovato: nel momento in cui ha cominciato a avvicinarsi a: al, ai medici: o alle 
altre persone, è stato, e: era difficile? La, la comunicazione, con, con l’establishment 
medico: eh: era difficoltosa: ha trovato comprensione: oppure ...
G:  no beh, andando da, da reumatologi per quanto le malattie le conoscono, ho trovato 
abbastanza comprensione non ho avuto difficoltà.
[interruzione]
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I: ahm, niente, quindi, mhm quando, eh: … lei ha sempre a che fare con persone, oltre 
che con i malatti però con gente che non ha la sua stessa esperienza, ah, trova: ehm 
come trova, riesce a comunicare quello che: che è la sua esperienza o pensa che sia, 
molto difficoltoso?
G:  Non, non comunico la, la mia malattia a nessuno. Cioè non, non ho occasione di dire, 
quello che ho, quello che provo.
I: ma magari, … immaginavo magari le sarà capitato qualche volta di: magari di dover 
essere coinvolta in qualche attività che non le è stato possibile:
G: mi rifiuto, perché: anche in parrocchia andavo a fare: appunto la segretaria, così: 
c’erano dei lavori, tranquillamente non ho mai, nascosto la mia malattia, anche perché 
si vede. E dico no, questo lavoro non lo posso fare perché la mia malattia non me lo 
permette. Si, dico la verità, magari: ci sono delle volte che, ci s, mhm, mi sento un po’ 
in imbarazzo con queste mani, Però: si superano.
I:  E: il suo rapporto con il suo corpo com’è? In seguito alla: un rapporto: non lo so, lo 
vive come qualcosa di: tra virgolette forse di: di nemico, di: di di di una fonte di, ah: 
di problemi, o …
G: non [so? Sono?] vado d’accordo con me stessa.
I: ma perché, pensavo, a alcuni può anche capitare di identificare, forse il corpo 
l’origine di, non non non {dei guai} [di non volersi] creare quasi un distacco fra, la la 
propria mente e quello che invece è la la sede di, ah: {della sofferenza} della 
sofferenza forse … credo che sia diverso per ogni persona.
G: penso di sì dipende da come, da come si accetta la malattia. Io penso che, tante volte 
magari ci son delle persone che proprio la rifiutano, la malattia o magari, hanno dei 
grossi problemi, le dico la verità, c’è stato un periodo che anch’io ho avuto dei 
problemi proprio perché, tutti i giorni che non stavo bene, tutti i giorni che avevo 
qualcosa: di fatti: avevo fatto un colloquio con, la psicologa, proprio per questo però, 
lei aveva stabilito che non avevo dei problemi, era solo magari un momentino più di 
sconforto.
I: questo era più, verso l’inizio.
G: molto indietro, dopo da allora, forse è stato quello, anche una spinta, a, a reagire. Da 
allora è iniziata proprio la salita.
I: e il suo lavoro all’interno dell’associazione le: come lo vede rispetto a, è uno dei 
fattori che l’aiutano a, a: appunto a stare meglio con se stessa?
G: si, si si indubbiamente perché, ci si sente utili lo stesso. Anzichè essere in casa 
solamente, tra le quattro mura: cioè ci si sente: utili anche, ad altre persone che hanno 
il tuo stesso problema.
I: c’è una certa comunità, tra: 
G: si, tra di noi, si. Cioè mi sento veramente: anche, cioè, dopo un po’ che non ci si vede: 
anche oggi, che è un’occasione del, dell’assem, cioè dell’incontro che abbiamo, nel 
pomeriggio, è stata un’occasione per ritrovarci dopo tanto tempo, perché non è che ci 
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si trova tutte sempre, spesso, quando invece ci sono quest’incontri ci si ritrova e: 
proprio: c’è quasi un affetto tra tutte, forse, condividiamo tutti la stessa pena.
I: sente, forse, più compresa dalle persone che, che soffrono come lei?
G: si, indubbiamente. Specialmente, all’inizio le persone che ti son vicine, a parte mio 
marito e i miei figli, ma le persone esterne non non capivano, la malattia, perché 
magari, io soffrivo e il giorno prima che ero là: a terra, al telefono come stai, sto 
male, così, ma il giorno dopo mi vedevano come nulla fosse, allora dicono ma “sta 
qua mi prende in giro”, e invece, son proprio, le malattie reumatiche che sono: una 
cosa molto oscura, che oggi stai male e domani invece non hai più niente.
I: … un po’ confonde lo stereotipo che le persone hanno di malattia che dovrebbe essere 
qualcosa forse, nell’immaginario comune che ti blocca in modo, costante a letto per 
un, non so mesi {si, è vero}
G: e, guardi io mi sono trovata il mese, no il mese di novembre, con delle mie ex 
colleghe, che è tanto tempo che non le vedevo io son stata a casa dall’ufficio che, non 
avevo niente, son stata a casa perché ho avuto il secondo bambino, e: dopo hanno 
parlato con mia sorella, perché lavoravamo tutte e due nella stessa azienda, e le han 
detto oh ma com’è conciata la G., con quelle mani, ma io non ho niente in confronto, 
cioè si sono immaginate chissà che cosa perché ho le mani deformate, no? Eh, però al 
momento loro non han detto niente però: hanno avuto proprio questa, questo impatto, 
mentre all’inizio le deformazioni non c’erano ancora, e allora: magari, lei stava male 
oggi domani non aveva più niente, sembra che non abbia mai niente, e invece: 
comporta prendere dei medicinali che sono anche piuttosto pesanti, per poter stare in 
piedi tutti i giorni.
I: quindi c’era un po’ questa situazione paradossale, per cui, prima, che magari non 
c’erano le deformazioni, ma c’era una forte {non era capito} sofferenza, non veniva 
compresa, adesso magari, si vedono i segni fisici, ma la sofferenza è, {è meno} è 
diminuita, le persone immaginino che invece sia più sofferenza perché vedono i segni 
…
G: si, è vero.
I: va bene signora, la ringrazio per, per avermi aiutato, c’è qualcosaltro che vuole, dire 
che pensa che è importante che magari non le ho chiesto:
G: no, io penso di vivere bene adesso con la mia malattia <ride> anche se adesso 
cominciano i problemi grossi forse.
I: perché?
G: perché incomincia il fegato, i reni:, il cuore, gli occhi, adesso c’è, l’altro risvolto 
<ride> però
I:  sempre legato all’artrite reumatoide.
G: e beh, i medicinali, da una parte fan bene ma dall’altra, per quanto son ventidueanni 
che me la curo.
I: […]
G: si.
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I: grazie.
G: di niente.
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4 Marta
Interviewer: la prima domanda, volevo chiederle un po’ se, voleva parlare di quella che è la sua 
esperienza con la malattia. Quando è iniziata giusto per: eh ...
M: io ho iniziato a cinquantotto anni ed ero, mai avuto nessuna malattia nella mia vita, 
ero veramente, mi consideravo fortunata, perché non avevo mai avuto nulla, e 
improvvisamente da un piccolo dolore, da un dito, è nata, tutto un susseguirsi di 
questa patologia, che c’ha l’artrite reumatoide.
I: mh mh
M: che, eh: man mano m’ha preso le mani. I piedi eh: diagnosticarla non è stato facile 
perché io sono: con gli esami sieronegativa, cioè non: agli esa:mi clinici non risultava 
nulla, per cui c’è è stata fatta una ricerca approfondita di tutto quello che poteva 
essere . non eh inerente a un’artrite reumatoide poi alla fine è stata diagnosticato e 
adesso ne porto le conseguenze perché nel giro praticamente di Quattro anni mi son 
trovata con piedi e mani compromessi al punto da dover operare.
I: e questo: diceva che il problema è iniziato a un dito ...
M: a un dito sì.
I: che tipo di:
M: mi è stato diagnosticato un semplicissimo dall’ortopedico un semplicissima: tendinite, 
eh: per cui non ha dato importanza a questa cosa, poi invece, successivamente ho 
avuto: dei problemi alle mani mhm sì dico alle mani bruciare, eh di notte avevo dei 
dolori fortissimi alle mani, po il piede ha cominciato a gonfiarsi un po la caviglia poi 
l’altro e così:
I: ed erano tutti: cioè sia alla caviglia: tutti: erano, la prima manifestazione era di tipo 
dolorosa, oppure era non so prima c’era il gonfiore e non dolore
M: no no … le mani è stata dolorosa perché naturalmente con: con anche il tunnel 
carpale che naturalmente viene compromesso anche da questa infiammazione per cui 
dava dei dolori alle mani: particolarmente di notte, questi bruciori da: insopportabili, 
eh niente un po’ di gonfiore.
I: quindi era erano bruciori questi ...
M: sì bruciore poi gonfiore . poi: la ma eh anche la caviglia ha iniziato a gonfiarsi, poi 
anche l’altra per cui ecco poi eh:
I: e il primo, quel problema al dito che lei ha avuto inizialmente … che tipo di dolor le 
dava era una qualcosa di:
M: niente avevo male: avevo male, male  a: questo pollice del dito per cui sono andata 
dall’ortopedico dicendo come mai avevo questo dolore, e lui m’ha detto è una ...
[una porzione dell’intervista e’ mancante a causa di un danno al nastro]
M: poteva poteva, adesso poi io parlo da ignorante, non voglio <ride} di ... maga ... però 
questo m’è rimasto in mente chiaramente per cui è stato fatto tutto il possibile e alla 
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fine mi hanno detto no, lei non ha niente altro, persino anche a livello neurologico, 
sono andata al Besta mi hanno fatto anche la: come si chiama, la lombare.
I: la lombare.
M: tutto anche il sistema nervoso ero a posto dal punto di vista, cioè fisico non … per cui 
mi hanno consigliato di seguire sempre la reumatologia e con altre terapie
I: e in tutto quel periodo . e anche in questo periodo: il, il dolore lei lo aveva in modo 
continuo? Oppure erano, non so, tra non so il periodo … in cui c’è stato ...
M: ma ma insomma intanto sono stata bastonata di antinfiammatori: cortisone: all’inizio. 
per cui naturalmente: i bruciori che avevo alle mani quest cose mi si sono: calmati: 
abbastanza, non posso dire . che: ecco, eh il dolore naturalmente anche ai piedi m’era 
venuto camminavo male perché naturalmente deformandosi le articolazioni poi 
creano … problemi. si induriscono le articolazioni, si si cammina male per cui ho 
dovuto intervenire anche, mi si è, avevo i piedi dritti le mani dritte normali <ride> per 
cui ho dovuto il dolore dato da queste malformazioni che ti ehm eh induriscono i: eh 
le: le articolazioni naturalmente i movimenti delle mani dei piedi e il dolore è un 
dolore almeno nel mio caso più che: quel dolore . cioè dici “oddio oddio adesso sto 
male, prendo subito un antidolorifico”, ma è una cosa che praticamente t’accompagna 
un po’ tutto il giorno . perché più che dolore è un indurimento un: un’incapacità di: di 
sentir difatti non chiudi bene le mani, non puoi essere e per cui hai sempre questa … 
tensione, a livello muscolare: articolare insomma.
I: ma questa sensazione che lei descrive, lei la prova anche quando: per esempio è 
ferma immobile, seduta che non sta facendo niente quando è a riposo, oppure è 
qualcosa che le si manifestava quando: cerca di muoversi, di fare qualche …
M: a volte anche quando si è a riposo si ha questa, a volte ci sono anche dolori che si 
manifestano anche a riposo . però naturalmente il riposo, consente di: e io ieri anch’io 
mi son data della stupida perché ho portato una borsa.
I: mhm.
M: vado a far la spesa, e stupidamente anche solo dalla macchina alla, al coso, l’ho 
invece che prenderla colle mani come si fa normalmente l’ho appoggiata sul: 
l’avambraccio e io stamattina mi sento tutto: … si vede che praticamente il nervo si è 
così e: e ho detto non non posso assolutamente portare più una borsa neanche 
sull’avambraccio, quindi devo … mi sono  <ride>
I: quindi adesso le fa: ha, generalmente adesso lei ha: in questo momento per esempio, 
mentre parliamo, ha delle sensazioni di: di dolore che, c come come si sente?
M: eh dunque, eh: mhm, naturalmente uno poi come, riesce anche abituarsi a uno stato 
che non è normale, … come tendo a dire, dolore questo momento no ma c’è sempre, 
sempre quella per esempio nelle caviglie nella cosa quella co, sensazione di ehm 
indurimento che … che magari le: magari non so muovo il piede perché, mi sembra di 
avere qualcosa che mi stringe mi: mi ostacola no, allora devo, magari parlo son lì 
bella tranquilla però magari muovo il piede, perché mi, sento che c’è questa cosa, la 
mano si sente perché e sì [perché] una cosa . come dico nel mio caso, più che di 
dolore acuto che richiede, è una sensazione di, di indurimento che è: alla fine però 
insomma disturba se non come il dolore: quasi ecco
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I: come, come direbbe che ha influenzato la sua vita, avere, un’artrite reumatoide? 
Come l’ha cambiata?
M: e beh insomma, direi che l’ha influenzata: nonostante io sia una abbastanza 
combattiva perché riesco a: sinceramente mio marito mi dice sempre che se fosse 
capitato a lui <ride> mi dice, cioè, riesco a reagire ancora bene, perché: 
I: … è difficile … quando non si prova comunque a capire come si potrebbe reagire.
M: infatti, io son sempre stata abituata a: andare fare correre a: camminare come dico 
prima di ammalarmi, è stato nel giugno del novantasette, io venti giorni prima, tanto è 
vero che ho persin dato colpa a questa camminata che ho fatto, ho fatto una 
camminata su una: su in montagna nell’Appennino.
I: mhm.
M: a duemila metri, cioè da mille metri sono andata … a duemila, son tornata indietro 
che ero molto molto: cioè a un certo punto ho dovuto abbandonare perché, ho lasciato 
la compagnia <ride> perché, [infatti?] son tornata indietro da sola perché non ce la 
facevo più ho fatto uno sforzo, forse non ero più a camminare così tanto, però stavo 
bene insomma, come dico ero una persona sana e anche avevo voglia di far le cose e 
naturalmente la mia vita è cambiata nel senso che, non posso più dire domani vado, 
faccio un viaggio . domani vedrò come sto, eh se posso fare, se posso andare, anche 
stamattina avevo un appuntamento con una mia: … però io stamattina sinceramente: 
non mi sentivo, e: anche se, cioè se fosse stato urgente, una cosa però, non posso 
tanto più programmare la mia vita, ecco primo, non posso programmare la mia vita, e 
questo naturalmente cambia molte cose.
I: è tutto più: lasciato alla ...
M: e insomma.
I: alla giornata.
M: io: a questo punto sì, a questo punto sì, la cosa che mi aiuta molto è il fatto di saper 
guidare.
I: mhm
M: perché siccome non cammino molto, chè naturalmente: a, non camminando molto, il 
fatto di poter guidare ancora <ride> mi aiuta moltissimo.
I: perché guidare invece riesce?
M: sì.
I: bene senza problemi.
M: no no no, riesco abbastanza bene no no non c’è problema anzi, non ho problemi, il 
fatto di poter dire vado al supermercato anche se cammino poco [acquisto?] le mie 
cose mi sento realizzata, io ho provato a star a casa due medi perché son stata operata 
a una mano non potevo guidare, mi sentivo una malata grave . perché non potevo 
andare in giro e dico se vado in giro e cammino quel poco e poi mi stanco, quindi 
ndare sui mezzi pubblici ho paura.
I: perché?
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M: perché avevo una mano sola.
I: ah.
M: non posso: andare <ride> con una mano, da sola, cioè non mi sentivo auto sufficiente, 
per cui ...
I: questo anche adesso avrebbe: delle, le darebbe problemi andare sui mezzi pubblici ... 
M: no adesso adesso con due mani[…
I: a perché prima n ne poteva usare una: inizialmente una sola?
M: e sì, sono stata operata: a una mano, eh allora, appunto dico bene, il fatto di guidare 
mi ha mi ha aiutato moltissimo, veramente, e questo …
I: per per non dipende per la dipendenza che …
M: sì sì, assolutamente, anche perché con col tipo di malattia che abbiamo: io dovrei 
sempre chiedere a mio marito accompagnami a far gli esami, accompagnami a a dal 
… medico, accompagnami a far le pratiche per fare: le le impegnative, ogni giorno ce 
n’è una cioè.
I: certo.
M: bisogna: e le pratiche per avere magari non so, i plantari devo andare dall’ortopedico, 
le sca, ma scherza, vuol dire un uomo, <ride> avrebbe …
I: dovrebbe essere sì molto, si sempre appunto a disposizione.
M: io dico sempre a mio marito che è stato fortunato che ho preso la patente trent’anni fa.
I: sì certo <ride>
M: quando lui non voleva, che mi diceva, perché prendi la patente.
I: e invece poi è diventata utile.
M: da bravo maschilista di una volta <ride>
I: adesso invece <ride> ha fatto, ha fatto bene.
M: e infatti infatti.
I: e senta, rispetto a: altri dolori che non sono legati a: alla malattia, che può provare o 
che ha provato in passato, come li paragonerebbe . non so que dolori che tutti hanno, 
magari cadendo per cui si prende una botta che fa male oppure, eh, un una bruciatura, 
cioè questi dolori ehm come sono rispetto . a quello invece è un: un dolore non legato 
alla malattia?
M: ma, dal punto di vista fisico, uno cade si fa male a: sopporta il dolore:, un dolore: 
dovuto a queste cose, passa, quindi uno le supera, a un certo punto, invece questo tipo 
di malattia, è senza ritorno cioè anche: pensi sempre ecco se son così poi domani 
potrò ancora guidare, potrò ancora.
I: mhm.
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M: insomma limita molto la: per cui è un: dire che è più grave delle altre cose, chè una 
malattia cronica insomma, diciamocela, che uno poi l’affronti più o meno: poi 
naturalmente davanti: io almeno quello che ho passato nella mia vita ho avuto dei 
grossi dispiaceri però, m: mi: anche abbastanza importanti perché ho perso due 
bambini, adesso vabè,appena nati perché ho avuto due gravidanze … bambini … son 
mancati appena nati.
I: sì.
M: per cui son cose gravi.
I: mhm.
M: dal punto di vista fisico, mentale, però, eh la superi e: così, però se fosse capitato a 
me di ammalarmi, quando ho perso i bambini quando avevo trent’anni di artrite 
reumatoide, penso che la mia vita sarebbe stata veramente peggio di quello che, delle 
esperienze che ho avuto insomma, io ho vissuto abbastanza bene diciamo, mi sento 
veramente quando mi dicono queste malate da: da quando hanno venti trent’anni 
veramente sono: eh la loro vita è stata rovinata eh insomma, da questa malattia …
I: quindi: okay, va bene la ringrazio molto.
M: […]
I: c’è qualcos’altro  che vuole dire che vuole aggiungere?
M: <ride> no no assolutamente io mi auguro che la sua ricerca <ride> aiuta qualche cosa 
ma ...
I: speriamo, no grazie, grazie mille.
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5 Sandra
Interviewer: allora, vuole magari cominciare parlandomi un po’ della: in generale della sua
esperienza, di quando ha incominciato.
Sandra: allora, io ho 32 anni, mi sono ammalata nel 1983, avevo 11 anni sono 21 anni che 
sono malata. Dunque ho cominciato, andavo alle scuole medie e avevo: ero: 
svogliata, sì si può dire. Ho cominciato ad avere febbre, dolori, però non avevo una 
febbre continua, avevo una febbriciattola andava e veniva per cui non sempre 
dimostravo ecco di ave, di star male. Poi una volta avevo male a un braccio, una volta 
sotto il piede e i dolori giravano. Finché un giorno sono andata dal medico, e: quel 
giorno avevo proprio 39 di febbre, era molto alta. Da quella volta lì niente 
praticamente sono andata sempre peggiorando.
I: questi dolori di cui mi parlava, al piede piuttosto che al braccio, che tipo di dolori 
erano, li ricorda?
Sandra: allora io faccio fatica a ricordarmelo, perché nel momento in cui sto bene, io cancello 
dalla mia mente il dolore che provo; nel momento in cui mi fa male anche solo un 
dito, riaffiora la sensazione di dolore che ho provato. Diciamo che: era un dolore 
molto acuto, del tipo che non riuscivo proprio ad appoggiare il piede, piuttosto che 
usare una mano. Però diciamo che: più che altro, si è manifestato: alzandosi la febbre, 
io quando ho una ricaduta molto forte, mi blocco. Mi blocco a livello proprio 
articolare, con dolori forti a livello delle articolazioni del bacino, delle anche e delle 
spalle, e diciamo così devo comunque essere aiutata a far tutto. Alzarmi vestirmi 
lavarmi, ah, diciamo addirittura anche per poter far colazione alzare la tazza del latte.
I: quindi sono molto:
Sandra: molto forti, in fase acuta di malattia. Perché in questo momento che ho avuto l’ultima 
ricaduta nel: 97, in cui si è comunque manifestata con dolori e febbre, ho 
praticamente: cioè adesso sono: sono tranquilla ecco, i dolori sono molto relativi, 
sono proprio a livello di una mano, da dove ho cominciato nel 97, e: ma però sono 
molto gestibili. Diciamo che son sempre stata trattata con molto cortisone, non so se 
vent’anni fa era questo il tipo di trattamento, perché sentendo parlare altre persone 
comunque, adesso non ne danno quanto ne ho preso io. Io ho preso veramente tanto 
cortisone ho fatto diversi boli di cortisone, e:
I: che cosa sono i boli?
Sandra: i boli di cortisone son delle flebo, di metilprendisone, proprio cortisone in vena, 
praticamente. Praticamente sono fatti in tre giorni, un bolo ogni giorno, e: 
servirebbero per proprio tamponare la malattia. A me li hanno dovuti fare anche 
consecutivamente, perché: praticamente non rispondevo alle medicine. Mi hanno 
integrato degli immunosoppressori, che ho sempre preso per molti anni, e niente con 
l’immunosoppressore poi sono riuscita a calare il cortisone, a prenderne una dose 
minima ecco. Non ho avuto molte ricadute, diciamo della malattia. Quelle che ho 
avuto sono state molto forti.
I: la diagnosi quando, quando l’ha avuta, mi diceva questa volta che ha avuto: 
Sandra: però parliamo di Lupus, non parliamo di artrite reumatoide?
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I: quindi la sua diagnosi è di Lupus?
Sandra: Si, me l’hanno diagnosticata subito. Io sono, diciamo che eh:
I: dopo questa vo, […] dopo questa volta, prima mi diceva che aveva avuto […] prima 
tanti dolori poi, l’esperienza di febbre molto alta ed era andata dal medico.
Sandra: esatto.
I: ed è lì che c’è stata la diagnosi.
Sandra: la diagnosi c’è stata, praticamente dopo due mesi, in cui io da aprile, no dopo un 
mese, perché da aprile che mi sono fermata nel letto a maggio, a fine maggio mi 
hanno ricoverato, e mi hanno diagnosticato subito la malattia, perché, il giorno dopo, 
praticamente mi è venuto l’eritema a farfalla, oltre i dolori, oltre la febbre alta tipo 40 
41 di febbre. Io non ricordo proprio come è andata, soltanto che appunto lì sì, lì: le 
hanno diagnosticato subito perché appunto: cioè c’era l’eritema a farfalla, c’erano le 
cellule, che era appunto: proprio l’esame per riconoscere una volta, questo tipo di 
malattia, c’erano gli anticorpi, molto alti, c’era una VES, vabè:
I: la VES, cos’è?
Sandra: praticamente serve per, l’indice di infiammazione.
I: ah, ok.
Sandra: e niente, ecco questi vari aspetti degli esami. I dolori, i dolori sono molto acuti in fase 
acuta di malattia.
I: che tipo di dolori sono, sono se:, come descriverli.
Sandra: dunque sono dolori che senti inizialmente sotto pelle. Non sono né all’osso né nel 
muscolo, oppure possono essere ben distinti, o nelle ossa, o nei muscoli. E’ un 
fastidio una smania, un: questa è una cosa che precede il dolore vero e proprio. 
Dopodiché, almeno quello che sento io è proprio un dolore, un dolore acuto, proprio 
sordo, di quelli proprio forti. Non riesco a usare un termine: vero e proprio, dolori che 
non ti permettono di: mhm, di svolgere diciamo: una vita normalmente, ma anche le 
cose più banali come scrivere, piuttosto che lavarsi, piuttosto che vestirsi ecco.
I: ma, sono, quando lei ha questi dolori, ci sono solo se lei cerca di fare un’attività.
Sandra: non riesco.
I: o, o anche se è ferma immobile, lì così.
Sandra: anche se sono ferma immobile, sì. Sì sì anche se sono ferma immobile il dolore c’è. 
Magari ecco, diciamo non riesco magari a mettermi in piedi, una volta però che sono 
in piedi, piano piano,riesco ad assumere la posizione eretta. Però non sempre facile, e 
sempre devo essere comunque aiutata. Poi altri: non riesco a trovare un termine 
sinceramente.
I: quindi non sono, non sono simili: perché a volte li immagino simili a dei bruciori ma 
…
366
Sandra: mhm, quello è una fase prima de: del dolore acuto. E’ una, e io la chiamo, è la fase 
prima che mi arrivi proprio il dolore vero e proprio, ecco, quella fase di bruciore, 
appunto no, io sento proprio il dolore alle articolazioni. Cioè distinguo bene, le 
articolazioni … per articolazione, e basta.
I: quindi ha una fase iniziale con, dove s, si prepara, poi ha la fase, quella acuta che è 
questo: questo dolore sordo che diceva prima è quello della fase acuta?
Sandra: esatto. E’ proprio un dolore molto forte che non ti permette di svolgere la vita 
normalmente ecco, le attività quotidiane che uno svolge ecco.
I: ahm, lei come direbbe che: che l’ha influenzata, che effetto ha avuto su di lei questo,
avere la malattia il dolore?
Sandra: la malattia? Il dolore non più di tanto, perché, a parte le fasi acute, dopo è molto 
gestibile. Di conseguenza dopo aver tamponato con le medicine, si riesce comunque, 
diciamo, a, a svolgere le proprie attività, non è che non si riesca. Per quanto riguarda 
invece: il fatto di essere: beh oddio, io sono: come posso dire, spiegarmi. Ogni scelta 
che ho fatto [end of tape. Question repeated.] diciamo che ogni scelta io ho dov, ho 
fatto nella mia vita, è sempre stata influenzata dalla malattia, perché è sempre stata 
presente, fin da piccola, e tutto ha sempre comportato, un problema. Un problema 
dover andare al mare, un problema dover, uscire con le amiche, un prob, qualsiasi 
cosa. Tuttora, e sono sposata, i problemi ci sono. Ogni mia scelta ha: voglio dire una 
conseguenza, perché la malattia si è sviluppata quando io ero piccola e ci son 
cresciuta insieme. Di conseguenza: viaggio parallelo.
I: sì è iniziato veramente:
Sandra: che avevo 11 anni.
I: sei si ricorda com’era la vita prima di ammalarsi?
Sandra: sinceramente io non ho avuto mai una malattia mai una febbre, mai: niente di niente, 
ho avuto solo il morbillo, a tre anni, e poi non ho avuto più niente. Fino agli 11 anni, 
che poi ecco. Dopodiché ci sono state delle conseguenze molto forti per il fatto delle 
terapie. Ho avuto osteoporosi alla colonna vertebrale con il crollo proprio della 
vertebra sono stata ingessata, e ho un’osteocondrite al ginocchio.
I: Osteocondrite?
Sandra: Osteocondrite. Molto molto rara, [non?] si trovano [nemmeno?] degli scritti <ride>
I: che cosa, di cosa, non:?
Sandra: praticamente l’osso si si asciuga, e poi si sgretola. La sostanza è questa, mi hanno, 
perforato il ginocchio in un’artroscopia, in modo che il sangue ossigeni l’osso, che, 
mi dicono comunque che non serve a molto. Io, a volte mi è capitato, dopo molti anni 
comunque di avere, dei dolori molto forti al ginocchi da non potere appoggiare il 
piede. Mi è capitato tra l’altro in vacanza <ride> non sapevo neanche che cosa fare. 
Mi hanno spiegato che l’unica cosa era il riposo, quando c’aveva voglia se ne andava, 
non c’erano pastiglie, non c’erano pomate. Niente, perché non sanno neanche niente, 
non sanno molto di questo tipo di problema. Poi altri tipi di problemi: vabè, la vita 
sociale: diciamo che non è, dipende anche molto dal carattere della persona. Diciamo 
che da quando mi sono sposata: è anche venuto di più fuori il mio carattere, di 
conseguenza son riuscita anche a combattere meglio le cose. Prima magari mi 
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lasciavo molto più andare, però, mai dire mai, anche perché io da quando mi sono 
spo, così mi sono sentita male l’ultima volta un anno prima di sposarmi, di 
conseguenza da quando mi sono sposata non ho più  avuto ricadute, per cui quando io 
non sto male, parlo, bene del mio vissuto di malattia, quando io sono in fase acuta, 
non parlatemi della mia malattia, perché è una cosa che non mi appartiene. Proprio: 
tendo a dissociarmi.
I: nel momento in cui sta avendo una crisi.
Sandra: sì sì, proprio: io è: da quando frequento l’associazione che riesco a parlare della mia 
malattia, se no lei mi vedeva, non vedeva che io ero malata perché non si vede, e io 
non gliene avrei mai parlato. Non per voglia di nascondersi, per più una sensazione di 
inferiorità.
I: nei confronti degli altri?
Sandra: nei confronti degli altri, sì. Che poi sia giusta o sbagliata, che sia per il carattere che 
ho, troppo emotivo, così: è la verità questo. Però diciamo che piano piano sto 
cercando di venir fuori. Di: di assumere più sicurezza.
I: però, mi diceva che invece nel momento in cui è, in fase acuta:
Sandra: quello ma, <ride> lo rivediamo magari quando starò male, perché ho sempre reagito 
così. Non riesco, cioè: io sto male, lasciatemi stare, quando starò bene ci, ne 
riparliamo.
I: Adesso non so, è difficile dirlo, ma pensa che sia un tipo di: di strategia per, per 
allontanarsi {è un rifiuto} da questa cosa nel momento in cui {è un rifiuto} per sopra
Sandra: e’ un rifiuto, è proprio un rifiuto nei confronti della malattia perché nel momento in 
cui stai male, stai affrontando delle cure pesanti, oltre a: a star male fisicamente 
proprio, per cui avere, non aver più voglia di, di niente perché sei talmente assorto dai 
tuoi dolori, o da altri problemi che ti procura la malattia, che non hai voglia di: stare a 
pensare ad altre cose. Ma comunque sia: cioè è proprio una forma di autodifesa, eh: 
anche perché le: le medicine che ti danno sono, molto forti e ti comportano veramente 
degli sbalzi di umore, dei cambiamenti di fisionomia, che quella è una cosa proprio 
che pesa, che pesa tanto {lei direbbe che:} proprio tanto. Lì mi sento proprio divers 
sissima.
I: Da come invece è normalmente?
Sandra: sì, non sono più io. Ma proprio cambio, cambio caratterialmente. Sì.
I: e, lei direbbe che il, SE è cambiato, come è cambiato il rapporto con il suo corpo?
Sandra: che domandina.
I: <ride.
Sandra: eh: il mio corpo, il mio corpo è stato devastato di conseguenza non ho un buon 
rapporto con il mio corpo perché le ripeto magari, potrà informarsi, ecco, presso dei 
medici. Le dosi di cortisone che ho preso io sono, purtroppo poi sul mio fisico molto 
giovane, me l’ha proprio devastato. Per fortuna non siamo tantissime ad essere così 
devastate, però: è successo, pazienza, cosa dobbiamo fare. Mi guardo poco <ride>
I: Si guarda poco?
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Sandra: Sì, <ride> [inudibile].
I: <ride> è interessante il rapporto che la malattia {sì:} ci ci ci, il, la posizione che 
assumiamo di fronte al nostro: al nostro corpo no?
Sandra: e è così, benché: voglio dire abbia mio marito che mi voglia bene tutte quelle cose, 
vabè [inudibile.] però: se devo andare a scavare dentro di me: è tutto molto difficile.
I: e lei trova: beh forse, adesso le sto parlando come ma, trova: facile difficile parlare 
della sua ma, del, prima mi ha spiegato di quello che la difficoltà che è maggiore nel 
momento di fase acuta: eh: piuttosto di un momento che invece non sta soffrendo. 
Ma, per parlare intendo le, il descrivere quello che che le accade, anche per esempio 
quando soffre, il tipo di dolore, eh: trova che sia una un’impresa difficile {si} per lei?
Sandra: per me è difficile, sì molto anche perché non sempre riesco a dare dei termini, ecco 
corretti di quello che però, anche perché, okay il dolore fisico, però centrano di, 
diversi tipi di dolore. C’è il dolore da tensione, io sto male ogni mese volendo 
guardare, prima de, del ciclo mestruale io sto male, ho una fase acuta di dolori, che mi 
prende dalle braccia alle spalle così, fino a quando io ho il ciclo, dopo sto benissimo, 
vai a sapere perché non lo sanno neanche i dottori, però ho anche questo tipo di 
problema ecco, che allora quando: quando ho questi, dolori forti dico “ossignur che 
cosa sta succedendo?” Allora ragiono, guardo un attimo il calendario poi, “beh 
aspettiamo fino al giorno tot”, quando vedo che dopo sto meglio allora non mi 
preoccupo, se no comincerei a preoccuparmi ecco.
I: e naturalmente visto che ha cominciato a soffrirne così: così giovane non può sapere 
se sono dolori no no che sarebbero normalmente legati al ...
Sandra: eh, non credo perché: non credo perché: voglio dire non comprendono soltanto: la 
fascia renale o la schiena, son proprio dolori legati proprio alla tensione, come se io 
non, diventassi tutta tesa e avrei, avessi questi dolori ecco: più che altro muscolari 
però.
I: senta quando: le capita un: dolore non legato alla malattia, che può essere che ne so la 
caduta, piuttosto che la scottatura: ehm {sa quante volte} <ride> qualsiasi cosa, 
quante, che come come come lo vive cioè è cambiata: la ...
Sandra: bah oddio, adesso non si vede neanche più, mi ero scottata anche qua sulla mano, 
avevo una bolla ma tanto chissenefrega, tanto dico un segno in più un segno in meno 
<ride> onestamente, non me ne faccio più di tanto. L’unica cosa che magari mi 
peserebbe di più è sul viso, se dovessi, e dico ecco anche quello no per piacere, 
<ride> abbiate pietà almeno il viso risparmiatemelo ecco, per il resto non mi 
interessa, sinceramente.
I: ma, c’è un, non lo so un dolore non legato alla malattia {okay} secondo lei.
Sandra: beh l’altro giorno faccio un esempio no, l’altro giorno sta, c’era il balcone bagnato e 
io nel girarmi, ho sbattuto contro, eh, lo stipite delle porte finestre. Ho tuttora male 
<ride> perché mi son data una bella botta, però: è diverso eh, non è lo stesso dolore, è 
molto diverso, si riesce a riconoscere
I: ma lei pensa che: {è una botta} l’avere sperimentato il dolore della malattia, le fa 
vedere in modo diverso, i dolori che: eh, di altro tipo:
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Sandra: ma magari ne do meno peso, ne do meno peso. Anche se ultimamente, anche quando 
io stessa sto male coi dolori diciamo della malattia, cerco comunque di darmi 
coraggio, perché dico sempre, cavolo, sabri devi andare avanti, devi farcela, fallo 
oggi che magari domani non sai come stai. Ecco ultimamente tendo a farmi questo 
tipo di discorsi [inudibile.].
I: per finire, in, se le facessi un’altra domanda difficile probabilmente {proviamo} in 
generale, eh: che cos’è il dolore?
Sandra: che cos’è il dolore? Il dolore fisico? O il dolore e, emozionale? {beh quello che per 
lei, la prima cosa che pensa?} quello, quello di più? Quello a cui penso maggiormente 
è il dolore, eh proprio: emozionale, quello mi pesa di più. Riuscire ad affrontare, ecco 
con più serenità forse riuscirei ad affrontare molto di più anche il dolore fisico. 
Benché fin, le posso assicurare che fino a quando non sono proprio bloccata io vado 
avanti, vado a lavorare, spolvero [inudibile] quando non ce la faccio più è perché 
sono arrivata, proprio al crollo. Così mi è capitato fino adesso.
I: cioè che cosa fa?
Sandra: io: sono impiegata in un’azienda sono in ufficio spedizioni però, da un anno a questa 
parte, prima ho sempre fatto archivio, fisicamente archivio, per cui forse è anche per 
quello che, principalmente mi ha preso le mani, diciamo, quando ho avuto l’ultima 
ricaduta, perché: negli ultimi sette anni ho usato molto le mani e ho: sollevato dei 
pesi, facendo ecco questo tipo di lavoro {di lavoro} sì.
I: ma lavora ancora a tempo pieno adesso?
Sandra: no: no no, io: ho chiesto inizialmente, son dieci anni che lavoro inizialmente ho 
chiesto un part-time a sei ore, perché non avendo mai lavorato, non ero in grado di 
stabilire se, ce la facevo a lavorare otto ore, quando mi son sposata, era praticamente 
più mia mamma che mi faceva i mestieri, che io che lavoravo in casa, perché quando 
arrivavo alle 4 a casa, io non ce la facevo più ero stanchissima non c’avevo voglia di 
fare niente. Non perché ero svogliata <ride> ero stanca. Allora ho chiesto una 
riduzione d’orario adesso faccio un part-time a 4 ore, in modo da gestirmi nell’arco 
del pomeriggio, le faccende di casa. Ecco allora riesco: a gestirmi abbastanza da sola. 
Non che non vengo aiutata e, perché in alcune cose devono comunque aiutarmi {però 
riesce a fare:} sì, riesco a svolgere le mie attività da sola tranquillamente.
I: va bene la ringrazio: la ringrazio molto. C’è qualcosa che vuole aggiungere: che ...
Sandra: non saprei.
I: ok.
Sandra: se può bastare:?
I: va benissimo, grazie mille.
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6 Veronica
Interviewer: niente, può magari parlarmi un po’ della sua esperienza signora, quando: {della mia, 
malattia?} si, quando è iniziata, com’è:
Veronica: dunque, io avevo 17 anni, facevo, atletica leggera a livello agonistico, e: fondo, 800 
metri, campestri: ho cominciato ad accusare questi dolori, e morale, per farla in breve, 
invece di finire a fare le gare sono finita <RIDE> al [nome ospedale].
I: <RIDE> un’altra gara.
V: un’altra gara, che è durata tutta una vita.
I: e questi dolori dove li accusava inizialmente, dove sono iniziati?
V: nelle mani e soprattutto nei piedi, tanto è vero che il mio allenatore mi diceva che io 
facevo apposta ad accusare i dolori per non, sforzarmi, perché lui aveva l’idea, eh: di 
farmi fare, allora le donne non lo facevano il fondo, quindi oltre l’allenamento 
normale per le gare, mi faceva fare anche allenamento per il fondo, ed è stato proprio 
lì, nell’articolazione del piede, in modo diverso, che ho cominciato ad accusare, 
questi dolori, e da allora li ho sempre avuti.
I: ai piedi, inizialmente.
V: ai piedi e, le mani ma le mani: non erano, però i piedi non era sempre erano proprio 
dolori, che si facevano sentire soprattutto alla fine dell’allenamento, però, ho sofferto 
questi dolori per, dunque 17 25 anni, la bellezza di: o quasi: otto anni, senza: che 
nessuno mi riconoscesse la mia malattia, perché la mia malattia era sieronegativa, 
quindi dagli esami del sangue, no si ide, evidenziava niente, io avevo, un tono 
muscolare, forte, perché facevo atletica, nessuna tumefazione nessun segno 
particolare, per cui un medico addirittura m’ha detto che era una malattia 
psicosomatica e che dovevo andare a curarmi da un’altra parte. Poi, però, appunto ho 
cominciato ad avere tumefazioni, e: nel frattempo il mio medico: allora era di 
famiglia non era di base, ha: voluto che io venissi qua dal professor B., che adesso 
non c’è più, era il primario di: reumatologia, e mi ha diagnosticato l’artrite 
reumatoide. M’ha fatto un bel grafico dove mi, mi spiegava che, la mia vita sarebbe 
sempre stata accompagnata da questa malattia, che avrei avuto degli alti e dei bassi, 
dei momenti mhm: di fase acuta momenti in cui sarei stata bene, però ogni volta sia la 
fase acuta che la fase in cui sarei stata bene, sarebbe stata sempre meno bene, della 
volta precedente, la fase buona, e più forte la fase: depressiva.
I: e scusi, quanti anni fa diceva che è iniziato il problema:
V: e quarant’annif: quarant’uno quest’anno ne faccio cinq, compio cinquantotto anni ad 
agosto, e avevo dicia:, adesso, 17 anni li avevo, ecco.
I: e dopo quanti anni è arrivata la diagnosi:
V: a 25 anni, dopo circa: 8, sette otto : sette anni e mezzo otto otto anni.
I: lì è stato quando lei ha saputo per certo di soffrire {che avevo l’artrite reumatoide, si} 
di artrite reumatoide. Senta, inizialmente, questi dolori che lei sentiva: beh prima ai 
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piedi, poi mi diceva: alle mani, che che, se dovesse descriverli, che tipo di dolori 
erano?
V: è passato tanto di quel tempo, … dunque allora: era un dolore, aspetti mi faccia 
pensare, la mano ricordo che un pomeriggio era un dolore acuto fisso, eh: che … 
come: è apparso se n’è andato, ma è durato tutto un pomeriggio,  a ecco vede 
pensando me n’è venuto uno anche all’inguine, anche quello, erano tutti dolori acuti 
ma fissi, non era che si alternavano, un attimo erano più o meno forti, eran sempre 
fissi mentre quelli dei piedi erano dolori, a camminare, non era proprio dolore, eh: 
presente: come per esempio mi si è presentato nella mano che lo sentivo anche a 
tenere la mano a riposo, quello dei piedi regolarmente io li sentivo, alla fine 
dell’allenamento, ed erano, quasi, dolori, un bruciore un: eh ricordo che il mio 
allenatore stavamo facendo la staffetta, aveva in mano il testimone, per prendermi in 
giro, non penso che l’abbia fatto per cattiveria, mi ha preso, ha preso il testimone e 
m:mi ha colpito sotto un piede dove mi faceva male, è stato un dolore atroce, acuto 
fortissimo, allora, lì lui ha smesso di prendermi in giro perché devo, probabilmente, 
trasfigurata, perché, stato un dolore fortissimo, però: vabè.
I: però ancora non c’erano segni, cioè che si vedessero, non c’erano ...
V: no, tra l’altro io avevo un paio di mani molto articolate, tant’è vero che molti mi 
dicevano, hai le mani di un pianista.
I: <RIDE> glielo stavo dicendo, si.
V: infatti, per cui, eh: mi dicevano muova le mani: e io muovevo, facevo tutto quello che 
loro mi chiede, dice no qui non c’è un’artrite, e, gliel’ho detto, le gambe erano un pa, 
un bel paio di gambe con tono muscolare molto presente perché, facendo fondo, io 
correvo tutti i giorni, facevo chilometri su chilometri, per cui: mhm: poteva anche dar 
adito al fatto che, fosse una, <RIDE> un discorso psicosomatico, e invece no poi era 
...
I: e poi, com’è cambiato invece, la situazione?
V: bah, allora: {dopo la diagnosi:  e andando avanti con il tempo?} co:, andando avanti 
con il tempo, io ho sempre avuto una forma lenta ma aggressiva, nel senso che, ho, 
non ho memoria, però potrei anche averli subiti  di me, perché io cancello, cioè se io 
adesso sto soffrendo, fra un quarto d’ora, se no soffro più dimentico: il dolore, è una 
mia forma di difesa, eh: penso, di non aver mai avuto, dolori come molti dicono di 
avere che, non si riesce a sopportare, io ho i dolori, e per esempio adesso mi fanno 
male le mani: però, ho: sono dolori sopportabili raramente ho avuto dolori così forti, 
da non: da non avere neanche la capacità di comunicare con gli altri e aver bisogno 
d’isolarmi, perché io quando ho avuto queste crisi, regolarmente io mi isolo, ho 
bisogno di chiudermi in me stessa, e: e recuperare, le mie forze le mie energie, 
dopodichè mi passa e: alle volte m’addormento anche sul dolore, perché: mi 
concentra, sì se non è un dolore: veramente forte, ma se è un dolore tipico della mia 
malattia, ch’è li fermo: o: io mi concentro sul punto in cui mi fa male, eh l’arto, e: 
dopodiché se sono isolata tranquilla con me stessa, riesco anche a addormentarmi sul 
dolore.
I: questa è una cosa, una tecnica che ha sviluppato da sola: o {si} qualche cosa che.
V: no no no no, ho fatto tutto da sola {ho capito} pian pianino me la sono: non so se, 
neanche autoimposta, mi è venuto spontaneo comportarmi in questo modo.
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I: quindi, questo, questo suo isolarsi è per, far fronte meglio a quello.
V: a isolare il dolore e superare per prima, m: molto prima la crisi, perché, anche con gli 
interventi che ho subito, sono 18 a questo, io mi sono resa conto che se io sto buona 
tranquilla,  non comunico con gli altri ma mi concentro, il dolore è meno: intenso, se 
invece devo parlare perché: anche magari ho bisogno di qualcosa, e dopo il dolore: 
diventa più forte, tempo di riprendere a controllarlo però, ci sono quei momenti che il 
dolore è decisamente più forte.
I: spero <RIDE> che non si senta male {no non no, sono dolori controllabilissimi 
perché, è la ma, quando sale un po’ mi fa male ma, no no stia tranquillo, no <RIDE> 
le direi di no}.
I: senta, e adesso, perché si trova in ospedale?
V: perché ho: subito un intervento, [ho] la protesi al ginocchio, la seconda gamba perché  
l’altra l’ho già: me l’hanno già impiantata due anni fa, e adesso ...
I: e: la protesi per: per ridare funzionalità al ginocchio?
V: esatto, perché avevo il ginocchio valgo, ma parecchio valgo, e: quindi {valgo vuol 
dire quando vengono:?} quando va in fuori {sporgono, ok, si} quando è, quando, io 
avevo in pratica, l: la coscia che, rientrava, e dal ginocchio al piede, valgo, usciva 
verso: l’esterno, ed era: oramai facevo fatica a camminare, e camminavo anche curva.
I: e quello le faceva male?
V: allora mi ha fatto male, fino a quando non: non si è, completamente deformato 
dopodiché, mi faceva male, è diventato un dolore meccanico nel senso che, se io 
stavo tranquilla non facevo nessuno sforzo, il ginocchio non lo sentivo, e di, posso 
anche dire che potevo anche, vivere normalmente in casa, però solamente volevo 
uscire a fare quattro passi, poi io ero sicura che il giorno dopo mi avrebbe fatto male 
però, è un dolore meccanico, non è un dolore dovuto alla malattia, cioè oramai le parti 
sono, rovinate sfregando infiammandole: e il giorno dopo ...
I: e che: e che che dolore le dava questo: era cosa, non so, come un brucio:re come era: 
che tipo di dolore:
V: e, e allora se si gonfia, allora è: più che altro appunto una sensazione di caldo di 
bruciore: un dolore: e, caldo, che brucia, se invece ma raramente perché di solito io 
con le ginocchia i problemi li ho avuti con questo liquido che mi si formava, il panno 
sinoviale che fuoriusciva e : quindi mi si formava tutto questo liquido, se no era: 
proprio, un dolore: m: nel movimento, in pratica se io mi stavo se stavo ferma seduta 
non avevo niente nel momento in cui articolavo la gamba, avevo, il dolore da 
sfregamento, ma non m: mai dolori così: insopportabili, raramente li ho avuti.
I: e quindi la progressione quale è stata una volta, cioè dopo la diagnosi?
V: allora, io ho, dunque … devo tornare indietro, di quarant’anni<RIDE>, m: no [nomi 
dei figli] li avevo già avuti, per fortuna perché poi mi avevano detto che era meglio 
non fare figli, e la diano, dunque ho avuto, per esempio, eh: quando mi si sono, 
bloccati i polsi, dei dolori continui fissi e poi alla fine:  i polsi: le tutte le ossa che ci 
sono, nel metacarpo si sono, quasi consolidate per cui vede, il mio movimento è: 
questo qua. E’ una costanza il dolore, nel senso che più o meno intenso o: c’è, ce l’ho 
sempre avuto, infatti gliel’ho detto è progressiva, lenta però: per cui, eh: non è mai 
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stato, quel dolore che mi impediva comunque di, vivere, di: uscire di andare a scuola, 
però nello stesso tempo io ce l’avevo, con me è stato sempre un mio compagno ecco, 
<RIDE> di 40 anni, l’anno scorso io ho compiuto 57 anni, l’artrite ne ha compiuti 40 
gli ho detto, dai fammi il favore, fammi diventare più giovane tu tieniti i 57 anni, 
<RIDE> s’è tenuta i suoi 40 anni.
I: e: adesso, in questo momento, sta: ha, sta soffrendo, ha del dolore adesso mentre noi 
parliamo?
V: si, adesso io, ma è un bruciore, non è un dolore, ce l’ho sul ginocchi dove m’hanno 
operata, ce l’ho in salita, quando arriva alla massima, piegatura del ginocchio allora 
ce l’ho, ecco io però ho un fatto per esempio se, capita di avere un dolore a un piede a 
una mano, a una spalla, ho avuto dolori forti alle, più che forti costanti, alla cervicale 
tanto è vero che ho avuto la lussazione per esempio dell’… quindi m’hanno dovuto 
operare, e: io accumulo i dolori, quindi eh: quello che sento è: il più forte, gli altri non 
mi rendo neanche conto di averli, mi rendo ecco vede adesso ho fatto questo 
movimento, il il gomito mi fa male mi ha fatto male ma è un dolore meccanico, 
perché, anche il gomito vede è valgo, e l’ho sentito altrimenti: non: non mi sarei 
accorta di avere il dolore al, cioè nell’usare le articolazioni se un’articolazione è 
dolorante, se se non la sento perché ce n’è un altro più forte, nel movimento in cui mi 
muovo m’accorgo che anche quella articolazione: mi fa male, è un discorso di 
accumulazione di dolori.
I: e: visto che lei ha convissuto così a lungo con il, eh: con questo tipo di dolori, ah: 
quando le capita, non so un dolore non legato alla malattia, non so prende dentro, 
contro uno spigolo: una scottatura col ferro da stiro, qualsiasi cosa, li vive? In modo 
diverso? 
V: no, è sempre dolore, è sempre dolore quindi: innesco innesco subito il meccanismo di 
difesa, eh:
I: che è quello dell’isolamento, che mi diceva prima?
V: o dell’isolamento o di concentrazione e: si con l’isolamento l’ho fatto raramente nei 
momenti in cui proprio stavo male, però io riesco a concentrarmi e, a: non dico 
isolarlo perché il dolore c’è e lo sento, però, se per esempio quando sono qua seduta 
faccio un esempio, e mi fa male il ginocchio, solamente accendere la televisione e 
guardare qualcosa, io riesco a distogliere la mente dal dolore, c’è, lo sento, ma ne, 
non è più il dolore insopportabile com’era un attimo prima, ho bisogno di fare 
qualcosa per: dimenticarlo, comunque il meccanismo di difesa dal dolore è: qualsiasi 
sia la: la fonte è sempre quello, penso che oramai si sia innescato in me: questo, 
questo meccanismo, questa difesa, credo.
I: va bene, signora la ringrazio molto.
V: niente.
I: c’è qualcosa che vuole dire che magari, ci tiene a fare, a: dire o qualcosa?
V: no, perché, ecco c’è una cosa importante e appunto che però gliel’ho già detto il 
discorso della memoria, nel senso che, è probabilmente una difesa anche quella, ah: 
che però non mi aiuta nei colloqui con i medici perché, come si sente, se io in quel 
momento [interruzione] se io in quel momento non ho, dolori, e magari sono stata 
male al punto di chiamare al medico e dire ho bisogno di un controllo, <RIDE> in 
quel momento mi viene spontaneo dire bene perché, ho cancellato tutto ciò che {è 
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passato} esatto, è passato e quindi è da mettere {ok} da parte. La ringrazio, 
arrivederla
I: la ringrazio signora, la ringrazio molto.
V: ci mancherebbe.
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7 Fabio
Interviewer: che tipo di problema hai avuto?
Fabio: allora, il mio problema è protusione discale. Eh, che potrebbe essere paragonata a, 
tipo ernia al disco, insomma.
I: questo quando è che è avvenuto [inudibile].
F: questo è avvenuto, allora l’intervento è stato fatto a dicembre del 2002. Primi di 
dicembre del 2002.
I: ok.
F: e questo problema, si è avvertito circa un anno prima, ha cominciato ad avvertirsi.
I: e, come si era presentato?
F: allora, premetto che, questo tipo di disturbo, mhm,  prima dell’intervento si era 
presentato già anni prima. Circa un sette otto anni prima, che miracolosamente era 
scomparso come era venuto. E’ durato alcuni mesi, anzi no, direi, forse un anno, con 
cui ho convissuto, in maniera non tranquilla. Però, siccome quello era un periodo 
abbastanza particolare della mia vita per cui non, ho sopportato, tra virgolette, il 
dolore. E poi, miracolosamente è scomparso. Miracolosamente e fortunatamente. 
Dopo anni, probabilmente a causa di un cambiamento, di lavoro, di tipologia di 
reparto, quindi con carichi di lavoro diversi, il dolore si è ripresentato. Com’era 
scomparso si è ripresentato. Inizialmente come un fastidio, quindi un fastidio, un 
qualcosa, eh, tipo la gocciolina che scende nel lavandino.
I: mh mh.
F: una cosa, così, che avvertivi, in maniera, continua, fastidiosa, ma che non, non, 
quando dico fastidiosa intendo, che non mi permetteva, eh, di, di, fare dei movimenti, 
fino a quel punto normali, ma diciamo, mi, mi causava degli handicap. Dopodiché 
pian piano, oltre al fastidio è cominciato a insidiarsi anche, dolore. 
I: di che tipo?
F: dolore, del tipo, eh, come, inizialmente come dei crampi, in maniera lievi. Dopodiché, 
eh, l’intensità era molto più elevata. Questi, questi fortissimo crampi, eh, quindi 
proprio come, uno stiramento, mh, scioccante dei muscoli. Quindi come se qualcuno 
ti, ti tirasse, eh, quindi assumeva come, mh, delle, non proprio fitte perché non c’era 
un culmine del dolore, ma come, un bruciore, come, come, eh, come spilli, da dentro 
che, che pungevano insomma.
I: e che cos’è che te lo faceva, mh, che te lo fa descrivere, cioè, che che che cos’era 
l’elemento determinante per cui prima era fastidio e poi lo descrivi come dolore?
F: che prima, eh, ecco, mh, il fastidio diciamo riuscivi a, eh, a compensarlo nelle attività 
che facevi. Quindi se t’impegnavi, eh, ti concentravi su altre cose, eh, diciamo che lo 
accantonavi. Non è che non non c’era più, però veniva accantonato, no? Mentre col 
dolore, eh, sì, riuscivi ad accantonarlo, però, cioè appena avevi uno sprazzo di 
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lucidità, lo percepivi, cioè sapevi che era lì, cioè che c’era lì. Ma perché comunque, 
eh, nei movimenti più semplici, oltre a essere bloccato si, il dolore, eh, si presentava. 
Cioè, lo tenevi sotto controllo, però nei movimenti un po’ particolari tipo, quindi non 
so, da seduto alzarmi di scatto oppure, piegarmi, oppure, eh, diciamo fare la 
fisioterapia ad un’altra paziente, o a un paziente che avevamo in reparto, eh, ti 
causava dei movimenti impropi, quindi il dolore, riaffioriva. Non è che si presentava 
in maniera più acuta, però riaffioriva, lo percepivi di più. Perché i movimenti, eh, ti 
permettevano di di di accusarlo in maniera, in maniera, più lucida ecco [inudibile.].
I: quindi tra il fastidio e il dolore c’era una differenza di, del grado d’interferenza nelle 
attività quotidiane, era questo che ti fa, è questo il [inudibile.] determinante per cui 
una cosa era fastidio e un’altra dolore?
F: eh, sì nei mo, mh, . diciamo che era più una cosa psicologica. Nel senso che il 
fastidio, lo riesci ad accantonare di più. Nel senso, lo percepisci ma lo lo lo, diciamo, 
lo sopporti. Mentre il dolore, eh, però ripeto, la, la mia, mi considero un elemento con 
una soglia del dolore molto elevato. Quindi, eh, a me fa più effetto, diciamo, sempre 
tra virgolette, la la la, il concentrarmi su cose diverse che degli antidolorifici. Infatti 
ho preso antidolorifici, tantissimi, e non mi hanno mai dato sollievo. Cioè non ho mai, 
eh, ricevuto beneficio dagli antidolorifici. Ho fatto una cura, di diverso, cioè per 
diverso tempo, proprio prescritta dal medico, quindi con antidolorifici, eh, cortisone, 
e altre cose, ma non ha, non mi ha dato nessun beneficio. Assolutamente zero, nel 
senso che il dolore era là e c’era e rimaneva insomma. 
I: ma se tu dovessi, avessi dovuto descrivere la, il tipo di sensazione che provavi in 
quella fase che tu descrivi come di fastidio, era uguale o simile a quella di dolore 
solamente meno intensa, o era diverso? Tu [inudibile.] hai parlato, non so di 
stiramento di muscoli, bruciore.
F: allora, per fastidio, allora tu, allora per fastidio è un qualcosa che c’è che ti ostacola, 
quindi ti blocca, eh, ti impedisce di di fare, ah, alcune cose. E questo fastidio, mh, 
poteva essere che ne so, paragonato: a un qualcosa di comune: potrebbe essere: un 
mal di testa, con intensità bassa insomma. Un qualcosa che c’è, che rimane, che è 
fastidioso, così che però sopporti.
I: ma quindi era ancora ...
F: mentre quando il fastidio diventa dolore.
I: mh, mh.
F: cioè io per dolore intendo proprio questa intensità, cioè questi crampi, con questi 
bruciori forti ai muscoli.
I: ma nella fase di di fastidio, quello che voglio dire, c’erano ancora questi bruciori 
questi crampi però, non così intensi o era una cosa completamente diversa?
F: No c’erano ma non intensi.
I: ho capito, quindi era [inudibile].
F: cioè un fastidio è, eh, allora diciamo, inizialmente era un fastidio, quindi non ti dava 
un dolore. Cioè era una cosa che percepivi che, che cominciava a insidiarsi nel nel tuo 
fisico. Dopodiché questo fastidio si è associato anche al dolore.
I: mh mh.
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F: dopodiché è diventato, eh, dolore, dolore che comunque manteneva sempre il fastidio, 
il fastidio perché, eh, io parlo poi anche di un fastidio più psicologico, più che fisico.
I: mh mh.
F: nel senso che, eh, m’innervosi, cioè, oltre al dolore poi quando è diventato, è sfociato 
proprio al limite, al culmine ...
I: mh mh.
F: creava anche un, un, almeno personalmente una cosa più, più di stress mentale.
I: mh mh.
F: cioè mi, mi, mi dava, mi causava più, eh, problema il, lo stress, che, che poi in realtà 
il dolore stesso.
I: mh mh.
F: anche perché il dolore non era descritto come, in alcuni momenti come un picco 
molto alto poi si abbassava poi si alzava. Era una cosa costante, cioè un dolore 
costante. 
I: mh mh.
F: un dolore con la stessa intensità, la stesso grado di di di di di, affermazione.
I: che però c’era sempre.
F: che c’era sempre. Quindi non, non, non era sufficiente il fatto, uno dice “vado a letto, 
mi riposo, e”, no. Cioè c’era, eh, nel momento in cui mi addormentavo, c’era questo 
dolore, mi svegliavo e si ripresentava. Quindi anche le notti, diventavano, cioè brutte, 
eh, ripeto, era più una cosa snervante, stressante che, che poi il dolore, che il dolore 
stesso insomma.
I: era, quello, cioè l’effetto che il dolore aveva sulla tua vi, sulla tua attività in generale?
F: esatto, sulla mia attività, sì perché essendo una persona, io, parlo chiaramente 
personalmente, essendo una persona, eh, attiva, questo mi ostacolava.
I: mh mh.
F: e quindi aveva un effetto psicologico molto negativo.
I: mh mh.
F: quindi debilitante, quindi se devo quantificare, eh, tra eh, la sopportazione psicologica 
e, eh, fisica, diciamo che era molto più sopportabile per me il dolore fisico, cosa che 
invece lo stress che questo mi causava non, eh, mi dava più problemi.
I: Mh mh.
F: cioè era più insopportabile lo stress che poi in realtà il dolore. Anche se il dolore, 
quindi mi sono reso conto che la mia sopportazione del dolore era più elevata, cioè 
avrei potuto più sopportare il dolore più che lo stress che questo mi, mi comportava.
I: e dopo l’operazione come è cambiata la situazione?
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F: dopo l’operazione, eh, diciamo che, eh, l’operazione era diventata ormai una, una 
speranza, finalmente a riprendere in maniera completa la la la mia attività, quello che 
faccio. Ma invece non è stato così perché proprio a causa del fatto che io sono molto 
attivo i giorni di convalescenza che ci sono stati dopo l’ l’intervento, che per altro 
l’intervento non è un intervento invasivo che quindi ti, ti scombussola, cioè ti lascia 
delle cicatrici. Perché è una cosa fatta in laparoscopia, quindi è una cosa, poco 
invasiva. Eh, non ho seguito le indicazioni mediche come avrei dovuto, quindi ho 
ripreso le mie attività, eh, prima del del tempo e quindi, eh, diciamo che il risultato è 
stato, pressoché negativo, diciamo, metà e metà insomma. Nel senso che tuttora,eh, 
mentre prima era una cosa costante adesso, eh, ad intervalli si ripresenta il dolore, eh, 
ma in maniera repentina. Cioè non è che inizia piano piano, cioè che si insidia, che tu 
lo senti, cioè si presenta punto e basta. 
I: a livello d’intensità e lo stesso di quello che provavi prima dell’operazione, o è 
diverso?
F: Eh, no, è ...
I: cioè se dovessi descrivere questo tipo di dolore a qualcuno che non ne ha mai sentito 
parlare prima, come lo descriveresti?
F: allora, diciamo che adesso come intensità di dolore no, è più basso, se parliamo 
d’intensità ...
I: e come tipo?
F: da un, diciamo che da uno a dieci, se allora prima il dolore, prima dell’intervento, era: 
diciamo a nove.
I: mh mh
F: adesso come dolore, è quattro, come fastidio è nove. Nel senso, eh, cioè io poi per 
fastidio intendo un qualcosa, mh:, che c’è, e che, eh, come se uno ti continuasse a 
dare, ecco, cerchiamo di paragonarlo in questo modo, come se qualcuno ti desso dei 
piccoli pizzicotti, eh, sempre nello stesso punto, no? Cioè sul, sul petto per esempio, 
questi pizzicottino che non sono dolorosi, però sono fastidiosi. Cioè che, uno continua 
a darti questi pizzicotti, pic pic pic, cioè a un certo punto: cioè lo consideri veramente 
come un fastidio, un ...
I: che comunque in qualche modo però riesce a: interferire con le tue attività quotidiane.
F: chiaro chiaro chiaro, sì. Sì perché ripeto, ancora, essendo una persona che fa mille 
cose, eh, cioè questo mi ostacolava. Nel senso, a parte il mio lavoro, e quindi quando 
lavoro cerco di fare al meglio le cose e quindi già questo mi ostacolava, eh ...
I: e ti ostacola ancora?
F: e mi ostacola ancora. D’inverno presepio, eh, faccio attività sportiva, quindi scio, e 
questo chiaramente, eh, dicevi, tanto che io scio che io non scio il dolore c’è sempre, 
per cui preferisco sciare.
I: mhm mhm.
F: in questo senso. Però chiaramente, scii ma non sei tranquillo e sereno e godi della 
della tua discesa, eh, in maniera fantastica, in maniera esuberante. Io poi ho 
un’attività che mi dura tutto l’anno, di fitness, palestra, quindi questo, eh, mi mi 
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causa, come: Ecco no, devo dire, che il beneficio di sollievo, è in un luogo di 
mancanza di gravità, quindi nuotando. 
I: mh mh.
F: nuotando, eh, non accuso niente. Solo che l’attività di nuoto mi piace e: non mi piace, 
nel senso che la reputo noiosa. Quindi nuoto sì, per un po’ di tempo ma dopodiché, 
eh, basta. Cioè non ...
F: senti prima ti avevo chiesto di, mh, creare un’immagine, cioè di dar, se dovessi 
figurare un po’ questo tip, il dolore che tu hai sperimentato di: con un’immagine, e, 
Me la vuoi, ripetere?
F: allora, l’immagine è, un operaio, su una strada, questi cantieri stradali, dove 
quest’operaio, usa un martello pneumatico. Ecco, io:
I: e tu cosa sei, la strada?
F: eh, ma no, propio ...
I: tu sei la persona che è vicino e sente questo rumore forte?
F: sì, più che la strada io sono: colui che sente questo rumore assordante, continuo, eh, 
che ti crea tutti quei problemi di conseguenza, cioè ...
I: mh mh.
F: quindi, un qualcosa, che quantifichi come una, un livello massimo no? Perché 
comunques questo martello, questo rumore che comunque, eh, sempre lì così, e che 
continua continua: cioè lo vedo, lo vedo, l’ho visto così il dolore, in in quel senso, più 
che qualcosa di molto catastrofico.
I: mh mh.
F: cose di questo genere.
I: quindi, dolo, l’immagine di dolore come rumore? In un certo senso? [inudibile]
F: come rumore, come movimento, cioè vedere comunque quest’operaio che con questo 
martello, gli gli vibra tutto, cioè quindi ...
I: e ti ti distrae, t’impedisce ...
F: esatto.
I: entra nella tua vita.
F: esatto, ti impedisce di continuarla e che tu crei questa forza, per mantenere questo, 
questo trapano, cioè quindi devi devi assumere una forza maggiore per sopportare 
questa, questa resistenza di questo trapano che se tu lo lasciassi andare.
I: mh mh
F: quindi: anche questo senso, questo gioco d di di di: ecco, era diventata una una lotta 
tra me e il dolore, no?
I: mhm mhm.
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F: cioè, vediamo chi è che resiste di più e chi ...
I: mh mhm.
F: quindi è, questo che mi logorava la la la la vita quotidiana, che ora diventata ormai 
una guerra no? Nel senso di, comunque di rifiutare questa cosa, di volerla rifiutare 
forse perché poi, mettici il fatto che, ti rendi conto che stai andando avanti con l’età e 
quindi non accetti, certe cose, che poi voglio dire, il dolore si può presentare anche in 
un ragazzo di vent’anni, se fa un incidente si spacca una gamba:
I: e adesso cos’è, una radio troppo alta?
F: adesso: no diciamo che, eh, quando quando c’è questa cosa questo dolore riaffiora 
diciamoquello che era poi lo lo stress, no?
I: mhm mh.
F: quindi la la, eh, qui subentra una cosa ancora più psicologica, cioè la la paura di di di 
di rivivere lo stress come lo vivevi prima.
I: mhm mhm.
F: cioè di essere bloccato nei movimenti di non di non essere più agile: per dire una 
cavolata soltanto a salire in macchina.
I: quindi un po’, più più che effettivamente quello che ti sta capitando è l, quello che è 
possibile un po’ il ricordo che ti si proietta davanti [paura di riviverlo].
F: esatto, esatto. Più che il dolore che mi si presenta. Perché quando sono per strada ad 
esempio che sto camminando, o che ne so che sto facendo una passeggiata: in 
maniera tranquilla, all’improvviso ti si blocca la gamba perché hai questa fitta che ti 
si presenta in maniera ...
I: mhm mhm.
F: a sorpresa.
I: mh mh.
F: allora, oltre al dolore ti viene, l la cosa dici cavolo, perché proprio adesso, cioè ...
I: mh mhm.
F: diventa una cosa, logorante a livello psicologico, più che di di di dolore.
I: mh mh.
F: perché se fosse il dolore punto e basta, uno dice “vabè” ...
I: mh mh.
F: Ce l’hai: un mal di denti voglio dire prendi un analgesico ti passa, per dire, o sai che 
che vai fai un intervento non so, [inudibile] cioè sai che c’è una fine.
I: mh mh.
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F: a un dolore di denti, mente in questo caso no. Perché comunque le protusioni discali, 
tutto quello che riguarda la la la colonna vertebrale sono cose che che ti rimangono 
insomma
I: Mh mhm.
F: cioè, in questo senso.
I: grazie.
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1.b Anna
Interviewer: [inaudible] ok, well, it’s going to be a rather informal chat, so there are no right or 
wrong answers, erm, I’d like to start by asking you to tell me a bit, generally, about 
your experience, when you began having problems, how … erm … how did you 
realise, just feel free to say anything you like.
Anna: so … not specifically on pain, on the …?
I: to begin with, well how it all began, how this experience began and then {on the 
types of pain?} yes then [inaudible] then [inaudible] so, when did you start having 
problems?
A: and … yes … the illness … clearly because … even before but … maybe it’s not not 
to do with the illness clearly … almost immediately the pain [inaudible] strong, and 
… by and by it grows and, at least in my case, then it becomes lancinating, so much 
so that, there have been moments, before, erm, and even during the therapy, that … 
erm … it would become so … intense, that only the thought that this pain might 
return, after a few minutes, a few hours, erm, I would think I really couldn’t go on 
living like that, I would tell my husband “look here, I can’t take it anymore, I feel 
like jumping off the window, it’s not possible” … the heart … would beat … fast, so 
much so … I’d pass out, and this lasted, for quite a long period of time … almost 
three years, and then … finally … some therapies let’s say they helped, and these 
periods were not as frequent, and when this pain would come it was still very strong, 
but, it would last less, erm, in terms of days let’s say, it would become fortnightly it 
would … erm … by and by.
I: I see, it would come every fifteen days or would it last fifteen days?
A: no, no, it would appear every fifteen days, had it lasted fifteen days it would have 
meant … well … I would have ended it because it wasn’t possible, it really was, a … 
when, when it was approaching … every couple of weeks, this period of two weeks, 
once a month it happened, once every two, at the beginning, it would come on, would 
be more frequent, and, well it was bad … even the drugs … in spite of taking lots of 
drugs, often, it was … really strong, strong and … well, strong.
I: where would you get these pains?
A: ok, I began with my hands.
I: your hands.
A: It would start ... from here [points].
I: from … from the wrist?
A: yes, or from here [points].
I: okay.
A: it would get inflamed slightly it would affect the tendons, up to her [points]. 
I: to the armpit …
A: yes, yes yes, and, and then normally, it would get me here [points] … on the back.
I: the back.
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A: and it felt it was something … serious precisely because … the doctors still were 
unable … at the beginning, and this lasted, always, in spite of the medication, it went 
on …
I: and how many years ago did this all begin?
A: erm … twenty … twenty-six years ago, twenty-five years.
I: twenty-five.
A: and then … then … little by little … well, something would get better, but the disease 
was making damages.
I: mhm.
A: in the meantime, once this [points to finger] would get bent, once that one. I had ten 
operations on my hands …
I: the hands, ten operations, ten operations on your hands?
A: ten operations yes, to clean the tendons, and … and a prosthesis because there was … 
a hole … and … then the disease began … later with the therapies … with heavier 
therapies let’s say that with those therapies on the market yes … do you want … do 
you want to know the names of the drugs? No?
I: if you remember …
A: oh well, I went from the immunosuppressants, we got to the immunosuppressants, 
anti-inflammatories based on cortisone … with the anti-inflammatories it was a 
relief, finally, and so without the pain, well then only the pain of the disaster was left, 
that the disease had caused {caused by the illness?}.
I: a pain … a psychological pain?
A: but, it wasn’t, a much milder pain, maybe to …
I: so we’re talking of a physical pain … a physical one?
A: and … yes, but …
I: after this acute phase?
A: yes, yes for sure, yes, it’s a bearable pain, and now let’s say we’re kind of used to it 
…
I: yes.
A: and so … because when I get it … strong … but now after the therapy … it took 
about … four months, seven years ago, when I began with this … and so now … let’s 
say I’m repairing … simply repairing the damage, but I still get the pains, for 
example now my foot need surgery.
I: pains in your foot, is that what you have now?
A: [inaudible] one foot was already operated upon five years ago, then the wrist …
I: the wrist …
A: well, let’s say these are all part of …
I: and those in your feet, what are they like?
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A: well, those in my foot … are … quite … quite bad too because … they are like, like 
… erm … think of when the blacksmith … hits the hot iron.
I: yes.
A: and it throws off sparks.
I: yes.
A: that’s it, there are all these painful sparks {Marta: there you go, she’s better than me 
at describing} in various places on the foot, also because … clearly the foot bears the 
whole weight of the person.
I: sure.
A: obviously, because there you feel from … in the toes … under the toes, you feel them 
… at the sides, above the metatarsus, erm, in the heel, and … even the one that was 
operated, this one [points] is the one that need operating, but also …
I: and that’s because one foot has already been operated?
A: yes yes.
I: mhm mhm.
A: yes, I can walk ok though, but … because the operation was done, but because I 
didn’t have a protruding toe, they … they weren’t able to operate …
I: yes.
A: up to the toe, because the toe had nothing wrong with it. 
I: a protruding toe … meaning it pushes out on one side?
A: yes yes, and it’s not only people with RA who get it, in many people it’s hereditary 
…
I: yes, many people.
A: many people even young ones, mine was slightly atypical as … let’s say that my toe 
was normal, whilst all the four metatarsus bones from the four other toes had moved 
down, and so they tied the toes but they told me I wouldn’t have problems because 
not having had the operation on the big toe, since it wasn’t needed, but that I would 
have problems later on and indeed all these problems did appears a couple of years 
ago, when the big toe began to move involuntarily, to the right hand side of the other 
toes …
I: yes.
A: and so it felt like pulling on something, that had to be lengthened. 
I: mhm mhm.
A: but erm … the big toe did move somewhat … so I can’t even begin to tell you how 
painful it was, in the bone of the [inaudible], because, if I, if I place it …
I: yes.
A: well you see the toe as if it were normal.
I: mhm mhm. 
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A: but it’s a painful toe, and I don’t even know what they’ll be able to do about it and it 
gets, terrible pangs really … luckily they don’t last long, yes, so what I can say is that 
both the operated foot and the other … that has to be operated, the operated one has 
the advantage that the metatarsus doesn’t hurt, because the bone … is in a straight 
line so it doesn’t come down. 
I: mhm mhm.
A: whilst this one that wasn’t operated upon [inaudible] comes back down.
I: yes.
A: it makes holes in my shoes, it hurts me, erm … even if I place a handkerchief inside, 
I mean, really … nothing … I walk with an insole but, it’s still very difficult because 
the foot still hurts. And then the toes above that become like this … so, so that’s what 
…
I: [inaudible] do they bend?
A: yes, oh yes because …
I: [inaudible].
A: because they hurt, they contract so, so, therefore … that’s how they become. Indeed 
the two toes of this foot … they will be sawn/tied42 like the ones on this side [points], 
so that they are lined up.
I: your, your …
A: the pain is intense, this one too, bearable, let’s say.
I: at this time, whilst we’re talking, are you in pain?
A: no.
I: no?
A: not now. But there are moments, suddenly, that I can count tens … tens at once.
I: the …
A: it’s really like a … sparks <LAUGHS>.
I: like sparks.
A: sure, then like … the pain becomes like a flash of lightning [tchin- tchin] … the feet.
I: intense?
A: yes, extremely intense.
I; and how would you say your diagnosis of RA came about?
A: yes, yes.
I: I mean, after how long did you get it?
                                                            
42 The recording is unclear. The word could be ‘segate’ (sawn off) or ‘legate’ (tied/bound together).
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A: as far as the diagnosis goes, let’s say I had it … because initially I had been followed 
by an orthopaedist, and … the orthopaedist hadn’t understood what it really was 
about then when he saw the tests results, that … the rheuma-test was higher and 
higher, and he couldn’t keep the illness at bay … let’s say it was an orthopaedist who 
got it right, whilst I was on holiday.
I: mhm mhm.
A: I was on holiday … in the same building where I was staying, and so … he saw me 
… with my little girl in my arm, she was screaming because she had hurt herself, and 
he saw my hands like this and he asked me, he goes “signora but do you … do you 
have RA?” I said “yes”, well I said “yes” … “do you … do you have RA?” I said “I 
don’t know, I know I have pains”. He said “look, there’s the [name of hospital] in 
Milano, and since you live there …”. I didn’t even know where it was.
I: yes.
A: because, I mean, when one is well one doesn’t …
I: … you don’t think of it …
A: you don’t think of it, you don’t go looking for hospitals and so … he said to me 
“look, it’s like this. There’s Professor B., whom I didn’t meet then but he was there”. 
And so I began my … my via crucis with the therapies, with the drugs that were 
needed. First aspirins, then vitamin injections … these things … but nothing … not 
really a cure …
I: how would you say your life has changed because of this illness?
A: for the illness? Yes it changed a lot. In my mood especially, I was … normally I was 
a bit of a jester, I was, erm, but, let’s say I was busy with many things I did … with 
my family but then … well things changed a lot because now I’m easily angered … I 
don’t need much …
I: mhm mhm.
A: even if …
I: it changed your personality, in other words …
A: it changed my personality yes, on those days when I’m well I kind of get back to how 
I was. 
I: to be …
A: but … I go up and down, it takes little to go up and little to go down.
I: sure.
A: erm … let’s say that … even if … even if I have everybody around me but … erm … 
at times I think that they don’t understand me but not because they won’t understand 
me, it’s because it’s difficult erm … even to keep asking you “how are you”, keep 
looking after you. 
I: yes.
A: because that’s what I need {yes} and they do it yes, but in the meantime they don’t 
ease {yes} because … when you have all these ups and downs, these days that … 
you go from one doctor to the other {yes} because then RA doesn’t just end there 
{yes}, it causes many other things.
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I: other problems?
A: problems and so, you spend entire days at … in the various hospitals, with the 
various doctors and … well, it’s never over. 
I: do you find …
A: one learns to live with it.
I: do you find it difficult to communicate about it to your family?
A: no.
I: I mean, to communicate the kind of pain you feel?
A: no I communicate … I can explain well, in the sense that I try to explain it well, to 
any doctor, I try to help them understand, just the way it is. For example, back in 
October I had, one night, a pain her [points].
I: in the sternum? {right here, in the thorax}.
A: in the thorax, right between my breasts, here [points] that began slowly from here 
[points].
I: from the side? {that gets stronger and stronger}.
A: yes from here, and when it got here [points] … there was an explosion, as if you saw 
… a bomb go off.
I: yes.
A: mhm, an explosion.
I: I see.
A: this is the exact definition of pain that I felt. Luckily it didn’t last more than … I 
think a minute and a half {yes} but for me it was an eternity. Also because at two in 
the morning I didn’t know what … I had to call my husband and my daughter, but, 
erm, either you go straight to A&E … but they tried to … this had never happened to 
me before, and because my grandma, my dad, and my dad’s sister who died of a heart 
attack, I became very worried. I get agitated because of this, and of course as I age …
I: yes, I experienced chest pain too {the sternum} and it scares you … maybe it wasn’t 
as strong and maybe … I remember once I had gastric reflux problems and it gives a 
very intense pain here [points], in the lower sternum, something I had never 
experienced. I was on a plane I remember I got very scared because I thought it had 
to do with the heart, I had no idea it was reflux {reflux coming back up} yes from the 
stomach {from the stomach} but it’s very common for people to become scared {oh 
yes, I … I …} rather than because of a pain in the leg, for example. 
A: I repeat, I got … in the morning around 7.30 because then I got it once or twice again 
but not as strong, maybe it wouldn’t start from here [points] and it would reach here 
[points].
I: to the breasts, and the armpit …
A: yes, then under the armpit, and I’ve also heard lots of people … my doctor told me 
many people hade it this past winter. But so I had a lot of tests done, last week I 
finished with the dopler, ecodopler. But in A&E they immediately saw the heart 
wasn’t affected. In spite of this, when I feel even a minor pain I get scared and then I 
have to ask for help, to my family or whoever is around. Because I pass out … I 
really lose it. 
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I: yes, there is a fear that comes from the pain, from the fear it might be …
A: yes, now there’s really a fear.
I: yes.
A: the fear. The fear of not making it, of getting a heart attack … something like this,
because then, I’ve had many things, I’ve had a cancer of the skin … here [points] and 
another one here [points].
I: and are they connected to RA? Or to other factors?
A: maybe it’s because of stress. I’m very stressed, I stress a lot, I try <LAUGHS> I try
to … how can I put it, I try to complicate things for myself. My husband says, and 
it’s true, I buy things … and they make me tired. I’m a tad masochistic, in this sense, 
I make things hard for myself, I should learn to take it easy, but I’m a bit hard 
headed, it’s the way I am.
I: do you think this is influenced by the illness? This way of being?
A: sure. Then now age is another factor, I am sixty-six so … I mean … I’m getting 
older, and family problems. My husband was unwell, and so it’s a combination of
stresses.
I: sure.
A; I’m already so sensitive, so tense. Like a violin string.
I: were you like this before {yes, oh yes}.
A: I just need to see a puppy that’s suffering, and I’m affected. 
I: one last thing, when did you begin seeing your body change, because of the illness?
A: almost immediately.
I: how …
A: do you mean physically?
I: yes physically, the deformity … is it something that upset you? Quite aside from the 
pain.
A: not really, because, I must say that thanks to the therapies then, if you believe, also 
thanks to God, I think you can be lucky, even in illness because … there’s people … 
I’ve seen people in much worse conditions, whilst I can still use my hands for many 
things. 
I: sure.
A: I use them, and some times I abuse of them, to my detriment, but what can I do. I use 
them, otherwise why did I get them fixed <LAUGHS> but let’s say I should use them 
but with care. But I’m a bit silly in this respect. My family tell me “leave it”. but 
that’s what I’m like but I have to say that yes, my hands are damaged but … I don’t 
know if you’ve seen other people’s hands.
I: I’ve seen some.
A: but I’m not really bothered if people look at my hands or what. What bothers me is 
that it’s difficult to walk and so I’m hoping that after the operation I’ll be able to 
walk better. I hope to be able to wear a pair of shoes and they won’t hurt, because at 
present shoes are always a problem but … well so far nobody has made me feel bad 
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because of this, but then again, there’s always somebody who maybe stares at you, 
but I don’t really care.
I: ok, thank you very much, signora. Thank you very much. Is there anything you’d 
like to add?
A: no, I think I’ve said all I wanted to.
I: thank you then.
A: not at all.
I: thank you. 
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2.b Annamaria
Interviewer: Ok, erm, how long ... first of all may I ask what exactly, from a medical point of 
view, what your pathology is?
Annamaria: I suffer from Systemic Lupus Erythematosus. 
I: when were you first diagnosed?
A: I got the diagnosis in 1985, while the first symptoms occurred in 1974, after the birth 
of my son.
I: in 1974. What kind of symptoms?
A: I had many articular [joint] pains, the knees would swell up, the hands too and ... so 
much so that I couldn’t even pick my son up, and so I found looking after him hard, 
and nothing, the joint pains most of all, they continued for around ten years.
I: But were they, they weren’t continuous, I mean were they continuous or intermittent?
A: they were, they were, yes yes, continuous, especially the knees, erm, always swollen 
and the hands, the hands and the knees have always been the sorest parts.
I: and initially, the doctor ... I mean, you went to see a doctor straight away, to ... when 
they began, did you see somebody or did they ... what would they say to you?
A: I went to, I went to an orthopaedist, who gave me cortisone, without conducting any 
tests. He told me right away that I had RA, and he gave me cortisone, erm, just 
looking at my fingers, and I ... well, for a month I took this cortisone, but then I 
realised that without a diagnosis, in spite of me being only twenty-one, I was still 
young, but I would tell myself “without a diagnosis I’m taking cortisone, and then?” 
So after a month I stopped taking it.
I: and the symptoms were ... during the, the therapy with cortisone were you ... were 
you feeling better?
A: yes, I was feeling very well, with cortisone I was feeling well, but after a month, 
when I stopped taking it I began with the pains again. My GP wasn’t saying anything 
... and my son’s paediatrician noticed that I wasn’t well because I took [to him] my 
son and he saw that I had troubles moving, and he ask me what was wrong. I told 
him, and he advised me to come to [name of the hospital], where there was a 
rheumatology ward. I came to [name of the hospital], did the initial tests, and the 
doctor told me that ... in his opinion it could be something but he thought it was only 
something ... something ... psychosomatic.
I: so he that ... he thought it was ...
A: a psychological factor, he told me that for him it was a psychological factor because 
... each time I went to see him I had nothing to show to him, because my hands would 
swell up and down, and the knees the same thing, and each time I came to see him I 
had nothing to show to him
I: and was the pain always there or only when the swelling was present?
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A: the pain was there mainly when they were swollen, of course. And so ... well, then he 
told me ... told me to come back once I had something swollen, without an 
appointment, and after two days I arrived with a swollen knee, and he says “well, 
then it’s not a psychological problem otherwise the knee wouldn’t have become 
swollen, so he analysed the liquid [inaudible] the knee, and ... he told me I had RA. 
But that it didn’t show in the blood tests. So he gave me no heavy drugs ... only anti-
inflammatories ... and told me to carry on. I mean ... he told me “Signora, I don’t 
know what else to say to you, come back when you feel worse”. I was twenty-one, I 
didn’t like the thing very much ... but that’s how things went because I carried on 
taking anti-inflammatories as and when, which was often, which means that for three 
four days a week, even five, I needed to take anti-inflammatories. Then these knees 
that would swell up and go back to normal again, they would stay swollen for a week 
at a time ... I had a heavy job, because I was a [textile] weaver and consequently, the 
continuous walking. But I kept on doing it, in spite of everything, with my swollen 
knees I would still go to work but ... and anyhow even if I’d stayed at home my life 
wouldn’t have changed. Nothing, I still managed to work.
I: so, the diagnosis of this second doctor was basically similar ... or the same as the first 
one’s?
A: yes, the first one had said it without ...
I: without doing any tests.
A: without doing any tests, just having looked at the hands, which were swollen, 
whereas the other one analysed the liquid he took from the knee. And nothing, then 
he told me “Signora I don’t know what else to do because the blood tests are always 
negative. Come back when you’ve got worse”. And I carried on for ten years like 
that. And then I did indeed get worse in the sense that ... erm ... it’s not ... it’s not 
something you only say but I’ve actually lived it, that when you’re not well 
psychologically, in moments of crisis these illnesses take over. And in fact I was 
going through a moment of crisis ... erm ... I put myself under heavy physical and 
moral stress and I began experiencing bigger problems. So problems on the skin, the 
pains had become more intense
I: on the skin what kind of problems did you have?
A: I had ... small red spots, just under the skin, that were sore when touched and I didn’t 
understand what was happening to me because they were symptoms I had never 
experienced before. And so I went back to be checked, but by another doctor, not by 
the earlier one because in the meantime an outpatient clinic had been set up here at 
[name of the hospital]. I am ... they advised me to see the rheumatologist, who is still 
my rheumatologist, and he gave me a diagnosis, after doing several tests, and he told 
me I had a disease with a very ugly name but that I shouldn’t get scared, because it 
wasn’t so tragic, that it could be kept under control ... he told me what the worst 
phases would be. Unfortunately, well, I only learned that later but anyway it changes 
nothing, that it’s a disease you can die from.
I: mhm
A: because, erm, it mainly affects the organs, not only the joints.
I [I see]
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A: and consequently, if it attacks vital organs, it goes without saying that ... it isn’t very 
easy. And nothing, I managed to live well with ...
I: and this in 1985, the diagnosis ...
A: this in 1985.
I: the certainty.
A: yes.
I: and the fact of having had ... a sure diagnosis ... has it changed anything for you, in 
your experience of the illness or ... how you reacted ...
A: well, I must say that I didn’t ... the thing didn’t upset me. I mean, I took it rather well 
... I didn’t ... I must say that I’m a positive person, I don’t ... don’t make a drama, ok, 
I mean, I tried to take it as best I could. I carried on with my life, as if nothing had 
happened ... I had a problem that had, finally – so to speak – a name but ... this meant 
starting a heavier therapy.
I: [inaudible]
A: consequently, sure, I had to start taking cortisone, and I’m still taking it, because it’s 
a disease that’s kept under control only with cortisone, then, as the years went by 
other things happened, because then, even though .... they’re not tragic things but, 
after a while, after starting cortisone I got pleurisy and pericarditis, and this scarred 
me a lot because I had ... for three months I’ve had to sleep on deckchair because I 
couldn’t breathe. And when I went back to sleeping in a bed, in any case I’ve had to 
sleep, for almost ten years, propped up with three pillows, because I couldn’t lie 
down any longer, because I had pains in my thorax. Because unfortunately, after ... 
erm ... I began having these pains in the thorax, it wasn’t immediately clear I had 
pleurisy, I then, at the beginning of the illness I was afraid of bothering the doctor, 
you see? Because I had phoned him to tell him I had these problems.
I: mhm.
A: ... he took x-rays of the chest, and told me “then read me the result on the phone”. I 
did the x-rays, because – as I said – I live outside Milano I did these x-rays ... I had 
difficulties travelling, because with this shortness of breath ... coming to Milano 
wasn’t easy. And so when I did these x-rays the diagnosis was that they hadn’t found 
anything so when I phoned my doctor, he tells me “well, I feared it might be pleurisy 
but since it isn’t it must be only a pain between the ribs”. And this was April. I didn’t 
have another appointment until June.
I: excuse me ... what type of pain was it?
A: I had a very strong pain, when breathing. I had stabbing pains at the thorax, and ... 
and not only, I felt that the heart was involved too. It didn’t beat with the same 
frequency, you see? So I felt ... I really felt a very strong pain in my thorax, so .... it’s 
been a really hard time. And, I didn’t remember but now that I think of it 
<LAUGHS> it’s been a hard time. And so nothing ... I could only walk slowly, 
because if I walked even only a bit quicker even at home, erm, I ... I felt these pangs 
that would make it impossible to breathe. And so ... even my family would say to me 
“but go to your doctor’s in Milano”. “No, now I’ve got my appointment coming up” 
so ... always the fear of being a nuisance, of appearing to be whingeing, you see?
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I: Yes ...
A: and when I finally arrived ... the day of the appointment and I arrived here at the 
hospital, a step at a time, my doctor got scared because than he ordered an x-ray a 
saw I had liquid in the lungs, both lungs, and I had pericarditis, so my heart was 
swollen, the pericardium ...
I: these were ... side-effects of the cortisone therapy ... or were they due ...
A: no, no, they were due to the disease ...
I: the disease.
A: it was the disease that had really ... it had developed and so had begun giving these 
symptoms.
I: and ... after how long ... three months, the time this crisis lasted, more or less?
A: yes this crisis lasts this much, yes, then ... erm ... he had to immediately increase the 
cortisone, the dosage, erm, but since he hadn’t ... he hadn’t known me long as a 
patient, so he sent me to have my stomach investigated. Because obviously cortisone 
can ruin the stomach. He tells me “let’s see that the stomach is ok first, then I’ll 
increase the dosage”. Unfortunately I had an ulcer I didn’t know I had so for another 
month I couldn’t increase the prescription ... so things went on ... and this caused me 
to develop adhesions between the pleura and ... and ... and so my breathing became 
difficult because of these adherences, they didn’t allow me to expand the chest, to 
breathe. And this is something that ... well after a month I was able to increase the 
therapy and the pains ... I’m not saying they stopped because that’s not true ... erm ... 
but I felt much better.
I: still these, these ... when you talk of these pangs ...
A: yes pangs, yes, yes, yes. Yes, which has been the thing that made me suffer the most, 
because obviously it limited my life also, the fact the fact of having had to sleep 
sitting up all this time ... because lying down wouldn’t allow me to breathe.
I: to breathe ....
A: it wasn’t easy ... also because it lead to a consequence, even if we can’t be sure, erm, 
I developed a tumour on my backside [inaudible] by sitting all that time in bed in that 
position, it must be that the tissues were under constant stress ... erm ...and I began 
having a cyst, which was removed thinking it was only a cyst but instead it was a 
malignancy and so ...
I: and this you realised only because ... because you felt it or ... [inaudible].
A: I realised because sitting on it, it hurt a lot.
I: what type of pain was it?
A: it was ... a very acute pain, only if I touched it, only if I sat ... or if I touched this, this 
cyst erm it would hurt a lot, like a burning, you see? And nothing, so I let my doctor 
know, my rheumatologist, I say “I got this thing right by the end of the spine and it 
hurts”. And he said “ok, we’ll remove it and have it analysed”. Because we truly 
thought it was due to the continuous ... 
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I: to the pressure …
A: yes, precisely. Instead, when it wan analysed it was … a malignancy.
I: in what year?
A: this happened in 1996.
I: in 1996. And … so you … you stayed … you stayed in hospital for this?
A: yes, I had to be hospitalised for further tests, right away to investigate all that needed 
investigating, then I was operated on again because obviously they had excised 
thinking it was cyst and instead then they had to clean [the area] completely. I was 
lucky because they were able to take everything out, I didn’t need chemo or 
radiotherapy. After a year it looked like it had come back, because the problem had 
reappeared. Through some tests they found there was still a nodule and so I was 
operated again but they found out that it wasn’t a relapse but only a nodule which had 
necrotised, caused by the position, by sitting, and so since then I forced myself to 
sleep lying down, now I can’t sleep with only one pillow, but with two pillows, lying 
on my back I have learnt
I: but now, so ... you still have a problem of ... the lung so ... your breathing is ... 
anyway you still have pains or ...
A: it happens, there are periods when I still get numerous chest pains.
I: of the same type you were telling me earlier?
A: yes, yes. Much less intense than that time ... erm ... but that still prevent me from 
breathing correctly, consequently when I have these pains I can’t walk as fast as I’m 
used to, I can’t lie down, and consequently ... I’m slightly limited, yes.
I: yes. And since that time, since then until, until now the rest ... I mean the disease, the 
disease has it had ... has it manifested itself in any other way?
A: yes I started having problem with the optical nerve.
I: mhm mhm.
A: I began ... I mean I would see a black spot, right in front of the eye I would see a 
black spot that within half an hour would change colour, it would turn white. No, if I 
closed my eyes it would turn white, erm, this spot I would see it white. If instead I 
would open them it would stay black, and then it would be reabsorbed and would get 
smaller in around half an hour. I went to have some tests done, to the eye specialist’s, 
whose patient I already was, because the therapies can affect ...
I: mhm.
A: the eyes, and he, the eye specialist, couldn’t see anything. He told me “if you ... if 
when this happens you can go to an A&E, and have the situation evaluated ...
I: a bit the old story of ...
A: [inaudible]
I: of the swelling, where there wasn’t ...
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A: sure. And so ... I was able, in a moment like that ... because with it being a problem 
that would pass in half an hour, I mean, I had to hurry to have it seen. So I managed 
to go to an A&E and they told me it was an ischemia of the optical nerve. And since 
lupus ... among other things, can have that, the problem of ... of blood coagulation ...
I: mhm mhm.
A: I am at risk of thrombosis.
I: mhm mhm.
A: so ... I had already realised because I had had thrombophlebitis ... erm ... in, in years 
past. So I was already taking Aspirin 500 to ... to try and keep my blood more fluid. 
But when I started having problems with the eyes then I began to have problems ... at 
times I wouldn’t remember where I was ... it wasn’t a pleasant sensation. And so my 
rheumatologist decided to get me started on an anticoagulant therapy. I go to have my 
blood tested, it depends, once a week, once a fortnight ... and they adjust the dosage 
of the drug to fluidify the blood.
I: this though wasn’t a problem ... it wasn’t painful the eye problem ...
A: no, not pain, no, it was purely the fact of not seeing ...
I: [inaudible]
A: ... or ... not having ... not being lucid is bad. it’s a bad sensation not ... not knowing 
where you are ...
I: but while it was happening did you realise what was going on, or only afterwards?
A: no, no, no, I would realise, because maybe ... I was coming out of the hospital and ... 
there was a moment when I’d say “I don’t know. What am I doing here? Where am 
I?” I mean ... it would only last a few seconds. But ... things ... <LAUGHS> really 
not very pleasant.
I: you would get scared ...
A: well, it was not very pleasant. A sensation of ... insecurity. And then obviously, it’s 
clear, any bodily pain I think you can live with it, but a mental thing ... I think that’s 
what scares you the most.
I: mhm mhm. And so you were perhaps more worried ... more worried than by the 
pains, at the joins, for example ...
A: yes, yes, without a doubt yes.
I: why?
A: because the fact of no longer being all there, with your mind <LAUGHS> I mean 
because the pain I think I can deal with. Anything, if it hurts I put up with it, I deal 
with it. But if you’re out of your mind ... that’s hard.
I: and this ... with regards to ... the first symptoms you experienced, precisely, the pains 
the swellings of the joints, are they still ... do you still get them?
A: yes ... yes yes yes yes yes. We now keep each other company, easily. I always say 
that my lupus and I have become friends. He leaves me a bit of space and I him. Then 
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maybe, when he starts giving me a few more problems, usually I tell myself “he must 
need a bit more ‘food’” then I have to increase the dosage of the medication, then he 
calms down again and we coexist in harmony.
I: <LAUGHS> it’s interesting the image of ...
A: <LAUGHS>
I: as if you visualised it, as if it were ...
A: yes. Yes yes.. and indeed when my mum ... she once said “this damn, this damn lupus 
[inaudible]”. “Don’t call it that! ‘cause he might take it out on me then. Let’s keep 
him on our side, let’s keep coexist peacefully, let’s not make him angry”.
I: if ... I mean, I imagine you’ve done this when, when you were talking to doctors. But 
... if you had, if somebody asked you what type of pain it is the pain you feel, for 
example in your joints, how would you describe it?
A: <DEEP BREATH> it’s not easy to describe pain <LAUGHS> ... I mean, there are 
many types, because .... the pain, erm, I could say a burning but it isn’t, it isn’t a 
burning. It’s really something acute. Sometimes, it feels like ... I mean you often hear 
these phrases, that you think are over the top, but ... it feels like is twisting a knife 
inside of you, you see? I mean ... and indeed often it’s exactly like that, even if these 
are things I never say because I don’t ... just hearing them bothers me. If feels like ... 
almost like making it sound worse, you see?
I: mhm
A: I mean making it more ... heavier, but truthfully that’s how it is. Sometimes the pain 
is really like a knife penetrating you ... the one at the thorax was .... atrocious, that 
truly felt like being stabbed.
<LONG PAUSE>
I: yes I think it’s hard to imagine. I think it is, precisely one of the problems, isn’t it? 
But when ... talking to the doctor, with people around you , the fact the for you it was 
hard to describe it did it frustrate you?
<PHONE RINGS> INERVIEW INERRUOTE; RESUMED AFTER THREE 
MINUTES
I: we were saying, erm, I don’t know the fact that ... this difficulty in managing to 
describe what was happening to you, what you were feeling physically, did ... how 
did you live it, didn’t you, didn’t you, did it have any effects on you ... was there any 
frustration when you couldn’t ...
A: no, what bothered me was arriving with nothing to show when I was seeing my 
doctor. Also because saying “it hurts” ... the doctor ... I mean if he knows his stuff ... 
he probably understands what you mean by “it hurts”, but the “it hurts” meant not 
being able to use a joint, it meant not being able to bend it, not being able to .. erm ... 
I mean this type of pain. But seeing was what would have given the doctor certainty, 
because ...
I: you mean if he had actually seen something ...
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A: the joints, yes precisely, the joints would swell, they were hard and hot. So he would 
have understood that there was indeed something. Because just describing with “it 
hurts”, “I can’t use the wrist rather than a finger” I mean often the doctor can’t truly 
understand how much you’re hurting. It isn’t easy. Because then everyone has got his 
different pain threshold. There’s the one who can bear a very intense pain and the one 
with a very small one, can’t cope.
I: and instead in your relationship with your family, with friends this ... often this 
inability to accurately describe what, the type of pain [inaudible] did it worry you? 
Frustrate you? Did you still manage to relate to people, or did you maybe feel 
isolated for not being able to ...
A: no, no, I must say ... erm, my family have always been very understanding, in the 
sense that, then they know me and they know that if I complain it’s because there is 
something ... something that’s really wrong, otherwise I wouldn’t have complained. 
Then I’m not one to make a drama or tell a lot, in the sense that ok I’m hurting but 
then I don’t want to go into details. Also because, if you tell a family member “it 
hurts” generally they believe you. They don’t think you’re exaggerating, you see. But 
getting a doctor to understand you is different. The doctor doesn’t know you, and 
maybe he thinks you’re exaggerating, that’s maybe is not as bad as you’re saying. 
But not at home. At home ... on the contrary, I don’t like being pitied, not at all. It’s 
something I’m not interested in, also because what’s the use? Often I’m the one who 
has to give strength to others, because ... this even when I had the tumour, because 
the other were distraught, and in the end I was the least distraught of all
I: well, it’s weird because it seems it happens quite a lot, that in the end one finds 
oneself…
A: he’s the one that has to give others strength.
I: to have … the problem, whatever it might be, he then has to take charge for others, 
who look like they could cope …
A: I remember when I had the breathing problem, one evening in particular I was on my 
bed, sitting up, with this heavy breathing, and it’s a terrible thing, and my husband by 
the bedroom door looking at me as if to say “tell me what I can do” and I sent him 
away “go away I don’t want to see you” <LAUGHS> because really, it’s been a dark 
period and I was … I mean not being able to breathe makes you nervous … really 
makes you nervous <LAUGHS>.
I: I can imagine <LAUGHS> I imagine it is …
A: yes, as for the rest … my family, let’s say I think they don’t realise, they know very 
well I have these problems but I never offloaded them onto anybody else. Principally 
because they’re not even that heavy for me, consequently …
I: this, this … earlier you told me about the red spots you would sometime get …
A: yes …
I: on the body. Does that still happen?
A: well, it’s these little spots that appeared under my skin, but on the palm of my hands 
and under my feet. Erm, these still come out from time to time, it depends on the 
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time, erm, I then got some, some nodules on my legs, these things are quite … 
frequent. And there too I have to increase the dosage of cortisone until it …
I: and do these hurt?
A: yes, they’re very painful.
I: are you talking of the nodules or the little spots?
A: the nodules.
I: the nodules. 
A; the nodules on the legs, because it appears they are nodules that sit right on the nerve, 
consequently, each time you move the leg … the foot … you feel this pang … 
continuous 
I: so they’re like pangs?
A: yes.
I: not burnings, pangs?
A: yes, no, no, no, really … a pang, yes.
I: but you don’t move [inaudible] you don’t move they don’t hurt?
A: it hurts. Not like when I walk, obviously not like when I walk. 
I: and instead the spots? [inaudible] what type?
A: well instead the spots … no the spots were … were sore if I touched them. Otherwise 
not, they didn’t hurt. They were like … they too like small nodules that had formed 
under the skin, on the palms of my hands and the soles of my feet. And it happens 
now, they still hurt, obviously, when I walk I feel them. Because it becomes red, both 
the sole of the foot and the palm of my hands, and it gets sore. But it’s also due to 
luck of [blood] circulation. 
I: you have, I mean do you have moments when you are completely free from pain 
these days?
A: yes.
I: so it isn’t, there are moments …
A: yes. Yes I was just thinking about it <LAUGHS> … I’m so used to it. no, one thing, 
for example, which I understood from the beginning, is that … I must be able to 
appreciate the times when I’m well. For example if my knees are swollen I find it 
difficult to walk down the stairs, to climb them, to walk. But when I’m well, I can 
hop down the stairs, I’m so happy. Things that people who are always well don’t 
even realise they have. And this is a kind of happiness not everyone can feel.
I: can you remember what life was like before all this began for you?
A: yes. I’ve always been a very active person. I’ve always enjoyed working, even toiling 
has never been heavy for me. I’ve always done it gladly, I always have to feel I’m 
moving about, always fell useful, doing something. And I must say that in spite of 
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everything I can still do it, even with the pains. Clearly, I’m limited as to what I can 
do, I can’t, I can’t get down, kneel any longer, do these things, I have problems. Now 
I’ve got nephews and nieces, my brother’s children and I’d like to run [with them]. 
From time to time the little one tells me “auntie, come on, catch me”. Well, easy to 
say <LAUGHS>.
I: it’s difficult …
A: running after a child has become very difficult for me. 
I: running after a child is difficult for everybody <LAUGHS>. If it happens that you 
experience a pain, a pain which probably isn’t tied to your illness, like, I don’t know, 
the kind of headache everyone gets, or a cut, a burning, do you … do you experience 
it differently? Live it, I mean, I don’t know, because I was thinking … earlier you 
mentioned, this image, this lupus that feeds, so it gives problem in that respect. But 
probably, since, ‘cause you’re alive and ... like everybody … it happens that you have 
problems not due … I don’t know, do you experience them differently? I mean like, 
for you, is there a lupus pain and other pains? And if so, how are they different, how 
do you perceive them? Or, in the end all is …
A: no, no, no, they are different. For example, I was thinking, maybe that’s why I got 
burned the other day, to answer your question, maybe I felt <LAUGHS>.
I: oh yes, thank you for the cooperation <LAUGHS>.
A: I felt a burning, very intense, and clearly … very different from the pains I feel … 
usually. And so quick, run under running water, and put some cream on, and it was 
unpleasant to feel this, erm, much more unpleasant that feeling the pain in my knees, 
or in my hands. Also it might be that I’m used to those pains. And then … a burning 
is a very intense pain, very strong, so you hope … it goes away quickly. 
I: mhm, mhm, erm … for example if you had to compare, I don’t know, the pangs you 
experienced, that weren’t too intense, or painful …
A: yes.
I: how, in what way do you think, in your view what difference … how would you 
describe the difference of … the pang that was something due to ..
A: like the one at the thorax, for example? 
I: yes, compared to an intense pain like … a … when I was sixteen I spilled 
<LAUGHS> boiling water onto my legs …
A: nooo
I: and I remember it as the most terrible experience in my life <LAUGHS>.
A: I can imagine. No I must say that the pain from scalding is a strong pain, erm, but 
that passes, in the sense that, erm, it’s something where you say “ok now I go under 
cold water” [inaudible] clearly, the burning from an iron isn’t … a pan full of boiling 
water that is spilled onto your legs. So you say “ok, it’ll pass, I’ll put something cool, 
but a pain like the pangs I felt at the thorax … they affected me a lot. They affected 
my life a lot, because it was difficult to breathe, and this was something … it kept me 
from doing many things.
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I: to wrap up, just one thing. I was struck by the image you used of lupus as, as an 
illness, this kind of monster, something which is inside of you. 
A: no, it’s not a monster.
I: a …
A: a wolf cub.
I: a wolf, a small friendly thing … the illness however, and lupus. If instead you had to 
give an image, I can’t give one, the pain, independently from pain itself. What image 
would you think of?
A: not an ugly one.
I: not ugly?
A: no … no, something which is part of my life. Then … I must say that I don’t even 
know if I’d like to be cured of this illness.
I: Oh.
A: because it taught me many things, and … I was able to … to do something in my life 
I really like, which is being helpful to other people. And I was able to do it thanks to 
the lupus. Because I would never have been able not to work. I’m on incapacity 
benefits, I worked for twenty-four years, so … I stay at home on benefits, even if 
they’re not a lot, but it’s enough for me.
I: mhm mhm.
A: and so this allows me to come to … Milan and to volunteer and to be near to the ill. 
It’s something I like a lot.
I: thank you.
A: not at all. 
401
3.b Gina 
Interviewer: to begin with, I just wanted to ask you if you could tell me a bit about your 
experience, how it began {my illness?} erm, and how it developed, the genesis of 
your story.
Gina: well, I began by … I began by feeling pains in my knees, or in my feet. I would 
mostly feel them when I went to the mountains. Because I very much like the 
mountains. And as I would come down, my knees would swell and I couldn’t 
continue. Then maybe at home erm … my hand would swell up, or my arm but mhm 
I would also get a temperature. But I wasn’t worried because they’d say to me “well 
if pain goes around it’s not serious”.
I: what kind of pains were these ones you felt initially?
G: in my knees they were very strong. I really couldn’t move, my joints were blocked. 
And it was the same with my hands and wrists. High temperature and intense pains 
… and then the joint would become swollen and become blocked. But at the time, I 
repeat, I didn’t think much of it. But one morning, I found that I couldn’t even get up 
from my bed. I called my GP, he said to come here to [name of hospital]. But it was 
rather far, and so I didn’t. I did some blood tests. I went to a doctor’s who sent me to 
another doctor. At first they thought it was my teeth, it looked like I had some 
abscesses, then they said it was an inflammation, something like that. But meanwhile, 
almost two years went by. When the illness was diagnosed, at that point I really 
couldn’t take it anymore, that’s because I had gone to see a cardiologist, a family 
friend. As soon as he saw my hands, he said I had RA. He sent me to do some tests 
… and that’s where it all started from, where the therapy for RA started. I began 
feeling a bit better, but … obviously … it was kind of hard, especially at the 
beginning.
I: and this … I’m sorry, when did this all began?
G: well … twenty … twenty-two years ago.
I: twenty-two years. And after how long did you get a diagnosis?
G: two years.
I: after two years. 
G: since I started experiencing the pains of the illness.
I: and since then, how did the illness progress?
G: it progressed with various deformities, my hands, my feet. I’ve already been operated 
twice. I’ve had to prosthetic implants … in my hands, especially … the joints … here 
[points] and … but I’m all right at present … a part from a few episodes … when you 
maybe do some house work and maybe, without realising … for example, yesterday I 
cut, I cut some vegetables and today … my finger is swollen and I can’t {does it 
hurt?} I don’t have the strength to …
I: and {yes it hurts} is it painful? {yes} these pains, initially, is it only in the joints? Are 
they only …?
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G: well, in the smaller joints … then at times it affects the shoulders, and … the most 
acute pain, the most troublesome is when it affects … here [points] on my back and it 
must be … it must be the muscles which get inflamed, and even breathing … I really 
can’t. at times even just going to bed … this movement of lowering myself … a 
tremendous pain, that really blocks my breathing.
I: so, very intense?
G: very.
I: and what about the joints … how would you describe the pains there? 
G: always intense, so that at times you feel like … they’re ripping them of you. I put ice 
on them … or something to alleviate ….
I: are they like burnings? Or what?
G: they’re really like … how can I say … like needles, like something that rips you, I 
can’t really say if it’s like … I can’t describe it. I just know it’s strong. 
I: and do they … when you get them do they last a long time?
G: well, initially they would last maybe a day, now instead … maybe two or three days, 
before they begin to wear off.
I: in spite of you taking …
G: in spite of me taking anti-inflammatories and all, and the main therapy.
I: how … how would you say that the illness has influenced your life?
G: initially … it’s been hard, because my children were still small, and so … they too 
were … I’m not saying traumatised but almost. Because so often I was blocked and 
they, they would have to help their daddy with the house work. And … consequently 
… I mean my life changed, but little by little, so I got used to it and now, now I feel 
I’m like everybody else, if I don’t look at my hands, that is.
I: also because …. You were telling me … you don’t get as much pain as you used to 
…
G: no not like before. Now, more or less, the illness is under control.
I: did you find that … when you started coming into contact with doctors, or other 
people, was it difficult? Communication, with the medical establishment, were they 
understanding or …
G: well … when going to rheumatologists, even if they know the illness, well I found 
them to be quite understanding, knowledgeable.
I so … anyway … when you deal … as you often deal with people in your situation 
but also with people not in your situation do you find … do you find it easy to 
communicate your experience, or do you think it’s a difficult task?
G: no, I don’t communicate my illness to anybody. I mean, I don’t really have a chance 
to say how I feel.
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I: well … I was thinking … it must have happened to you that maybe at time you were 
involved in activities that you couldn’t ….
G: I refuse. Even at church I would act as … as secretary … there were things to do and 
I never concealed my condition, also because you can see it. And I say “no, I can’t do 
this job because my condition doesn’t allow me”. Yes, I tell the truth … and there are 
times when I feel slightly embarrasses because of these hands. But you overcome 
them. 
I: and what is your relationship with your own body like? I mean, after your illness, do 
you experience it [your body] as a stranger, an enemy, a source of problems?
G: no, I get along with myself.
I: I’m asking because it can happen that one identifies one’s own body as a source of 
{of problems} so that one wants to put some distance between self and the body 
whish is the source of {of suffering} of suffering maybe … but I think it’s different 
for everybody.
G: I think so. It depends on the extent to which you accept the illness. I think that, often 
there are people who truly reject it, especially when they are going through difficult 
times. I’ll tell you the truth, there was a time when I was going through a difficult 
time because, every day I was unwell, there was something every day. So I met a 
psychologist but she said there were no really big problems, I was just feeling down.
I: and this was … at the beginning?
G: yes, long ago, but then … maybe that’s what encouraged me to react. Since the I 
started on the way up.
I: and what about your work with the support group … how do you see it, is this one of 
the factors that help you feel better?
G: yes, yes yes, undoubtedly because you feel useful. Instead of just staying at home, 
without four walls, you feel useful … to other people who have the same problems as 
you.
I: there’s a sense of community …
G: yes there is amongst ourselves. After not seeing each other for a long time … even 
today, it’s a chance to … for the meeting we have in the afternoon, it was a chance to 
see each other again after a long time, because it’s not often that we can all meet but 
because of this we can get together and really … there’s true affection … maybe 
because we all share the same sorrow.
I: do you fell … do you feel more understood by people who suffer like you?
G: ye, sure. Especially initially, people near you, apart from my husband and my 
children, but those outside didn’t really understand, the illness. Because maybe I was 
in pain and the day before, on the phone “how are you” “I’m really unwell” and then 
the next day they’d see me, as if nothing had happened. Maybe they thought “she’s 
taking us for a ride” but no, it’s the nature of rheumatic diseases … difficult to 
understand … one day you’re in pain, the next you’re well.
I: it’s maybe the idea, the stereotype of people with illness who should be in bed, 
unable to move, constantly {yes yes, it’s true}.
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G: for example, last November I met with some former colleagues, I hadn’t seen them in 
a long time because I stopped working after having my second child. Anyway, then 
they talked to my sister, we all worked together, and they said to her “my God, poor 
Gina, with those hands” but that’s nothing. They imagine God know what because of 
my deformed hands. Well they didn’t say anything to me but this was the impact, 
whilst initially there were still no deformities and maybe you were in pain but the 
next day nothing but instead … and you had to take very strong medication to be able 
to function. 
I: so there was this paradoxical situation, so that maybe before there were no 
deformities but you were suffering a lot {it wasn’t understood}, it wasn’t understood, 
and then perhaps you see the physical signs but the suffering {is less} is less but 
people think it’s worse because they see the signs.
G: yes, it’s true.
I: ok thank you for your help. Is there anything else you’d like to add that maybe I 
haven’t asked?
G: no, I think I’m coping well with my illness <LAUGHS> even if now is when the 
truly big problems begin.
I: why?
G: because it begins to affect the liver, the kidneys, the heart, the eyes, it the other side 
<LAUGHS>
I: always to do with RA?
G: yes, the drugs, they’re good on one side but bad on the other. I’ve been taking them 
for twenty-two years.
I: [inaudible]
G: yes.
I: thank you.
G: not at all.
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4.b Marta
Interviewer: the first question, I just wanted to ask you if you wanted to tell me about your 
experience of illness. When did it begin, for example …?
Marta: I began when I was fifty-eight it, I had never had any illness in my life so I 
considered myself lucky, because I had never been ill, and suddenly, from a minor 
pain, from a finger, a whole succession of … this pathology was born, RA.
I: mhm mhm.
M: and, erm, little by little it got to my hands, and feet. Diagnosing it wasn’t easy 
because I’m … my tests are seronegative, I mean, they didn’t show anything, and so 
further tests were carried out to find out what it might be … which maybe didn’t 
involve RA. Then in the end it was diagnosed and now I’m living with the 
consequences because within four years my hands and feet were compromised, and 
they had to be operated.
I: and you said … you were saying it began with a finger?
M: yes, a finger.
I: what kind of …
M: I was diagnosed a simple, by the orthopaedist, a very simple tendonitis, erm, so I 
didn’t think much of it. but then, later, I had problems in my hands, burnings, erm, at 
night I had very intense pains in my hands. Then my foot began to swell and the 
ankle, and more. Things like these.
I: and were they all … I mean … at the ankle and so, was the first manifestation always 
painful, or was it a case of swelling first then pain?
M: no no … with the hands it was painful, because obviously the carpal tunnel becomes 
totally compromised and inflamed so it would be painful, the hands were, especially 
at night. These burnings, unbearable, and some swelling too.
I: so the pains were burnings?
M: yes, burning and then swelling, then … then one ankle began to swell, then the other, 
and so …
I: and what about the first one, that initial problem you had in your finger … what type 
of pain was it?
M: well it hurt. It hurt … this thumb, so I went to the orthopaedist asking why I had this 
pain, and he told me “it’s a …”
[portion of recording missing owing to damaged tape]
M: it could, it could be, of course I don’t know about these things, and I’m not saying 
that, <LAUGHS> but … this stuck in my mind clearly and everything possible was 
done and in the end they told me “no, you’ve got nothing else”. Also from a 
neurological point of view I went to [name of the hospital] and they did a lumbar [x-
ray?].
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I: the lumbar43 …
M: all. And all was fine, the nervous system was fine, physically … so I was advised to 
follow rheumatologic therapies. 
I: and during all that period … and even in this one, was your pain continuous? Or 
maybe … not …?
M: well, to begin with I was bludgeoned with anti-inflammatories. Cortisone, at the 
beginning. And so, naturally, the burnings I felt in my hands kind of abated, more or 
less. Well, I can’t say … even in my feet, walking was difficult because with the 
joints having become deformed they create problems … the joints become stiff and 
walking becomes difficult and I had to do something. Even though my hands were 
straight, my feet were straight, normal <LAUGHS> and so I got pain from these 
deformities that stiffen your joints. And naturally the movements of the hands, the 
feet, the pain is a pain, at least in my case, it’s not a pain where you go “oh my God, 
oh my God I’m hurting, I’ll take a painkiller right away” but it’s something that stays 
with you the whole day, because more than a pain it’s a stiffening, a … a difficulty in 
… you can’t close your hand properly, you can’t … so you always have this tension 
… in your muscles, the joints …
I: is this sensation you’re describing something that you feel, that you feel even when 
you’re not moving, and you’re sitting, doing nothing, when you’re at rest. Or is it 
something that comes on when you attempt to make a movement?
M: sometimes even when I’m doing nothing, when I’m at rest, some pains come on 
when you’re at rest. But obviously rest helps. For example yesterday I told myself I 
was stupid because I carried a bag {mhm mhm} I go shopping and stupidly, even 
only  from the car to the, the thing, instead of carrying by the handles as you 
normally do I carried it on my forearm. And this morning I’m all … it must be where 
the nerve is and … it got … and I said “I can’t carry absolutely anything, not even a 
bag on my forearm”, and so … I did … <LAUGS>.
I: so at present … generally now, for example right now, as we speak, have you got any 
pains?
M: well, then obviously one can get use to a state which is not normal … in terms of 
pain, now I don’t have any but there always is, for example in my ankles, that 
sensation of stiffening that … well I may move a foot because it feels like there’s 
something that constricts me, so maybe say I’m there, sitting, with no problems, I 
have to move my foot because I feel something, more than intense pain in my case it 
is a sensation of stiffening, which maybe doesn’t bother you as much as pain but still 
…
I: how would you say that having RA influence your life, how did it modify it?
M: well, it did. I’ve always enjoyed running, walking, before I became ill. In June 97, 
twenty days earlier, I went for a walk in the mountains. And in fact I blamed this.
                                                            
43 Rachicentesis, or “lumbar puncture”, introduction of a hollow needle into the subarachnoid space 
of the spinal canal, usually between the fourth and fifth lumbar vertebrae, usually performed for 
diagnostic purposes. 
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I: mhm mhm.
M: I went to two thousand metres, well from one thousand I went to two and came back. 
At one point I had to stop and go back, leave the group <LAUGHS> I went back on 
my own because I couldn’t take it anymore, I made an effort but couldn’t. Maybe I 
wasn’t used to walking that much anymore, but I was well, like I said I was a healthy 
person with a desire to do things and naturally my life changed in the sense that I 
can’t say anymore “tomorrow I’ll go, go on a trip”. Tomorrow I’ll see how I feel, if I 
can do it. like this morning, I had an appointment to see a friend, but to be honest I 
didn’t feel to good. Even if had been urgent … there’s one thing, I can’t really plan 
my life, that’s it, I can’t plan my life, and naturally this changes many things.
I: everything is more …
M: how can you say …
I: unpredictable.
M: what really helps me these days is being able to drive.
I: mhm mhm.
M: because since I can’t walk much, obviously, not being able to walk much, being still 
able to drive <LAUGHS> helps me really a lot.
I: so you can drive?
M: yes.
I: without any problems?
M: none. And being able to go, say, to the supermarket, do my own shopping even if my 
walking isn’t good … it makes me feel fulfilled. There have been times when I’ve 
had to be housebound for two months at a time, because I had been operated and 
couldn’t drive, I felt like I was a serious case. Because I couldn’t go around, I would 
say “what if I go out, walk a bit, and then get tired?”. I’m scared of using public 
transport.
I: why?
M: because I had only one hand I could use.
I: I see.
M: I can’t function … go <LAUGHS> with just one hand, I didn’t think I could do it, so 
…
I: would you still have problems using public transport?
M: not so much now, with two hands …
I: because before you could only use one?
M: yes, because I had surgery on one hand, and so, being able to drive really did help me 
a lot, really.
I: because you didn’t depend on anybody?
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M: yes, sure. Also because with the type of illness we have … I’d always have to ask my 
husband to take to do tests, to the GP, do the bureaucratic things that are needed, 
there’s always something.
I: sure.
M: so there are forms to fill, to be given insoles I have to see the orthopaedist, are you 
kidding me? A man <LAUGHS> would have to …
I: he’d have to always be available.
M: I always tell my husband that he’s lucky I took my license thirty years ago.
I: sure <LAUGHS>.
M: when he didn’t want me to. He’d say “why do you need a license?”
I: but instead it proved useful.
M: typical chauvinist of old <LAUGHS>
I: whereas now <LAUGHS>. You did the right thing.
M: sure, sure.
I: compared to other pains unrelated to the illness, that you felt or may have felt in the 
past, how would you compare them? I mean everybody has … I don’t know maybe a 
bruise because of a fall, a scalding, I mean what are these pains like, compared to a 
pain caused by the illness?
M: well, physically, one falls down and manages the pain. This kind of pain goes away, 
one overcomes it, but in this type of illness there’s no going back. I mean, you think 
“ok, this is how I’m feeling, but what about tomorrow? Will I still be able to drive? 
Still be able to …?”.
I: mhm mhm.
M: I mean, it’s very limiting, it’s more serious than other things, it’s chronic, let’s be 
honest about it. then one can manage in different ways. In my life I’ve had many 
sorrows, quite big ones, I lost two children, soon after giving birth …
I: yes.
M: so serious things.
I: mhm mhm.
M: but physically and mentally you overcome them, I mean. Certainly, if it had 
happened to me to become ill with RA when I lost the children and I was thirty, I 
think my life would have been much worse. I feel quite good overall. When I hear 
about these women who became ill in their twenties or thirties, I feel … their lives 
have been ruined by this illness.
I: ok. Thanks a lot.
M: [inaudible].
I: is there anything you’d like to add?
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M: <LAUGHS> no, nothing, I hope your research can be of help <LAUGHS>.
I: I hope so too, many many thanks. 
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5.b Sandra
Interviewer: ok, would you like to begin by telling me a bit, in general terms, about your 
experience, when it started?
Sandra: right, I’m thirty-two, I became ill in 1983, I was eleven I’ve been ill for twenty-one 
years. So, I began … I was in middle school [scuola media] and I had … I was 
listless, one might say. I began to have fevers, pains, but the fever wasn’t continuous, 
I had an intermittent low fever so it didn’t always look like I was unwell. Then one 
time my arm would hurt, then the sole of my foot and the pains would move around. 
Until one day I went to the doctor’s and … that day my temperature was 39C, it was 
very high. Since that time, nothing, practically I kept getting worse. 
I: … these pains you were talking about, in your foot or arm, what kind of pains were 
they, can you remember them?
S: well I find it difficult to remember, because the moment I’m fine again I delete 
everything from my mind, the pain I feel, but the moment when even only a finger 
hurts the sensation of pain I’ve felt resurfaces. Let’s say … it was a very intense pain, 
I wasn’t able to put the foot down or use a hand. But let’s say that … more than 
anything it manifested itself with me getting a temperature … when I have a relapse I 
just can’t move any more. My joints are blocked, with strong pains in my hip joints, 
and the shoulders too, and let’s say that I need help to do anything. Getting up, 
getting dressed, washing, even to have breakfast, to lift up my bowl of milk.
I: so they’re very …
S: very strong, when I’m going through an acute phase. Because when I had the latest 
relapse, in 1997, when it [the illness] manifested itself with pains and fever, I 
practically … I mean now I am … I’m ok. The pains are minor, just in one hand, 
where I began in 97, and … but they are very manageable. Let’s say I’ve always been 
treated with lots of cortisone, I can’t say if twenty years ago this was what treatment 
was like, because when I hear other people, now they don’t give you as much as I 
was given. I really took a lot of cortisone, I was given several boli of cortisone.
I: what are they?
S: boli are doses of cortisone administered intravenously, of methylprednisolone. They 
are administered over three days, a dose per day, and … their purpose is … to halt the 
illness. Sometimes I’ve had to have them administered consecutively, because … 
because I was not responding to the drugs. They also gave me immunosuppressants, 
that I took for many years, and nothing, with the immunosuppressants than I was able 
to decrease the dose of cortisone, to take the minimum dose. I haven’t had many 
relapses, in my illness. The ones I’ve had have been very strong. 
I: the diagnosis … when did you get it … you told me it was that time you had …
S: we are talking lupus, not RA.
I: so your diagnosis is of lupus.
S: yes, I was given it right away. I am … let’s say that …
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I: after this time … after this time, you were telling me that you’d experienced … first 
several pains than the fever, which was very high and you’d been to see a doctor.
S: right. 
I; and that’s when you received a diagnosis.
S: the diagnosis came, practically, after two months in which I, from April… no after a 
month because from April I had to stay in bed until May, end of May, I was taken 
into hospital and they immediately diagnosed the illness, because the following day, 
well I got the butterfly-shaped erythema, as well as the pains, as well as 40-41C 
temperature. I can’t recall exactly how it went, only that then yes, there … they made 
an immediate diagnosis because of the erythema, there were the cells [inaudible] that 
was … the test once used to ascertain this type of illness, there were the antibodies, 
very high, the ESR was very high [erythrocyte sedimentation rate], yes …
I: what is the ESR?
S: well, practically it’s used to determine the level of inflammation.
I: oh, I see.
S: and nothing, these various test results. The pains. The pains are very intense when I 
go through an acute phase.
I: what type of pains are they? Are they … how would you describe them?
S: well, they are pains you initially feel under the skin. They’re neither in the bone nor 
in the muscle, or they can be distinct, or in the bones, or the muscles. It’s an 
unpleasant sensation, a sensation that makes you fell restless. A … something that 
precedes the onset of pain proper. Then, at least the ones I feel, it’s really a pain, an 
intense pain, dull, a really strong one. I can’t find an appropriate term … pains that 
won’t let you … mhm …lead a normal life, but even the most mundane things like 
writing, washing, getting dressed.
I: but are they, when you have these pains, are they there only if you try to do 
something …
S: I can’t …
I: or even if you’re still, not moving, like that …
S: even if I’m still, yes, not moving, yes. Yes, yes even if I don’t move the pain is still 
there. So maybe I’m not able to stand up or … say … but once I’m on my feet, 
slowly, I can stand. But it’s not always easy, and I always need to be assisted. Then 
others …. I can’t describe them, to be honest.
I: so they’re not like … because at times I imagine them similar to burning sensations 
but …
S: mhm, that’s an initial phase of the pain, before the acute pain. It’s a … I call it … it’s 
the phase before I get the pain proper, yes, that phase of burning, yes. I truly feel pain 
in the joints. I mean I can really feel all the joints … one by one.
I: so you have an initial phase with … where … which precedes the acute phase … and 
this dull pain you described before, is it part of the acute phase?
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S: precisely. It’s really a very intense pain that will not allow you to lead a normal life, 
the daily activities one does, yes.
I: erm, how would you say … that it has … what effect has the illness had on you, the 
pain?
S: the illness? The pain not that much, because, aside fro the acute phases, then it’s very 
manageable. Consequently after having plugged it with medication you can, you can 
still … do your own things, you can. As far as the illness is concerned … well … 
how can I say … how can I explain? Every choice I’ve made, every choice I’ve made 
in my life has always been influenced by the illness, because it’s always been there, 
ever since I was a child, and everything has always been … a problem. A problem 
going to the seaside, a problem going out with my friends, a problem … everything. 
Still, and I’m married, there are problems. Every choice has … has had a 
consequence, because the illness developed when I was little and we grew up 
together. Consequently … it’s been a parallel journey. 
I: yes, it really started …
S: when I was eleven.
I: can you remember what life was like before becoming ill?
S: honestly, I had never had a temperature, never an illness, never … anything, nothing 
at all, I had only had chicken pox, when I was three, and then nothing else. Until the 
age of eleven, then … then there have been very serious consequence because of the 
therapies. I got spinal osteoporosis, where the vertebrae collapsed. I was in cast … 
and I have an osteochondrites in my knee.
I: osteochondritis?
S: osteochondritis. Very rare … [inaudible] not much written about it <LAUGHS>.
I: what, what is …?
S: practically the bone dries up and then becomes brittle. This is what it is in short. The 
perforated my knee with an arthoscopy, so that the blood can bring oxygen to the 
bone … although … they tell me it’s not much help. I … at times it happened … after 
several years to have very strong pains in my knees so much so I couldn’t put my feet 
down. It happened while I was on holiday <LAUGHS> I didn’t know what to do. 
They explained to me that the only thing was rest, when it felt like it it would go, 
there were no tablets, no cream. Nothing, because they don’t even know much about 
it themselves. Then other problems … ok, my social life … let’s say it isn’t … it also 
depends a lot on one’s personality. Let’s say that since I got married … my true 
personality truly emerged, consequently I was able to fight it better. Before I would 
not fight as much, but, never say never, even because since I got married … I had a 
relapse last time a year before getting married, consequently since I got married I 
haven’t had other relapses, so I’m not in a bad way. I speak positively of my lived 
experience of bein ill, when I have a relapse, don’t talk to me about my illness, 
because it’s a thing that doesn’t belong to me. I really tend to disassociate from it. 
I: when you are experiencing a relapse?
S: yes, yes, right … it’s only been since I started coming to the group that I’ve been able 
to talk about my illness, before you’d see me, you wouldn’t notice I was ill because 
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you can’t tell, and I would never had told you. Not out of a desire to hide, more 
because of a feeling of inferiority. 
I: with others?
S: yes, right. I don’t know whether that’s right or wrong, it’s the way I am, very 
emotive, like this … this is the truth. But let’s say that little by little I’m trying to 
overcome it. to … to become more self-confident.
I: however, you were telling me that when you’re experiencing a relapse … 
S: yes <LAUGHS> we’ll talk about it when I’m unwell again, because that’s the way 
I’ve always reacted, I can’t, I mean … I’m unwell, leave me alone, when I’m well 
again we can talk about it. 
I: now, I don’t know, might be difficult to say, but do you think this is a kind of 
strategy to … to remove oneself {it’s a refusal} to overcome …
S: it’s a rejection. It truly is a rejection of the illness because when you’re suffering, 
you’re undergoing heavy treatments, as well as … as well as being physically unwell 
you really, so you have, you don’t feel like doing anything anymore because you’re 
so absorbed by your pains, or by other problems that the illness gives you, that you 
don’t feel like … you don’t feel like thinking of anything else. But anyway … it 
really is a self-defence mechanism, erm, … also because … the drugs they give you 
are, very strong and they cause you mood swings, changes in physiognomy, and 
that’s’ something really heavy, it really does, a lot. Then I truly feel very different.
I: from what you normally are?
S: yes, I’m not myself anymore. I truly change, my personality changes, yes.
I: and, what would you say … how would you say your relationship with your own 
body has changed?
S: … tricky question!
I: <LAUGHS>.
S: erm … my body. My body has been devastated consequently I don’t have a good 
relationship with my body because, I tell you again, and you can ask around, ask 
doctors. The doses of cortisone that I took, unfortunately on my very young body, it 
really devastated it. luckily not many of us have been so devastated, but … it 
happened, amen, what can we do? I don’t look at myself much <LAUGHS>.
I: you don’t look at yourself much?
S: yes <LAUGHS> [inaudible].
I: <LAUGHS> it’s interesting the relationship that illness {yes} … the posture we 
assume vis-à-vis … our body, isn’t it?
S: that’s right, even though … I have my husband who loves me and all that, well 
[inaudible] but … if I dig deep inside me … it’s all very difficult.
I: and do you find … well … now I am talking to you but … do you find it difficult to 
talk about your illness? Earlier you said you find it difficult especially during a 
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relapse … more than when you’re not in pain. But, what I mean, is it difficult to 
describe what happens to you? Is it difficult?
S: to me it’s difficult, yes very, also because I can’t always find appropriate terms 
because, ok, it’s physical pain, but it can be different types of pain. There’s tension 
pain. Or I’m unwell every month to be honest, before the menstrual cycle I feel very 
unwell. I have an acute phase of pain that takes my arms and shoulders until I get the 
cycle, then I’m perfectly well, who knows why. Not even doctors know but this is 
also a problem I experience, so when I have these strong pains I say “oh god, what’s 
happening?” but then I think about it, look at the calendar then … ok “let’s wait until 
such and such day” and then, when I see I’m better, then I don’t worry any more, 
otherwise I’d start to worry, yes. 
I: and obviously, given you became ill so early you can’t really tell if they’re pains that 
… normally connected to …
S: erm, I don’t think so because … I don’t think so because … I mean it’s not only 
about … the renal area or the back, they’re really pains connected to the tension, as 
if, as if I … I don’t know … if I tensed all up and had, had these pains, you see … 
muscular pains, mainly. 
I: so, when you experience a pain not related to the illness, like a fall, or a burning … 
erm {if you knew how often <LAUGHS> anything, how … how do you experience 
it, I mean has the way in which you experience changed?
S: well, now you can’t see it anymore, I had a burning here on my hand, I had a blister 
but “who cares” what does one more scar matter? <LAUGHS> honestly, it’s not a 
big problem. The only thing that would bother me is if the face … if I developed 
something on my face <LAUGHS> “have mercy, at least spare my face”, yes, the 
rest, I don’t really care. 
I: but, is there, a type of pain not related to the illness …
S: well, to give you an example, the other day my balcony was wet and whilst turning I 
hit the corner of one of the windows. I’m still hurting <LAUGHS> because I really 
hit it hard, but … it’s different, erm, it’s not the same pain, it’s very different, you 
can recognise it.
I: but do you think {it’s a bruise} have experience illness related pain, do you see other 
types of pain differently?
S: well, perhaps I don’t care as much, I care less. Even if lately, when I’m in pain 
because of the illness, I try to pick myself up, because I always tell myself “heck 
Sandra, you must carry on, you must make it, do it today because you don’t know 
what tomorrow will be like”. Yes, lately I tend to tell myself these kind of things. 
I: to conclude, if I asked you another question, probably a difficult one {ok let’s try} in 
general … what is pain?
S: what is pain? Physical pain? Or psychological pain? {well, the first you think of} the 
most …? The one which is foremost in my mind is … erm … psychological pain, the 
one that’s heavy to bear. That’s the heaviest for me. To be able to face … with more 
serenity … maybe I’d also be able to better face physical pain. Although I can assure 
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you that until and unless I’m completely blocked I carry on, I keep on working, I do 
the dusting [inaudible] when I can’t take it any more it’s because I’ve reached the 
limit, the end of the line. That’s how it’s been so far.
I: what do you do?
S: I … I’m a secretary in a firm … I work in the shipping office but for a year now, I 
was in the archive before, physically archiving, and maybe that’s why the hands were 
affected the last time I had a relapse … because in the past seven years I’ve used my 
hands a lot and I have … lifted weights, doing this kind of work, yes.
I: are you still working full-time at present?
S: no, no, no … initially … I’ve been working for ten years, initially I asked to go part-
time, six hours, because having never worked before, I couldn’t tell if I’d have been 
able to work eight hours. When I got married my mum was the one who had to do the 
housework for me, I couldn’t work at home too, because when I got home at four I 
was so tired I couldn’t do anything. Not because I didn’t want to <LAUGHS> I was 
tired. So I requested to work less and now I work part-time, four hours per day, so 
that in the afternoon I can do things at home. So now … I can more or less manage 
on my own. I’m not saying I don’t get any help, there are things for which I need to 
be helped {but you manage} yes, I can do my things, without help.
I: well, thank you very much. Is there anything you’d like to add?
S: not sure …
I: ok.
S: is this enough?
S: yes, really good. Many thanks. 
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6.b Veronica
Interviewer: nothing, could you please tell me a bit about your experience, when …
Veronica: when it began?
I: yes when it began, how it did …
V: well, I was 17, I did athletics professionally, and … distance running, 800 metres, I 
started having these pains, and to cut a long story short, instead of ending up on the 
track I ended up at the <LAUGHS> hospital].
I: <LAUGHS> another race.
V: another race, which lasted an entire life. 
I: and these pains you felt initially, where did you feel them?
V: in my hands and mostly in my feet, and in fact my coach would say to me I was 
putting on an act, in order not to make an effort, because he wanted me to … in those 
days women didn’t do distance running, so on top of the normal training, he would 
make me train for distance running, and it was there, in my foot joint, in a different 
way, that I began experiencing, these pains, and I’ve had them ever since. 
I: in your feet, initially?
V: in my feet, and hands but the hands weren’t … in my feet, it wasn’t continuous they 
were pains that would be felt after training, but, I’ve had these pains for 17, 25 years 
– well – almost … almost eight years, without … nobody recognising my illness, 
because my illness was seronegative, so the blood tests you couldn’t, you couldn’t 
detect anything. I had good muscular tone, strong because I was doing athletics, no 
hardening, no outward sign, so that one doctor even told me it was psychosomatic 
and that I had to go elsewhere to be treated. Then however, I began getting 
tumefactions and … in the meantime my GP wanted me to come here, to see 
Professor B., who’s no longer here, he was the consultant in rheumatology and he 
diagnosed RA. He draw me a graph where he explained that my life would always be 
accompanied by this illness, that I would have highs and lows, moments of … mhm 
… relapse and moments of remission, but that each time the relapse would be more 
acute and that during the remission I would have felt less well that the previous time.
I: pardon me, how old did you say you were when the problem began?
V: well, forty years ago … forty-one, this year I turn fifty-eight in August, and I was … 
let’s say … I was seventeen.
I: and after how many years did you get a diagnosis?
V: I was twenty-five, after about eight … seven eight, seven and years and a half eight 
years.
I: that’s when you knew for sure you had RA. Listen, these pains you felt at initially, 
first in your feet, then you said … in your hands, what, what … if you had to describe 
them, what kind of pains were they?
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V: it’s been such along time … well … it was a pain … let me think, in my hand I 
remember one afternoon it was an acute pain, fixed, erm, that … as it appeared it 
went, but it lasted the whole afternoon, oh yes, come to think of it I also got it in my 
groin, even that one, they were all acute pains but fixed, they were not alternating in 
intensity, more and less intense, they were fixed whilst those in my feet came on 
when I walked, it wasn’t really pain, erm, you see … for example I got a pain in my 
hand that I felt even with my hand at rest, the one in my feet I would always feel it 
after training and they were, almost, pains, a burning a … erm I remember once my 
coach we were doing the relay race, he had the baton in his hand, to pull my leg, I 
don’t think he meant any harm, he took the baton and … he hit the sole of one of my 
feet where it hurt, it was a terrible pain, acute very intense, then he stopped teasing 
me because I must have, probably, must have been transfigured by pain, because, it 
was such a strong pain, but … never mind.
I: but there were still no signs, I mean visible ones, there weren’t …
V: no. and by the way I hade very good hands, so much so that many would tell me 
“you’ve got the hands of a pianist”.
I: <LAUGHS> I was going to say it myself, yes.
V: indeed, so …, erm … they would tell me “move your hands” … and I would move 
them, I would do everything they asked, they would say “no, there’s no RA here” and 
I told you, the legs, they were a nice pair of legs with good muscular tone because, 
doing distance running, I would run every day, kilometres upon kilometres, so … 
mhm … it could be thought of, something … <LAUGHS> psychosomatic, but 
instead it was …
I: and then, how did the situation change?
V: well … {after diagnosis … as time went by …?} well, with time, I’ve always had a 
slow progressing but aggressive form of RA, meaning that, I … I can’t recall, but I 
could have experience them but … I erase, I mean if I’m in pain now, in fifteen 
minutes if I’m not in pain any more I forget … the pain, it’s a defence mechanism , 
erm, I think, I think I never had pains like some say that, that you can’t bear them. I 
have pains, for example at present my hands are hurting … but, I have … they’re 
bearable pains, rarely have I had pains that were so strong  that … that I couldn’t 
even communicate with others and to need to isolate myself, because when I’ve had 
them, normally I shut off, I need to wrap up in myself, and … and get my strength 
back, and then it passes and … at times I even fall asleep on the pain, because … it 
helps me concentrate, yes if it isn’t a particularly intense pain, but if it is a pain 
typical of my illness, which is there, still … I focus on the place that’s hurting, the 
limb, and … afterwards if I’m by myself, calm, I can even fall asleep on my pain. 
I: and this thing … is it a technique you’ve developed independently {yes} something 
that …
V: no, no, no no, I did it all by myself {I see} little by little I did … I don’t know if, I 
wouldn’t even say I made myself do it, it came naturally to behave like this. 
I: so, this, this isolating yourself it to, to better face …
V: to isolate the pain and to overcome faster the crisis, because, even with all the 
operations I’ve had, this is my 18th, I realised that if I stay calm, don’t communicate 
with others and concentrate, the pain is les … less intense. If instead I have to speak 
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because … maybe because I need something, then the pain becomes stronger, takes 
time to control it again, but there are moments when the pain is definitely stronger. 
I: I hope <LAUGHS> you’re not feeling pain now …
V: no, no, these pains are easy to tolerate, it’s my hand … when it goes up it hurts a bit 
but, no no, don’t worry, no <LAUGHS> I would say so.
I: so, why are you in hospital at the moment?
V: because I’ve had an operation, I have a knee replacement, the second leg because I 
have had one for the other one two years ago, and then …
I: and … the replacement, is it to help the knee function again?
V: that’s right, because I had a knock knee, quite a lot, and … {meaning … protruding?} 
yes, yes, practically, my hip was moving inwards … and from the knee to the foot … 
well it pointed outwards and it was … I had problems moving, I found it difficult to 
walk.
I: and did it hurt?
V: well it did. Until it got completely deformed and then it became a mechanical pain, in 
the sense that if I didn’t move, making no effort, I didn’t feel it and, and I can say I 
could live normally at home. But it was enough to go out for a little walk and I could 
be sure the next day it would hurt. But it’s a mechanical pain, not due to the illness. I 
mean it’s the parts that now are worn out, because of rubbing against each other 
that’s inflamed them … and the next day …
I: and what … what type of pain would this give you … I mean, was it a burning or 
what?
V: well, ok, if it swells up, then … it’s a sensation of heat, a burning, a pain … and hot, 
it burns. If instead, but rarely because usually my knee problems have been caused by 
the liquid that formed, the synovial joint that would come out, and so all this liquid 
formed, if not it was only a pain … when moving. So if I remained sitting, still, I had 
no pain but the moment I moved my leg I had, I had the pain caused by the rubbing, 
but not … never unbearable pains, rarely have I had them. 
I: and so, what was the progression of the illness after the diagnosis?
V: well, I have, ok … I must go back in time, forty years <LAUGHS> no, [name of 
daughter and name of son] I had already had them, luckily because then they told me 
it was better not to have children, and the diagnosis… ok, I have had, for example, 
erm … when my wrists became blocked, I have had fixed, continuous pains and in 
the end ... the wrists ... and all the bones, in the metacarpus became … they became 
almost consolidated so you see, what I can move is this [shows hand movement]. 
Pain is constant. In the sense that more or less intense I’ve always had it, I’ve told 
you it’s progressive but slow … so that, erm … it’s never been that kind of pain that 
didn’t allow me to live, to … go to school, but still I had it, with me. It’s always been 
a companion of mine, yes <LAUGHS> of forty years. Last year I turned fifty-seven, 
RA turned forty. I told it “com on, do me a favour, make me younger. You keep the 
fifty-seven … <LAUGHS>. But it kept its forty years.
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I: and now, at this moment are you … are you in pain while we’re talking? 
V: yes, but I, it’s a burning, not a pain, I have it in my knee where they operated. I have 
it going up, by the place where the knee bends I have it. but there’s something, if it 
happens that I have a pain in one foot, or a hand, a shoulder, I have had strong … 
well, constant more than strong, in the cervical vertebrae, so much so that I had a 
dislocation of the [inaudible] so thy had to operate, and … I accumulate pains, so … 
the one I feel the most is the strongest. The others, I don’t even realise I have them. I 
realise … you see now I’ve made this movement [shows movement] my elbow hurts. 
It hurt, it’s a mechanical pain because you see the elbow too is deformed. And I felt it 
[the pain] … otherwise I wouldn’t have realised I had a pain in, I mean when using a 
joint, if the joint is painful, if I don’t feel it it’s because there’s something else more 
painful, and so when I move I realise that there’s a pain in the joint … it hurts. It’s 
pains accumulating. 
I: and … given you’ve lived so long with , erm, with these types of pains … when it 
happens, I don’t know, a pain which is not connected to your illness, for example if 
you bump into something, a corner … a burning with an iron, anything, do you … do 
you experience them differently?
V: no, it’s still pain. It’s still a pain so I immediately resort to the defence mechanism. 
I which is the isolation you were telling me before?
V: isolation or concentration and … with isolation, I’ve done it rarely when I was really 
suffering, but I can concentrate and, to … I’m not saying to isolate because the pain I 
have it and I feel it, but, if for example, when I’m sitting here, and my knee hurts, if 
only I can turn the TV on and watch something, I can take my mind off pain. The 
pain is still there, I feel it, but it’s no longer unbearable as it was a moment before. I 
need to do something to forget it. Anyway the defence mechanism against pain is … 
wherever it may be coming from … it’s always the same, I think that by now it’s 
become automatic … this mechanism, this defence, I think.
I: well, thank you very much Signora, I’m really grateful. 
V: not at all.
I: is there anything you’d like to say, anything you’d like to add?
V: no, because, well there’s something important and that is … but I’ve told you, it’s the 
memory thing, in the sense that, that too is probably a defence mechanism, and … 
but something that doesn’t help me when I talk to doctors because … “how are you 
feeling?”, if at that moment I … [interruption] if at that moment I don’t have, any 
pains, but maybe I have felt so unwell as to call the doctor and say “I need to be 
seen” … <LAUGHS> at that moment I feel like answering that I’m well because, I 
have erased all that has {that’s passed} yes, right and that I then put to one side.
I: thank you very much.
V: not at all. 
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7.b Fabio
Interviewer: what type of problem did you experience?
Fabio: well, my problem is a discal protrusion. Erm … that could be compared to … like a 
herniated disc, more or less.
I: this, when did this happen [inaudible]?
F: this happened, well the operation was done in December 2002. Early December 
2002.
I: ok.
F: and this problem started to be felt about a year earlier, it began to be felt.
I: and how did it manifest itself?
F: well, I must say that this type of problem, mhm … before the operation, I had 
experienced years before. About seven eight years before, that miraculously it had 
gone as it had come on. It lasted a few months, well no, I would say … maybe a year, 
and I lived with it not very well. But, since that was a particular time in my life so I 
didn’t … I put up, so to speak, with the pain. And then, miraculously it disappeared. 
Miraculously and luckily. Years later, probably because of a change in my job, of 
ward44 type, so with much heavier work, the pain came back. As it had disappeared it 
reappeared. Initially, as a bother, so a nuisance, something, ehm, like the dripping of 
the tap. 
I: mhm mhm
F: something like that, that you’d perceived, continuously, fastidiously, but that 
wouldn’t … when I say fastidious I mean it wouldn’t let me … to make movements 
that had been hitherto normal. But let’s say it caused me some disadvantages. And 
then, little by little, as well as this sensation pain began to appear. 
I: what type of pain?
F: of the type … initially like cramps, not too intense. Then, erm, the intensity 
increased. These very strong cramps, like a muscle being violently pulled. As if 
somebody were pulling you and so you’d feel, not really pangs, because there was no 
apex in the pain, but something like … like a burning, like needles, stinging from 
inside.
I: and what makes you describe them first like an ache, something bothersome, then 
pain?
F: well, it’s that at first, I mean, the ache you could more or less erase it by engaging in 
other activities, concentrating on other things you’d put it to one side. But with the 
pain, well, you could put it to one side but then all of a sudden you’d feel it, it was 
                                                            
44 Meaning: “hospital ward”; at the time of the narrated episode as well as the time when he was 
interviewed, Fabio was working as a professional nurse for the Italian National Health Service (SSN).
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there. But also because even with the simplest moves, aside from being blocked, yes 
the pain would reappear. I mean, you’d keep it under control, but if you made a 
movement just like of the ordinary, like getting up from a chair quickly, or bending 
over or helping a patient with physiotherapy, or to somebody we had in the ward, it 
would force you to make these unusual movements and so the pain would reappear. 
It’s not that it would come on in an acute way, but still, it would reappear, you’d feel 
it more. Because the movements would make you feel it more distinctly [inaudible].
I: so, between the ache and the pain the difference was in the degree with which it 
interfered in your daily activities. Was it this that, is it this [inaudible] the 
determinant fact that made the former an ache and the latter pain?
F: erm, yes when … let’s say it was more a psychological thing. In the sense that an 
ache is easier to put to one side. You feel it but, let’s say, you can manage it. whilst a 
pain, erm, but let me repeat, I consider myself to have a very high pain threshold. So, 
erm, for me it’s more effective, so to speak, to focus and things other than pain rather 
than taking painkillers. In fact I did take painkillers, very many, and the never helped. 
I mean, I was never helped by the painkillers. I followed a therapy for quite some 
time, prescribed by the doctor, with painkillers, erm, cortisone, and other stuff, but it 
never … it never helped. Nothing at all. In the sense that the pain was there and 
wouldn’t move, that’s it. 
I: but if you had, if you’d had to describe … the type of sensation you felt during that 
phase that you were calling an ache, was it the same or similar to that caused by pain, 
only less intense, or was it different? You [inaudible] spoke, of muscles being pulled, 
burning …
F: well, when I say “ache”, think, an ache is something that hinders you, that stops you, 
erm, keeps you from doing certain things. And this ache, erm, I don’t know … it 
could be compared to a common ailment, like a low-intensity headache. Something 
which is there, which bothers you, but that you can manage.
I: but so it was still …
F: whereas when an ache becomes a pain {yes} and what I mean by pain is this 
intensity, these cramps, these intense burnings in the muscles.
I: but what I mean is, in the ache phase, would you still get these cramps and burnings, 
only at a lower intensity? Or was it an entirely different thing?
F: no, they were there but less intense.
I: I see. So it was [inaudible].
F: yes an ache is, erm, initially it was an ache, it didn’t give you pain. I mean, it was 
something you’d feel that began to set inside your body. Then pain added itself to 
this ache.
I: mhm mhm.
F: and then it became, erm, pain. Pain which of course still maintained ache-like 
qualities, because the ache, the nuisance caused by the ache is in the end more 
psychological than physical. 
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I: mhm mhm.
F: it would cause, at least to me, a mental stress.
I: mhm mhm.
F: I mean, it, it’d give me, it would cause me more problems the stress than … than pain 
itself.
I: mhm mhm.
F: also because the pain wasn’t something that would go up and down [in intensity]. It 
was constant, I mean a constant pain.
I: mhm mhm.
F: a constant pain of the same intensity.
I: which was always there.
F: which was always there. So, the fact of saying “I’ll go to bed and rest” wasn’t 
enough. I mean it was there, erm, when I fell asleep, this pain was there. Then I’d 
wake up and it would return. And so the nights, they would become, well bad, erm, I 
repeat, it was an unnerving thing, stressful, more than the pain itself.
I: it was … that was the effect that pain had on your life, on your activities in general?
F: yes, on my activities. Yes, because being a person, I’m obviously talking about 
myself, being an active person this was an obstacle.
I: mhm mhm.
F: and therefore it had a very negative psychological effect.
I: mhm mhm.
F: therefore debilitating. So if I have to quantify … the physical and psychological 
effects, let’s say that to me physical pain was much more manageable, whereas the 
stress caused me many more problems. 
I: mhm mhm.
F: I mean, the stress was more unbearable that the pain. And even if I realised that my 
pain threshold was high, physical pain was easier to bear than the stress this would 
cause me. It would give me more problems.
I: mhm mhm. And how did this change after the operation?
F: after the operation … let’s say that the operation had become a hope. A hope to start 
living fully again, to engage in my activities. But it wasn’t so. Precisely because I’m 
very active, the days of convalescence following the operation, and by the way – it 
wasn’t an invasive procedure that messed you up and left you scars, it was done with 
a laparoscopy – I didn’t follow my doctor’s instructions as I should have and I began 
my activities again, before it was time and so … the result was negative, only half a 
success. In the sense that, whilst before it was constant, now occasionally the pain 
reappears, suddenly. So it doesn’t appear gradually, so you feel it’s coming on. It just 
appear, and that’s it. 
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I: in terms of intensity, is it the same as it was before the operation, or is it different?
F: erm, not, it’s …
I: I mean, if you had to describe this type of pain to somebody who’s never heard you 
talking about it before, how would you describe it?
F: well, let’s say that in terms of intensity it’s lower, if we’re talking about the intensity.
I: and in terms of quality?
F: from, well … from ten, if before the pain, if before the operation it was … let’s say 
nine.
I: mhm mhm.
F: now the pain is four, the fastidiousness is nine. In the sense that for fastidiousness I 
mean … as an example, like somebody who keeps pinching you, erm, always in the 
same place. Do you understand? On your chest, for example. These little pinches that 
are not painful, but they are fastidious. I mean … somebody keep pinching you pinch 
pinch pinch, until you end up thinking of it as really troublesome, like …
I: but something that still manages to interfere with your daily activities …?
F: yes, sure, yes. Yes because, I repeat, being a person who does a myriad of things, 
erm, I mean, this would hinder me. Meaning that, quite apart from my job, which I 
try do at the best of my abilities, other things …
I: and does it still hinder you?
F: and it still hinders me. In the winter, for example, I practice sport, I sky, and this … 
anyway whether I sky or not the pain is still there, so I’d rather sky.
I: mhm mhm.
F: in this sense. But obviously yes, you’re skiing but you’re not really enjoying going 
down fast, without a care in the world, happily. I also have an activity that lasts the 
whole year, of fitness in the gym … and so this causes me … actually I have to say I 
feel some relief in the absence of gravity, so swimming. 
I: mhm mhm.
F: when I swim I don’t feel anything. But I don’t really enjoy swimming, I find it 
boring. So yes, I do swim, for a while, but then …
I: well, earlier I asked you to think of an image, to create an image to represent this 
pain, the pain you’ve experienced with an image. Can you repeat it to me?
F: well, the image is a workman in the street, one of those roadside worksites, where a 
workman is using a pneumatic drill, yes and I …
I: and are you the street?
F: erm, no, not really …
I: are you the person nearby who hears this loud noise?
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F: yes, more than the street I am … the one who hears this deafening noise, unremitting, 
which, erm, which causes you all those problems and consequences …
I: mhm mhm. 
F: so, something that you quantify, that you assign a maximum value to. Because this 
drill, this noise, erm, always there, which goes on and on … I mean I see it, I see it, 
that’s how I’ve seen the pain, in that sense, more than something utterly catastrophic. 
I: mhm mhm.
F: something like this. 
I: so pain … as image of noise, in a sense [inaudible]?
F: like noise, like movement, I mean seeing this workman that’s holding this drill, and 
everything shakes, so …
I: and it distracts you, it keeps you from …
F: exactly.
I: it enters into your life.
F: exactly, it stops you from continuing it, and you apply strength to control this 
pneumatic drill, and you need increasing strength to bear it, to hold it in place, more 
strength than if you just let it go.
I: mhm mhm.
F it’s like “ok, let’s see who’s stronger”.
I: mhm mhm.
F: and so, this is what wore me out, wore out my daily life, which had now become a 
war. In the sense that I refused this thing, I kept refusing it because … well maybe a 
factor is that you realise you’re getting older and don’t accept it, don’t accept certain 
things, although pain can happen also to a twenty-year old man, in case of an 
accident, or if he breaks a leg. 
I: and now what is it, a radio playing too loud?
F now … no, let’s say when this thing is there, when the pain returns, with the stress, 
because it was the stress …
I: mhm mhm.
F: so, erm, there’s a psychological factor coming in, I mean the fear of, of living the 
same experience as before.
I: mhm mhm.
F: so to be unable to move, to feel blocked, even for a stupid thing like getting into a 
car.
I: so more than, more than what what’s actually happening to you, it’s what’s possible, 
the possibility of reliving the experience?
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F: right. That’s right. More than the pain that comes back. Because for example, 
sometimes I’m walking in the street, going on a walk … easily, and suddenly your 
leg gets stuck because you have this pang that comes on …
I: mhm mhm.
F: suddenly.
I: mhm mhm.
F: and so, as well as the pain you think “heck, why now” I mean …
I: mhm mhm.
F: it’s something that wears you out, psychologically, more about that than about pain.
I: mhm mhm.
F: because if it was just the pain and nothing else, one could say “ok” …
I: mhm mhm. 
F: if you have … if you have a toothache you take a painkiller and it goes, yes, or if you 
know you have to have an operation, say [inaudible], I mean you know it’s going to 
have an end.
I: mhm mhm.
F: with a toothache, but not in this case. Because discal protrusions, anything to do with 
the spine, it stays.
I: mhm mhm.
F: this is it, I mean.
I: thank you. 
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